Ellen Markman
IBM Provostial Professor
Psychology
Bio
Markman’s research interests include the relationship between language and thought; early word learning; categorization and induction; theory of mind and pragmatics; implicit theories and conceptual change, and how theory-based explanations can be effective interventions in health domains.
Administrative Appointments
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Senior Associate Dean for the Social Sciences, Stanford University (2013 - Present)
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Faculty Athletics Representative, Stanford University (2005 - 2010)
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Cognizant Dean for the Social Sciences, Stanford University (1998 - 2000)
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Chair, Department of Psychology, Stanford University (1994 - 1997)
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Professor, Stanford University (1988 - Present)
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Associate Professor, Stanford University (1981 - 1988)
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Assistant Professor, Stanford University (1975 - 1980)
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Assistant Professor, University of Illinois (1973 - 1975)
Honors & Awards
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William James Lifetime Achievement Award for Basic Research, American Psychological Society (2013)
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Fellow, Cognitive Science Society (2012)
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Elected to National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences (2011)
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Elected Fellow, Association for Psychological Science (2006)
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Division 7 Outstanding Mentoring Award, American Psychological Association (2004)
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Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2003)
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Appointed as Lewis M. Terman Professor, Stanford University (2002)
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Elected Fellow, American Psychological Society (1989)
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University Fellow, Stanford University (1983-1984)
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Fellow, The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1982-1983)
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University Fellow, Stanford University (1981-1982)
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Sigma XI Research Award, University of Pennsylvania (1973)
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Graduated with Honors, University of Maryland (1969)
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Psi Chi Award, PSI CHI, The International Honor Society in Psychology (1968)
Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations
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Member, Provost’s Taskforce on Women and Leadership (2014 - Present)
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Member, Scientific and Technological Advisory Council, Menus of Change, Cuilinary Institute of America and Harvard School of Public Health (2014 - Present)
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Member, Committee on the Science of Children Birth to Age 8, National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, 2013-2014. (2013 - 2014)
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Member, CUES (2011 - 2012)
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Member, Selection Committee, Division 7, APA Book Award Committee (2008 - 2008)
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Member, Selection Committee, Division 7, APA Book Award Committee (2007 - 2007)
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Member, External Review Committee, University of California, Berkeley (2007 - 2007)
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Member, External Review Committee, University of Chicago, Development Area (2006 - 2006)
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Member, External Review Committee, University of Maryland (2006 - 2006)
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Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development (2005 - 2005)
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Elected to Faculty Senate, Stanford University (2004 - 2004)
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Member, External Review Committee, Temple University (2004 - 2004)
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Member, Harvard Visiting Committee (2003 - 2006)
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Member, Panel of Fact-Finders, Stanford University (2002 - Present)
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Member, Appointments and Promotions Committee, H&S, Stanford University (2002 - 2003)
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Chairperson, Center for Scientific Review, Special Emphasis Panel, National Institute of Health (2001 - 2001)
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Member, Selection Committee for APA's Distinguished Scientific Award for Early Contribution to Developmental Psychology (1999 - 1999)
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Participant, National Research Council's Workshop on Developmental Issues and Delinquency (1999 - 1999)
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Member, Search Committee for the Dean of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University (1998 - 1998)
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Member, National Research Council's Committee on National Needs for Biomedical and Behavioral Scientists (1997 - 2000)
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Member, Executive Committee of the Children and Society Curriculum, Stanford University (1992 - Present)
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Member of the Editorial Board, Cognitive Psychology (1990 - 1996)
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Member, Governing Council of Society for Research in Child Development (1987 - 1993)
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Member of the Editorial Board, Cognitive Development (1986 - 1994)
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Member, Steering Committee of the Study of Stanford and the Schools, Stanford University (1983 - 1984)
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Member, Cognition Emotion and Personality Review section in National Institute of Mental Health (1982 - 1985)
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Member, Child Development Subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council (1981 - 1984)
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Consulting Editor, Developmental Psychology (1978 - 1983)
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Consulting Editor, Child Development (1977 - 1996)
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Advisory Editor, Contemporary Psychology (1977 - 1979)
Program Affiliations
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Symbolic Systems Program
Professional Education
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Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania (1973)
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B.A., University of Maryland (1969)
2024-25 Courses
- Developmental Psychology
PSYCH 211 (Win) - General Development Seminar
PSYCH 243 (Win) - Senior Honors Research
PSYCH 198 (Aut, Win, Spr) -
Independent Studies (4)
- Graduate Research
PSYCH 275 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Practicum in Teaching
PSYCH 281 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Reading and Special Work
PSYCH 194 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Special Laboratory Projects
PSYCH 195 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum)
- Graduate Research
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Prior Year Courses
2023-24 Courses
- Developmental Psychology
PSYCH 211 (Win) - General Development Seminar
PSYCH 243 (Win) - Senior Honors Research
PSYCH 198 (Aut, Win, Spr)
2022-23 Courses
- Developmental Psychology
PSYCH 211 (Win) - General Development Seminar
PSYCH 243 (Win) - Senior Honors Research
PSYCH 198 (Aut, Win, Spr)
2021-22 Courses
- Advanced Research
PSYCH 197 (Aut) - Developmental Psychology
PSYCH 211 (Win) - General Development Seminar
PSYCH 243 (Win) - Senior Honors Research
PSYCH 198 (Win, Spr)
- Developmental Psychology
Stanford Advisees
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Doctoral Dissertation Reader (AC)
Aaron Chuey, Rondeline Williams -
Doctoral Dissertation Co-Advisor (AC)
David Rose
All Publications
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Modeling and Leveraging Intuitive Theories to Improve Vaccine Attitudes
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
2023
Abstract
Much of the richness of human thought is supported by people's intuitive theories-mental frameworks capturing the perceived structure of the world. But intuitive theories can also contain and reinforce dangerous misconceptions. In this paper, we take up the case of misconceptions about vaccine safety that discourages vaccination. These misconceptions constitute a major public health risk that predates the coronavirus pandemic but that has become all the more dire in recent years. We argue that addressing such misconceptions requires awareness of the broader conceptual contexts in which they are embedded. To build this understanding, we examined the structure and revision of people's intuitive theories of vaccination in five large survey studies (total N = 3,196). Based on these data, we present a cognitive model of the intuitive theory surrounding people's decisions about whether to vaccinate young children against diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Using this model, we were able to make accurate predictions about how people's beliefs would be revised in light of educational interventions, design an effective new intervention encouraging vaccination, and understand how these beliefs were affected by real-world events (the measles outbreaks of 2019). In addition to presenting a promising way forward for promoting the MMR vaccine, this approach has clear implications for encouraging the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, especially among parents of young children. At the same time, this work provides the foundation for richer understandings of intuitive theories and belief revision more broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
View details for DOI 10.1037/xge0001324
View details for Web of Science ID 000946703900001
View details for PubMedID 36913288
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Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?
