Paul Milgrom
Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, Professor of Economics, Senior Fellow at SIEPR and Professor, by courtesy, of Economics at the GSB and of Management Science and Engineering
Web page: https://milgrom.people.stanford.edu
Bio
Paul Milgrom is the Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University and professor, by courtesy, in the Stanford Graduate School of Business and in the Department of Management Sciences and Engineering. Born in Detroit, Michigan on April 20, 1948, he is a member of both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a winner of the 2008 Nemmers Prize in Economics, the 2012 BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge award, the 2017 CME-MSRI prize for Innovative Quantitative Applications, and the 2018 Carty Award for the Advancement of Science.
Milgrom is known for his work on innovative resource allocation methods, particularly in radio spectrum. He is coinventor of the simultaneous multiple round auction and the combinatorial clock auction. He also led the design team for the FCC's 2017 incentive auction, which reallocated spectrum from television broadcast to mobile broadband.
According to his BBVA Award citation: “Paul Milgrom has made seminal contributions to an unusually wide range of fields of economics including auctions, market design, contracts and incentives, industrial economics, economics of organizations, finance, and game theory.” As counted by Google Scholar, Milgrom’s books and articles have received more than 80,000 citations.
Finally, Milgrom has been a successful adviser of graduate students, winning the 2017 H&S Dean's award for Excellence in Graduate Education.
Academic Appointments
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Professor, Economics
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
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Professor (By courtesy), Economics
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Professor (By courtesy), Management Science and Engineering
Administrative Appointments
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Professor (by courtesy), Management Sciences and Engineering, Stanford University (2018 - Present)
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Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University (1993 - Present)
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Professor of Economics, Stanford University (1987 - Present)
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Professor (by courtesy), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (1987 - Present)
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Senior Fellow, SIEPR, Stanford University (2007 - Present)
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Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford University (1989 - 1991)
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Williams Brothers Professor of Management Studies and Professor of Economics, Yale University (1985 - 1987)
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Professor of Economics and Management, Yale University (1983 - 1985)
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Visiting Professor, Yale University (1982 - 1983)
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Kellogg Graduate School of Management Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University (1979 - 1983)
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Professor, Northwestern University (1982 - 1983)
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Associate Professor, Northwestern University (1981 - 1982)
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Assistant Professor, Northwestern University (1979 - 1981)
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Honorary doctorate, Stockholm School of Economics (2001 - Present)
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Taussig Visiting Research Professor, Harvard University (2000 - 2000)
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Fellow (2nd time), Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1998 - 1998)
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Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Reform (1993 - 1993)
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Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1992 - 1992)
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International Guest Scholar, Kyoto University (1992 - 1992)
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Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1991 - 1991)
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Ford Visiting Professor of Economics, University of California-Berkeley (1986 - 1986)
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Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1985 - Present)
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Fellow, Econometric Society (1984 - 1984)
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Fellow, Morse College (of Yale University) (1984 - 1984)
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Visiting Research Associate, Stanford University (1981 - 1981)
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Fellow, Society of Actuaries (1974 - 1974)
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Williams Brothers Chair in Management Studies, Yale University (1986 - 1986)
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Fellowship to study "Economic Theories of Organization", John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship (1986 - 1986)
Honors & Awards
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Hononary Doctorate, Charles University (2024)
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Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel, Nobel Foundation (2020)
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John J Carty Award for the Advancement of Science, National Academy of Sciences (2018)
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CME-MSRI Prize for Innovative Quantitative Methods in Economics & Finance, Chicago Mercantile Exchange & Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (2017)
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Dean's Award for Excellence in Graduate Education, Stanford College of Humanities & Sciences (2017)
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Foundations of Knowledge Award, BBVA Foundation (2012)
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Phase IB Award for "Incorporating Bidder Budget Constraints in Multi-item Auctions'', National Science Foundation - Small Business Innovation Research (2010)
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Phase I Award for "Incorporating Bidder Budget Constraints in Multi-Item'', National Science Foundation - Small Business Innovation Research (2010)
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Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University (2008)
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Landau economics teaching prize, Stanford University (2003)
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Best Paper of the Year, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries (1987)
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Faculty Research Award, Yale University (1983)
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Honorary Master of Arts degree, Yale University (1983)
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Leonard J. Savage Thesis Award, International Society for Bayesian Analysis (1980)
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Triennial Paper Prize, Society of Actuaries (1976)
Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations
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Chairman of Economics Section, National Academy of Sciences (2019 - 2022)
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President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2007 - 2007)
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Elected member, National Academy of Sciences (2006 - 2006)
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Elected member, Executive Committee of the Econometric Society (2005 - 2005)
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Elected Vice President, Western Economic Association (2005 - 2005)
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Council Member, Econometric Society (2004 - 2004)
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Elected member, Game Theory Society (2003 - 2003)
