Academic Appointments


2017-18 Courses


All Publications


  • When Far Becomes Near: Perspective Taking Induces Social Remapping of Spatial Relations PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Cavallo, A., Ansuini, C., Capozzi, F., Tversky, B., Becchio, C. 2017; 28 (1): 69-79
  • Coordinating Gesture, Word, and Diagram: Explanations for Experts and Novices SPATIAL COGNITION AND COMPUTATION Kang, S., Tversky, B., Black, J. B. 2015; 15 (1): 1-26
  • Conceptually congruent actions can promote thought JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN MEMORY AND COGNITION Segal, A., Tversky, B., Black, J. 2014; 3 (3): 124-130
  • Thinking in action PRAGMATICS & COGNITION Tversky, B., Kessell, A. 2014; 22 (2): 206-223
  • Through your eyes: incongruence of gaze and action increases spontaneous perspective taking FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE Furlanetto, T., Cavallo, A., Manera, V., Tversky, B., Becchio, C. 2013; 7

    Abstract

    What makes people spontaneously adopt the perspective of others? Previous work suggested that perspective taking can serve understanding the actions of others. Two studies corroborate and extend that interpretation. The first study varied cues to intentionality of eye gaze and action, and found that the more the actor was perceived as potentially interacting with the objects, the stronger the tendency to take his perspective. The second study investigated how manipulations of gaze affect the tendency to adopt the perspective of another reaching for an object. Eliminating gaze cues by blurring the actor's face did not reduce perspective-taking, suggesting that in the absence of gaze information, observers rely entirely on the action. Intriguingly, perspective-taking was higher when gaze and action did not signal the same intention, suggesting that in presence of ambiguous behavioral intention, people are more likely take the other's perspective to try to understand the action.

    View details for DOI 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00455

    View details for Web of Science ID 000322949500001

    View details for PubMedID 23964228

  • Space, Time, and Story PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION, VOL 58 Tversky, B., Heiser, J., Morrison, J. 2013; 58: 47-76
  • How to put things together COGNITIVE PROCESSING Daniel, M., Tversky, B. 2012; 13 (4): 303-319

    Abstract

    Instructions for putting things together or understanding how things work are notoriously frustrating. Performance relies on constructing mental models of the object and the actions of the object from text or diagrams or both. Here, we show that instructions can be improved by turning users into designers and deriving design principles from their designs. People first assembled an object and then crafted assembly instructions, using text alone or text and diagrams. Some were required to be brief and to include only the most essential information. Users' instructions had a narrative structure with an introduction, a middle, and an end. The essential middle described or depicted the step-by-step sequence of actions on parts. Diagrams were regarded as fundamental, and redundancy of depictions and descriptions desirable. These design principles have wide applicability to many kinds of explanations.

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s10339-012-0521-5

    View details for Web of Science ID 000310317100002

    View details for PubMedID 22923042

  • Some ways gestures guide thought Tversky, B., Jamalian, A., Kang, S. SPRINGER HEIDELBERG. 2012: S32–S32
  • Remembering Routes: Streets and Landmarks APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Tom, A. C., Tversky, B. 2012; 26 (2): 182-193

    View details for DOI 10.1002/acp.1805

    View details for Web of Science ID 000300971000003

  • The Shape of Action JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Hard, B. M., Recchia, G., Tversky, B. 2011; 140 (4): 586-604

    Abstract

    How do people understand the everyday, yet intricate, behaviors that unfold around them? In the present research, we explored this by presenting viewers with self-paced slideshows of everyday activities and recording looking times, subjective segmentation (breakpoints) into action units, and slide-to-slide physical change. A detailed comparison of the joint time courses of these variables showed that looking time and physical change were locally maximal at breakpoints and greater for higher level action units than for lower level units. Even when slideshows were scrambled, breakpoints were regarded longer and were more physically different from ordinary moments, showing that breakpoints are distinct even out of context. Breakpoints are bridges: from one action to another, from one level to another, and from perception to conception.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/a0024310

    View details for Web of Science ID 000296913700004

    View details for PubMedID 21806308

  • Visualizing Thought TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE Tversky, B. 2011; 3 (3): 499-535
  • Effects of visual and verbal presentation on cognitive load in vigilance, memory, and arithmetic tasks PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY Klingner, J., Tversky, B., Hanrahan, P. 2011; 48 (3): 323-332