Cognitive science
2021; 45 (5): e12954
Abstract
Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named "dual-character concepts." Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept "artist" has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither "man" nor "woman" appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.
View details for DOI 10.1111/cogs.12954
View details for PubMedID 34018232
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"Just as good": Learning gender stereotypes from attempts to counteract them.
Developmental psychology
2021; 57 (1): 114–25
Abstract
How do children learn gender stereotypes? Although people commonly use statements like "Girls are as good as boys at math" to express gender equality, such subject-complement statements subtly perpetuate the stereotype that boys are naturally more skilled. The syntax of such statements frames the item in the complement position (here, boys) as the standard for comparison or reference point. Thus, when the statement concerns ability, listeners infer that this item is naturally more skilled than the item in the subject position (here, girls). In 2 experiments, we ask whether subject-complement statements could not only reinforce preexisting gender stereotypes, but also teach them. The participants were 288 adults (51% women, 49% men) and 337 children ages 7 to 11 (50% girls, 50% boys; of the 62% who reported race, 44% self-declared as White; from primarily middle-class to upper middle-class families). Participants were provided with subject-complement statements about either novel abilities (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at trewting") or nonstereotyped activities (e.g., "Boys are as good as girls at snapping"). Both adults and children inferred that the gender in the complement position was naturally more skilled than the gender in the subject position. Using subject-complement statements to express gender equality (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at math") could thus backfire and teach children that boys have more natural ability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
View details for DOI 10.1037/dev0001143
View details for PubMedID 33382327
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What should we eat for breakfast? American and Chinese children's prescriptive judgments about breakfast foods
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
2020; 54
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100873
View details for Web of Science ID 000540372000014
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When intents to educate can misinform: Inadvertent paltering through violations of communicative norms.
PloS one
2020; 15 (5): e0230360
Abstract
Paltering is a form of deception whereby true statements are used to mislead and is widely employed in negotiations, marketing, espionage, and ordinary communications where speakers hold ulterior motives. We argue that paltering is accomplished through strategic violations of communicative norms such as the Gricean cooperative principles of relevance, quantity, quality and manner. We further argue that, just as genuine paltering deceives by deliberately violating communicative norms, inadvertent violations of these norms may be just as misleading. In this work, we demonstrated that educational information presented prominently on the American Diabetes Association website violated the Gricean communicative principles and disrupted readers' performance on a test of diabetes knowledge. To establish the effects of these communicative violations, we revised the ADA's information to preserve the original content while better adhering to pragmatic principles. When these ADA explanations were judiciously revised to minimize pragmatic violations, they were transformed from misleading to educational.
View details for DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0230360
View details for PubMedID 32469993
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Why do we eat cereal but not lamb chops at breakfast? Investigating Americans' beliefs about breakfast foods.
Appetite
2019: 104458
Abstract
Healthy breakfast consumption has a multitude of positive benefits. However, typical American breakfasts are notoriously unhealthy. We hypothesize that the resistance to include nutritious foods at breakfast is due in part to misconceptions about what "breakfast" should be. Consistent with this proposal, results from three studies (N = 1097) suggest that American adults perceive typical breakfast foods as particularly well suited for breakfast and believe that more nutritious alternatives consumed at lunch or dinner are less appropriate for breakfast. As a result, people are unwilling to add more nutritious alternatives to their breakfast repertoire. To counter this rigidity, we devised an intervention passage emphasizing that (1) many foods became breakfast staples because of intensive marketing campaigns, and that (2) people in other cultures readily include lunch or dinner foods on their breakfast plate. This approach effectively revised people's beliefs about breakfast foods, and improved their motivation to adopt a healthier breakfast diet. Our findings demonstrate the power of a conceptually rich framework in undermining mistaken beliefs and boosting healthy eating behaviors.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.appet.2019.104458
View details for PubMedID 31526837
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"Girls Are as Good as Boys at Math" Implies That Boys Are Probably Better: A Study of Expressions of Gender Equality.
Cognitive science
2018
Abstract
Although "Girls are as good as boys at math" explicitly expresses equality, we predict it could nevertheless suggest that boys have more raw talent. In statements with this subject-complement structure, the item in the complement position serves as the reference point and is thus considered more typical and prominent. This explains why "Tents are like houses," for instance, sounds better than "Houses are like tents"-people generally think of houses as more typical. For domains about ability, the reference point should be the item that is typically more skilled. We further propose that the reference point should be naturally more skilled. In two experiments, we presented adults with summaries of actual scientific evidence for gender equality in math (Experiment 1) or verbal ability (Experiment 2), but we manipulated whether the reference point in the statements of equality in the summaries (e.g., "Boys' verbal ability is as good as girls'") was girls or boys. As predicted, adults attributed more natural ability to each gender when it was in the complement rather than subject position. Yet, in Experiment 3, we found that when explicitly asked, participants judged that such sentences were not biased in favor of either gender, indicating that subject-complement statements must be transmitting this bias in a subtle way. Thus, statements such as "Girls are as good as boys at math" can actually backfire and perpetuate gender stereotypes about natural ability.
View details for PubMedID 29954049
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Misleading Health Consumers Through Violations of Communicative Norms: A Case Study of Online Diabetes Education.
Psychological science
2018: 956797617753393
Abstract
Communication is a cooperative endeavor that goes well beyond decoding sentences' literal meaning. Listeners actively construe the meaning of utterances from both their literal meanings and the pragmatic principles that govern communication. When communicators make pragmatically infelicitous statements, the effects can be similar to paltering-misleading speech that evokes false inferences from true statements. The American Diabetes Association's (ADA's) "Diabetes Myths" website provides a real-world case study in such misleading communications. Calling something a myth implies that it is clearly false. Instead, the ADA's "myths" are false only because of some technicality or uncharitable reading. We compared participants' baseline knowledge of diabetes with that of participants who read either the ADA's myths or the myths rewritten as questions that do not presuppose the statement is false. As predicted, exposure to the ADA's "myths," but not to the rephrased questions, reduced basic knowledge of diabetes. Our findings underscore the need to consider psycholinguistic principles in mass communications.
