Bio


Lee Ross is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation The author of three influential books, Human Inference and the Person and the Situation (both with Richard Nisbett) and, more recently The Wisest One in the Room (with Thomas Gilovich) and many highly cited papers, his research on attributional biases and shortcomings in human inference has exerted a major impact in social psychology and the field of human inference, judgment and decision-making. Among the phenomena he identified and has explored are the fundamental attribution error, the false consensus effect, reactive devaluation, the hostile media phenomenon, and the convictions of naïve realism. More recently he has ventured into more applied domains, exploring psychological barriers to dispute resolution (most notably the phenomenon of reactive devaluation) and participating in conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. He has also taken part in efforts to deal with other applied topics including telemarketer fraud directed against the elderly, the behavior aspects of health care utilization and the problem of combating global warming. Ross was elected in 1994 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and in 2010 to the National Academy of Sciences. He has also received distinguished career awards from the American Psychological Society and the Society of Experimental Social Psychology.
Education: University of Toronto BA, 1965. Columbia University PhD, 1979 (where he earned his PhD with Stanley Schachter. Upon graduation in 1969, he joined Stanford faculty)

Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • co-Founder, Stanford Center on International conflict and negotiation (1978 - Present)

Professional Education


  • Ph.D., Columbia University, Social Psychology (1969)

Current Research and Scholarly Interests


Attributional processes and biases. Strategies and shortcomings in lay judgment and decision making. Basis of (and biases in) knowledge about self and others; egocentrism and "naive realism." Sources of interpersonal and intergroup conflict. Barriers to conflict resolution and techniques for overcoming such barriers.

2017-18 Courses


Stanford Advisees


All Publications


  • Intergroup Sentiments, Political Identity, and Their Influence on Responses to Potentially Ameliorative Proposals in the Context of an Intractable Conflict JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Kahn, D. T., Liberman, V., Halperin, E., Ross, L. 2016; 60 (1): 61-88
  • The Climate Change Challenge and Barriers to the Exercise of Foresight Intelligence BioScience Ross, L., Arrow, K., Cialdini, R., Diamond, J., Diamond-Smith, N., Dunne, J., Feldman, M., Horn, R., Kennedy, D., Murphy, C., Pirages, D., Smith, K., York, R., Ehrlich, P. 2016: 363-370

    View details for DOI 10.1093/biosci/biw025

  • The Mote in Thy Brother’s Eye Skeptical Inquirer Gilovich, T., Ross, L. 2016; 40.2: 40-44
  • The letter to a friend that helped launch a career Scientists Making a Difference Ross, L. Cambridge University Press. 2016: 306–310
  • The WISEST ONE in the ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY'S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS Gilovich, T. D., Ross, L. Free Press. 2015
  • What kinds of conservatives does social psychology lack, and why? Behavioral and Brain Sciences Ross, L. 2015; 38
  • Overcoming Relational Barriers to Agreement Negotiating in Times of Conflict Bland, B., Ross, L. 2015: 205–212
  • The Bias Blind Spot and its Implications Contemporary Organizational Behavior: From Ideas to Action Ehrlinger, J., Gilovich, T., Ross, L. Pearson Prentice Hall. 2015: 137–145
  • Research-Based Knowledge in Psychology: What, if Anything, is Its Incremental Value to the Practitioner? INTEGRATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE Smedslund, J., Ross, L. 2014; 48 (4): 365-383
  • Forewarning Reduces Fraud Susceptibility in Vulnerable Consumers BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Scheibe, S., Notthoff, N., Menkin, J., Ross, L., Shadel, D., Deevy, M., Carstensen, L. L. 2014; 36 (3): 272-279
  • Research-Based Knowledge in Psychology: What, if Anything, is Its Incremental Value to the Practitioner? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science Smedslund, J., Ross, L. 2014; 48 (4): 365–383
  • Barriers to agreement in the asymmetric Israeli–Palestinian conflict Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict Ross, L. 2014; 48 (4): 120-136
  • David L. Rosenhan (1929-2012). American psychologist Ross, L., Kavanagh, D. 2013; 68 (6): 469-?

    Abstract

    Presents an obituary for David L. Rosenhan (1929-2012). A distinguished psychologist and professor emeritus at Stanford University, Rosenhan died February 6, 2012, at the age of 82, after a long illness. Born in Jersey City, New Jersey, on November 22, 1929, he received a bachelor's degree in mathematics (1951) from Yeshiva College and a master's degree in economics (1953) and a doctorate in psychology (1958) from Columbia University. A professor of law and of psychology at Stanford University from 1971 until his retirement in 1998, Rosenhan was a pioneer in applying psychological methods to the practice of law, including the examination of expert witnesses, jury selection, and jury deliberation. A former president of the American Psychology-Law Society and of the American Board of Forensic Psychology, Rosenhan was a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, of the American Psychological Association, and of the American Psychological Society. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty, he was a member of the faculties of Swarthmore College, Princeton University, Haverford College, and the University of Pennsylvania. He also served as a research psychologist at the Educational Testing Service. As generations of Stanford students can attest, David Rosenhan was a spellbinding lecturer who managed to convey the sense that he was speaking to each individual, no matter how large the group. To his graduate students, he was consistently encouraging and optimistic, always ready to share a joke or story, and gently encouraging of their creativity and progressive independence as researchers. The lessons he cared most about offering, in the classroom as in his research, were about human dignity and the need to confront abuse of power and human frailties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).