    Abstract

    Degree of pupil dilation has been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of cognitive load, but the effect of aural versus visual task presentation on pupil dilation is unknown. To evaluate effects of presentation mode, pupil dilation was measured in three tasks spanning a range of cognitive activities: mental multiplication, digit sequence recall, and vigilance. Stimuli were presented both aurally and visually, controlling for all known visual influences on pupil diameter. The patterns of dilation were similar for both aural and visual presentation for all three tasks, but the magnitudes of pupil response were greater for aural presentation. Accuracy was higher for visual presentation for mental arithmetic and digit recall. The findings can be accounted for in terms of dual codes in working memory and suggest that cognitive load is lower for visual than for aural presentation.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01069.x

    View details for Web of Science ID 000287144300004

    View details for PubMedID 20718934

  • Visualizing space, time, and agents: production, performance, and preference COGNITIVE PROCESSING Kessell, A., Tversky, B. 2011; 12 (1): 43-52

    Abstract

    Visualizations of space, time, and agents (or objects) are ubiquitous in science, business, and everyday life, from weather maps to scheduling meetings. Effective communications, including visual ones, emerge from use in the field, but no conventional visualization form has yet emerged for this confluence of information. The real-world spiral of production, comprehension, and use that fine-tunes communications can be accelerated in the laboratory. Here, we do so in search of effective visualizations of space, time, and agents. Users' production, preference, and performance aligned to favor matrix representations with time as rows or columns and space and agents as entries. Overall, performance and preference were greater for matrices with discrete dots representing cell entries than for matrices with lines, but lines connecting cells may provide an advantage when evaluating temporal sequence. Both the diagram type and the technique have broader applications.

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s10339-010-0379-3

    View details for Web of Science ID 000286613500006

    View details for PubMedID 21082213

  • Embodied and disembodied cognition: Spatial perspective-taking COGNITION Tversky, B., Hard, B. M. 2009; 110 (1): 124-129

    Abstract

    Although people can take spatial perspectives different from their own, it is widely assumed that egocentric perspectives are natural and have primacy. Two studies asked respondents to describe the spatial relations between two objects on a table in photographed scenes; in some versions, a person sitting behind the objects was either looking at or reaching for one of the objects. The mere presence of another person in a position to act on the objects induced a good proportion of respondents to describe the spatial relations from that person's point of view (Experiment 1). When the query about the spatial relations was phrased in terms of action, more respondents took the other's perspective than their own (Experiment 2). The implication of action elicits spontaneous spatial perspective-taking, seemingly in the service of understanding the other's actions.

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.10.008

    View details for Web of Science ID 000263206200012

    View details for PubMedID 19056081

  • Cognitive Methods for Visualizing Space, Time, and Agents 5th International Conference on Diagrammatic Representation and Inference Kessell, A. M., Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2008: 382–384
  • The effect of animation on comprehension and interest JOURNAL OF COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING Kim, S., Yoon, M., Whang, S., Tversky, B., Morrison, J. B. 2007; 23 (3): 260-270
  • Making sense of abstract events: Building event schemas MEMORY & COGNITION Hard, B. M., Tversky, B., Lang, D. S. 2006; 34 (6): 1221-1235

    Abstract

    Everyday events, such as making a bed, can be segmented hierarchically, with the coarse level characterized by changes in the actor's goals and the fine level by subgoals (Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). Does hierarchical event perception depend on knowledge of actors' intentions? This question was addressed by asking participants to segment films of abstract, schematic events. Films were novel or familiarized, viewed forward or backward, and simultaneously described or not. The participants interpreted familiar films as more intentional than novel films and forward films as more intentional than backward films. Regardless of experience and film direction, however, the participants identified similar event boundaries and organized them hierarchically. An analysis of the movements in each frame revealed that event segments corresponded to bursts of change in movement features, with greater bursts for coarse than for fine units. Perceiving event structure appears to enable event schemas, rather than resulting from them.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000243292300003

    View details for PubMedID 17225504

  • Arrows in comprehending and producing mechanical diagrams COGNITIVE SCIENCE Heiser, J., Tversky, B. 2006; 30 (3): 581-592

    Abstract

    Mechanical systems have structural organizations-parts, and their relations-and functional organizations-temporal, dynamic, and causal processes-which can be explained using text or diagrams. Two experiments illustrate the role of arrows in diagrams of mechanical systems. In Experiment 1, people described diagrams with or without arrows, interpreting diagrams without arrows as conveying structural information and diagrams with arrows as conveying functional information. In Experiment 2, people produced sketches of mechanical systems from structural or functional descriptions. People spontaneously used arrows to indicate functional processes in diagrams. Arrows can play a powerful role in augmenting structural diagrams to convey dynamic, causal, or functional information.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000238416300006

