All Publications


  • Epistemic language in news headlines shapes readers' perceptions of objectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Chuey, A., Luo, Y., Markman, E. M. 2024; 121 (20): e2314091121

    Abstract

    How we reason about objectivity-whether an assertion has a ground truth-has implications for belief formation on wide-ranging topics. For example, if someone perceives climate change to be a matter of subjective opinion similar to the best movie genre, they may consider empirical claims about climate change as mere opinion and irrelevant to their beliefs. Here, we investigate whether the language employed by journalists might influence the perceived objectivity of news claims. Specifically, we ask whether factive verb framing (e.g., "Scientists know climate change is happening") increases perceived objectivity compared to nonfactive framing (e.g., "Scientists believe [...]"). Across eight studies (N = 2,785), participants read news headlines about unique, noncontroversial topics (studies 1a-b, 2a-b) or a familiar, controversial topic (climate change; studies 3a-b, 4a-b) and rated the truth and objectivity of the headlines' claims. Across all eight studies, when claims were presented as beliefs (e.g., "Tortoise breeders believe tortoises are becoming more popular pets"), people consistently judged those claims as more subjective than claims presented as knowledge (e.g., "Tortoise breeders know…"), as well as claims presented as unattributed generics (e.g., "Tortoises are becoming more popular pets"). Surprisingly, verb framing had relatively little, inconsistent influence over participants' judgments of the truth of claims. These results demonstrate how, apart from shaping whether we believe a claim is true or false, epistemic language in media can influence whether we believe a claim has an objective answer at all.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2314091121

    View details for PubMedID 38709916

  • Young children can infer information preferences from goals and recommend appropriate sources to others. Developmental psychology Chuey, A., Lockhart, K., Trouche, E., Keil, F. 2023

    Abstract

    As adults, we intuitively understand how others' goals influence their information-seeking preferences. For example, you might recommend a dense book full of mechanistic details to someone trying to learn about a topic in-depth, but a more lighthearted book filled with surprising stories to someone seeking entertainment. Moreover, you might do this with confidence despite knowing few details about either book. Even though we offer or receive such recommendations frequently as adults, we know little about how the ability to evaluate and recommend information sources to others develops. Two studies examined how children (6-9 years, Eastern U.S. residents, n = 311) and adults (U.S. residents, n = 180) select mechanistic and entertaining information sources for others depending on their goals. Participants recommended books containing mechanistic information to agents who wanted to learn and entertaining information to agents who wanted to have fun. In contrast to adults who strongly favored entertaining books, children recommended both kinds of books equally to a generally curious agent. These results suggest children can infer others' information-seeking preferences based on their goals and recommend appropriate information sources to satisfy those goals despite possessing little topical knowledge themselves. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

    View details for DOI 10.1037/dev0001573

    View details for PubMedID 37358540

  • Beyond knowledge versus belief: The contents of mental-state representations and their underlying computations. The Behavioral and brain sciences Asaba, M., Chuey, A., Gweon, H. 2021; 44: e141

    Abstract

    Moving beyond distinguishing knowledge and beliefs, we propose two lines of inquiry for the next generation of theory of mind (ToM) research: (1) characterizing the contents of different mental-state representations and (2) formalizing the computations that generate such contents. Studying how children reason about what others think of the self provides an illuminating window into the richness and flexibility of human social cognition.

    View details for DOI 10.1017/S0140525X20001879

    View details for PubMedID 34796826

  • Moderated Online Data-Collection for Developmental Research: Methods and Replications FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY Chuey, A., Asaba, M., Bridgers, S., Carrillo, B., Dietz, G., Garcia, T., Leonard, J. A., Liu, S., Merrick, M., Radwan, S., Stegall, J., Velez, N., Woo, B., Wu, Y., Zhou, X. J., Frank, M. C., Gweon, H. 2021; 12: 734398