    View details for DOI 10.1037/a0032245

    View details for PubMedID 24016118

  • The meaning of default options for potential organ donors PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Davidai, S., Gilovich, T., Ross, L. D. 2012; 109 (38): 15201-15205

    Abstract

    Rates of participation in organ donation programs are known to be powerfully influenced by the relevant default policy in effect ("opt-in" vs. "opt-out"). Three studies provide evidence that this difference in participation may occur in part because the requirement to opt-in or opt-out results in large differences in the meaning that individuals attach to participation. American participants in Study 1 rated participation as a significantly more substantial action when agreement was purportedly obtained under opt-in rather than opt-out conditions, and nonagreement as a greater abrogation of responsibility when that decision was made under opt-out rather than under opt-in conditions. Study 2 replicated these findings with respondents who live in Germany, which employs an opt-in donation policy, and in Austria, which has an opt-out policy. Study 3 required American participants to rate various actions that differ in the effort and self-sacrifice they demand. As predicted, the placement of organ donation on the resulting multidimensional scaling dimension differed significantly depending on whether it purportedly was made in an opt-in country (where it was considered roughly akin to giving away half of one's wealth to charity upon one's death) or an opt-out country (where it fell between letting others get ahead of one in line and volunteering some time to help the poor). We discuss the relationship between this change of meaning account and two other mechanisms-behavioral inertia and implicit norms-that we believe underlie the default effect in decision making and other effects of policies designed to influence decision-makers.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1211695109

    View details for Web of Science ID 000309211000034

    View details for PubMedID 22949639

  • Albert H. Hastorf III (1921-2011) AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST Ross, L. D. 2012; 67 (6): 493-493

    Abstract

    Presents an obituary for Albert H. Hastorf III. Albert H. Hastorf III, a pioneer in the study of social perception and interaction and a celebrated member of the Stanford University administration, died September 26, 2011, in Palo Alto, California. Al was known early in his career as the coauthor of one of social psychology's most famous studies-a study that vividly illustrated the constructive and potentially biased nature of perception-and his contributions to psychology and American academia were wide-ranging. Hastorf joined Stanford's faculty in 1961, serving as executive head of the Psychology Department from 1961 to 1970. He was also a founder of the university's Interdisciplinary Human Biology Program, soon one of Stanford's most popular majors and an attractive gateway for students interested in medicine. Al's unique gifts as an administrator were apparent to all who knew him. His sound judgment, personal graciousness, good humor, and unquestioned integrity made him a popular choice as dean of the School of Humanities & Sciences from 1970 to 1974 and as provost from 1980 to 1984. The esteem in which Al was held by the Stanford community was recognized with a succession of awards, including the Lloyd W. Dinkelspiel Award for Outstanding Service to Undergraduate Education and the Richard W. Lyman Award for unique and dedicated service to the university.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/a0029596

    View details for Web of Science ID 000309300900007

    View details for PubMedID 22963416

  • How Christians reconcile their personal political views and the teachings of their faith: Projection as a means of dissonance reduction PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ross, L. D., Lelkes, Y., Russell, A. G. 2012; 109 (10): 3616-3622

    Abstract

    The present study explores the dramatic projection of one's own views onto those of Jesus among conservative and liberal American Christians. In a large-scale survey, the relevant views that each group attributed to a contemporary Jesus differed almost as much as their own views. Despite such dissonance-reducing projection, however, conservatives acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "fellowship" issues (e.g., taxation to reduce economic inequality and treatment of immigrants) and liberals acknowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to "morality" issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). However, conservatives also claimed that a contemporary Jesus would be even more conservative than themselves on the former issues whereas liberals claimed that Jesus would be even more liberal than themselves on the latter issues. Further reducing potential dissonance, liberal and conservative Christians differed markedly in the types of issues they claimed to be more central to their faith. A concluding discussion considers the relationship between individual motivational processes and more social processes that may underlie the present findings, as well as implications for contemporary social and political conflict.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1117557109

    View details for Web of Science ID 000301117700012

    View details for PubMedID 22308413

  • Naive realism and capturing the "wisdom of dyads" JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Liberman, V., Minson, J. A., Bryan, C. J., Ross, L. 2012; 48 (2): 507-512
  • REFLECTIONS ON BIASED ASSIMILATION AND BELIEF POLARIZATION CRITICAL REVIEW Ross, L. 2012; 24 (2): 233-245
  • Perspectives on disagreement and dispute resolution: Lessons from the lab and the real world The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy Ross, L. Princeton University & Russell Sage Foundation Press. 2012: 108–125
  • Two Social Psychologists' Reflections on Situationism and the Criminal Justice System Ideology, Psychology, and Law Ideology, Psychology, and Law Ross, L., Shestowski, D. Oxford University Press. 2012
  • Barriers to Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Peacemaking and Relationships between Adversaries Understanding social action, promoting human rights Bland, B., Powell, B., Ross, L. Oxford University Press. 2012: 265–291
  • Two to Tango: Effects of Collaboration and Disagreement on Dyadic Judgment PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Minson, J. A., Liberman, V., Ross, L. 2011; 37 (10): 1325-1338

    Abstract

    Four studies examined dyadic collaboration on quantitative estimation tasks. In accord with the tenets of "naïve realism," dyad members failed to give due weight to a partner's estimates, especially those greatly divergent from their own. The requirement to reach joint estimates through discussion increased accuracy more than reaching agreement through a mere exchange of numerical "bids." However, even the latter procedure increased accuracy, relative to that of individual estimates (Study 1). Accuracy feedback neither increased weight given to partner's subsequent estimates nor produced improved accuracy (Study 2). Long-term dance partners, who shared a positive estimation bias, failed to improve accuracy when estimating their performance scores (Study 3). Having dyad members ask questions about the bases of partner's estimates produced greater yielding and accuracy increases than having them explain their own estimates (Study 4). The latter two studies provided additional direct and indirect evidence for the role of naïve realism.

