Liran Einav

All Publications

• A Blueprint for U.S. Health Insurance Reform. Annals of internal medicine Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2024

  Abstract

  The current U.S. health insurance "system" was not deliberately planned and constructed but has emerged piecemeal over the past half-century through a series of incremental and haphazard reforms. That policy history also reveals a clear but unfulfilled societal commitment to providing access to essential health care regardless of resources. To fulfill this obligation, the solution proposed in this article has 2 key elements: 1) universal coverage that is automatic, free, and basic, and 2) the option to buy supplemental coverage in a well-designed market. Such a system could, if desired, be created without raising taxes and without disrupting or changing the delivery of medical care.

  View details for DOI 10.7326/M24-0091

  View details for PubMedID 38739923

• A blueprint for US health insurance policy Response JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2024

  View details for DOI 10.1002/pam.22603

  View details for Web of Science ID 001214534200001

• A blueprint for US health insurance policy JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2024

  View details for DOI 10.1002/pam.22602

  View details for Web of Science ID 001211022700001

• Long-Term Care Hospitals: A Case Study in Waste REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2023; 105 (4): 745-765

  View details for DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01092

  View details for Web of Science ID 001026156500001

• Adoption and utilization of device-assisted telemedicine. Journal of health economics Zeltzer, D., Einav, L., Rashba, J., Waisman, Y., Haimi, M., Balicer, R. D. 2023; 90: 102780

  Abstract

  We estimate the effect of adopting a digital device for performing medical exams at home during telehealth visits. We match visits of adopters and non-adopters who used the same virtual care clinic but without the device and compare healthcare utilization after the matched visits. We find that device adoption, partially offset by decreased use of other primary care modalities, results in a 12% higher utilization rate of primary care and increased use of antibiotics. But - particularly among adults - adoption lowers the use of urgent care, the emergency room, and hospital care, resulting in no increase in total cost.

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102780

  View details for PubMedID 37331155

• The Impact of Increased Access to Telemedicine JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Zeltzer, D., Einav, L., Rashba, J., Balicer, R. D. 2023

  View details for DOI 10.1093/jeea/jvad035

  View details for Web of Science ID 001018038000001

• Why Is End-of-Life Spending So High? Evidence from Cancer Patients REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Zeltzer, D., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Shir, T., Stemmer, S. M., Balicer, R. D. 2023; 105 (3): 511-527

  View details for DOI 10.1162/rest_a_01066

  View details for Web of Science ID 000984535400002

• The risk of losing health insurance in the United States is large, and remained so after the Affordable Care Act. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2023; 120 (18): e2222100120

  Abstract

  Health insurance coverage in the United States is highly uncertain. In the post-Affordable Care Act (ACA), pre-COVID United States, we estimate that while 12.5% of individuals under 65 are uninsured at a point in time, twice as many-one in four-are uninsured at some point over a 2-y period. Moreover, the risk of losing insurance remained virtually unchanged with the introduction of the landmark ACA. Risk of insurance loss is particularly high for those with health insurance through Medicaid or private exchanges; they have a 20% chance of losing coverage at some point over a 2-y period, compared to 8.5% for those with employer-provided coverage. Those who lose insurance can experience prolonged periods without coverage; about half are still uninsured 6 mo later, and almost one-quarter are uninsured for the subsequent 2 y. These facts suggest that research and policy attention should focus not only on the "headline number" of the share of the population uninsured at a point in time, but also on the stability and certainty (or lack thereof) of being insured.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2222100120

  View details for PubMedID 37094163

• Empirical analyses of selection and welfare in insurance markets: a self-indulgent survey GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2023

  View details for DOI 10.1057/s10713-023-00084-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000977840800001

• Assessing the Gains from E-Commercet AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS Dolfen, P., Einav, L., Klenow, P. J., Klopack, B., Levin, J. D., Levin, L., Best, W. 2023; 15 (1): 342-370