    View details for PubMedID 21702825

  • How eyewitnesses talk about events: Implications for memory APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Marsh, E. J., Tversky, B., Hutson, M. 2005; 19 (5): 531-544

    View details for DOI 10.1002/acp.1095

    View details for Web of Science ID 000230681600001

  • Bodies and their parts MEMORY & COGNITION Morrison, J. B., Tversky, B. 2005; 33 (4): 696-709

    Abstract

    How do we think about the space of bodies? Several accounts of mental representations of bodies were addressed in body part verification tasks. An imagery account predicts shorter times to larger parts (e.g., back < hand). A part distinctiveness account predicts shorter times to more discontinuous parts (e.g., arm < chest). Apart significance account predicts shorter times to parts that are perceptually distinct and functionally important (e.g., head < back). Because distinctiveness and significance are correlated, the latter two accounts are difficult to distinguish. Both name-body and body-body comparisons were investigated in four experiments. In all, larger parts were verified more slowly than smaller ones, eliminating the imagery/size account. Despite the correlation between distinctiveness and significance, the data suggest that when comparisons are perceptual (body-body), part distinctiveness is the best predictor, and when explicit or implicit naming is involved, part significance is the best predictor. Naming seems to activate the functional aspects of bodies.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000231811100013

    View details for PubMedID 16248334

  • Expert and non-expert knowledge of loosely structured environments International Conference on Spatial Informational Theory Fontaine, S., Edwards, G., Tversky, B., Denis, M. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2005: 363–378
  • Segmenting Everyday Actions: an Object Bias? 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Dowell, R. E., Martin, B. A., Tversky, B. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 2005: 1553–1553
  • Narratives of space, time, and life Conference on Narrative Tversky, B. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2004: 380–92
  • Spinning the stories of our lives APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Marsh, E. J., Tversky, B. 2004; 18 (5): 491-503

    View details for DOI 10.1002/acp.1001

    View details for Web of Science ID 000222705300001

  • Telling a story or telling it straight: The effects of entertaining versus accurate retellings on memory APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Dudukovic, N. M., Marsh, E. J., Tversky, B. 2004; 18 (2): 125-143

    View details for DOI 10.1002/acp.953

    View details for Web of Science ID 000220545600001

  • Characterizing diagrams produced by individuals and dyads 4th International Conference on Spatial Cognition Heiser, J., Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2004: 214–226
  • Designing effective step-by-step assembly instructions Annual Symposium of the ACM SIGGRAPH Agrawala, M., Phan, D., Heiser, J., Hayrnaker, J., Klingner, J., Hanrahan, P., Tversky, B. ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY. 2003: 828–37
  • Structuring information interfaces for procedural learning 40th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic-Society Zacks, J. M., Tversky, B. AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2003: 88–100

    Abstract

    Interface design should be informed by the application of top-down cognitive principles derived from basic theory and research. Cognitive design principles from 2 domains, event cognition and media, were applied to the design of interfaces for teaching procedures. According to theories of event cognition, procedures should be presented hierarchically, organized by objects or large object parts and actions on objects. According to research on effects of media, adding appropriate graphics to text instructions can facilitate learning and memory. These principles were partially supported in 2 tasks: assembling a musical instrument and building a model. Although both top-down principles were effective in guiding interface design, they were not sufficient. They can be combined with iterative bottom-up methods to produce usable interfaces.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/1076-898X.9.2.88

    View details for Web of Science ID 000184173900003

    View details for PubMedID 12877269

  • Cognitive design principles for visualizations: Revealing and instantiating 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Heiser, J., Tversky, B., Agrawala, M., Hanrahan, P. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 2003: 545–550
  • Constructive perception: A metacognitive skill for coordinating perception and conception PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, PTS 1 AND 2 Suwa, M., Tversky, B. 2003: 1140-1145
  • Structures of mental spaces - How people think about space ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR Tversky, B. 2003; 35 (1): 66-80
  • Sketches for design and design of sketches Conference on Human Behaviour in Design Tversky, B., Suwa, M., Agrawala, M., Heiser, J., Stolte, C., Hanrahan, P., Phan, D., Klingner, J., Daniel, M. P., Lee, P., Haymaker, J. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2003: 79–86
  • Navigating by mind and by body Spatial Cognition 2002 Meeting Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2003: 1–10
  • Segmenting ambiguous events 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Martin, B. A., Tversky, B. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 2003: 781–786
  • Animation: can it facilitate? Workshop on Interactive Graphical Communication Tversky, B., Morrison, J. B., Betrancourt, M. ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD. 2002: 247–62