    View details for DOI 10.1177/0146167211410436

    View details for Web of Science ID 000294473900004

    View details for PubMedID 21632960

  • Affirming the Self to Promote Agreement With Another: Lowering a Psychological Barrier to Conflict Resolution PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Ward, A., Atkins, D. C., Lepper, M. R., Ross, L. 2011; 37 (9): 1216-1228

    Abstract

    Two studies investigated the capacity of a self-affirmation intervention to lower a psychological barrier to conflict resolution. Study 1 used a role-play scenario in which a student negotiated with a professor for greater rewards for work on a collaborative project. A self-affirmation manipulation, in which participants focused on an important personal value, significantly reduced their tendency to derogate a concession offered by the professor relative to one that had not been offered. Study 2 replicated this effect and showed that the phenomenon did not depend on the self-affirmed participant's experience of a heightened sense of deservingness or a tendency to make positive attributions about the professor. Distraction and explicit mood enhancement were also ruled out as mediators of the self-affirmation effect, which appears to stem from motivational rather than explicit cognitive processes.

    View details for DOI 10.1177/0146167211409439

    View details for Web of Science ID 000293081600006

    View details for PubMedID 21586689

  • Affirmation, Acknowledgment of In-Group Responsibility, Group-Based Guilt, and Support for Reparative Measures JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Cehajic-Clancy, S., Effron, D. A., Halperin, E., Liberman, V., Ross, L. D. 2011; 101 (2): 256-270

    Abstract

    Three studies, 2 conducted in Israel and 1 conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrated that affirming a positive aspect of the self can increase one's willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for wrongdoing against others, express feelings of group-based guilt, and consequently provide greater support for reparation policies. By contrast, affirming one's group, although similarly boosting feelings of pride, failed to increase willingness to acknowledge and redress in-group wrongdoing. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the mediating role of group-based guilt. That is, increased acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for out-group victimization produced increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increased support for reparation policies to the victimized group. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/a0023936

    View details for Web of Science ID 000292846600004

    View details for PubMedID 21639648

  • Wishful Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of Scientific Evidence PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Bastardi, A., Uhlmann, E. L., Ross, L. 2011; 22 (6): 731-732

    View details for DOI 10.1177/0956797611406447

    View details for Web of Science ID 000294709200005

    View details for PubMedID 21515736

  • Achieving difficult agreements: Effects of Positive Expectations on negotiation processes and outcomes JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Liberman, V., Anderson, N. R., Ross, L. 2010; 46 (3): 494-504
  • A history of social psychology: Insights, contributions, and challenges The Handbook of Social Psychology Ross, L., Lepper, M., Ward, A. Random House. 2010
  • Happiness and Memory: Affective Significance of Endowment and Contrast EMOTION Liberman, V., Boehm, J. K., Lyubomirsky, S., Ross, L. D. 2009; 9 (5): 666-680

    Abstract

    Three studies (two conducted in Israel and one in the United States) examined associations between self-rated dispositional happiness and tendencies to treat memories of positive and negative events as sources of enhanced or attenuated happiness through the use of "endowment" and "contrast." Although participants generally endorsed items describing happiness-enhancing tendencies more than happiness-diminishing ones, self-reported happiness was associated with greater endorsement of "positive endowment" items and less endorsement of "negative endowment" items, and also with less endorsement of items that involved contrasting the present with happier times in the past. Only in the American sample, however, was happiness associated with greater endorsement of items that involved contrasting the present with less happy times in the past. These data suggest that relatively unhappy people show somewhat conflicting memorial tendencies vis-à-vis happiness, whereas very happy people show simpler, and less conflicting, tendencies. These findings augment the existing literatures on the affective consequences of memory, which have been concerned more with mood than with temperament and/or have dealt only with a subset of the endowment and contrast tendencies explored in the present work.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/a0016816

    View details for Web of Science ID 000270700100008

    View details for PubMedID 19803589

  • Political mindset: Effects of schema priming on liberal-conservative political positions JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Bryan, C. J., Dweck, C. S., Ross, L., Kay, A. C., Mislavsky, N. O. 2009; 45 (4): 890-895
  • Dealing with Conflict: Experiences and Experiments The Scientist and the Humanist: A Festschrift in Honor of Elliot Aronson Ross, L. Psychology Press. 2009: 39–66
  • Relational accommodation in negotiation: Effects of egalitarianism and gender on economic efficiency and relational capital ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES Curhan, J. R., Neale, M. A., Ross, L., Rosencranz-Engelmann, J. 2008; 107 (2): 192-205
  • Acknowledging the other side in negotiation NEGOTIATION JOURNAL Ward, A., Disston, L. G., Brenner, L., Ross, L. 2008; 24 (3): 269-285
  • Environmental Values and Behaviors: Strategies to Encourage Public Support for Initiatives to Combat Global Warming Virginia Environmental Law Journal Rhode, D. L., Ross, L. 2008; 26: 161-187
  • Bridging the partisan divide: Self-affirmation reduces ideological closed-mindedness and inflexibility in negotiation JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Cohen, G. L., Bastardi, A., Sherman, D. K., Hsu, L., McGoey, M., Ross, L. 2007; 93 (3): 415-430