View details for PubMedID 29757711
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Rethinking people's conceptions of mental life
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2017; 114 (43): 11374–79
Abstract
How do people make sense of the emotions, sensations, and cognitive abilities that make up mental life? Pioneering work on the dimensions of mind perception has been interpreted as evidence that people consider mental life to have two core components-experience (e.g., hunger, joy) and agency (e.g., planning, self-control) [Gray HM, et al. (2007) Science 315:619]. We argue that this conclusion is premature: The experience-agency framework may capture people's understanding of the differences among different beings (e.g., dogs, humans, robots, God) but not how people parse mental life itself. Inspired by Gray et al.'s bottom-up approach, we conducted four large-scale studies designed to assess people's conceptions of mental life more directly. This led to the discovery of an organization that differs strikingly from the experience-agency framework: Instead of a broad distinction between experience and agency, our studies consistently revealed three fundamental components of mental life-suites of capacities related to the body, the heart, and the mind-with each component encompassing related aspects of both experience and agency. This body-heart-mind framework distinguishes itself from Gray et al.'s experience-agency framework by its clear and importantly different implications for dehumanization, moral reasoning, and other important social phenomena.
View details for PubMedID 29073059
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Theory-based explanation as intervention.
Psychonomic bulletin & review
2017
Abstract
Cogent explanations are an indispensable means of providing new information and an essential component of effective education. Beyond this, we argue that there is tremendous untapped potential in using explanations to motivate behavior change. In this article we focus on health interventions. We review four case studies that used carefully tailored explanations to address gaps and misconceptions in people's intuitive theories, providing participants with a conceptual framework for understanding how and why some recommended behavior is an effective way of achieving a health goal. These case studies targeted a variety of health-promoting behaviors: (1) children washing their hands to prevent viral epidemics; (2) parents vaccinating their children to stem the resurgence of infectious diseases; (3) adults completing the full course of an antibiotic prescription to reduce antibiotic resistance; and (4) children eating a variety of healthy foods to improve unhealthy diets. Simply telling people to engage in these behaviors has been largely ineffective-if anything, concern about these issues is mounting. But in each case, teaching participants coherent explanatory frameworks for understanding health recommendations has shown great promise, with such theory-based explanations outperforming state-of-the-art interventions from national health authorities. We contrast theory-based explanations both with simply listing facts, information, and advice and with providing a full-blown educational curriculum, and argue for providing the minimum amount of information required to understand the causal link between a target behavior and a health outcome. We argue that such theory-based explanations lend people the motivation and confidence to act on their new understanding.
View details for DOI 10.3758/s13423-016-1207-2
View details for PubMedID 28097604
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Navigating pedagogy: Children's developing capacities for learning from pedagogical interactions
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
2016; 38: 27-35
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.01.001
View details for Web of Science ID 000374074500003
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Are Horses Like Zebras, or Vice Versa? Children's Sensitivity to the Asymmetries of Directional Comparisons
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2016; 87 (2): 568-582
Abstract
Adults exhibit strong preferences when framing symmetrical relations. Adults prefer, for example, "A zebra is like a horse" to "A horse is like a zebra," and "The bicycle is near the building" to "The building is near the bicycle." This is because directional syntax requires more typical or prominent items (i.e., reference points) to be placed in the complement position. Three experiments with children ages 4-8 (N = 181) explored whether children share this sensitivity to directional syntax. Children of this age showed an incipient preference for framing reference points as complements. Stating, "Girls do math as well as boys," which frames boys as the reference point for girls, may therefore actually teach children that boys set the standard.
View details for DOI 10.1111/cdev.12476
View details for Web of Science ID 000373398500017
View details for PubMedID 26727987
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Children Increase Their Sensitivity to a Speaker's Nonlinguistic Cues Following a Communicative Breakdown
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2016; 87 (2): 385-394
Abstract
Bilingual children regularly face communicative challenges when speakers switch languages. To cope with such challenges, children may attempt to discern a speaker's communicative intent, thereby heightening their sensitivity to nonverbal communicative cues. Two studies examined whether such communication breakdowns increase sensitivity to nonverbal cues. English-speaking monolingual (n = 64) and bilingual (n = 54) 3- to 4-year-olds heard instructions in either English only or English mixed with a foreign language. Later, children played a hiding game that relied on nonverbal cues. Hearing a foreign language switch improved both monolingual and bilingual children's use of these cues. Moreover, bilinguals with more prior code-switching exposure outperformed those with less prior code-switching exposure. Children's short-term strategies to repair communication breakdowns may evolve into a more generalizable set of skills.
View details for DOI 10.1111/cdev.12479
View details for Web of Science ID 000373398500004
View details for PubMedID 26841131
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A bilingual advantage in how children integrate multiple cues to understand a speaker's referential intent
BILINGUALISM-LANGUAGE AND COGNITION
2015; 18 (3): 391-399
View details for DOI 10.1017/S1366728914000133
View details for Web of Science ID 000355753200003
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Preschoolers use pedagogical cues to guide radical reorganization of category knowledge
COGNITION
2014; 130 (1): 116-127
Abstract
In constructing a conceptual understanding of the world, children must actively evaluate what information is idiosyncratic or superficial, and what represents essential, defining information about kinds and categories. Preschoolers observed identical evidence about a novel object's function (magnetism) produced in subtly different manners: accidentally, intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically. Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for their benefit did children reliably go beyond salient perceptual features (color or shape), to infer function to be a defining property on which to base judgments about category membership. Children did not show this pattern when reasoning about a novel perceptual property, suggesting that a pedagogical communicative context may be especially important for children's learning about artifact functions. Observing functional evidence in a pedagogical context helps children construct fundamentally different conceptions of novel categories as defined not by superficial appearances but by deeper, functional properties.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.10.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000328662900011
View details for PubMedID 24211439
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Teaching Young Children a Theory of Nutrition: Conceptual Change and the Potential for Increased Vegetable Consumption
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
2013; 24 (8): 1541-1553
Abstract
In two experiments, we used a novel approach to educating young children about nutrition. Instead of teaching simple facts, we provided a rich conceptual framework that helped children understand the need to eat a variety of healthy foods. Using the insight that children's knowledge can be organized into coherent belief systems, or intuitive theories, we (a) analyzed the incipient knowledge that guides young children's reasoning about the food-body relationship, (b) identified the prerequisites that children need to conceptualize food as a source of nutrition, and (c) devised a strategy for teaching young children a coherent theory of food as a source of diverse nutrients. In these two experiments, we showed that children can learn and generalize this conceptual framework. Moreover, this learning led children to eat more vegetables at snack time. Our findings demonstrate that young children can benefit from an intervention that capitalizes on their developing intuitive theories about nutrition.