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mac.20210049

  View details for Web of Science ID 000913814600010

• Financial Incentives to Facilities and Clinicians Treating Patients With End-stage Kidney Disease and Use of Home Dialysis: A Randomized Clinical Trial. JAMA health forum Ji, Y., Einav, L., Mahoney, N., Finkelstein, A. 2022; 3 (10): e223503

  Abstract

  Importance: Home dialysis rates for end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) treatment are substantially lower in the US than in other high-income countries, yet there is limited knowledge on how to increase these rates.Objective: To report results from the first year of a nationwide randomized clinical trial that provides financial incentives to ESKD facilities and managing clinicians to increase home dialysis rates.Design, Setting, and Participants: Results were analyzed from the first year of the End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choice (ETC) model, a multiyear, mandatory-participation randomized clinical trial designed and implemented by the US Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation. Data were reported on Medicare patients with ESKD 66 years or older who initiated treatment with dialysis in 2021, with data collection through December 31, 2021; the study included all eligible ESKD facilities and managing clinicians. Eligible hospital referral regions (HRRs) were randomly assigned to the ETC (91 HRRs) or a control group (211 HRRs).Interventions: The ESKD facilities and managing clinicians received financial incentives for home dialysis use.Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcome was the percentage of patients with ESKD who received any home dialysis during the first 90 days of treatment. Secondary outcomes included other measures of home dialysis and patient volume and characteristics.Results: Among the 302 HRRs eligible for randomization, 18 621 eligible patients initiated dialysis treatment during the study period (mean [SD] age, 74.8 [1.05] years; 7856 women [42.1%]; 10 765 men [57.9%]; 859 Asian [5.2%], 3280 [17.7%] Black, 730 [4.3%] Hispanic, 239 North American Native, and 12 394 managing clinicians. The mean (SD) share of patients with any home dialysis during the first 90 days was 20.6% (7.8%) in the control group and was 0.12 percentage points higher (95% CI, -1.42 to 1.65 percentage points; P=.88) in the ETC group, a statistically nonsignificant difference. None of the secondary outcomes differed significantly between groups.Conclusions and Relevance: The trial results found that in the first year of the US Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation-designed ETC model, HRRs assigned to the model did not have statistically significantly different rates in home dialysis compared with control HRRs. This raises questions about the efficacy of the financial incentives provided, although further evaluation is needed, as the size of these incentives will increase in subsequent years.Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT05005572.

  View details for DOI 10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.3503

  View details for PubMedID 36206005

• VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ji, Y., Mahoney, N. 2022; 137 (1): 565-618

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjab035

  View details for Web of Science ID 000743312400011

• VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM. The quarterly journal of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ji, Y., Mahoney, N. 2022; 137 (1): 565-618

  Abstract

  Government programs are often offered on an optional basis to market participants. We explore the economics of such voluntary regulation in the context of a Medicare payment reform, in which one medical provider receives a single, predetermined payment for a sequence of related healthcare services, instead of separate service-specific payments. This "bundled payment" program was originally implemented as a 5-year randomized trial, with mandatory participation by hospitals assigned to the new payment model; however, after two years, participation was made voluntary for half of these hospitals. Using detailed claim-level data, we document that voluntary participation is more likely for hospitals that can increase revenue without changing behavior ("selection on levels") and for hospitals that had large changes in behavior when participation was mandatory ("selection on slopes"). To assess outcomes under counterfactual regimes, we estimate a stylized model of responsiveness to and selection into the program. We find that the current voluntary regime generates inefficient transfers to hospitals, and that alternative (feasible) designs could reduce these inefficient transfers and raise welfare. Our analysis highlights key design elements to consider under voluntary regulation.

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjab035

  View details for PubMedID 35233120

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8884469

• Consolidation of primary care physicians and its impact on healthcare utilization. Health economics Zhang, J., Chen, Y., Einav, L., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2021

  Abstract

  We use administrative data from Medicare to document the massive consolidation of primary care physicians over the last decade and its impact on patient healthcare utilization. We first document that primary care organizations have consolidated all over the United States between 2008 and 2014. We then show that regions that experienced greater consolidation are associated with greater decline in overall healthcare spending. Finally, in our primary exercise, we exploit transitions of patients across organizations that are driven by changes in the organizational affiliations of their primary care physicians to study the impact of organizational size on overall spending. Our preferred specification suggests that patients switching from small to large physician organizations reduce their overall healthcare spending by 16%, and that this reduction is primarily driven by a 13% reduction in primary care visits and 0.09 (21%) fewer inpatient admissions per year.

