Academic Appointments

  • Professor, Economics
  • Professor (By courtesy), Economics

Administrative Appointments

  • Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley (2008 - 2008)
  • Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business (2004 - Present)
  • Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2002 - Present)
  • Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University (1999 - 2002)
  • John Stauffer National Fellow, Hoover Institution (1998 - 1999)
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley (1995 - 1998)
  • Visiting Assistant Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1995 - 1995)
  • Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University (1991 - 1992)

Honors & Awards

  • Test of Time Award for "an influential paper ... published between ten and twenty-five years ago", Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (2019)
  • Edelman Award for Achievement in Advanced Analytics, Operations Research, and Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (2018)
  • Citation of Excellence for “the most highly cited and influential paper”, Emerald Publishing (2017)
  • Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2017)
  • Compass Lexecon Prize, Compass Lexecon (2008)
  • Fellowship, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation (2002-2003)
  • Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1999-2001)
  • Graduate Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1994-1995)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations

  • Editor-in-Chief, ACM Transactions in Economics and Computation (2017 - Present)
  • Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2017 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Econometrica (2015 - Present)
  • Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2013 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (2013 - 2015)
  • Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies (2010 - 2016)
  • Member, Economics Panel, National Science Foundation (2008 - 2010)
  • Member, Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4 (2006 - 2009)
  • Member, Toulouse Network on Information Technology (2005 - Present)
  • Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department (2005 - 2011)
  • Member, Committee on Libraries, Stanford University (2004 - 2007)
  • Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University (2004 - 2005)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (2003 - Present)
  • Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2003 - 2005)
  • Member, Editorial Board, American Economic Review (2002 - 2005)
  • Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (2002 - 2003)
  • Editor, B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics (1999 - 2005)
  • Associate Editor, RAND Journal of Economics (1998 - 2006)

Professional Education

  • Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (1995)
  • M.S., Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Applied Mathematics (1991)

2023-24 Courses

All Publications

  • Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2020; 128 (1): 1–31

    View details for DOI 10.1086/704074

    View details for Web of Science ID 000507285500002

  • Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Carroll, G., Segal, I. 2019; 86 (4): 1527–55
  • Operations Research Enables Auction to Repurpose Television Spectrum for Next-Generation Wireless Technologies INTERFACES Kiddoo, J. L., Kwerel, E., Javid, S., Dunford, M., Epstein, G. M., Meisch, C. E., Hoffman, K. L., Smith, B. B., Coudert, A. B., Sultana, R. K., Costa, J. A., Charbonneau, S., Trick, M., Segal, I., Leyton-Brown, K., Newman, N., Frechette, A., Menon, D., Salasznyk, P. 2019; 49 (1): 7–22
  • Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Leyton-Brown, K., Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2017; 114 (28): 7202-7209


    The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1701997114

    View details for PubMedID 28652335

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5514724


    View details for DOI 10.1111/jeea.12185

    View details for Web of Science ID 000393105400002

  • What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Jeziorski, P., Segal, I. 2015; 7 (3): 24-53
  • DYNAMIC MECHANISM DESIGN: A MYERSONIAN APPROACH ECONOMETRICA Pavan, A., Segal, I., Toikka, J. 2014; 82 (2): 601-653

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA10269

    View details for Web of Science ID 000333678400005

  • The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2014; 81 (1): 273-289
  • AN EFFICIENT DYNAMIC MECHANISM ECONOMETRICA Athey, S., Segal, I. 2013; 81 (6): 2463-2485

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA6995

    View details for Web of Science ID 000326878900007

  • Property Rights Handbook of Organizational Economics Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. edited by Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. Princeton University Press. 2012
  • A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining) THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2011; 6 (1): 109-125

    View details for DOI 10.3982/TE591

    View details for Web of Science ID 000296007500005

  • Optimal Information Disclosure JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Rayo, L., Segal, I. 2010; 118 (5): 949-987

    View details for DOI 10.1086/657922

    View details for Web of Science ID 000287136900004

  • Nash implementation with little communication THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Segal, I. R. 2010; 5 (1): 51-71