View details for DOI 10.1177/0956797612474827
View details for Web of Science ID 000322904700018
View details for PubMedID 23804961
- Preschoolers; ability to navigate communicative interactions in guiding their inductive inferences Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 2013
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Thinking in Categories or Along a Continuum: Consequences for Children's Social Judgments
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2012; 83 (4): 1145-1163
Abstract
Can young children, forming expectations about the social world, capture differences among people without falling into the pitfalls of categorization? Categorization often leads to exaggerating differences between groups and minimizing differences within groups, resulting in stereotyping. Six studies with 4-year-old children (N = 214) characterized schematic faces or photographs as falling along a continuum (really mean to really nice) or divided into categories (mean vs. nice). Using materials that children naturally group into categories (Study 3), the continuum framing prevented the signature pattern of categorization for similarity judgments (Study 1), inferences about behavior and deservingness (Studies 2 and 5), personal liking and play preferences (Study 4), and stable and internal attributions for behavior (Study 6). When children recognize people as members of continua, they may avoid stereotypes.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01774.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000306403700004
View details for PubMedID 22540868
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Preschoolers Use Intentional and Pedagogical Cues to Guide Inductive Inferences and Exploration
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2012; 83 (4): 1416-1428
Abstract
Children are judicious social learners. They may be particularly sensitive to communicative actions done pedagogically for their benefit, as such actions may mark important, generalizable information. Three experiments (N = 224) found striking differences in preschoolers' inductive generalization and exploration of a novel functional property, depending on whether identical evidence for the property was produced accidentally, intentionally, or pedagogically and communicatively. Results also revealed that although 4-year-olds reserved strong generalizations for a property that is pedagogically demonstrated, 3-year-olds made such inferences when it was produced either intentionally or pedagogically. These findings suggest that by age 4 children assess whether evidence is produced for their benefit in gauging generalizability, giving them a powerful tool for acquiring important kind-relevant, generic knowledge.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01775.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000306403700021
View details for PubMedID 22540939
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Finding the Cause: Verbal Framing Helps Children Extract Causal Evidence Embedded in a Complex Scene
JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT
2012; 13 (1): 38-66
View details for DOI 10.1080/15248372.2011.567201
View details for Web of Science ID 000302059800003
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Bilingualism and children's use of paralinguistic cues to interpret emotion in speech
BILINGUALISM-LANGUAGE AND COGNITION
2011; 14 (4): 562-569
View details for DOI 10.1017/S1366728910000404
View details for Web of Science ID 000294423800009
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Preschoolers' Use of Morphosyntactic Cues to Identify Generic Sentences: Indefinite Singular Noun Phrases, Tense, and Aspect
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2011; 82 (5): 1561-1578
Abstract
Generic sentences (e.g., "Birds lay eggs") convey generalizations about entire categories and may thus be an important source of knowledge for children. However, these sentences cannot be identified by a simple rule, requiring instead the integration of multiple cues. The present studies focused on 3- to 5-year-olds' (N = 91) use of morphosyntactic cues--in particular, on whether children can (a) interpret indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., "a strawberry") as generic and (b) use a verb's tense and aspect (e.g., "A bat sleeps/slept/is sleeping upside down") to determine whether its subject noun phrase is generic. Children demonstrated sensitivity to both cues. Thus, solving the in-principle problem of identifying generics may not be beyond the reach of young children's comprehension skills.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01615.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000295048300016
View details for PubMedID 21790538
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The Generic/Nongeneric Distinction Influences How Children Interpret New Information About Social Others
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2011; 82 (2): 471-492
Abstract
These studies investigate how the distinction between generic sentences (e.g., "Boys are good at math") and nongeneric sentences (e.g., "Johnny is good at math") shapes children's social cognition. These sentence types are hypothesized to have different implications about the source and nature of the properties conveyed. Specifically, generics may be more likely to imply that the referred-to properties emerge naturally from an internal source, which may cause these properties to become essentialized. Four experiments (N = 269 four-year-olds and undergraduates) confirmed this hypothesis but also suggested that participants only essentialize the information provided in generic form when this construal is consistent with their prior theoretical knowledge. These studies further current understanding of language as a means of learning about others.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01525.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000288760000003
View details for PubMedID 21410911
- Teaching and Learning Suomen Atropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 2011; 36: 38-39
- Thinking for seeing: Enculturation of visual-referential expertise as demonstrated by photo-triggered reorganization of two-tone 'Mooney' images Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 2011
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Young Bilingual Children's Heightened Sensitivity to Referential Cues
JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT
2011; 12 (1): 12-31
View details for DOI 10.1080/15248372.2011.539524
View details for Web of Science ID 000287032200002
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Bilingual Children's Integration of Multiple Cues to Understand a Speaker's Referential Intent
34th Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development
CASCADILLA PRESS. 2010: 480–490
View details for Web of Science ID 000286287500042
- Constraints children place on word meanings Language Acquisition: Critical concepts in linguistics edited by Yang, C. Routledge, Press. 2010
- Pedagogical cues influence children's inductive inference and exploratory play Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society edited by Ohlsson, S., Catrambone, R. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 2010
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Information learned from generic language becomes central to children's biological concepts: Evidence from their open-ended explanations
COGNITION
2009; 113 (1): 14-25
Abstract
Generic sentences (e.g., "Snakes have holes in their teeth") convey that a property (e.g., having holes in one's teeth) is true of a category (e.g., snakes). We test the hypothesis that, in addition to this basic aspect of their meaning, generic sentences also imply that the information they express is more conceptually central than the information conveyed in similar non-generic sentences (e.g., "This snake has holes in his teeth"). To test this hypothesis, we elicited 4- and 5-year-old children's open-ended explanations for generic and non-generic versions of the same novel properties. Based on arguments in the categorization literature, we assumed that, relative to more peripheral properties, properties that are understood as conceptually central would be explained more often as causes and less often as effects of other features, behaviors, or processes. Two experiments confirmed the prediction that preschool-age children construe novel information learned from generics as more conceptually central than the same information learned from non-generics. Additionally, Experiment 2 suggested that the conceptual status of novel properties learned from generic sentences becomes similar to that of familiar properties that are already at the category core. These findings illustrate the power of generic language to shape children's concepts.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.004
View details for Web of Science ID 000271685000002
View details for PubMedID 19674739
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Children's Use of Mutual Exclusivity to Learn Labels for Parts of Objects
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
2009; 45 (2): 592-596
Abstract
When teaching children part terms, adults frequently outline the relevant part rather than simply point. This pragmatic information very likely helps children interpret the label correctly. But the importance of gestures may not negate the need for default lexical biases such as the whole object assumption and mutual exclusivity. On this view, children initially assume that a novel label refers to a whole object. If the label for the object is familiar, mutual exclusivity blocks this assumption and frees children to look for a part referent. In this study, the authors taught children part terms by outlining a novel part of a real object. We made mutual exclusivity available by showing children familiar whole objects with novel parts and unavailable by showing unfamiliar whole objects with novel parts. During test, the object was oriented with the part facing away from the child to distinguish pointing to the object from pointing to the part. Both 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds learned more part labels when mutual exclusivity was available. Thus, mutual exclusivity is indispensable even when part labeling is accompanied by naturalistic communicative gestures.