  View details for DOI 10.1002/hec.4257

  View details for PubMedID 33764640

• Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Curto, V., Einav, L., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2021

  View details for DOI 10.1086/711951

  View details for Web of Science ID 000606799200001

• Supply-side variation in the use of emergency departments. Journal of health economics Zeltzer, D. n., Einav, L. n., Chasid, A. n., Balicer, R. D. 2021; 78: 102453

  Abstract

  We study the role of person- and place-specific factors in explaining geographic variation in emergency department utilization using detailed data on 150,000 patients who moved regions within Israel. We document that about half of the destination-origin differences in the average emergency department utilization rate across districts translates to the change (up or down) in movers' propensity to visit the emergency department. In contrast, we find no change in the probability of having a hospital admission through the emergency department. Similar results are obtained in a complementary event study, which uses hospital entry as a source of variation. The results from both approaches suggest that supply-side variation in emergency department access affects only the less severe cases-for which close substitutes likely exist-and that variation across emergency physicians in their propensity to admit patients is not explained by place-specific factors, such as differences in incentives, capacity, or diagnostic quality.

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102453

  View details for PubMedID 33964651

• Screening and Selection: The Case of Mammograms AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Oostrom, T., Ostriker, A., Williams, H. 2020; 110 (12): 3836–70

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20191191

  View details for Web of Science ID 000620672400005

• Screening and Selection: The Case of Mammograms. The American economic review Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Oostrom, T., Ostriker, A., Williams, H. 2020; 110 (12): 3836-3870

  Abstract

  We analyze selection into screening in the context of recommendations that breast cancer screening start at age 40. Combining medical claims with a clinical oncology model, we document that compliers with the recommendation are less likely to have cancer than younger women who select into screening or women who never screen. We show this selection is quantitatively important: shifting the recommendation from age 40 to 45 results in three times as many deaths if compliers were randomly selected than under the estimated patterns of selection. The results highlight the importance of considering characteristics of compliers when making and designing recommendations.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20191191

  View details for PubMedID 34305149

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8300583

• Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Einav, L. n., Finkelstein, A. n., Ji, Y. n., Mahoney, N. n. 2020

  Abstract

  Changes in the way health insurers pay healthcare providers may not only directly affect the insurer's patients but may also affect patients covered by other insurers. We provide evidence of such spillovers in the context of a nationwide Medicare bundled payment reform that was implemented in some areas of the country but not in others, via random assignment. We estimate that the payment reform-which targeted traditional Medicare patients-had effects of similar magnitude on the healthcare experience of nontargeted, privately insured Medicare Advantage patients. We discuss the implications of these findings for estimates of the impact of healthcare payment reforms and more generally for the design of healthcare policy.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2004759117

  View details for PubMedID 32719129

• Can targeting high-risk patients reduce readmission rates? Evidence from Israel JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS Shadmi, E., Zeltzer, D., Shir, T., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Balicer, R. D. 2020; 23 (1): 729–45

  View details for DOI 10.1080/15140326.2020.1798194

  View details for Web of Science ID 000594414500001

• Rising opioid prescription fulfillment among non-cancer and non-elderly patients-Israel's alarming example. Regional anesthesia and pain medicine Miron, O. n., Zeltzer, D. n., Shir, T. n., Balicer, R. D., Einav, L. n., Feldman, B. S. 2020

  View details for DOI 10.1136/rapm-2020-101924

  View details for PubMedID 33214218

• Prediction Accuracy With Electronic Medical Records Versus Administrative Claims. Medical care Zeltzer, D., Balicer, R. D., Shir, T., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Shadmi, E. 2019