    Abstract

    Three studies link resistance to probative information and intransigence in negotiation to concerns of identity maintenance. Each shows that affirmations of personal integrity (vs. nonaffirmation or threat) can reduce resistance and intransigence but that this effect occurs only when individuals' partisan identity and/or identity-related convictions are made salient. Affirmation made participants' assessment of a report critical of U.S. foreign policy less dependent on their political views, but only when the identity relevance of the issue rather than the goal of rationality was salient (Study 1). Affirmation increased concession making in a negotiation over abortion policy, but again this effect was moderated by identity salience (Studies 2 and 3). Indeed, although affirmed negotiators proved relatively more open to compromise when either the salience of their true convictions or the importance of remaining faithful to those convictions was heightened, the reverse was true when the salient goal was compromise. The theoretical and applied significance of these findings are discussed.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.415

    View details for Web of Science ID 000248992100007

    View details for PubMedID 17723057

  • Race, Crime and Antidiscrimination Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom Banks, R., Eberhardt, J., Ross, L. Blackwell. 2007: 3–22
  • Idiosyncratic matching and choice: When less is more ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES Liberman, V., Ross, L. 2006; 101 (2): 168-183
  • Discrimination and implicit bias in a racially unequal society CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW Banks, R. R., Eberhardt, J. L., Ross, L. 2006; 94 (4): 1169-1190
  • Temporal differences in trait self-ascription: When the self is seen as an other JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Pronin, E., Ross, L. 2006; 90 (2): 197-209

    Abstract

    Seven studies exploring people's tendency to make observer-like attributions about their past and future selves are presented. Studies 1 and 2 showed temporal differences in trait assessments that paralleled the classic actor-observer difference. Study 3 provided evidence against a motivational account of these differences. Studies 4-7 explored underlying mechanisms involving differences in the focus of attention of the sort linked to the classic actor-observer difference. In Study 4, people perceived past and future selves from a more observer-like perspective than present selves. In Studies 5 and 6, manipulating attention to internal states (vs. observable behavior) of past and future selves led people to ascribe fewer traits to those selves. Study 7 showed an inverse relationship for past and present selves between observer-like visual focus and salience of internal information.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.197

    View details for Web of Science ID 000236445600001

    View details for PubMedID 16536646

  • Peering into the bias blind spot: People's assessments of bias in themselves and others PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Ehrlinger, J., Gilovich, T., Ross, L. 2005; 31 (5): 680-692

    Abstract

    People tend to believe that their own judgments are less prone to bias than those of others, in part because they tend to rely on introspection for evidence of bias in themselves but on their lay theories in assessing bias in others. Two empirical consequences of this asymmetry are explored. Studies 1 and 2 document that people are more inclined to think they are guilty of bias in the abstract than in any specific instance. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that people tend to believe that their own personal connection to a given issue is a source of accuracy and enlightenment but that such personal connections in the case of others who hold different views are a source of bias. The implications of this asymmetry in assessing objectivity and bias in the self versus others are discussed.

    View details for DOI 10.1177/0146167204271570

    View details for Web of Science ID 000228472900008

    View details for PubMedID 15802662

  • Psychological dimensions of the Israeli settlements issue: Endowments and identities Conference on Past, Present and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements - The Internal Israeli Conflict Hackley, S., Bazerman, M., Ross, L., Shapiro, D. L. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2005: 209–19
  • Material priming: The influence of mundane physical objects on situational construal and competitive behavioral choice ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES Kay, A. C., Wheeler, S. C., Bargh, J. A., Ross, L. 2004; 95 (1): 83-96
  • The name of the game: Predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., Ross, L. 2004; 30 (9): 1175-1185

    Abstract

    Two experiments, one conducted with American college students and one with Israeli pilots and their instructors, explored the predictive power of reputation-based assessments versus the stated "name of the game" (Wall Street Game vs. Community Game) in determining players' responses in an N-move Prisoner's Dilemma. The results of these studies showed that the relevant labeling manipulations exerted far greater impact on the players' choice to cooperate versus defect--both in the first round and overall--than anticipated by the individuals who had predicted their behavior. Reputation-based prediction, by contrast, failed to discriminate cooperators from defectors. A supplementary questionnaire study showed the generality of the relevant short-coming in naïve psychology. The implications of these findings, and the potential contribution of the present methodology to the classic pedagogical strategy of the demonstration experiment, are discussed.

    View details for DOI 10.1177/0146167204264004

    View details for Web of Science ID 000223215500007

    View details for PubMedID 15359020

  • Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW Pronin, E., Ross, L., Gilovich, T. 2004; 111 (3): 781-799

    Abstract

    Important asymmetries between self-perception and social perception arise from the simple fact that other people's actions, judgments, and priorities sometimes differ from one's own. This leads people not only to make more dispositional inferences about others than about themselves (E. E. Jones & R. E. Nisbett, 1972) but also to see others as more susceptible to a host of cognitive and motivational biases. Although this blind spot regarding one's own biases may serve familiar self-enhancement motives, it is also a product of the phenomenological stance of naive realism. It is exacerbated, furthermore, by people's tendency to attach greater credence to their own introspections about potential influences on judgment and behavior than they attach to similar introspections by others. The authors review evidence, new and old, of this asymmetry and its underlying causes and discuss its relation to other psychological phenomena and to interpersonal and intergroup conflict.

