Fuhito Kojima

All Publications

• Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kamada, Y., Kojima, F. 2015; 105 (1): 67-99

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20101552

  View details for Web of Science ID 000347464300003

• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences DISCRETE APPLIED MATHEMATICS Hatfield, J. W., Kojima, F., Narita, Y. 2014; 179: 235-240

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003

  View details for Web of Science ID 000347131300022

• Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Kamada, Y., Kojima, F. 2014; 6 (4): 203-236

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.6.4.203

  View details for Web of Science ID 000344920600008

• Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Hatfield, J. W., Kojima, F., Kominers, S. D. 2014; 104 (5): 436-441

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.5.436

  View details for Web of Science ID 000338925400074

• The "Boston" school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ECONOMIC THEORY Kojima, F., Uenver, M. U. 2014; 55 (3): 515-544

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8

  View details for Web of Science ID 000333158100001

• Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis (Extended Abstract) 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) Kojima, F., Tamura, A., Yokoo, M. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2014: 291–291

  View details for Web of Science ID 000347388000025

• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kojima, F. 2013; 82: 1-14

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.005

  View details for Web of Science ID 000338813500001

• Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. 2013; 128 (4): 1585-1632

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt019

  View details for Web of Science ID 000325776900004

• The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kamada, Y., Kojima, F. 2013; 80: 179-185

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001

  View details for Web of Science ID 000320071200011

• Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Budish, E., Che, Y., Kojima, F., Milgrom, P. 2013; 103 (2): 585-623

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.103.2.585

  View details for Web of Science ID 000317108100002

• Matching Theory: Contributions and Influences of Roth and Shapley Keizai Seminar Kamada,, Y., Kojima, F. 2013
• School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kojima, F. 2012; 75 (2): 685-693

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003

  View details for Web of Science ID 000305038100017

• Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kamada, Y., Kojima, F. 2012; 102 (3): 366-370

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.3.366

  View details for Web of Science ID 000304262000063

• The "rural hospital theorem" revisited INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Kojima, F. 2012; 8 (1): 67-76

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00174.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000300682200006

• Robust stability in matching markets THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Kojima, F. 2011; 6 (2): 257-267

  View details for DOI 10.3982/TE780

  View details for Web of Science ID 000296007600004

• MATCHING AND MARKET DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED TOPICS JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW Kojima, F., Troyan, P. 2011; 62 (1): 82-98

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2010.00525.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000287700800005

• Matching Theory and Its Application: "Regional Imbalance of Doctors" and Its Solution Iryo Keizai Kenkyu Kamada, Y., Wako, J., Kenkyu, I. K. 2011; 23: 5-19
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Hatfield, J. W., Kojima, F. 2010; 145 (5): 1704-1723

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000282147500005

• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms ECONOMETRICA Che, Y., Kojima, F. 2010; 78 (5): 1625-1672

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA8354

  View details for Web of Science ID 000282882700005

• A theory of hung juries and informative voting GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kojima, F., Takagi, Y. 2010; 69 (2): 498-502

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.003

  View details for Web of Science ID 000279306900021

• Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms ECONOMICS LETTERS Kojima, F. 2010; 107 (1): 69-70

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.029

  View details for Web of Science ID 000276139900021

• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance ECONOMETRICA Kojima, F., Manea, M. 2010; 78 (2): 633-653

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7443

  View details for Web of Science ID 000276508500006

• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Kojima, F., Manea, M. 2010; 145 (1): 106-123

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000274931000005

• The Frontier of the School Choice Problem Designing School Choice Systems Yasuda, Y., Kojima, F. edited by Yasuda, Y. NTT Press; Tokyo. 2010
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Hatfield, J. W., Kojima, F. 2009; 67 (2): 745-749

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000271143900029

• Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A. 2009; 99 (3): 608-627

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.3.608

  View details for Web of Science ID 000267626000003

• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES Kojima, F. 2009; 57 (1): 134-142

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.003

  View details for Web of Science ID 000262736200011

• Matching Market Design Keizai Seminar Yasuda, Y., Kojima, F. 2009
• p-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Kojima, F., Takahashi, S. 2008; 67 (3-4): 689-701

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.07.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000259665400011

• Matching with contracts: Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Hatfield, J. W., Kojima, F. 2008; 98 (3): 1189-1194

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.98.3.1189

  View details for Web of Science ID 000257441500028

• Bureaucrats or politicians? Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kojima, F. 2008; 98 (1): 561-562

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.98.1.561

  View details for Web of Science ID 000254676000023

• /Matching and price competition: Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kojima, F. 2007; 97 (3): 1027-1031

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600026

• The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market Economics Letters Kojima, F. 2007; 99: 581-584
• When can Manipulations be A voided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Kojima, F. 2007
• Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability International Game Theory Review Takahashi, S., Kojima, F. 2007; 9: 667-688
• Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures Social Choice and Welfare Kojima, F. 2007; 31: 357-365
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Kojima, F. 2006; 27 (1): 25-28

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6

  View details for Web of Science ID 000240438900002

• Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Kojima, F. 2006; 128 (1): 255-273

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006

  View details for Web of Science ID 000238044700010

• Stability and Instability of the Unbeatable Strategy in Dynamic Processes International Journal of Economic Theory Kojima, F. 2006; 2: 41-54
• Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration International Journal of Game Theory Ünver, M. U., Kojima, F. 2006; 36: 473-488