View details for DOI 10.1037/a0014838
View details for Web of Science ID 000263939000024
View details for PubMedID 19271842
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Understanding a Speaker's Communicative Intent: Bilingual Children's Heightened Sensitivity to Referential Gestures
33rd Annual Boston-University Conference on Language Development
CASCADILLA PRESS. 2009: 646–657
View details for Web of Science ID 000266036800055
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Preschool children's use of cues to generic meaning
Biennial Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 2008: 19–53
Abstract
Sentences that refer to categories - generic sentences (e.g., "Dogs are friendly") - are frequent in speech addressed to young children and constitute an important means of knowledge transmission. However, detecting generic meaning may be challenging for young children, since it requires attention to a multitude of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic cues. The first three experiments tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds use (a) the immediate linguistic context, (b) their previous knowledge, and (c) the social context to determine whether an utterance with ambiguous scope (e.g., "They are afraid of mice", spoken while pointing to 2 birds) is generic. Four-year-olds were able to take advantage of all the cues provided, but 3-year-olds were sensitive only to the first two. In Experiment 4, we tested the relative strength of linguistic-context cues and previous-knowledge cues by putting them in conflict; in this task, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, preferred to base their interpretations on the explicit noun phrase cues from the linguistic context. These studies indicate that, from early on, children can use contextual and semantic information to construe sentences as generic, thus taking advantage of the category knowledge conveyed in these sentences.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.008
View details for Web of Science ID 000255144500002
View details for PubMedID 17765216
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Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds' imitation
4th Biennial Meeting of the Cognitive-Development-Society
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2008: 275–85
Abstract
Children are selective and flexible imitators. They combine their own prior experiences and the perceived causal efficacy of the model to determine whether and what to imitate. In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to have either a difficult or an easy experience achieving a goal. They then saw an adult use novel means to achieve the goal. Children with a difficult prior experience were more likely to imitate the adult's precise means. Experiment 2 showed further selectivity--children preferentially imitated causally efficacious versus nonefficacious acts. In Experiment 3, even after an easy prior experience led children to think their own means would be effective, they still encoded the novel means performed by the model. When a subsequent manipulation rendered the children's means ineffective, children recalled and imitated the model's means. The research shows that children integrate information from their own prior interventions and their observations of others to guide their imitation.
View details for DOI 10.1037/0012-1649.44.1.275
View details for Web of Science ID 000252232800027
View details for PubMedID 18194026
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Subtle linguistic cues affect children's motivation
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
2007; 18 (4): 314-316
View details for Web of Science ID 000246152000008
View details for PubMedID 17470255
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Striking deficiency in top-down perceptual reorganization of two-tone images in preschool children
6th IEEE International Conference on Development Learning
IEEE. 2007: 289–294
View details for Web of Science ID 000253369100050
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Looks aren't everything: 24-month-olds' willingness to accept unexpected labels
24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society
LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC INC-TAYLOR & FRANCIS. 2007: 93–111
View details for Web of Science ID 000244799700005
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Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
2006; 9 (6): 590-596
Abstract
Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).
View details for Web of Science ID 000241507900010
View details for PubMedID 17059456
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Precision of imitation as a function of preschoolers' understanding of the goal of the demonstration
Biennial Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2006: 723–31
Abstract
The authors argue that imitation is a flexible and adaptive learning mechanism in that children do not always reproduce all of the details they can from a demonstration. Instead, they vary their replications depending on their interpretation of the situation. Specifically, the authors propose that when children do not understand the overall reason for a model's behavior, they will be more likely to imitate precisely. By copying conservatively in these situations, children may have a good chance of reproducing the action of the model correctly. In contrast, when the reason for an action is clear, children will be more likely to deviate from the manners and flourishes of the model and use their own means to complete the action.
View details for DOI 10.1037/0012-1649.42.4.723
View details for Web of Science ID 000238659200011
View details for PubMedID 16802904
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The absence of a shape bias in children's word learning
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
2005; 41 (6): 1003-1019
Abstract
There is debate about whether preschool-age children interpret words as referring to kinds or to classes defined by shape similarity. The authors argue that the shape bias reported in previous studies is a task-induced artifact rather than a genuine word-learning strategy. In particular, children were forced to extend an object's novel label to one of several stand-alone, simple-shaped items, including a same-shape option from a different category and a different-shape option from the same superordinate category. Across 6 experiments, the authors found that the shape bias was eliminated (a) when the objects were more complex, (b) when they were presented in context, or (c) when children were no longer forced to choose. Moreover, children preferred the different-shape category alternatives when these were part of the same basic-level category as the target. The present experiments suggest that children seek out objects of the same kind when presented with a novel label, even if they are sometimes unable to identify the relevant kinds on their own.
View details for DOI 10.1037/0012-1649.41.6.1003
View details for Web of Science ID 000233715700017
View details for PubMedID 16351346
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Appearance questions can be misleading: A discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problem
Biennial Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. 2005: 233–63
Abstract
Preschoolers' success on the appearance-reality task is a milestone in theory-of-mind development. On the standard task children see a deceptive object, such as a sponge that looks like a rock, and are asked, "What is this really?" and "What does this look like?" Children below 412 years of age fail saying that the object not only is a sponge but also looks like a sponge. We propose that young children's difficulty stems from ambiguity in the meaning of "looks like." This locution can refer to outward appearance ("Peter looks like Paul") but in fact often refers to likely reality ("That looks like Jim"). We propose that "looks like" is taken to refer to likely reality unless the reality is already part of the common ground of the conversation. Because this joint knowledge is unclear to young children on the appearance-reality task, they mistakenly think the appearance question is about likely reality. Study 1 analyzed everyday conversations from the CHILDES database and documented that 2 and 3-year-olds are familiar with these two different uses of the locution. To disambiguate the meaning of "looks like," Study 2 clarified that reality was shared knowledge as part of the appearance question, e.g., "What does the sponge look like?" Study 3 used a non-linguistic measure to emphasize the shared knowledge of the reality in the appearance question. Study 4 asked children on their own to articulate the contrast between appearance and reality. At 91%, 85%, and 81% correct responses, children were at near ceiling levels in each of our manipulations while they failed the standard versions of the tasks. Moreover, we show how this discourse-based explanation accounts for findings in the literature. Thus children master the appearance-reality distinction by the age of 3 but the standard task masks this understanding because of the discourse structure involved in talking about appearances.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.09.001
View details for Web of Science ID 000228614900001
View details for PubMedID 15826611
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Word learning in dogs?