    View details for DOI 10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.781

    View details for Web of Science ID 000222380200008

    View details for PubMedID 15250784

  • Identity bifurcation in response to stereotype threat: Women and mathematics JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Pronin, E., Steele, C. M., Ross, L. 2004; 40 (2): 152-168
  • Dynamic valuation: Preference changes in the context of face-to-face negotiation JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Curhan, J. R., Neale, M. A., Ross, L. 2004; 40 (2): 142-151
  • Naive realism and affirmative action: Adversaries are more similar than they think BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Sherman, D. K., Nelson, L. D., Ross, L. D. 2003; 25 (4): 275-289
  • The perceptual push: The interplay of implicit cues and explicit situational construals on behavioral intentions in the Prisoner's Dilemma JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Kay, A. C., Ross, L. 2003; 39 (6): 634-643
  • Contemporary psychology's challenges to legal theory and practice NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Ross, L., Shestowsky, D. 2003; 97 (3): 1081-1114
  • Culture and morality: Conflicting perspectives at a time of cultural confrontation - Essay review of the culture of morality: Social development, context, and conflict by Elliot Turiel HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Ross, L. 2003; 46 (2-3): 151-154

    View details for DOI 10.1159/000068587

    View details for Web of Science ID 000181694600008

  • Reactive devaluation of an "Israeli" vs. "Palestinian" peace proposal JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MAOZ, I., Ward, A., Katz, M., Ross, L. 2002; 46 (4): 515-546
  • The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., Ross, L. 2002; 28 (3): 369-381
  • Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives Heuristics and Biases; The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment Pronin, E., Puccio, C., Ross, L. Cambridge University Press. 2002: 636–665
  • You don't know me, but I know you: The illusion of asymmetric insight 106th Annual Convention of the American-Psychological-Association Pronin, E., Kruger, J., Savitsky, K., Ross, L. AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 2001: 639–56

    Abstract

    People, it is hypothesized, show an asymmetry in assessing their own interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge relative to that of their peers. Six studies suggested that people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them. Several of the studies explored sources of this perceived asymmetry, especially the conviction that while observable behaviors (e.g., interpersonal revelations or idiosyncratic word completions) are more revealing of others than self, private thoughts and feelings are more revealing of self than others. Study 2 also found that college roommates believe they know themselves better than their peers know themselves. Study 6 showed that group members display a similar bias-they believe their groups know and understand relevant out-groups better than vice versa. The relevance of such illusions of asymmetric insight for interpersonal interaction and our understanding of "naive realism" is discussed.

    View details for DOI 10.1037//0022-3514.81.4.639

    View details for Web of Science ID 000171577400007

    View details for PubMedID 11642351

  • Getting down to fundamentals: Lay dispositionism and the attributions of psychologists PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY Ross, L. D. 2001; 12 (1): 37-40
  • Naive realism in everyday life and its implications for the misunderstanding PSIKHOLOGICHESKII ZHURNAL Ross, L., Ward, A. 2000; 21 (6): 24-37
  • The mentor's dilemma: Providing critical feedback across the racial divide PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Cohen, G. L., Steele, C. M., Ross, L. D. 1999; 25 (10): 1302-1318
  • Changes in attractiveness of elected, rejected, and precluded alternatives: A comparison of happy and unhappy individuals JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Lyubomirsky, S., Ross, L. 1999; 76 (6): 988-1007

    Abstract

    In 3 studies the authors compared the responses of self-rated happy and unhappy students in situations involving choice. In Study 1, high school seniors evaluated colleges after applying for admission and then later after making their selections. Happy students tended to be more satisfied than unhappy ones with the colleges they ultimately chose and those they ultimately rejected, and they more sharply devalued the colleges that rejected them. Studies 2 and 3 dealt with postdecisional consequences of less consequential decisions about fancy desserts. In Study 2, unhappy participants sharply derogated the desserts they rejected or were denied, relative to those selected by or for them, whereas happy participants showed no such derogation. These group differences, moreover, proved to be largely independent of self-esteem and optimism. The design of Study 3 helped explicate underlying mechanisms by inducing both groups to distract themselves or to self-reflect. Doing so eliminated all group differences. Implications of the results for the link between cognitive processes and hedonic consequences are discussed.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000081061600008

    View details for PubMedID 10402682

  • Fairness norms and the potential for mutual agreements involving majority and minority groups. Research on managing groups and teams/Volume 2 Jost, J. T., Ross, L. JAI Press. 1999: 93–114
  • Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for the dynamics of social conflict VOPROSY PSIKHOLOGII Ross, L., Ward, A. 1999: 61-?
  • Independence from whom? Interdependence with whom? Cultural perspectives on ingroups versus outgroups Cultural divides Iyengar, S., Lepper, M., Ross, L. Sage. 1999: 273–301
  • Framing Effects and Income Flow Preferences in Decisions about Social Security Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics Fetherstonhaugh, D., Ross, L. Brookings Institution Press. 1999: 187–209
  • The role of stereotyping in overconfident social prediction SOCIAL COGNITION Brodt, S. E., Ross, L. D. 1998; 16 (2): 225-252
  • Comment on Gilbert Conference in honor of Edward Ellsworth Jones Ross, L. AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC. 1998: 53–66
  • Hedonic consequences of social comparison: A contrast of happy and unhappy people JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Lyubomirsky, S., Ross, L. 1997; 73 (6): 1141-1157