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IBM Research Chair, Northwestern University (1981 - 1981)
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Member, Editorial Board of European Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics (2012)
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Member, Editorial Board of AEJ-Microeconomics (2009)
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President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2007 - 2008)
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Member, National Academy of Sciences (2006 - 2007)
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President-Elect, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2006 - 2007)
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Vice President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2005 - 2006)
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Member, Executive Committee of the Econometric Society (2005 - 2008)
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Member, Council, Econometric Society (2004)
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Member, Council, Game Theory Society (2003)
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Chief economist, Perfect Commerce (2000 - 2002)
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Editorial Consultant, MIT Press (1997 - 2002)
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Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Comparative Economics (1997 - 1999)
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Founder, Market Design Inc. (1996)
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Director, Market Design Inc. (1996)
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Chairman, Market Design Inc. (1996 - 2002)
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Member, Nemmers Prize Selection Committee, Northwestern University (1996 - 1996)
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Member, Advisory Board, Microeconomics Abstracts (1996)
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Member, Advisory Board, Economics Research Network (1995)
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Member, Program Committee, 1995 World Congress of the Econometric Society (1994 - 1995)
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Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Reform (1993 - 1995)
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Associate Editor, American Economic Review (1993 - 2000)
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Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1992)
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Co-Editor, American Economic Review (1990 - 1993)
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Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior (1990)
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Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation (1989 - 1992)
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Associate Editor, Econometrica (1987 - 1990)
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Associate Editor, Rand Journal of Economics (1985 - 1989)
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Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (1983 - 1987)
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Chair, Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meetings (1984 - 1984)
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Fellow, Econometric Society (1984)
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Member, American Economic Association (1980)
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Member, Economic Association (2005 - 2005)
Professional Education
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Ph.D, Stanford University, Business (1978)
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M.S., Stanford University, Statistics (1978)
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A.B., University of Michigan, Mathematics (1970)
Patents
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Paul Milgrom, Stephan Cunningham, Marissa Beck. "United States Patent 11,574,358 Impression Allocation System and Method Using an Auction that Considers Losing Bids", OpenX Technologies, Inc, Feb 7, 2023
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Paul Milgrom, Steve Goldband. "United States Patent 8,788,364 System for Configuration and Implementation of an Assignment Auction or Exchange", Auctionomics, Inc, Jul 22, 2014
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Lawrence Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,744,924 System and Method for Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances", Efficient Auctions, LLC, Jun 3, 2014
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Marc Porat, Kevin Surace, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,738,463 Method, System and Business Model for a Buyer's Auction with Near-Perfect Information Using the Internet", Perfect Commerce, LLC, May 27, 2014
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Paul Milgrom, David Salant. "United States Patent 8,577,746 System and Method for a Multi-Product Clock Auction", Auction Technologies, LLC, Nov 5, 2013
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Lawrence Ausubel, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,566,211 System and Method for a Dynamic Auction with Package Bidding", Efficient Auctions, LLC, Oct 22, 2013
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Marc Porat, Kevin Surace, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,341,033 Method, System and Business Model for a Buyer's Auction with Near-Perfect Information Using the Internet", Perfect Commerce, Dec 25, 2012
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Lawrence Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,335,738 System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction", Efficient Auctions, LLC, Dec 18, 2012
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Paul Milgrom, Steven Goldband. "United States Patent 8,271,345 System and Method for Incorporating Bidder Budgets in Multi-Item Auctions", Auctionomics, Inc, Sep 18, 2012
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Lawrence Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom. "United States Patent 8,224,743 System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction", Efficient Auctions, LLC, Jul 17, 2012
2024-25 Courses
- Market Design
ECON 136 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics II
ECON 203 (Win) -
Independent Studies (4)
- Directed Reading
ECON 139D (Aut, Win, Spr) - Directed Reading
ECON 239D (Aut, Win, Spr) - Honors Thesis Research
ECON 199D (Aut, Win, Spr) - Practical Training
ECON 299 (Aut, Win, Spr)
- Directed Reading
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Prior Year Courses
2023-24 Courses
- Market Design
ECON 136 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics II
ECON 203 (Win)
2022-23 Courses
- Market Design
ECON 136 (Spr) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics II
ECON 203 (Win)
2021-22 Courses
- Market Design
ECON 136 (Win) - Microeconomic Theory Seminar
ECON 391 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Microeconomics II
ECON 203 (Win) - Simplicity and Complexity in Economic Theory
CS 360, ECON 284 (Spr)
- Market Design
Stanford Advisees
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Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)
Kevin Li, Bing Liu, Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto, Mitchell Watt -
Doctoral Dissertation Co-Advisor (AC)
Michael Crystal, Billy Ferguson -
Master's Program Advisor
Zoe Tweedie
All Publications
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Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2024
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.02489
View details for Web of Science ID 001161933100001
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment
ECONOMETRICA
2023; 91 (6): 1969-2003
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA19559
View details for Web of Science ID 001179178700005
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Taming the Communication and Computation Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: The FUEL Bid Language
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2022
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4465
View details for Web of Science ID 000827162600001
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When Should Control Be Shared?