    View details for DOI 10.1006/ijhc.1017

    View details for Web of Science ID 000179123000002

  • A parametric study of mental spatial transformations of bodies NEUROIMAGE Zacks, J. M., Ollinger, J. M., Sheridan, M. A., Tversky, B. 2002; 16 (4): 857-872

    Abstract

    TWO CLASSES OF MENTAL SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION CAN BE DISTINGUISHED: Object-based spatial transformations are imagined movements of objects; and egocentric perspective transformations are imagined movements of one's point of view. The hypothesis that multiple neural systems contribute to these mental imagery operations was tested with functional MRI. Participants made spatial judgments about pictures of human bodies, and brain activity was analyzed as a function of the judgment required and the time taken to respond. Areas in right temporal, occipital and parietal cortex and the medial superior cerebellum appear to be differentially involved in object-based spatial transformations. Additionally, midline structures and lateral parietal cortex were found to decrease in activity during the spatial reasoning tasks, independently of the judgment required or of the latency of response. The results are discussed in terms of a model of spatial reasoning that postulates specialized subsystems for performing object-based and egocentric perspective image transformations.

    View details for DOI 10.1006/nimg.2002.1129

    View details for Web of Science ID 000177444900002

    View details for PubMedID 12202075

  • External representations contribute to the dynamic construction of ideas 2nd International Conference on Theory and Application of Diagrams Suwa, M., Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2002: 341–343
  • Perceiving, remembering, and communicating structure in events 38th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic-Society Zacks, J. M., Tversky, B., Iyer, G. AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2001: 29–58

    Abstract

    How do people perceive routine events, such as making a bed, as these events unfold in time? Research on knowledge structures suggests that people conceive of events as goal-directed partonomic hierarchies. Here, participants segmented videos of events into coarse and fine units on separate viewings; some described the activity of each unit as well. Both segmentation and descriptions support the hierarchical bias hypothesis in event perception: Observers spontaneously encoded the events in terms of partonomic hierarchies. Hierarchical organization was strengthened by simultaneous description and, to a weaker extent, by familiarity. Describing from memory rather than perception yielded fewer units but did not alter the qualitative nature of the descriptions. Although the descriptions were telegraphic and without communicative intent, their hierarchical structure was evident to naive readers. The data suggest that cognitive schemata mediate between perceptual and functional information about events and indicate that these knowledge structures may be organized around object/action units.

    View details for DOI 10.1037//0096-3445.130.1.29

    View details for Web of Science ID 000170958800002

    View details for PubMedID 11293458

  • Event structure in perception and conception PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN Zacks, J. M., Tversky, B. 2001; 127 (1): 3-21

    Abstract

    Events can be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The authors first draw on several bodies of research to construct an analysis of how people use event structure in perception, understanding, planning, and action. Philosophy provides a grounding for the basic units of events and actions. Perceptual psychology provides an analogy to object perception: Like objects, events belong to categories, and, like objects, events have parts. These relationships generate 2 hierarchical organizations for events: taxonomies and partonomies. Event partonomies have been studied by looking at how people segment activity as it happens. Structured representations of events can relate partonomy to goal relationships and causal structure; such representations have been shown to drive narrative comprehension, memory, and planning. Computational models provide insight into how mental representations might be organized and transformed. These different approaches to event structure converge on an explanation of how multiple sources of information interact in event perception and conception.

    View details for DOI 10.1037//0033-2909.127.1.3

    View details for Web of Science ID 000166843700001

    View details for PubMedID 11271755

  • Effect of computer animation on users' performance: A review TRAVAIL HUMAIN Betrancourt, M., Tversky, B. 2000; 63 (4): 311-329
  • Biased retellings of events yield biased memories COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B., Marsh, E. J. 2000; 40 (1): 1-38

    Abstract

    When people retell events, they take different perspectives for different audiences and purposes. In four experiments, we examined the effects of this postevent reorganization of events on memory for the original events. In each experiment, participants read a story, wrote a biased letter about one of the story characters, and later remembered the original story. Participants' letters contained more story details and more elaborations relevant to the purpose of their retellings. More importantly, the letter perspective affected the amount of information recalled (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the direction of the errors in recall (Experiments 1 and 3) and recognition (Experiment 2). Selective rehearsal plays an important role in these bias effects: retelling involves selectively retrieving and using story information, with consequent differences in memory. However, biased memory occurred even when the biased letters contained little, if any, specific information (Experiment 4) or contained the same amount and kinds of story information as a neutral control condition (Experiment 3). Biased memory is a consequence of the reorganizing schema guiding the retelling perspective, in addition to the effects of rehearsing specific information in retelling.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000085533600001

