Academic Appointments

Contact

  • Academic
    kecasey@stanford.edu
    University - Faculty Department: Graduate School of Business - Faculty Position: Professor

Additional Info

  • Mail Code: 4800

Links

2023-24 Courses

Stanford Advisees

All Publications

  • Skill Versus Voice in Local Development REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Casey, K., Glennerster, R., Miguel, E., Voors, M. 2023; 105 (2): 311-326

    View details for DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01082

    View details for Web of Science ID 000943249200005

  • Long-Run Effects of Aid: Forecasts and Evidence from Sierra Leone ECONOMIC JOURNAL Casey, K., Glennerster, R., Miguel, E., Voors, M. 2023

    View details for DOI 10.1093/ej/uead001

    View details for Web of Science ID 000935835000001

  • Snap Judgments: Predicting Politician Competence from Photos JOURNAL OF POLITICS Casey, K. 2022

    View details for DOI 10.1086/716284

    View details for Web of Science ID 000748081400001

  • An Experiment in Candidate Selection AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Casey, K., Kamara, A., Meriggi, N. F. 2021; 111 (5): 1575-1612

    View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20200125

    View details for Web of Science ID 000645085600008

  • Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Bidwell, K., Casey, K., Glennerster, R. 2020; 128 (8): 2880–2924

    View details for DOI 10.1086/706862

    View details for Web of Science ID 000555145000002

  • Radical Decentralization: Does Community-Driven Development Work? ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 10 Casey, K., Aghion, P., Rey, H. 2018; 10: 139–63

    View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053339

    View details for Web of Science ID 000443938800006

  • CONFLICT. Reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Science (New York, N.Y.) Casey, K. n., Glennerster, R. n. 2016; 352 (6287): 766–67

    View details for PubMedID 27174970

  • Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Casey, K. 2015; 105 (8): 2410-2448

    Abstract

    Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision flows through voter behavior and ultimately impacts the distribution of political spending. I test the theory on data from Sierra Leone using decentralization and differential radio coverage to identify information's effects. Estimates suggest that information increases voting across ethnic-party lines and induces a more equitable allocation of campaign spending. (JEL D72, D83, J15, O17, Z13).

    View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20130397

    View details for Web of Science ID 000359164400004

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5603250

  • Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Casey, K., Glennerster, R., Miguel, E. 2012; 127 (4): 1755-1812

    View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qje027

    View details for Web of Science ID 000311905500005