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES
2004; 8 (11): 479-481
Abstract
In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations - learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning - as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2004.09.007
View details for Web of Science ID 000225240700001
View details for PubMedID 15491899
- Acquiring and using a grammatical form class: Lessons from the proper-count distinction Weaving a lexicon edited by Wasman, S., Hall, D. G. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2004: 371–410
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Use of the mutual exclusivity assumption by young word learners
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
2003; 47 (3): 241-275
Abstract
A critical question about early word learning is whether word learning constraints such as mutual exclusivity exist and foster early language acquisition. It is well established that children will map a novel label to a novel rather than a familiar object. Evidence for the role of mutual exclusivity in such indirect word learning has been questioned because: (1) it comes mostly from 2 and 3-year-olds and (2) the findings might be accounted for, not by children avoiding second labels, but by the novel object which creates a lexical gap children are motivated to fill. Three studies addressed these concerns by having only a familiar object visible. Fifteen to seventeen and 18-20-month-olds were selected to straddle the vocabulary spurt. In Study 1, babies saw a familiar object and an opaque bucket as a location to search. Study 2 handed babies the familiar object to play with. Study 3 eliminated an obvious location to search. On the whole, babies at both ages resisted second labels for objects and, with some qualifications, tended to search for a better referent for the novel label. Thus mutual exclusivity is in place before the onset of the naming explosion. The findings demonstrate that lexical constraints enable babies to learn words even under non-optimal conditions--when speakers are not clear and referents are not visible. The results are discussed in relation to an alternative social-pragmatic account.
View details for DOI 10.1016/S0010-0285(03)00034-3
View details for Web of Science ID 000186134400001
View details for PubMedID 14559217
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The relative strengths of indirect and direct word learning
Biennial Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2003: 745–60
Abstract
Indirect word learning lacks many of the overt social-pragmatic cues to reference available in direct word learning, yet the two result in equally robust mappings when comprehension is assessed immediately after learning. The 3 studies reported here investigated how 3-year-olds (N=96) respond to more challenging tests of the relative strengths of indirect and direct word learning. In Study 1, children's comprehension of indirectly and directly learned proper and common names was tested after a 2-day delay. Both types of learning resulted in proper name mappings that picked out an individual and in common name mappings that could be extended to another category member. In Studies 2 and 3, children's comprehension was tested after they had been provided with additional, and sometimes inconsistent, information about the scope of previously learned words. There was a hint of a difference between indirect and direct word learning. but results overall suggested that the two were equivalent.
View details for DOI 10.1037/0012-1649.39.4.745
View details for Web of Science ID 000183743000010
View details for PubMedID 12859127
- The relative strength of indirect and direct word learning Developmental Psychology 2003; 39: 745-760
- Abilities and assumptions underlying conceptual development Early category and concept development: Making sense of the blooming, buzzing confusion edited by Rakison, D. H., Oakes, L. M. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003: 384–402
- Children's acceptance and use of unexpected category labels to draw non-obvious inferences Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society edited by Gray, W., Schunn, C. 2002: 500–505
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Learning proper and common names in inferential versus ostensive contexts
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
2001; 72 (3): 768-786
Abstract
A single, indirect exposure to a novel word provides information that could be used to make a fast mapping between the word and its referent, but it is not known how well this initial mapping specifies the function of the new word. The four studies reported here compare preschoolers' (N = 64) fast mapping of new proper and common names following an indirect exposure requiring inference with their learning of new names following ostension. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown an animate-inanimate pair of objects and asked to select, for example, Dax, a dax, or one. Children spontaneously selected an animate over an inanimate object as the referent for a novel proper name, but had no animacy preference in common name or baseline conditions. Next, the children were asked to perform actions on, for example, Dax or a dax, when presented with an array of three objects: the one they had just selected, another member of like kind, and a distracter. An indirectly learned proper name was treated as a marker for the originally selected object only, whereas a new common name was generalized to include the other category member. Study 2 showed that mappings made by inference were as robust as those made by ostension. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that even 2-year-olds can learn as much about the function of a new word from an indirect exposure as from ostension.
View details for Web of Science ID 000169048800011
View details for PubMedID 11405581
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Multiple approaches to the study of word learning in children
39th Annual Meeting of the Japanese-Association-of-Educational-Psychology
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING. 1999: 79–81
View details for Web of Science ID 000079549900007
- Cognitive development Cognitive Science volume of the Handbook of cognition and perception edited by Bly, B. M., Rumelhart, D. 1999
- Early word learning Handbook of child psychology edited by Kuhn, D., Siegler, R. New York: Wiley. 1998: 371–420
- Early Word Learning Constraints Annual Report of Educational Psychology in Japan 1998; 73: 21-26
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Young children's appreciation of the mental impact of their communicative signals
Biennial Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 1997: 630–36
Abstract
This work addresses whether 30-month-olds appreciate that their communicative signals are being understood (or not) by another person. Infants produce a range of behaviors, such as repairing their failed signals, that have been construed as evidence that they have an implicit theory of mind. Such behavior could be interpreted as attempts to obtain some desired goal rather than as attempts to gain listener understanding. This study was designed to separate listener comprehension from obtaining a material goal. In 4 conditions, children either did or did not get what they wanted and the experimenter understood or misunderstood their request. As predicted, children clarified their signal more when the experimenter misunderstood compared to when she understood. Regardless of whether young children achieved their overt goal, they engaged in behaviors to ensure their communicative act had been understood.
View details for Web of Science ID A1997XK18800006
View details for PubMedID 9232378
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Infants' reliance on a social criterion for establishing word-object relations
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1996; 67 (6): 3135-3153
Abstract
The language children hear presents them with a multitude of co-occurrences between words and things in the world, and they must repeatedly determine which among these manifold co-occurrences is relevant. Social factors--such as cues regarding the speaker's referential intent--might serve as one guide to whether word-object covariation should be registered. In 2 studies, infants (15-20 months and 18-20 months in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) heard novel labels at a time when they were investigating a single novel object; in one case the label was uttered by a speaker seated within the infant's view and displaying concurrent attention to the novel toy (coupled condition), whereas in the other case the label emanated from a speaker seated out of the infant's view (decoupled condition). In both studies, subsequent comprehension questions indicated that infants of 18-20 months registered a stable link between label and object in the coupled conditions, but not in the decoupled condition, despite the fact that covariation between label and object was equivalent in the 2 conditions. Thus, by 18-20 months children are inclined to establish a mapping between word and object only when a speaker displays signs of referring to that object.
