Andrzej Skrzypacz
Theodore J. Kreps Professor in the Graduate School of Business and Professor, by courtesy, of Economics
Web page: http://web.stanford.edu/people/skrz
2024-25 Courses
- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing
MGTECON 602 (Spr) - Economics of Strategy and Organization
MGTECON 533 (Spr) - Managerial Economics - Accelerated
MGTECON 203 (Win) -
Independent Studies (8)
- Directed Reading
ECON 139D (Spr) - Directed Reading
ECON 239D (Spr) - Doctoral Practicum in Research
MGTECON 699 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Doctoral Practicum in Teaching
MGTECON 698 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Honors Thesis Research
ECON 199D (Spr) - Individual Research
GSBGEN 390 (Aut, Win, Spr) - PhD Directed Reading
ACCT 691, FINANCE 691, MGTECON 691, MKTG 691, OB 691, OIT 691, POLECON 691 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Practical Training
ECON 299 (Spr)
- Directed Reading
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Prior Year Courses
2023-24 Courses
- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing
MGTECON 602 (Spr) - Economics of Strategy and Organization
MGTECON 533 (Spr)
2022-23 Courses
- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing
MGTECON 602 (Spr) - Economics of Strategy and Organization
MGTECON 533 (Spr) - Managerial Economics - Accelerated
MGTECON 203 (Win)
2021-22 Courses
- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing
MGTECON 602 (Spr) - Managerial Economics - Accelerated
MGTECON 203 (Win)
- Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing
All Publications
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Disclosing a Random Walk
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
2023
View details for DOI 10.1111/jofi.13290
View details for Web of Science ID 001106219400001
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The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
2023
View details for DOI 10.1093/rfs/hhad040
View details for Web of Science ID 000993902100001
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Market Design for AI Algorithms
ACM SIGECOM EXCHANGES
2022; 20 (2): 62-68
View details for Web of Science ID 000947940700004
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Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility
Telecommunications Policy
2021; 45 (7)
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102167
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Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
2020; 87 (6): 2893–2937
View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rdaa012
View details for Web of Science ID 000613723100014
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Persuading the Principal to Wait
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2020; 128 (7): 2542–78
View details for DOI 10.1086/706687
View details for Web of Science ID 000543777600003
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Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
2019; 33: 105–27
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.red.2019.03.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000474682500006
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Test Design and Minimum Standards
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2019; 109 (6): 2173–2207
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20171722
View details for Web of Science ID 000469846800007
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Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2018; 10 (2): 58–82
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.20160282
View details for Web of Science ID 000439580900002
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Selling Information
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2016; 124 (6): 1515-1562
View details for Web of Science ID 000389049100001
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Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2016; 106 (9): 2528-2551
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20141212
View details for Web of Science ID 000387334800005
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Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
2016; 11 (3): 1103-1144
View details for DOI 10.3982/TE2237
View details for Web of Science ID 000383587200010
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Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2016; 124 (4): 1046-1087
View details for Web of Science ID 000380760100004
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Mechanisms for Repeated Trade
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2015; 7 (4): 252-293
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.20140173
View details for Web of Science ID 000364153300009
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A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2015; 61 (7): 1598-1614
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2064
View details for Web of Science ID 000357611900008
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Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2015; 158: 371-406
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.009
View details for Web of Science ID 000358469600017
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Recall and private monitoring
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2015; 90: 162-170
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
View details for Web of Science ID 000354590300012
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TIME HORIZON AND COOPERATION IN CONTINUOUS TIME
ECONOMETRICA
2015; 83 (2): 587-616
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA11380
View details for Web of Science ID 000352625700007
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Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2014; 104 (8): 2400-2420
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.8.2400
View details for Web of Science ID 000341587600005
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Limited records and reputation bubbles
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2014; 151: 2-29
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.014
View details for Web of Science ID 000335099600001
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Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2013; 5 (4): 219-243
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.5.4.219
View details for Web of Science ID 000326512600009
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Auctions with contingent payments - An overview
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
2013; 31 (5): 666-675
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.02.003
View details for Web of Science ID 000330000800027
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Rules with Discretion and Local Information
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2013; 128 (3): 1273-1320
View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt013
View details for Web of Science ID 000321462000007
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Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2013; 148 (3): 1226-1236
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000319790200013
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Beliefs and Private Monitoring
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
2012; 79 (4): 1637-1660
View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rds009
View details for Web of Science ID 000310160600012
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Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2011; 101 (6): 2425-2449
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.101.6.2425
View details for Web of Science ID 000296572200005
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Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2010; 100 (3): 802-836
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.100.3.802
View details for Web of Science ID 000279253100006
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The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
ECONOMETRICA
2010; 78 (3): 847-882
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA6420
View details for Web of Science ID 000277980400001
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Impossibility of collusion under imperfect monitoring with flexible production
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2007; 97 (5): 1794-1823
View details for Web of Science ID 000252228800012
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Collusion under monitoring of sales
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2007; 38 (2): 314-331
View details for Web of Science ID 000251549700002
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Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2007; 133 (1): 58-82
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.004
View details for Web of Science ID 000245185300003
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Network externalities and long-run market shares
ECONOMIC THEORY
2006; 29 (3): 621-648
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00199-005-0031-0
View details for Web of Science ID 000240898900007
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Bidding with securities: Auctions and security design
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2005; 95 (4): 936-959
View details for Web of Science ID 000233213000003
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Inflation and price setting in a natural experiment
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
2005; 52 (3): 621-632
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.07.006
View details for Web of Science ID 000229346400007
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Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining
ECONOMETRICA
2005; 73 (1): 69-91
View details for Web of Science ID 000226895700003
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Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2004; 114 (1): 153-169
View details for DOI 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00128-5
View details for Web of Science ID 000187562100007