    View details for PubMedID 10692232

  • Lines, blobs, crosses and arrows: Diagrammatic communication with schematic figures 1st International Conference on Theory and Application of Diagrams (Diagrams 2000) Tversky, B., Zacks, J., Lee, P., Heiser, J. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2000: 221–230
  • Familiarity and categorical inference 22nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Collister, D., Tversky, B. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 2000: 1020–1020
  • Some ways that maps and diagrams communicate SPATIAL COGNITION II Tversky, B. 2000; 1849: 72-79
  • Cognitive models of geographical space INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SCIENCE Mark, D. M., Freksa, C., Hirtle, S. C., Lloyd, R., Tversky, B. 1999; 13 (8): 747-774
  • Bars and lines: A study of graphic communication MEMORY & COGNITION Zacks, J., Tversky, B. 1999; 27 (6): 1073-1079

    Abstract

    Interpretations of graphs seem to be rooted in principles of cognitive naturalness and information processing rather than arbitrary correspondences. These predict that people should more readily associate bars with discrete comparisons between data points because bars are discrete entities and facilitate point estimates. They should more readily associate lines with trends because lines connect discrete entities and directly represent slope. The predictions were supported in three experiments--two examining comprehension and one production. The correspondence does not seem to depend on explicit knowledge of rules. Instead, it may reflect the influence of the communicative situation as well as the perceptual properties of graphs.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000083747100013

    View details for PubMedID 10586582

  • Three spaces of spatial cognition 1997 Annual Meeting of the Association-of-American-Geographers Tversky, B., Morrison, J. B., Franklin, N., Bryant, D. J. ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD. 1999: 516–24
  • Imagined transformations of bodies: an fMRI investigation NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA Zacks, J., Rypma, B., Gabrieli, J. D., Tversky, B., Glover, G. H. 1999; 37 (9): 1029-1040

    Abstract

    A number of spatial reasoning problems can be solved by performing an imagined transformation of one's egocentric perspective. A series of experiments were carried out to characterize this process behaviorally and in terms of its brain basis, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (tMRI). In a task contrast designed to isolate egocentric perspective transformations, participants were slower to make left-right judgments about a human figure from the figure's perspective than from their own. This transformation led to increased cortical activity around the left parietal-temporal-occipital junction, as well as in other areas including left frontal cortex. In a second task contrast comparing judgments about inverted figures to judgments about upright figures (always from the figure's perspective), participants were slower to make left-right judgments about inverted figures than upright ones. This transformation led to activation in posterior areas near those active in the first experiment, but weaker in the left hemisphere and stronger in the right, and also to substantial left frontal activation. Together, the data support the specialization of areas near the parietal-temporal-occipital junction for egocentric perspective transformations. These results are also suggestive of a dissociation between egocentric perspective transformations and object-based spatial transformations such as mental rotation.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000081926300004

    View details for PubMedID 10468366

  • Mental representations of perspective and spatial relations from diagrams and models JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION Bryant, D. J., Tversky, B. 1999; 25 (1): 137-156

    Abstract

    In previous research (D. J. Bryant, B. Tversky, & N. Franklin, 1992; N. Franklin & B. Tversky, 1990), the authors showed that spatial knowledge conveyed by descriptions and direct experience induces participants to take the perspective of a character surrounded by objects. In this study, the authors used models and diagrams to convey the same information. With models, as with descriptions and experience, participants adopted the character's perspective (the spatial framework analysis). With diagrams, participants took an outside perspective (the intrinsic computation analysis). Even when informationally equivalent, different depictions made salient different aspects of the world. When instructed, however, participants were able to take either the inside or the outside perspective in memory for both diagrams and models. Depth cues in depictions also govern participants' perspective. When diagrams contained rich pictorial depth cues, participants used the spatial framework analysis, and when models were viewed without access to depth cues, participants relied on the intrinsic computation analysis.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000077997300010