  Abstract

  OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to evaluate the incremental predictive power of electronic medical record (EMR) data, relative to the information available in more easily accessible and standardized insurance claims data.DATA AND METHODS: Using both EMR and Claims data, we predicted outcomes for 118,510 patients with 144,966 hospitalizations in 8 hospitals, using widely used prediction models. We use cross-validation to prevent overfitting and tested predictive performance on separate data that were not used for model training.MAIN OUTCOMES: We predict 4 binary outcomes: length of stay (≥7d), death during the index admission, 30-day readmission, and 1-year mortality.RESULTS: We achieve nearly the same prediction accuracy using both EMR and claims data relative to using claims data alone in predicting 30-day readmissions [area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC): 0.698 vs. 0.711; positive predictive value (PPV) at top 10% of predicted risk: 37.2% vs. 35.7%], and 1-year mortality (AUC: 0.902 vs. 0.912; PPV: 64.6% vs. 57.6%). EMR data, especially from the first 2 days of the index admission, substantially improved prediction of length of stay (AUC: 0.786 vs. 0.837; PPV: 58.9% vs. 55.5%) and inpatient mortality (AUC: 0.897 vs. 0.950; PPV: 24.3% vs. 14.0%). Results were similar for sensitivity, specificity, and negative predictive value across alternative cutoffs and for using alternative types of predictive models.CONCLUSION: EMR data are useful in predicting short-term outcomes. However, their incremental value for predicting longer-term outcomes is smaller. Therefore, for interventions that are based on long-term predictions, using more broadly available claims data is equally effective.

  View details for DOI 10.1097/MLR.0000000000001135

  View details for PubMedID 31135691

• Health Care Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare. American economic journal. Applied economics Curto, V., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2019; 11 (2): 302-332

  Abstract

  We compare healthcare spending in public and private Medicare using newly available claims data from Medicare Advantage (MA) insurers. MA insurer revenues are 30 percent higher than their healthcare spending. Adjusting for enrollee mix, healthcare spending per enrollee in MA is 9 to 30 percent lower than in traditional Medicare (TM), depending on the way we define "comparable" enrollees. Spending differences primarily reflect differences in healthcare utilization, with similar reductions for "high value" and "low value" care, rather than healthcare prices. We present evidence consistent with MA plans encouraging substitution to less expensive care and engaging in utilization management. (JEL H11, H42, H51, I11, I13).

  View details for DOI 10.1257/app.20170295

  View details for PubMedID 31131073

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6532061

• Health Care Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Curto, V., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2019; 11 (2): 302–32

  View details for DOI 10.1257/app.20170295

  View details for Web of Science ID 000462352600011

• Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts (Reprinted from Journal of Public Economics vol 146, pg 27-40, 2017) JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2019; 171: 117–30

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.03.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000466252200008

• The impact of financial incentives on health and health care: Evidence from a large wellness program. Health economics Einav, L., Lee, S., Levin, J. 2018

  Abstract

  Workplace wellness programs have become increasingly common in the United States, although there is not yet consensus regarding the ability of such programs to improve employees' health and reduce health care costs. In this paper, we study a program offered by a large U.S. employer that provides substantial financial incentives directly tied to employees' health. The program has a high participation rate among eligible employees, around 80%, and we analyze the data on the first 4years of the program, linked to health care claims. We document robust improvements in employee health and a correlation between certain health improvements and reductions in health care cost. Despite the latter association, we cannot find direct evidence causally linking program participation to reduced health care costs, although it seems plausible that such a relationship will arise over longer horizons.

  View details for PubMedID 30450769

• Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals. Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2018; 86 (6): 2161-2219

  Abstract

  We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting - a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. When we conservatively limit ourselves to alternative contracts that hold the LTCH harmless, we find that an alternative contract can generate Medicare savings of about $2,100 per admission, or about 5% of total payments. More aggressive payment reforms can generate substantially greater savings, but the accompanying reduction in LTCH profits has potential out-of-sample consequences. Our results highlight how improved financial incentives may be able to reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for industry profits or patient health.