    Abstract

    Two studies tested the hypothesis that self-rated unhappy individuals would be more sensitive to social comparison information than would happy ones. Study 1 showed that whereas unhappy students' affect and self-assessments were heavily affected by a peer who solved anagrams either faster or slower, happy students' responses were affected by the presence of a slower peer only. These between-group differences proved to be largely independent of 2 factors associated with happiness, i.e., self-esteem and optimism. Study 2 showed that whereas the unhappy group's responses to feedback about their own teaching performance were heavily influenced by a peer who performed even better or even worse, happy students' responses again were moderated only by information about inferior peer performance. Implications for our appreciation of the link between cognitive processes and "hedonic" consequences are discussed.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1997YK98900001

    View details for PubMedID 9418274

  • Self-interest and fairness in problems of resource allocation: Allocators versus recipients JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Diekmann, K. A., Samuels, S. M., Ross, L., Bazerman, M. H. 1997; 72 (5): 1061-1074

    Abstract

    Two studies explored the tension between self-interest and the equality norm in problems of resource allocation. Study 1 presented graduate business students with a hypothetical task requiring them to make a series of managerial decisions. On learning the outcome of those decisions, they were asked to divide a bonus pool between self and a rival manager (who had opted for very different decisions and achieved either the same results as self on 2 criteria or a better result on 1 criterion and a worse result on the other criterion). Study 2 required Stanford and San Jose State undergraduates to consider the division of a hypothetical scholarship fund between candidates from their 2 schools. Data from both studies contrasted the apparent evenhandedness and lack of self-interest manifested by allocators with the self-serving responses of evaluators. Furthermore, when faced with different claims, participants were inclined to justify an unequal allocation of resources--provided that they, or a representative of their group, received the larger share--that few personally would have recommended, demanded, or imposed.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1997WX85600008

    View details for PubMedID 9150585

  • Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding 23rd Annual Symposium of the Jean-Piaget-Society Ross, L., Ward, A. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1996: 103–135
  • ACTUAL VERSUS ASSUMED DIFFERENCES IN CONSTRUAL - NAIVE REALISM IN INTERGROUP PERCEPTION AND CONFLICT JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Robinson, R. J., Keltner, D., Ward, A., Ross, L. 1995; 68 (3): 404-417
  • Strategic, psychological, and institutional barriers: An introduction. Barriers to conflict resolution Mnookin, R. H., Ross, L. Norton. 1995: 2–25
  • Barriers to conflict resolution edited by Arrow, K., Mnookin, R., Ross, L., Tversky, A., Wilson, R. W.W. Norton. 1995
  • Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Ross, L., Ward, A. 1995; 27: 255-304
  • The reactive devaluation in negotiation & conflict resolution Barriers to conflict resolution Ross, L. Norton. 1995: 26–42
  • Psychological barriers to conflict resolution. The Arab-Israeli negotiations: Political positions and conceptual frameworks Ross, L. Papyrus. 1993
  • Perspectives on Personality and Social Psychology: Books waiting to be written Psychological Inquiry Ross, L., Nisbett, R. 1992; 3(1): 99-102
  • BARRIERS TO CONFLICT-RESOLUTION NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Ross, L., STILLINGER, C. 1991; 7 (4): 389-404
  • The person and the situation : perspectives of social psychology McGraw-Hill series in social psychology Ross, L., Nisbett, R. E. McGraw Hill. 1991
  • SUBJECTIVE CONSTRUAL, SOCIAL INFERENCE, AND HUMAN MISUNDERSTANDING ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Griffin, D. W., Ross, L. 1991; 24: 319-359
  • THE ROLE OF CONSTRUAL PROCESSES IN OVERCONFIDENT PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE SELF AND OTHERS JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Griffin, D. W., Dunning, D., Ross, L. 1990; 59 (6): 1128-1139

    Abstract

    Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1-3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions". In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly"--again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1990EM79900005

    View details for PubMedID 2283587

  • OVERCONFIDENT PREDICTION OF FUTURE ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES BY SELF AND OTHERS JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY VALLONE, R. P., Griffin, D. W., Lin, S., Ross, L. 1990; 58 (4): 582-592

    Abstract

    In a follow-up study to Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, and L. Ross (1990), which had investigated the phenomenon of overconfidence in social prediction, two samples of first-year undergraduates were invited to make predictions about their own future responses (and, in the case of Sample 2, also those of their roommates) over the months ahead. These predictions were accompanied by confidence estimates and were evaluated in the light of actual responses reported later by the subjects in question. The primary finding was that self-predictions, like social predictions, proved to be consistently overconfident. As in Dunning et al., moreover, overconfidence could be traced to two sources. First, expressions of particularly high confidence rarely proved to be warranted; as confidence increased, the gap between accuracy and confidence widened. Second, predictions that went against relevant base rates yielded very low accuracy in the face of relatively unattenuated confidence levels. The implications of these results are discussed, and one potentially important underlying mechanism--the failure to make adequate inferential allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal--is proposed for further research.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1990DC44300003

    View details for PubMedID 2348360

  • THE OVERCONFIDENCE EFFECT IN SOCIAL PREDICTION JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Dunning, D., Griffin, D. W., Milojkovic, J. D., Ross, L. 1990; 58 (4): 568-581