    View details for PubMedID 9949712

  • Pictorial and verbal tools for conveying routes International Conference on Spatial Information Theory (COSIT 99) Tversky, B., Lee, P. U. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 1999: 51–64
  • Ontology and geographic objects: An empirical study of cognitive categorization International Conference on Spatial Information Theory (COSIT 99) Mark, D. M., Smith, B., Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 1999: 283–298
  • Reading bar graphs: Effects of extraneous depth cues and graphical context JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-APPLIED Zacks, J., Levy, E., Tversky, B., Schiano, D. J. 1998; 4 (2): 119-138
  • Indexing events in memory: Evidence for index dominance MEMORY Taylor, H. A., Tversky, B. 1997; 5 (4): 509-542

    Abstract

    Research on narrative comprehension and autobiographical memory converge on three hypotheses which make different predictions about event organisation. The availability of different event components as indexes may explain the convergence on three hypotheses rather than one. In this paper, three experiments assessed event indexing in narratives with different available indexes. In Experiment 1, participants read event descriptions organised by character or time. In Experiment 2, event descriptions were organised by character or location. In Experiment 3, participants read event descriptions where events were grouped by activity. In each experiment, memory could be organised by any of the available components alone, by both components, or by using the organisation imposed by the discourse. Participants indexed events by character in Experiment 1, re-indexing information when necessary. Results of Experiment 2 indicated equal use of character and location indexes. In this case, participants used the discourse organisation. In Experiment 3, participants indexed events using activity groupings, again re-indexing events when necessary. Results are interpreted as indicating reliance on a single organising index with flexibility in the selection of different event components as indexes.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1997XG05100004

    View details for PubMedID 9282221

  • Three-dimensional bilateral symmetry bias in judgments of figural identity and orientation PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE McBeath, M. K., Schiano, D. J., Tversky, B. 1997; 8 (3): 217-223
  • What's happening? The structure of event perception 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Zacks, J., Tversky, B. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1997: 1095–1095
  • Body schemas 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society Morrison, J. B., Tversky, B. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1997: 525–529
  • Perspective in spatial descriptions JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE Taylor, H. A., Tversky, B. 1996; 35 (3): 371-391
  • SPATIAL CONCEPTS AND PERCEPTION OF PHYSICAL AND DIAGRAMMED SCENES PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS Bryant, D. J., Lanca, M., Tversky, B. 1995; 81 (2): 531-546

    Abstract

    The accessibility of objects in mental spatial frameworks depends on their relation to the spatial axes of the world and people's typical interactions with space. The current study investigated perception of space. Subjects viewed either a physical model of a person surrounded by objects (Exp. 1) or diagrams of scenes (Exp. 2). Subjects named objects at directions from their own external perspective. For physical scenes, subjects were faster to name objects at Above/Below locations, followed by Front/Behind locations, followed by Left/Right locations. This finding indicates that subjects used spatial frameworks to locate objects perceptually. For diagrams, response times to name objects did not conform to this pattern, perhaps because the spatial axes of a diagram do not correspond to stable spatial axes of the world.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1995TD13200036

    View details for PubMedID 8570353

  • COGNITIVE ORIGINS OF GRAPHIC PRODUCTIONS Conference on Understanding Images Tversky, B. SPRINGER-VERLAG. 1995: 29–53
  • SPATIAL MENTAL MODELS FROM DESCRIPTIONS JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE Tversky, B., Franklin, N., Taylor, H. A., Bryant, D. J. 1994; 45 (9): 656-668
  • PREPOSITIONS ARENT PLACES BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES Tversky, B., Clark, H. H. 1993; 16 (2): 252-253
  • DESCRIPTIONS AND DEPICTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTS MEMORY & COGNITION Taylor, H. A., Tversky, B. 1992; 20 (5): 483-496

    Abstract

    Subjects studied maps with the expectation that they would draw or describe them from memory. In fact, subjects did both. Order of drawing or describing landmarks revealed the mental organization of environments. Organization was quite similar across maps and descriptions of the same environments, revealing hierarchical structures based on spatial and functional features of the environments and on conventions for sequencing the landmarks.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1992JQ27400005

    View details for PubMedID 1453966

  • SWITCHING POINTS-OF-VIEW IN SPATIAL MENTAL MODELS MEMORY & COGNITION Franklin, N., Tversky, B., COON, V. 1992; 20 (5): 507-518

    Abstract

    In six experiments, subjects read narratives describing varying spatial scenes with more than one point of view. They were probed with questions about objects located in six directions from each character's point of view. Subjects' response times were consistent with a one place-one perspective rule. They seemed to form separate mental models for separate places and to take a character's perspective when there was only one relevant character in a scene, but they seemed to take a neutral perspective when there was more than one probed point of view, rather than switch perspectives.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1992JQ27400007