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA15022

  View details for PubMedID 31130738

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6529222

• Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence From Long-Term Care Hospitals ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2018; 86 (6): 2161–2219

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA15022

  View details for Web of Science ID 000452859800009

• Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-Specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Polyakova, M. 2018; 10 (3): 122–53

  View details for DOI 10.1257/pol.20160355

  View details for Web of Science ID 000439894600005

• Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part D. American economic journal. Economic policy Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Polyakova, M. 2018; 10 (3): 122-153

  Abstract

  We explore how private drug plans set cost-sharing in the context of Medicare Part D. While publicly-provided drug coverage typically involves uniform cost-sharing across drugs, we document substantial heterogeneity in the cost-sharing for different drugs within privately-provided plans. We also document that private plans systematically set higher consumer cost sharing for drugs or classes associated with more elastic demand; to do so we estimate price elasticities of demand across more than 150 drugs and across more than 100 therapeutic classes. We conclude by discussing the various channels that likely affect private plans' cost-sharing decisions.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/pol.20160355

  View details for PubMedID 30233766

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6141206

• Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It. Journal of the European Economic Association Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2018; 16 (4): 957–82

  Abstract

  We describe research on the impact of health insurance on healthcare spending ("moral hazard"), and use this context to illustrate the value of and important complementarities between different empirical approaches. One common approach is to emphasize a credible research design; we review results from two randomized experiments, as well as some quasi-experimental studies. This work has produced compelling evidence that moral hazard in health insurance exists-that is, individuals, on average, consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket-as well as qualitative evidence about its nature. These studies alone, however, provide little guidance for forecasting healthcare spending under contracts not directly observed in the data. Therefore, a second and complementary approach is to develop an economic model that can be used out of sample. We note that modeling choices can be consequential: different economic models may fit the reduced form but deliver different counterfactual predictions. An additional role of the more descriptive analyses is therefore to provide guidance regarding model choice.

  View details for PubMedID 30220888

• Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Dinerstein, M., Einav, L., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 108 (7): 1820–59

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.20171218

  View details for Web of Science ID 000436969700006

• Predictive modeling of US health care spending in late life SCIENCE Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mullainathan, S., Obermeyer, Z. 2018; 360 (6396): 1462-+

  Abstract

  That one-quarter of Medicare spending in the United States occurs in the last year of life is commonly interpreted as waste. But this interpretation presumes knowledge of who will die and when. Here we analyze how spending is distributed by predicted mortality, based on a machine-learning model of annual mortality risk built using Medicare claims. Death is highly unpredictable. Less than 5% of spending is accounted for by individuals with predicted mortality above 50%. The simple fact that we spend more on the sick-both on those who recover and those who die-accounts for 30 to 50% of the concentration of spending on the dead. Our results suggest that spending on the ex post dead does not necessarily mean that we spend on the ex ante "hopeless."

  View details for PubMedID 29954980

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6038121

• Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 126 (1): 178–215

  View details for DOI 10.1086/695529

  View details for Web of Science ID 000424291500005

• Outpatient Office Wait Times And Quality Of Care For Medicaid Patients HEALTH AFFAIRS Oostrom, T., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2017; 36 (5): 826-832

  Abstract

  The time patients spend in a doctor's waiting room prior to a scheduled appointment is an important component of the quality of the overall health care experience. We analyzed data on twenty-one million outpatient visits obtained from electronic health record systems, which allowed us to measure time spent in the waiting room beyond the scheduled appointment time. Median wait time was a little more than four minutes. Almost one-fifth of visits had waits longer than twenty minutes, and 10 percent were more than thirty minutes. Waits were shorter for early-morning appointments, for younger patients, and at larger practices. Median wait time was 4.1 minutes for privately insured patients and 4.6 minutes for Medicaid patients. After adjustment for patient and appointment characteristics, Medicaid patients were 20 percent more likely than the privately insured patients to wait longer than twenty minutes, with most of this disparity explained by differences in practices and providers they saw. Wait times for Medicaid patients relative to privately insured patients were longer in states with relatively lower Medicaid reimbursement rates. The study complements other work that suggests that Medicaid patients face some additional barriers in the receipt of care.