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2022
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4356
View details for Web of Science ID 000827143200001
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Extended proper equilibrium
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2021; 194
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105258
View details for Web of Science ID 000652015500008
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Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2021; 111 (5): 1383-1405
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.111.5.1383
View details for Web of Science ID 000645085600002
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Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2020; 128 (1): 1–31
View details for DOI 10.1086/704074
View details for Web of Science ID 000507285500002
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Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 11, 2019
2019; 11: 383–405
View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025818
View details for Web of Science ID 000483866000015
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Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
ECONOMETRICA
2018; 86 (1): 219–61
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA12536
View details for Web of Science ID 000424165700008
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Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
2017; 114 (28): 7202-7209
Abstract
The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1701997114
View details for PubMedID 28652335
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5514724
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Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2016; 106 (10): 2852-2866
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20141198
View details for Web of Science ID 000387338100003
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Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2014; 85: 210-231
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.006
View details for Web of Science ID 000335616100014
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Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2013; 103 (2): 585-623
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.103.2.585
View details for Web of Science ID 000317108100002
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CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN
ECONOMIC INQUIRY
2011; 49 (2): 311-320
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000288559900001
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Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2010; 70 (1): 62-70
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000281341000007
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Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2010; 2 (3): 160-185
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.2.3.160
View details for Web of Science ID 000285179200006
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Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design
122nd Annual Meeting of the American-Economics-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2010: 603–7
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.100.2.603
View details for Web of Science ID 000278389300116
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Assignment Messages and Exchanges
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2009; 1 (2): 95-113
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.1.2.95
View details for Web of Science ID 000285178600006
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Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2009; 144 (1): 212-247
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000262945700009
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The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2008; 98 (4): 1653-1674
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.98.4.1653
View details for Web of Science ID 000259978600022
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Economics - The promise of prediction markets
SCIENCE
2008; 320 (5878): 877-878
View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1157679
View details for PubMedID 18487176
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What the seller won't tell you: Persuasion and disclosure in markets
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2008; 22 (2): 115-131
View details for Web of Science ID 000256108200006
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Core-selecting package auctions
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
2008; 36 (3-4): 393-407
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7
View details for Web of Science ID 000253625400006
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Package auctions and exchanges
ECONOMETRICA
2007; 75 (4): 935-965
View details for Web of Science ID 000247562100001
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Matching with contracts
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2005; 95 (4): 913-935
View details for Web of Science ID 000233213000002
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Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets
ECONOMETRICA
2002; 70 (2): 583-601
View details for Web of Science ID 000174196600005
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Advances in routing technologies and Internet peering agreements
113th Annual Meeting of the American-Economics-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2001: 292–96
View details for Web of Science ID 000169114600055
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Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2000; 108 (2): 245-272
View details for Web of Science ID 000086063400002
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Combination bidding in spectrum auctions
26th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC)
LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1999: 19–26
View details for Web of Science ID 000084617500003
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Game theory and the spectrum auctions
12th Annual Congress of the European-Economic-Association
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 1998: 771–78
View details for Web of Science ID 000074767100028
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Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
1996; 17 (1): 113-128
View details for Web of Science ID A1996VU52800005
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The LeChatelier principle
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1996; 86 (1): 173-179
View details for Web of Science ID A1996UB51800009
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COMPLEMENTARITIES AND FIT - STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
1995; 19 (2-3): 179-208
View details for Web of Science ID A1995QW22000002
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Continuous adjustment and fundamental change in business strategy and organization
International Workshop on Trends in Business Organization - Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness
