Administrative Appointments
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Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2013 - Present)
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Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2009 - 2013)
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Postdoctoral Associate, Cowles Foundation, Yale University (2008 - 2009)
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Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Columbia University (2011 - 2012)
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Fellow, Virtual Center for Advanced Studies in Institution (VCASI) (2008 - Present)
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Sloan Research Fellow, Sloan Research (2013 - 2015)
Honors & Awards
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Inaugural Ken-ichi Miyazawa Memorial Award, Ken-ichi Miyazawa (2010)
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American Economic Review Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2007-2008)
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American Economic Review Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2010-2011)
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International Journal of Economic Theory Lionel W. McKenzie Prize, International Journal of Economic Theory (2007)
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International Journal of Economic Theory, Lionel W. McKenzie Prize, International Journal of Economic Theory (2006)
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Presidential Scholarship, Harvard University (2003)
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Ouchi Hyoe Award, University of Tokyo (2003)
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Presidential Award, University of Tokyo (2003)
Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations
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Co-Editor, Economic Theory (2013 - Present)
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Co-Editor, Economic Theory Bulletin (2013 - Present)
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Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (2013 - Present)
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Associate Editor, Economic Theory (2009 - 2013)
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Associate Editor, International Journal of Game Theory (2011 - Present)
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Associate Editor, Review of Economic Design (2011 - Present)
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Referee, Algorithms
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Referee, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
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Referee, American Economic Review
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Referee, American Political Science Review
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Referee, Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
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Referee, Econometrica
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Referee, Economics Letters
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Referee, Economic Theory
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Referee, Games and Economic Behavior
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Referee, International Journal of Economic Theory
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Referee, International Journal of Game Theory
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Referee, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
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Referee, Journal of Economic Theory
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Referee, Journal of Experimental Algorithmics
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Referee, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
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Referee, Journal of Labor Economics
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Referee, Journal of Mathematical Economics
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Referee, Journal of Public Economics
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Referee, Mathematics of Operations Research
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Referee, National Science Foundation (NSF)
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Referee, Operations Research
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Referee, Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Referee, Research Grants Council
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Referee, Review of Economic Design
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Referee, Review of Economic Studies
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Referee, Social Choice and Welfare
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Referee, Swiss National Science Foundation
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Referee, Theoretical Economics
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Referee, Theory and Decision
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Referee, United States-Israel Science Foundation
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Referee, Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)
Professional Education
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B.A., University of Tokyo, Economics (2003)
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Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (2008)
2019-20 Courses
- Advanced Topics in Game Theory and Information Economics
ECON 289 (Win) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics III
ECON 204 (Spr) -
Independent Studies (4)
- Directed Reading
ECON 139D (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Directed Reading
ECON 239D (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Honors Thesis Research
ECON 199D (Aut, Win, Spr) - Practical Training
ECON 299 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum)
- Directed Reading
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Prior Year Courses
2018-19 Courses
- Advanced Topics in Game Theory and Information Economics
ECON 289 (Win) - Honors Market Design
ECON 182 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics III
ECON 204 (Spr)
2017-18 Courses
- Advanced Topics in Game Theory and Information Economics
ECON 289 (Win) - Honors Market Design
ECON 182 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics III
ECON 204 (Spr)
2016-17 Courses
- Advanced Topics in Game Theory and Information Economics
ECON 289 (Win) - Honors Market Design
ECON 182 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Advanced Topics in Game Theory and Information Economics
Stanford Advisees
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Doctoral Dissertation Reader (AC)
Qingyun Wu -
Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)
Guido Martirena
All Publications
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Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2015; 105 (1): 67-99
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20101552
View details for Web of Science ID 000347464300003
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Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
DISCRETE APPLIED MATHEMATICS
2014; 179: 235-240
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.dam.2014.07.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000347131300022
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Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2014; 6 (4): 203-236
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.6.4.203
View details for Web of Science ID 000344920600008
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Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2014; 104 (5): 436-441
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.5.436
View details for Web of Science ID 000338925400074
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The "Boston" school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
ECONOMIC THEORY
2014; 55 (3): 515-544
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8
View details for Web of Science ID 000333158100001
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Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis (Extended Abstract)
7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)
SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2014: 291–291
View details for Web of Science ID 000347388000025
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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2013; 128 (4): 1585-1632
View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt019
View details for Web of Science ID 000325776900004
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Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2013; 82: 1-14
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.005
View details for Web of Science ID 000338813500001
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The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2013; 80: 179-185
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001
View details for Web of Science ID 000320071200011
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Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2013; 103 (2): 585-623
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.103.2.585
View details for Web of Science ID 000317108100002
- Matching Theory: Contributions and Influences of Roth and Shapley Keizai Seminar 2013
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School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2012; 75 (2): 685-693
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000305038100017
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Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2012; 102 (3): 366-370
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.3.366
View details for Web of Science ID 000304262000063
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The "rural hospital theorem" revisited
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2012; 8 (1): 67-76
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00174.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000300682200006
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Robust stability in matching markets
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
2011; 6 (2): 257-267
View details for DOI 10.3982/TE780
View details for Web of Science ID 000296007600004
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MATCHING AND MARKET DESIGN: AN INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED TOPICS
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW
2011; 62 (1): 82-98
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2010.00525.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000287700800005
- Matching Theory and Its Application: "Regional Imbalance of Doctors" and Its Solution Iryo Keizai Kenkyu 2011; 23: 5-19
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Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2010; 145 (5): 1704-1723
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007
View details for Web of Science ID 000282147500005
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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
ECONOMETRICA
2010; 78 (5): 1625-1672
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA8354
View details for Web of Science ID 000282882700005
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A theory of hung juries and informative voting
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2010; 69 (2): 498-502
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000279306900021
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Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
ECONOMICS LETTERS
2010; 107 (1): 69-70
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.029
View details for Web of Science ID 000276139900021
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Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
ECONOMETRICA
2010; 78 (2): 633-653
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7443
View details for Web of Science ID 000276508500006
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Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2010; 145 (1): 106-123
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000274931000005
- The Frontier of the School Choice Problem Designing School Choice Systems edited by Yasuda, Y. NTT Press; Tokyo. 2010
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Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2009; 67 (2): 745-749
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007
View details for Web of Science ID 000271143900029
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Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2009; 99 (3): 608-627
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.3.608
View details for Web of Science ID 000267626000003
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Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
2009; 57 (1): 134-142
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000262736200011
- Matching Market Design Keizai Seminar 2009
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p-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
2008; 67 (3-4): 689-701
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.07.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000259665400011
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Matching with contracts: Comment
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2008; 98 (3): 1189-1194
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.98.3.1189
View details for Web of Science ID 000257441500028
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Bureaucrats or politicians? Comment
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2008; 98 (1): 561-562
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.98.1.561
View details for Web of Science ID 000254676000023
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/Matching and price competition: Comment
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2007; 97 (3): 1027-1031
View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600026
- The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market Economics Letters 2007; 99: 581-584
- When can Manipulations be A voided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 2007
- Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability International Game Theory Review 2007; 9: 667-688
- Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures Social Choice and Welfare 2007; 31: 357-365
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Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
2006; 27 (1): 25-28
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6
View details for Web of Science ID 000240438900002
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Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2006; 128 (1): 255-273
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006
View details for Web of Science ID 000238044700010
- Stability and Instability of the Unbeatable Strategy in Dynamic Processes International Journal of Economic Theory 2006; 2: 41-54
- Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration International Journal of Game Theory 2006; 36: 473-488