  View details for DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1478

  View details for Web of Science ID 000400394900008

  View details for PubMedID 28461348

• Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2017; 146: 27-40

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.011

  View details for Web of Science ID 000394073400003

• Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts. Journal of public economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2017; 146: 27-40

  Abstract

  A large literature in empirical public finance relies on "bunching" to identify a behavioral response to non-linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually. We conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in Medicare Part D, where a kink in the individual's budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous "donut hole". We show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern, but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts. These findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest.

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.011

  View details for PubMedID 28785121

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5544036

• Reducing Readmission Rates: Evidence from a Large Intervention in Israel Shadmi, E., Zeltzer, D., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Balicer, R., Engelbrecht, R., Balicer, R., HercigonjaSzekeres, M. IOS PRESS. 2017: 109–10

  View details for DOI 10.3233/978-1-61499-824-2-109

  View details for Web of Science ID 000450270500039

• Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R., Schrimpf, P. 2016; 8 (2): 195-224

  View details for DOI 10.1257/app.20150131

  View details for Web of Science ID 000373135500007

• Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores. American economic journal. Applied economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R., Schrimpf, P. 2016; 8 (2): 195-224

  Abstract

  "Big data" and statistical techniques to score potential transactions have transformed insurance and credit markets. In this paper, we observe that these widely-used statistical scores summarize a much richer heterogeneity, and may be endogenous to the context in which they get applied. We demonstrate this point empirically using data from Medicare Part D, showing that risk scores confound underlying health and endogenous spending response to insurance. We then illustrate theoretically that when individuals have heterogeneous behavioral responses to contracts, strategic incentives for cream skimming can still exist, even in the presence of "perfect" risk scoring under a given contract.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/app.20150131

  View details for PubMedID 27429712

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4945120

• Paying on the Margin for Medical Care: Evidence from Breast Cancer Treatments AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Williams, H. 2016; 8 (1): 52-79

  Abstract

  We present a simple graphical framework to illustrate the potential welfare gains from a "top-up" health insurance policy requiring patients to pay the incremental price for more expensive treatment options. We apply this framework to breast cancer treatments, where lumpectomy with radiation therapy is more expensive than mastectomy but generates similar average health benefits. We estimate the relative demand for lumpectomy using variation in distance to the nearest radiation facility, and estimate that the "top-up" policy increases social welfare by $700-2,500 per patient relative to two common alternatives. We briefly discuss additional tradeoffs that arise from an ex-ante perspective.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/pol.20140293

  View details for Web of Science ID 000369095000003

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4758371

• Peer-to-Peer Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 8 Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J. 2016; 8: 615-635

  View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334

  View details for Web of Science ID 000389577500022

• MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Einav, L., Levin, J. 2015; 13 (6): 998-1021

  View details for DOI 10.1111/jeea.12146

  View details for Web of Science ID 000367685300002

• MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER? REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. 2015; 97 (4): 725-741

  Abstract

  Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.

  View details for DOI 10.1162/REST_a_00518

  View details for Web of Science ID 000362284600002

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4710379

• MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER? The review of economics and statistics Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. 2015; 97 (4): 725-741

  Abstract

  Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.

  View details for DOI 10.1162/REST_a_00518

  View details for PubMedID 26769985

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4710379

• Assessing Sale Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Einav, L., Kuchler, T., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2015; 7 (2): 215-247

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.20130046

  View details for Web of Science ID 000354040100009

• THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D. The quarterly journal of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2015; 130 (2): 841-899

  Abstract

  We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire non-linear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from "filling" the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that "filling" the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects "anticipatory" behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows - in a highly stylized way - for individuals to engage in such cross year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 per year.

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjv005

  View details for PubMedID 26769984

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4710380

• THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NONLINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2015; 130 (2): 841-899

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjv005

  View details for Web of Science ID 000354733000008

• Economics in the age of big data SCIENCE Einav, L., Levin, J. 2014; 346 (6210): 715-?