    Abstract

    In five studies with overlapping designs and intents, subjects predicted a specific peer's responses to a variety of stimulus situations, each of which offered a pair of mutually exclusive and exhaustive response alternatives. Each prediction was accompanied by a subjective probability estimate reflecting the subjects' confidence in its accuracy--a measure validated in Study 5 by having subjects choose whether to "gamble" on the accuracy of their prediction or on the outcome of a simple aleatory event. Our primary finding was that in social prediction, as in other judgmental domains, subjects consistently proved to be highly overconfident. That is, regardless of the type of prediction item (e.g., responses to hypothetical dilemmas, responses to contrived laboratory situations, or self-reports of everyday behaviors) and regardless of the type of information available about the person whose responses they were predicting (e.g., predictions about roommates or predictions based on prior interviews), the levels of accuracy subjects achieved fell considerably below the levels required to justify their confidence levels. Further analysis revealed two specific sources of overconfidence. First, subjects generally were overconfident to the extent they were highly confident. Second, subjects were most likely to be overconfident when they knowingly or unknowingly made predictions that ran counter to the relevant response base rates and, as a consequence, achieved low accuracy rates that their confidence estimates failed to anticipate. Theoretical and normative implications are discussed and proposals for subsequent research offered.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1990DC44300002

    View details for PubMedID 2348359

  • Recognizing the role of construal processes. The legacy of Solomon Asch: Essays in cognition and social psychology. Ross, L. edited by Rock, I. Erlbaum. 1990: 77–96
  • Situationist Perspectives on the obedience experiments. Review of A.G. Miller. The obedience experiments. Contemporary Psychology Ross, L. 1988; 33 (2): 101-104

    View details for DOI 10.1037/025376

  • Lee Ross, Personal Narrative A narrative history of experimental social psychology: The Lewin Tradition Ross, L. edited by Patnoe, S. Springer Verlag. 1988: 151–168
  • The problem of construal in social inference and social psychology A distinctive approach to psychological research: The influence of Stanley Schachter Ross, L. 1987: 118–150
  • PERSISTENCE OF INACCURATE BELIEFS ABOUT THE SELF - PERSEVERANCE EFFECTS IN THE CLASSROOM JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Lepper, M. R., Ross, L., LAU, R. R. 1986; 50 (3): 482-491

    Abstract

    The perseverance of erroneous self-assessments was examined among high school students. Subjects were first exposed to either highly effective or thoroughly useless filmed instruction, leading, respectively, to their consequent success or failure. No-discounting subjects received no assistance in recognizing the relative superiority or inferiority of their instruction. Discounting subjects, by contrast, were subsequently shown the opposite instructional film, highlighting the obvious differences in instructional quality. Subsequent measures revealed that all subjects recognized the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their instruction, although this contrast was clearer for discounting subjects. Nevertheless, both discounting and no-discounting subjects continued to draw unwarranted inferences--in line with their initial outcomes--about their personal capacities, immediately afterward. Dissociated and disguised measures of academic preferences and perceptions completed weeks later produced even more dramatic results: The continuing impact of initial outcomes was generally greater for discounting than no-discounting subjects.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1986C109200003

    View details for PubMedID 3701590

  • THE HOSTILE MEDIA PHENOMENON - BIASED PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA BIAS IN COVERAGE OF THE BEIRUT MASSACRE JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY VALLONE, R. P., Ross, L., Lepper, M. R. 1985; 49 (3): 577-585

    Abstract

    After viewing identical samples of major network television coverage of the Beirut massacre, both pro-Israeli and pro-Arab partisans rated these programs, and those responsible for them, as being biased against their side. This hostile media phenomenon appears to involve the operation of two separate mechanisms. First, partisans evaluated the fairness of the media's sample of facts and arguments differently: in light of their own divergent views about the objective merits of each side's case and their corresponding views about the nature of unbiased coverage. Second, partisans reported different perceptions and recollections about the program content itself; that is, each group reported more negative references to their side than positive ones, and each predicted that the coverage would sway nonpartisans in a hostile direction. Within both partisan groups, furthermore, greater knowledge of the crisis was associated with stronger perceptions of media bias. Charges of media bias, we concluded, may reflect more than self-serving attempts to secure preferential treatment. They may result from the operation of basic cognitive and perceptual mechanisms, mechanisms that should prove relevant to perceptions of fairness or objectivity in a wide range of mediation and negotiation contexts.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1985AQJ6600001

    View details for PubMedID 4045697

  • SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL INFERENCE .1. THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE AND BEHAVIORAL-DATA JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Andersen, S. M., Ross, L. 1984; 46 (2): 280-293
  • PUBLIC-OPINION AND CAPITAL-PUNISHMENT - A CLOSE EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF ABOLITIONISTS AND RETENTIONISTS CRIME & DELINQUENCY Ellsworth, P. C., Ross, L. 1983; 29 (1): 116-169
  • Informal covariation assessment: Data-based vs. theory-based judgments. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases Jennings, D., Amabile, T., Ross, L. Cambridge University Press. 1982: 211–230
  • Shortcomings in the attribution process: On the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Ross, L., Anderson, C. Cambridge University Press. 1982: 129–152
  • Persistence of impression of personal persuasiveness: Persistence of erroneous self-perceptions outside the debriefing paradigm Personalty and Social Psychology Bulletin Jennings, D. L., Lepper, M. R., Ross, L. 1981; 7: 257-263