    View details for DOI 10.3982/TE576

    View details for Web of Science ID 000296007000003

  • The communication cost of selfishness JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Fadel, R., Segal, I. 2009; 144 (5): 1895-1920
  • Antitrust in innovative industries AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2007; 97 (5): 1703-1730
  • The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Segal, I. 2007; 136 (1): 341-378
  • Designing efficient mechanisms for dynamic bilateral trading games 119th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Athey, S., Segal, I. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2007: 131–36
  • Auctions with severely bounded communication JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. 2007; 28: 233-266
  • Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey European Competition Law Review Segal, I. R. 2007: 323-32
  • Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings Athey, S. ., Segal, I. R. 2007: 131–6
  • The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Nisan, N., Segal, I. 2006; 129 (1): 192-224
  • Communication in economic mechanisms 9th World Congress of the Econometric-Society Segal, I. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. 2006: 222–68
  • Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games Combinatorial Auctions Segal, I. R. edited by Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R. MIT Press. 2006
  • Communication in Economic Mechanisms Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs) Segal, I. R. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. Cambridge University Press. 2006
  • Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X Nisan, N., Segal, I. R. 2005: 158–164
  • Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X Fadel, R., Segal, I. R. 2005: 165–76
  • Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Segal, I. 2003; 113 (2): 147-181
  • Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I. 2003; 93 (3): 509-529
  • Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric-Society Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2003: 757–91
  • Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Segal, I. 2003; 70 (2): 439-460
  • Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication 11th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2003) Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2003: 102–113
  • Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication Blumrosen, L., Nisan, N., Segal, I. R. 2003
  • Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2002; 70 (2): 583-601
  • The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold-up and risk sharing) ECONOMETRICA Segal, I., Whinston, M. D. 2002; 70 (1): 1-45
  • Naked exclusion: Comment AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. D. 2000; 90 (1): 296-309
  • Exclusive contracts and protection of investments RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Segal, I. R., Whinston, M. D. 2000; 31 (4): 603-633
  • Exclusive Contracts and Protection of lnvestments RAND Journal of Economics Whinston, M., Segal, I. R. 2000; 31 (4): 603-633
  • Contracting with externalities QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Segal, I. 1999; 114 (2): 337-388
  • Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Segal, I. 1999; 66 (1): 57-82
  • Monopoly and soft budget constraint RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS SEGAL, I. R. 1998; 29 (3): 596-609
  • Solutions Manual for "Microeconomic Theory" by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green Hara, C., Segal, I., Tadelis, S. Oxford University Press. 1997


    Clonidine, an alpha 2-adrenergic agonist, can potentiate opioid-induced analgesia. In a double-blind placebo-controlled study in human volunteers, we sought to determine whether clonidine also potentiates opioid-induced respiratory depression. Hypercapnic ventilatory responses (minute ventilation, mean inspiratory flow rate, and mouth occlusion pressure) were measured in five healthy male volunteers on two separate occasions (with or without clonidine, approximately 3.5 orally) under the following conditions: baseline, 2 h after clonidine/placebo (alfentanil concentration of 0), and during computer-controlled alfentanil infusions to approximate plasma concentrations of 5, 10, 20, 40, and 80 Plasma alfentanil concentrations were measured before and after each rebreathing test, and clonidine concentrations were measured after each rebreathing test. The end-tidal CO2 (PET(CO2)) was measured continuously. Data were analyzed by repeated-measures analysis of variance. The PET(CO2) and measured concentrations of alfentanil were included as covariates, and a compound symmetry error analysis was assumed. Statistical significance was achieved when P less than 0.05. For minute ventilation, mean inspiratory flow rate, and mouth occlusion pressure there was a statistically significant relationship to the covariates of PET(CO2) and plasma alfentanil concentration. Clonidine, when compared to placebo, caused a small but significant depression of mean inspiratory flow rate. There was similarly a small, but statistically insignificant, depression of minute ventilation by clonidine. The mouth occlusion pressure was not affected by clonidine treatment. Clonidine treatment did not potentiate alfentanil-induced respiratory depression. Although the combination of an opioid and an alpha 2-adrenergic agonist may act synergistically for the analgesic response, there is no synergistic effect by this drug combination on respiratory depression.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1992HY13700005

    View details for PubMedID 1599110