Academic Appointments


  • Professor, Economics
  • Professor (By courtesy), Economics

Administrative Appointments


  • Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley (2008 - 2008)
  • Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business (2004 - Present)
  • Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2002 - Present)
  • Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University (1999 - 2002)
  • John Stauffer National Fellow, Hoover Institution (1998 - 1999)
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley (1995 - 1998)
  • Visiting Assistant Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1995 - 1995)
  • Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University (1991 - 1992)

Honors & Awards


  • Compass Lexecon Prize, Compass Lexecon (2008)
  • Fellowship, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation (2002-2003)
  • Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1999-2001)
  • Graduate Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1994-1995)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (2013 - Present)
  • Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2013 - Present)
  • Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies (2010 - Present)
  • Member, Economics Panel, National Science Foundation (2008 - 2010)
  • Member, Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4 (2006 - 2009)
  • Member, Toulouse Network on Information Technology (2005 - Present)
  • Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department (2005 - 2011)
  • Member, Committee on Libraries, Stanford University (2004 - 2007)
  • Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University (2004 - 2005)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (2003 - Present)
  • Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2003 - 2005)
  • Member, Editorial Board, American Economic Review (2002 - 2005)
  • Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (2002 - 2003)
  • Editor, B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics (1999 - 2005)
  • Associate Editor, RAND Journal of Economics (1998 - 2006)

Professional Education


  • Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (1995)
  • M.S., Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Applied Mathematics (1991)

2017-18 Courses


All Publications


  • Property Rights Handbook of Organizational Economics Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. edited by Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. Princeton University Press. 2012
  • A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining) THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2011; 6 (1): 109-125

    View details for DOI 10.3982/TE591

    View details for Web of Science ID 000296007500005

  • Optimal Information Disclosure JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Rayo, L., Segal, I. 2010; 118 (5): 949-987

    View details for DOI 10.1086/657922

    View details for Web of Science ID 000287136900004

  • Nash implementation with little communication THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Segal, I. R. 2010; 5 (1): 51-71

    View details for DOI 10.3982/TE576

    View details for Web of Science ID 000296007000003

  • The communication cost of selfishness JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Fadel, R., Segal, I. 2009; 144 (5): 1895-1920
  • Antitrust in innovative industries AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2007; 97 (5): 1703-1730
  • The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Segal, I. 2007; 136 (1): 341-378
  • Auctions with severely bounded communication JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. 2007; 28: 233-266
  • Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey European Competition Law Review Segal, I. R. 2007: 323-32
  • Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings Athey, S. ., Segal, I. R. 2007: 131–6
  • The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Nisan, N., Segal, I. 2006; 129 (1): 192-224
  • Communication in Economic Mechanisms Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs) Segal, I. R. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. Cambridge University Press. 2006
  • Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games Combinatorial Auctions Segal, I. R. edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R. MIT Press. 2006
  • Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X Nisan, N., Segal, I. R. 2005: 158–164
  • Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X Fadel, R., Segal, I. R. 2005: 165–76
  • Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Segal, I. 2003; 113 (2): 147-181
  • Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I. 2003; 93 (3): 509-529
  • Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric-Society Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2003: 757–91
  • Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Segal, I. 2003; 70 (2): 439-460
  • Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. R. 2003
  • Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication 11th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2003) Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2003: 102–113
  • Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2002; 70 (2): 583-601
  • The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing) ECONOMETRICA Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2002; 70 (1): 1-45
  • Naked exclusion: Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. D. 2000; 90 (1): 296-309
  • Exclusive Contracts and Protection of lnvestments RAND Journal of Economics Whinston, M., Segal, I. R. 2000; 31 (4): 603-633
  • Contracting with externalities QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Segal, I. 1999; 114 (2): 337-388
  • Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Segal, I. 1999; 66 (1): 57-82
  • Monopoly and soft budget constraint RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS SEGAL, I. R. 1998; 29 (3): 596-609
  • Solutions Manual for "Microeconomic Theory" by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green Hara, C., Segal, I., Tadelis, S. Oxford University Press. 1997