    View details for PubMedID 1453968

  • DISTORTIONS IN COGNITIVE MAPS GEOFORUM Tversky, B. 1992; 23 (2): 131-138
  • SPATIAL MENTAL MODELS DERIVED FROM SURVEY AND ROUTE DESCRIPTIONS JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE Taylor, H. A., Tversky, B. 1992; 31 (2): 261-292
  • INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SPATIAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REPRESENTING DESCRIBED SCENES JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE Bryant, D. J., Tversky, B., Franklin, N. 1992; 31 (1): 74-98
  • STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY IN ENCODING SIMPLIFIED GRAPHS MEMORY & COGNITION Schiano, D. J., Tversky, B. 1992; 20 (1): 12-20

    Abstract

    Tversky and Schiano (1989) found a systematic bias toward the 45 degrees line in memory for the slopes of identical lines when embedded in graphs, but not in maps, suggesting the use of a cognitive reference frame specifically for encoding meaningful graphs. The present experiments explore this issue further using the linear configurations alone as stimuli. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that perception and immediate memory for the slope of a test line within orthogonal "axes" are predictable from purely structural considerations. In Experiments 3 and 4, subjects were instructed to use a diagonal-reference strategy in viewing the stimuli, which were described as "graphs" only in Experiment 3. Results for both studies showed the diagonal bias previously found only for graphs. This pattern provides converging evidence for the diagonal as a cognitive reference frame in encoding linear graphs, and demonstrates that even in highly simplified displays, strategic factors can produce encoding biases not predictable solely from stimulus structure alone.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1992HH59400002

    View details for PubMedID 1549061

  • ASSESSING SPATIAL FRAMEWORKS WITH OBJECT AND DIRECTION PROBES BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY Bryant, D. J., Tversky, B. 1992; 30 (1): 29-32
  • CROSS-CULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL-TRENDS IN GRAPHIC PRODUCTIONS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B., Kugelmass, S., Winter, A. 1991; 23 (4): 515-557
  • PARTS AND THE BASIC LEVEL IN NATURAL CATEGORIES AND ARTIFICIAL STIMULI - COMMENTS ON MURPHY (1991) MEMORY & COGNITION Tversky, B., Hemenway, K. 1991; 19 (5): 439-442

    Abstract

    Natural taxonomies consist of categories that vary in level of abstraction. Categories at the basic level, such as chair and apple, are preferred in a broad range of situations (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Several studies have revealed qualitative differences between the basic level and other levels. For example, Tversky and Hemenway (1984) presented evidence that parts proliferative at the basic level; they proposed that parts link the appearance of category members with their functions. Although not taking issue with these findings, Murphy (1991) investigated whether parts are necessary or sufficient for a basic level. In an attempt to demonstrate that parts are not necessary, Murphy used artificial stimuli that did not capture the essential features of natural taxonomies. These discrepancies preclude any conclusions based on his studies. Murphy's data also do not support his claim that parts are not sufficient for a basic level. Finally, it is unlikely that pursuing questions of necessity or sufficiency will produce insights into human categorization.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1991GG73000002

    View details for PubMedID 1956305

  • SPATIAL MENTAL MODELS PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION-ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY Tversky, B. 1991; 27: 109-145
  • SEARCHING IMAGINED ENVIRONMENTS JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Franklin, N., Tversky, B. 1990; 119 (1): 63-76
  • PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL FACTORS IN DISTORTIONS IN MEMORY FOR GRAPHS AND MAPS JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Tversky, B., Schiano, D. J. 1989; 118 (4): 387-398

    Abstract

    We propose that representations of visual stimuli are a consequence of both perceptual and conceptual factors that may be revealed in systematic errors in memory. Three experiments demonstrated increased (horizontal or vertical) symmetry in perception and memory of nearly symmetric curves in graphs and rivers in maps. Next, a conceptual factor, an accompanying description biasing toward symmetry or asymmetry, also distorted memory in the expected direction for the symmetric descriptions. In the two final experiments, we investigated conceptual factors in selection of a frame of reference. Subjects remembered lines in graphs, but not in maps, as closer to the imaginary 45 degrees line. Combined with earlier research, this suggests that the reference frame for map lines is the canonical axes and for graph lines, the imaginary 45 degrees line.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1989CA00300005