    View details for DOI 10.1177/014616728172012

  • Social Cognitive Development: Frontiers and possible futures edited by Flavell, J., Ross, L. Cambridge Press. 1981
  • The "intuitive scientist" formulation and its developmental implications Social cognitive development: Frontiers and possible futures Ross, L. edited by Flavell, J. H., Ross, L. Cambridge University Press. 1981: 1–42
  • PERSEVERANCE OF SOCIAL THEORIES - THE ROLE OF EXPLANATION IN THE PERSISTENCE OF DISCREDITED INFORMATION JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., Ross, L. 1980; 39 (6): 1037-1049
  • Human inference : strategies and shortcomings of social judgment Nisbett, R. E., Ross, L. Prentice-Hall. 1980
  • BIASED ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDE POLARIZATION - EFFECTS OF PRIOR THEORIES ON SUBSEQUENTLY CONSIDERED EVIDENCE JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Lord, C. G., Ross, L., Lepper, M. R. 1979; 37 (11): 2098-2109
  • Afterthoughts on the intuitive psychologist Cognitive theories in social psychology Ross, L. edited by Berkowitz, L. Academic Press. 1979
  • PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETATION OF SELF-SERVING ASYMMETRIES IN CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION - REPLY SOCIOMETRY Ross, L. D. 1977; 40 (2): 112-114
  • Empirical data and judicial decision-making: Capital punishment research Capital punishment Ellsworth, P., Ross, L. edited by Bedau, H., Pierce, C. AMS Press. 1977
  • THE INTUITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST AND HIS SHORTCOMINGS DISTORTIONS IN THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L. Academic Press. 1977: 173–220
  • SOCIAL EXPLANATION AND SOCIAL EXPECTATION - EFFECTS OF REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL EXPLANATIONS ON SUBJECTIVE LIKELIHOOD JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., Strack, F., Steinmetz, J. 1977; 35 (11): 817-829
  • SOCIAL ROLES, SOCIAL-CONTROL, AND BIASES IN SOCIAL-PERCEPTION PROCESSES JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L. D., AMABILE, T. M., STEINMETZ, J. L. 1977; 35 (7): 485-494
  • FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT - EGOCENTRIC BIAS IN SOCIAL-PERCEPTION AND ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L., Greene, D., House, P. 1977; 13 (3): 279-301
  • ROLE OF ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES IN CONFORMITY AND DISSENT - REVISITING ASCH SITUATION AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST Ross, L., BIERBRAUER, G., Hoffman, S. 1976; 31 (2): 148-157
  • INTIMACY IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT GAZE JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ellsworth, P., Ross, L. 1975; 11 (6): 592-613
  • PERSEVERANCE IN SELF-PERCEPTION AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION - BIASED ATTRIBUTIONAL PROCESSES IN DEBRIEFING PARADIGM JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., Hubbard, M. 1975; 32 (5): 880-892

    Abstract

    Two experiments demonstrated that self-perceptions and social perceptions may persevere after the initial basis for such perceptions has been completely discredited. In both studies subjects first received false feedback, indicating that they had either succeeded or failed on a novel discrimination task and then were thoroughly debriefed concerning the predetermined and random nature of this outcome manipulation. In experiment 2, both the initial outcome manipulation and subsequent debriefing were watched and overheard by observers. Both actors and observers showed substantial perseverance of initial impressions concerning the actors' performance and abilities following a standard "outcome" debriefing. "Process" debriefing, in which explicit discussion of the perseverance process was provided, generally proved sufficient to eliminate erroneous self-perceptions. Biased attribution processes that might underlie perserverance phenomena and the implications of the present data for the ethical conduct of deception research are discussed.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1975AW34500014

    View details for PubMedID 1185517

  • Attribution of education outcome by professional and nonprofessional instructors. Journal of personality and social psychology Ross, L., BIERBRAUER, G., Polly, S. 1974; 29 (5): 609-618

    View details for PubMedID 4833425

  • ATTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES BY PROFESSIONAL AND NONPROFESSIONAL INSTRUCTORS JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L., BIERBRAU, G., Polly, S. 1974; 29 (5): 609-618
  • EFFECTS OF MISATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL UPON ACQUISITION AND EXTINCTION OF A CONDITIONED EMOTIONAL RESPONSE JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Loftis, J., Ross, L. 1974; 30 (5): 673-682

    View details for Web of Science ID A1974U611600010

    View details for PubMedID 4443888

  • RETROSPECTIVE MISATTRIBUTION OF A CONDITIONED EMOTIONAL RESPONSE JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Loftis, J., Ross, L. 1974; 30 (5): 683-687

    View details for Web of Science ID A1974U611600011

    View details for PubMedID 4443889

  • SOME DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL-EXTERNAL METAPHOR IN THEORIES OF PERSONALITY JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY Collins, B. E., Martin, J. C., ASHMORE, R. D., Ross, L. 1973; 41 (4): 471-492

    View details for Web of Science ID A1973R604600001

    View details for PubMedID 4761388

  • Dissonance, self-perception, and the perspective of others: A study in Cognitive cognitive dissonance Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Arrowood, J., Wood, L., Ross, L. 1970; 6 (3): 304–315
  • DISSONANCE, SELF-PERCEPTION, AND PERCEPTION OF OTHERS - A STUDY IN COGNITIVE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ARROWOOD, A. J., Wood, L., Ross, L. 1970; 6 (3): 304-?
  • TOWARD AN ATTRIBUTION THERAPY - REDUCTION OF FEAR THROUGH INDUCED COGNITIVE-EMOTIONAL MISATTRIBUTION JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ross, L., Rodin, J., Zimbardo, P. G. 1969; 12 (4): 279-?

    View details for Web of Science ID A1969D956000002

    View details for PubMedID 5821854

  • COMMENTS ON EARNINGS-PRICE NOTE STANFORD LAW REVIEW ROSS, L. M. 1969; 21 (FEB): 644-649
  • ANTICIPATED EFFORT AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ARROWOOD, A. J., Ross, L. 1966; 4 (1): 57-?

    View details for Web of Science ID A19668030600008

    View details for PubMedID 5965192