    Abstract

    Online data collection methods are expanding the ease and access of developmental research for researchers and participants alike. While its popularity among developmental scientists has soared during the COVID-19 pandemic, its potential goes beyond just a means for safe, socially distanced data collection. In particular, advances in video conferencing software has enabled researchers to engage in face-to-face interactions with participants from nearly any location at any time. Due to the novelty of these methods, however, many researchers still remain uncertain about the differences in available approaches as well as the validity of online methods more broadly. In this article, we aim to address both issues with a focus on moderated (synchronous) data collected using video-conferencing software (e.g., Zoom). First, we review existing approaches for designing and executing moderated online studies with young children. We also present concrete examples of studies that implemented choice and verbal measures (Studies 1 and 2) and looking time (Studies 3 and 4) across both in-person and online moderated data collection methods. Direct comparison of the two methods within each study as well as a meta-analysis of all studies suggest that the results from the two methods are comparable, providing empirical support for the validity of moderated online data collection. Finally, we discuss current limitations of online data collection and possible solutions, as well as its potential to increase the accessibility, diversity, and replicability of developmental science.

    View details for DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.734398

    View details for Web of Science ID 000720000200001

    View details for PubMedID 34803813

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8595939

  • No guts, no glory: underestimating the benefits of providing children with mechanistic details. NPJ science of learning Chuey, A., McCarthy, A., Lockhart, K., Trouche, E., Sheskin, M., Keil, F. 2021; 6 (1): 30

    Abstract

    Previous research shows that children effectively extract and utilize causal information, yet we find that adults doubt children's ability to understand complex mechanisms. Since adults themselves struggle to explain how everyday objects work, why expect more from children? Although remembering details may prove difficult, we argue that exposure to mechanism benefits children via the formation of abstract causal knowledge that supports epistemic evaluation. We tested 240 6-9 year-olds' memory for concrete details and the ability to distinguish expertise before, immediately after, or a week after viewing a video about how combustion engines work. By around age 8, children who saw the video remembered mechanistic details and were better able to detect car-engine experts. Beyond detailed knowledge, the current results suggest that children also acquired an abstracted sense of how systems work that can facilitate epistemic reasoning.

    View details for DOI 10.1038/s41539-021-00108-5

    View details for PubMedID 34686681

  • Children and adults selectively generalize mechanistic knowledge. Cognition Chuey, A. n., Lockhart, K. n., Sheskin, M. n., Keil, F. n. 2020; 199: 104231

    Abstract

    A central component of evaluating others as sources of information involves estimating how much they know about different domains: one might be quite knowledgeable about a certain domain (e.g., clocks), but relatively ignorant about another (e.g., birds). Estimating one's domain knowledge often involves making inferences from specific instances or demonstrations, with some suggesting broader knowledge than others. For instance, an American who demonstrates knowledge of an unfamiliar country like Djibouti likely knows more about geography as a whole compared to an American who demonstrates knowledge of a more familiar country like Canada. The current studies investigate the extent to which one potentially salient kind of knowledge - mechanistic knowledge - signals greater domain knowledge as a whole. Across four developmental studies, we find that both adults and children as young as six think that those who possess mechanistic knowledge about a basic level artifact category (e.g., clocks) are more knowledgeable about its superordinate level category (e.g., machines) than those with factual non-mechanistic knowledge (Studies 1a and 2a). We also find an analogous, yet delayed pattern with biological categories (Studies 1b and 2b). Together, these studies demonstrate that even young children, who possess little mechanistic knowledge themselves, nevertheless have a sophisticated sense of how knowledge of mechanism generalizes across related categories.

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104231

    View details for PubMedID 32092550

  • The Privileged Status of Knowing Mechanistic Information: An Early Epistemic Bias CHILD DEVELOPMENT Lockhart, K. L., Chuey, A., Kerr, S., Keil, F. C. 2019; 90 (5): 1772–88

    Abstract

    Four studies with 180 5-7 year olds, 165 8-11 year olds and 199 adults show that young children appreciate the distinctive role played by mechanistic explanations in tracking causal patterns. Young children attributed greater knowledge to individuals offering mechanistic reasons for a claim than others who provide equally detailed nonmechanistic reasons. In Study 1, 5-7 year olds attributed greater knowledge to those offering mechanistic reasons. In Studies 2 and 3, all ages (5-7 and adults for Study 2; 5-7, 8-11 and adults for Study 3) assigned greater knowledge to those offering mechanistic reasons about causally central features than those offering nonmechanistic reasons. In Study 4, all ages (5-7, 8-11, adults) modulated the epistemic bias as a function of embedding goals.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/cdev.13246

    View details for Web of Science ID 000486524600029

    View details for PubMedID 31106424