View details for Web of Science ID A1996WN23500030
View details for PubMedID 9071774
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16-MONTH-OLD AND 24-MONTH-OLD - USE OF MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY AS A DEFAULT ASSUMPTION IN 2ND-LABEL LEARNING
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
1994; 30 (6): 955-968
View details for Web of Science ID A1994PT35400017
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RAPID WORD LEARNING IN 13-MONTH-OLDS AND 18-MONTH-OLDS
1991 Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 1994: 553–66
View details for Web of Science ID A1994NW05300009
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CONSTRAINTS ON WORD MEANING IN EARLY LANGUAGE-ACQUISITION
LINGUA
1994; 92 (1-4): 199-227
View details for Web of Science ID A1994NH81200008
- Constraints on word meaning in early language acquisition The acquisition of lexicon edited by Gleitman, L., Landau, B. MIT Press. 1994: 199–228
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INFANTS ABILITY TO DRAW INFERENCES ABOUT NONOBVIOUS OBJECT PROPERTIES - EVIDENCE FROM EXPLORATORY PLAY
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1993; 64 (3): 711-728
Abstract
Generalizing knowledge about nonobvious object properties often involves inductive inference. For example, having discovered that a particular object can float, we may infer that other objects of similar appearance likewise float. In this research, exploratory play served as a window on early inductive capability. In the first study, 48 infants between 9 and 16 months explored pairs of novel toys in 2 test conditions: violated expectation (two similar toys were presented in sequence, the first toy produced an interesting nonobvious property, such as a distinctive sound or movement, while the second toy was invisibly altered such that it failed to produce the nonobvious property available in the first toy), and interest control (two similar-looking toys were presented in sequence, neither of which produced the interesting property). Infants quickly and persistently attempted to reproduce the interesting property when exploring the second toy of the violated expectation condition relative to the first toy of the interest control condition (a baseline estimate) or the second toy of the interest control condition (an estimate of simple disinterest). The second study, with 40 9-16-months-olds, confirmed these results and also indicated a degree of discrimination on infants' part: Infants seldom expected toys of radically different appearance to possess the same nonobvious property. The findings indicate that infants as young as 9 months can draw simple inferences about nonobvious object properties after only brief experience with just 1 exemplar.
View details for Web of Science ID A1993LJ94100006
View details for PubMedID 8339691
- Constraints children place on word meanings Language acquisition: Core readings edited by Bloom, P. Herts, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1993: 154–173
- Review of "Epigenesis of mind: Essays on biology and cognition" American Scientist 1993: 395-396
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CONSTRAINTS ON WORD LEARNING - SPECULATIONS ABOUT THEIR NATURE, ORIGINS, AND DOMAIN SPECIFICITY
MINNESOTA SYMPOSIA ON CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
1992; 25: 59-101
View details for Web of Science ID A1992JX48500003
- Ways in which children constrain word meanings Language and Cognition: A Developmental Perspective. The Fifth Annual Tel Aviv Workshop in Human Development and Education edited by Dromi, E. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 1992: 61–87
- Classes and collections: Internal organization and resulting holistic properties Jean Piaget: Critical assessment edited by Smith, L. Routledge, Chapman and Hall Ltd.. 1992: 561–577
- The whole object, taxonomic, and mutual exclusivity assumptions as initial constraints on word meanings Perspectives on language and cognition: Interrelations in development edited by Byrnes, J. P., Gelman, S. A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991: 72–106
- Constraints on learning as default assumptions: Comments on Merriman & Bowman's "The mutual exclusivity assumption in children's word learning" Development Review 1991; 11: 137-163
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CONSTRAINTS CHILDREN PLACE ON WORD MEANINGS
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
1990; 14 (1): 57-77
View details for Web of Science ID A1990DK92300005
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ESTABLISHING WORD-OBJECT RELATIONS - A 1ST STEP
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1989; 60 (2): 381-398
Abstract
This work explores how infants in the early phases of acquiring language come to establish an initial mapping between objects and their labels. If infants are biased to attend more to objects in the presence of language, that could help them to note word-object object pairings. To test this, a first study compared how long 18 10-14-month-old infants looked at unfamiliar toys when labeling phrases accompanied their presentation, versus when no labeling phrases were provided. As predicted, labeling the toys increased infants' attention to them. A second study examined whether the presence of labeling phrases increased infants' attention to objects over and above what pointing, a powerful nonlinguistic method for directing infants' attention, could accomplish on its own. 22 infants from 2 age groups (10-14- and 17-20-month-olds) were shown pairs of unfamiliar toys in 2 situations: (a) in a pointing alone condition, where the experimenter pointed a number of times at one of the toys, and (b) in a labeling + pointing condition, where the experimenter labeled the target toy while pointing to it. While the pointing occurred, infants looked just as long at the target toy whether or not it was labeled. During a subsequent play period in which no labels were uttered, however, infants gazed longer at the target toys that had been labeled than at those that had not. Thus language can increase infants' attention to objects beyond the time that labeling actually occurs. These studies do not pinpoint which aspects of labeling behavior contribute to the attentional facilitation effect that was observed. In any case, however, this tendency for language to sustain infants' attention to objects may help them learn the mappings between words and objects.
View details for Web of Science ID A1989T356100010
View details for PubMedID 2924658
- Categorization and naming in children: Problems of induction Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books. 1989
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CHILDRENS USE OF MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY TO CONSTRAIN THE MEANINGS OF WORDS
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
1988; 20 (2): 121-157
View details for Web of Science ID A1988M809500001
View details for PubMedID 3365937
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YOUNG CHILDRENS INDUCTIONS FROM NATURAL KINDS - THE ROLE OF CATEGORIES AND APPEARANCES
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1987; 58 (6): 1532-1541
Abstract
Recent analyses of natural kind terms (e.g., dog, gold) suggest that people expect members of a kind to share unforeseen properties. The present study investigated the development of this expectation by studying children's inductive inferences. On each of a series of problems, 3- and 4-year-old children were taught a new fact about an object and then were asked whether it would generalize to: an object that looked like the original, that had the same label as the original, that looked like the original and had the same label, or that differed from the original in both respects. The results indicate that 3- and 4-year-olds drew more inferences based on category membership than on perceptual appearances, when both were available. Furthermore, children often based their inferences on category membership even when no label was provided. Thus even 3-year-olds assumed that natural kind categories include more than superficial features.
View details for Web of Science ID A1987K905500014
View details for PubMedID 3691200
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WORD LEARNING IN CHILDREN - AN EXAMINATION OF FAST MAPPING
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1987; 58 (4): 1021-1034
Abstract
Children may be able to gain at least partial information about the meaning of a word from how it is used in a sentence, what words it is contrasted with, as well as other factors. This strategy, known as fast mapping, may allow the child to quickly hypothesize about the meaning of a word. It is not yet known whether this strategy is available to children in semantic domains other than color. In the first study, 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds were introduced to a novel color, shape, or texture word by contrasting the new term with a well-known word from that domain. They were then tested for their ability to produce and comprehend the new term and for whether they knew what semantic domain the word referred to. The results show that even 2-year-old children can quickly narrow down the meaning of a word in each of the semantic domains examined, although children learned more about shape terms than color or texture words. A second study explored the effects of several variables on children's ability to infer the meaning of a new term. One finding of this study was that if the context is compelling, children can figure out the meaning of a new word even without hearing an explicit linguistic contrast.