    View details for PubMedID 2531198

  • PARTS, PARTONOMIES, AND TAXONOMIES DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B. 1989; 25 (6): 983-995
  • A RECONCILIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY - COMMENTS JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Tversky, B., TUCHIN, M. 1989; 118 (1): 86-91
  • DEVELOPMENT OF TAXONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF NAMED AND PICTURED CATEGORIES DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B. 1985; 21 (6): 1111-1119
  • MEMORY FOR FACES - ARE CARICATURES BETTER THAN PHOTOGRAPHS MEMORY & COGNITION Tversky, B., Baratz, D. 1985; 13 (1): 45-49

    View details for Web of Science ID A1985AHK5800006

    View details for PubMedID 4010513

  • OBJECTS, PARTS, AND CATEGORIES JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Tversky, B., Hemenway, K. 1984; 113 (2): 169-193

    Abstract

    Concepts may be organized into taxonomies varying in inclusiveness or abstraction, such as furniture, table, card table or animal, bird, robin. For taxonomies of common objects and organisms, the basic level, the level of table and bird, has been determined to be most informative (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Psychology, linguistics, and anthropology have produced a variety of measures of perception, behavior, and communication that converge on the basic level. Here, we present data showing that the basic level differs qualitatively from other levels in taxonomies of objects and of living things and present an explanation for why so many measures converge at that level. We have found that part terms proliferate in subjects' listings of attributes characterizing category members at the basic level, but are rarely listed at a general level. At a more specific level, fewer parts are listed, though more are judged to be true. Basic level objects are distinguished from one another by parts, but members of subordinate categories share parts and differ from one another on other attributes. Informants agree on the parts of objects, and also on relative "goodness" of the various parts. Perceptual salience and functional significance both appear to contribute to perceived part goodness. Names of parts frequently enjoy a duality not evident in names of other attributes; they refer at once to a particular appearance and to a particular function. We propose that part configuration underlies the various empirical operations of perception, behavior, and communication that converge at the basic level. Part configuration underlies the perceptual measures because it determines the shapes of objects to a large degree. Parts underlie the behavioral tasks because most of our behaviors is indirect toward parts of objects. Labeling appears to follow the natural breaks of perception and behavior; consequently, part configuration also underlies communication measures. Because elements of more abstract taxonomies, such as scenes and events, can also be decomposed into parts, this analysis provides a bridge to organization in other domains of knowledge. Knowledge organization by parts (partonomy) is contrasted to organization by kinds (taxonomy). Taxonomies serve to organize numerous classes of entities and to allow inference from larger sets to sets included in them. Partonomies serve to separate entities into their structural components and to organize knowledge of function by components of structure. The informativeness of the basic level may originate from the availability of inference from structure to function at that level.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1984ST15600001

    View details for PubMedID 6242749

  • CITATION CLASSIC - PICTORIAL AND VERBAL ENCODING IN A SHORT-TERM-MEMORY TASK CURRENT CONTENTS/SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES Tversky, B. 1984: 18-18
  • FORCE OF SYMMETRY IN FORM PERCEPTION AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY Freyd, J., Tversky, B. 1984; 97 (1): 109-126

    Abstract

    Many objects, natural and manufactured, have at least one axis of symmetry; thus, the detection of symmetry could facilitate the detection and representation of objects. Literature is reviewed that supports the notion that humans have effective and efficient symmetry-detection ability. The question addressed in the present research is whether symmetry detection leads to biases in representations of visual forms. Two types of experimental tasks were used: a similarity-judgment task and a matching-figures task in which reaction time to find identical figures in a display was measured. Stimuli varied in degree of measured symmetry. The results of the experiments reported here indicate that nearly symmetric standard forms are judged to be more similar to, and are more confusable with, even more symmetric forms than they are with less symmetric forms. The pull toward a more symmetric form does not occur for standard forms of lower symmetry. These findings can be accounted for by a two-stage process. First, the perceiver quickly determines the presence of overall symmetry. Then, if the form is perceived as having overall symmetry, the form is assumed, sometimes incorrectly, to have symmetry at the local level as well.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1984SL11600009

    View details for PubMedID 6721005

  • CATEGORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCENES COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B., Hemenway, K. 1983; 15 (1): 121-149
  • DISTORTIONS IN MEMORY FOR MAPS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Tversky, B. 1981; 13 (3): 407-433
  • DEVELOPMENTAL-TRENDS IN THE USE OF PERCEPTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTES IN GROUPING, CLUSTERING, AND RETRIEVAL JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY MELKMAN, R., Tversky, B., Baratz, D. 1981; 31 (3): 470-486

    View details for Web of Science ID A1981LN91800008

    View details for PubMedID 7288360