J C B MOHR (PAUL SIEBECK). 1995: 231–258
View details for Web of Science ID A1995BE99F00013
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THE FIRM AS AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1994; 84 (4): 972-991
View details for Web of Science ID A1994PJ23200013
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COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT - THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1994; 102 (4): 745-776
View details for Web of Science ID A1994PG75900005
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COMPARING EQUILIBRIA
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1994; 84 (3): 441-459
View details for Web of Science ID A1994NT45800005
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COMPARING OPTIMA - DO SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS AFFECT CONCLUSIONS
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1994; 102 (3): 607-615
View details for Web of Science ID A1994NZ46000009
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MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICS
ECONOMETRICA
1994; 62 (1): 157-180
View details for Web of Science ID A1994MT84400006
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ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS, INFLUENCE COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP CHANGES
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
1992; 1 (1): 9-35
View details for Web of Science ID 000209480900002
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INFORMATION AND TIMING IN REPEATED PARTNERSHIPS
ECONOMETRICA
1991; 59 (6): 1713-1733
View details for Web of Science ID A1991GR98000010
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A THEORY OF HIERARCHIES BASED ON LIMITED MANAGERIAL ATTENTION
JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES
1991; 5 (3): 205-225
View details for Web of Science ID A1991GE48400001
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COMPLEMENTARITIES, MOMENTUM, AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN MANUFACTURING
103RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC
AMER ECON ASSN. 1991: 84–88
View details for Web of Science ID A1991FJ36400015
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ADAPTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED LEARNING IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
1991; 3 (1): 82-100
View details for Web of Science ID A1991GU55200005
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MULTITASK PRINCIPAL AGENT ANALYSES - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND JOB DESIGN
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION
1991; 7: 24-52
View details for Web of Science ID A1991GY22000003
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RATIONALIZABILITY, LEARNING, AND EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES
ECONOMETRICA
1990; 58 (6): 1255-1277
View details for Web of Science ID A1990EL31000001
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SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS AND LONG-TERM AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1990; 51 (1): 1-31
View details for Web of Science ID A1990DG82000001
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THE ECONOMICS OF MODERN MANUFACTURING - TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY, AND ORGANIZATION
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1990; 80 (3): 511-528
View details for Web of Science ID A1990DM56800014
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THE EFFICIENCY OF EQUITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-PROCESSES
102 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 1990: 154–59
View details for Web of Science ID A1990DA38900030
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REGULATING TRADE AMONG AGENTS
SYMP ON THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS : DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS
J C B MOHR. 1990: 85–105
View details for Web of Science ID A1990CX26300009
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AUCTIONS AND BIDDING - A PRIMER
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
1989; 3 (3): 3-22
View details for Web of Science ID A1989AJ71800001
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ECONOMIC-THEORIES OF THE FIRM - PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE
1988; 21 (3): 444-458
View details for Web of Science ID A1988Q124600002
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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES, AND EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION DESIGN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1988; 96 (1): 42-60
View details for Web of Science ID A1988M339100003
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AN ECONOMIC-APPROACH TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN ORGANIZATIONS
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
1988; 94: S154-S179
View details for Web of Science ID A1988P262400006
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COMMUNICATION AND INVENTORY AS SUBSTITUTES IN ORGANIZING PRODUCTION
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1988; 90 (3): 275-289
View details for Web of Science ID A1988T460900003
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JOB DISCRIMINATION, MARKET FORCES, AND THE INVISIBILITY HYPOTHESIS
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1987; 102 (3): 453-476
View details for Web of Science ID A1987J363100001
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INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, AND INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATION
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1987; 77 (2): 184-193
View details for Web of Science ID A1987H238400029
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AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES
ECONOMETRICA
1987; 55 (2): 303-328
View details for Web of Science ID A1987G612400003
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PRICE AND ADVERTISING SIGNALS OF PRODUCT QUALITY
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1986; 94 (4): 796-821
View details for Web of Science ID A1986D357600005
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RELYING ON THE INFORMATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1986; 17 (1): 18-32
View details for Web of Science ID A1986A637800002
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RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1982; 27 (2): 245-252
View details for Web of Science ID A1982NZ02400001
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PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1982; 27 (2): 280-312
View details for Web of Science ID A1982NZ02400003
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LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS
ECONOMETRICA
1982; 50 (2): 443-459
View details for Web of Science ID A1982NE73800007
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CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
ECONOMETRICA
1979; 47 (3): 679-688
View details for Web of Science ID A1979GY04100010