View details for Web of Science ID A1987J305700014
View details for PubMedID 3608655
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ACQUIRING WORD MEANINGS VIA LINGUISTIC CONTRAST
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
1987; 2 (3): 217-236
View details for Web of Science ID A1987K663700003
- How children constrain the possible meanings of words Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization edited by Neisser, U. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987: 255–287
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CATEGORIES AND INDUCTION IN YOUNG-CHILDREN
COGNITION
1986; 23 (3): 183-209
View details for Web of Science ID A1986E860600001
View details for PubMedID 3791915
- Understanding natural kind terms: A developmental comparison Papers and Reports on Child Language Development 1986; 25: 41-48
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IMPLICIT CONTRAST IN ADJECTIVES VS NOUNS - IMPLICATIONS FOR WORD-LEARNING IN PRESCHOOLERS
JOURNAL OF CHILD LANGUAGE
1985; 12 (1): 125-143
View details for Web of Science ID A1985ADU5900010
View details for PubMedID 3980597
- Comprehension monitoring: Developmental and educational issues Thinking and learning skills. Vol. 2: Research and open questions edited by Chipman, S. F., Segal, J. W., Glaser, R. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 1985: 275–292
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WHY SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY TERMS CAN BE MASS NOUNS
COGNITION
1985; 19 (1): 31-53
View details for Web of Science ID A1985AEM0500002
View details for PubMedID 4039641
- The acquisition and hierarchical organization of categories by children Origins of Cognitive Skills edited by Sophian, C. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984: 371–406
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CHILDRENS SENSITIVITY TO CONSTRAINTS ON WORD MEANING - TAXONOMIC VERSUS THEMATIC RELATIONS
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
1984; 16 (1): 1-27
View details for Web of Science ID A1984SD88500001
- An analysis of hierarchical classification Advances in the psychology of human intelligence edited by Sternberg, R. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 1983: 325–365
- Two different kinds of hierarchical organization New trends in conceptual representation: Challenges to Piagetian theory edited by Scholnick, E. K. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1983
- Cognitive Development Handbook of Child Psychology edited by Flavell, J. H., Markman, E. M., Mussen, H. New York: Wiley. 1983; III
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PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION IN YOUNG CHILDRENS NATURAL-LANGUAGE HIERARCHIES
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1982; 53 (4): 1093-1101
View details for Web of Science ID A1982PG44000030
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THE STANDARD OBJECT-SORTING TASK AS A MEASURE OF CONCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
1981; 17 (1): 115-117
View details for Web of Science ID A1981LE53700015
- Comprehension Monitoring Children's oral communication skills edited by Dickson, W. P. New York: Academic Press. 1981: 61–84
- Two different principles of conceptual organization Advances in developmental psychology edited by Lamb, M., Brown, A. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1981
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CHILDRENS ABILITY TO ADJUST THEIR STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING COMPREHENSION
JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
1981; 73 (3): 320-325
View details for Web of Science ID A1981LV05300003
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REFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION - EFFECTS OF LISTENER PRESENCE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUNG SPEAKERS
MERRILL-PALMER QUARTERLY-JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
1981; 27 (3): 307-315
View details for Web of Science ID A1981NJ67600009
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CLASSES AND COLLECTIONS - PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION IN THE LEARNING OF HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS
COGNITION
1980; 8 (3): 227-241
View details for Web of Science ID A1980KF41100001
View details for PubMedID 7398232
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DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ACQUISITION OF BASIC AND SUPERORDINATE CATEGORIES
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1980; 51 (3): 708-719
View details for Web of Science ID A1980KP35100011
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REALIZING THAT YOU DONT UNDERSTAND - ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL CHILDRENS AWARENESS OF INCONSISTENCIES
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1979; 50 (3): 643-655
Abstract
2 factors were proposed to affect awareness of one's comprehension failure: the inferential processing requirements, and the kind of standards against which comprehension is evaluated. These studies investigated elementary school children's awareness of their own comprehension failure when presented with inconsistent information. Study 1 showed that children were more likely to notice explicit than implicit contradictions. However, even 12-year-olds judged as comprehensible a sizable proportion of essays with seemingly obvious inconsistencies. Yet, the children had good probed recall of the information, the logical capacity to draw the inferences, and were not generally reluctant to question the experimenter. In subsequent studies children were (a) asked to repeat sentences in order to guarantee that the 2 inconsistent propositions were concurrently activated in working memory, and (b) warned about the existence of a problem in order to promote more careful evaluation. Taken together, the results suggest that to notice inconsistencies children have to encode and store the information, draw the relevant inferences, retrieve and maintain the (inferred) propositions in working memory, and compare them. Third through sixth graders do not spontaneously carry out those processes that they are capable of carrying out.
View details for Web of Science ID A1979HQ93500004
View details for PubMedID 498843
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CHILDRENS THINKING - WHAT DEVELOPS - SIEGLER,RS (Book Review)
CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY
1979; 24 (12): 963-964
View details for Web of Science ID A1979JB15900001
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CLASSES AND COLLECTIONS - CONCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION AND NUMERICAL ABILITIES
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
1979; 11 (4): 395-411
View details for Web of Science ID A1979HN80500001
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EMPIRICAL VERSUS LOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO PART-WHOLE COMPARISON PROBLEMS CONCERNING CLASSES AND COLLECTIONS
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1978; 49 (1): 168-177
View details for Web of Science ID A1978EX30400020
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PROBLEMS OF LOGIC AND EVIDENCE
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
1978; 1 (2): 194-195
View details for Web of Science ID A1978HA30600015
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REALIZING THAT YOU DONT UNDERSTAND - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1977; 48 (3): 986-992
View details for Web of Science ID A1977DW37100028
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CLASSES AND COLLECTIONS - INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND RESULTING HOLISTIC PROPERTIES
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
1976; 8 (4): 561-577
View details for Web of Science ID A1976CF96500005
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CHILDRENS DIFFICULTY WITH WORD-REFERENT DIFFERENTIATION
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1976; 47 (3): 742-749
View details for Web of Science ID A1976CF97900021
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LANGUAGE AND ABILITY TO EVALUATE CONTRADICTIONS AND TAUTOLOGIES
COGNITION
1975; 3 (3): 213-226
View details for Web of Science ID A1975AY58000002
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FACILITATION OF PART-WHOLE COMPARISONS BY USE OF COLLECTIVE NOUN FAMILY
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
1973; 44 (4): 837-840
View details for Web of Science ID A1973R314300022
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RELEASED OFFENDERS PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTION
CORRECTIVE PSYCHIATRY & JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THERAPY
1970; 16 (1-4): 88-96
View details for Web of Science ID A1970I918300013