  View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1243089

  View details for Web of Science ID 000344690100029

• Economics in the age of big data. Science (New York, N.Y.) Einav, L., Levin, J. 2014; 346 (6210): 1243089

  Abstract

  The quality and quantity of data on economic activity are expanding rapidly. Empirical research increasingly relies on newly available large-scale administrative data or private sector data that often is obtained through collaboration with private firms. Here we highlight some challenges in accessing and using these new data. We also discuss how new data sets may change the statistical methods used by economists and the types of questions posed in empirical research.

  View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1243089

  View details for PubMedID 25378629

• Growth, Adoption, and Use of Mobile E-Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Levin, J., Popov, I., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (5): 489-494

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.5.489

  View details for Web of Science ID 000338925400083

• Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Knoepfle, D., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (1): 1-26

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.1.1

  View details for Web of Science ID 000329219300001

• A MODEL OF MARKET POWER IN CUSTOMER MARKETS JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS Somaini, P., Einav, L. 2013; 61 (4): 938-986

  View details for DOI 10.1111/joie.12039

  View details for Web of Science ID 000328937700004

• The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2013; 44 (2): 249-274

  View details for DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12019

  View details for Web of Science ID 000320557300004

• Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S. P., Schrimpf, P., Cullen, M. R. 2013; 103 (1): 178-219

  Abstract

  We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.103.1.178

  View details for Web of Science ID 000314175800006

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3989940

• Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance. The American economic review Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S., Schrimpf, P., Cullen, M. R. 2013; 103 (1): 178-219

  Abstract

  We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.103.1.178

  View details for PubMedID 24748682

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3989940

• The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2013; 27 (1): 197-222

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.27.1.197

  View details for Web of Science ID 000314799800010

• The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, three decades later. The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2013; 27 (1): 197-222

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.27.1.197

  View details for PubMedID 24610973

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3943162

• How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., Cullen, M. R. 2012; 102 (6): 2606-2638

  Abstract

  We analyze the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" individuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.6.2606

  View details for Web of Science ID 000309822200008

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3951766

• How General are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains. The American economic review Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., Cullen, M. R. 2012; 102 (6): 2606-2038

  Abstract

  We analyze the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" individuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.6.2606

  View details for PubMedID 24634517

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3951766

• ON THE OPTIMALITY OF LINE CALL CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL TENNIS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Kolkowitz, S., Mill, R. 2012; 53 (3): 939-963

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00706.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000306806800011

• Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2012; 80 (4): 1387-1432

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7677

  View details for Web of Science ID 000306761800002

• Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Tadelis, S. 2012; 26 (2): 207-221

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.26.2.207

  View details for Web of Science ID 000306357300011

• Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2011; 25 (1): 115-138

  Abstract

  Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such intervention, based on classic work from the 1970s, has been the problem of adverse selection. Over the last decade, empirical work on selection in insurance markets has gained considerable momentum. This research finds that adverse selection exists in some insurance markets but not in others. And it has uncovered examples of markets that exhibit "advantageous selection"—a phenomenon not considered by the original theory, and one that has different consequences for equilibrium insurance allocation and optimal public policy than the classical case of adverse selection. Advantageous selection arises when the individuals who are willing to pay the most for insurance are those who are the most risk averse (and so have the lowest expected cost). Indeed, it is natural to think that in many instances individuals who value insurance more may also take action to lower their expected costs: drive more carefully, invest in preventive health care, and so on. Researchers have taken steps toward estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential public policy interventions. In this essay, we present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets. This graphical approach provides both a useful and intuitive depiction of the basic theory of selection and its implications for welfare and public policy, as well as a lens through which one can understand the ideas and limitations of existing empirical work on this topic.

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.25.1.115

  View details for Web of Science ID 000287303900006

  View details for PubMedID 21595322

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3248809

• ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R. 2010; 125 (3): 877-921

  Abstract

  We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.

  View details for Web of Science ID 000281353500001

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3016055

• ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES. The quarterly journal of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R. 2010; 125 (3): 877-921

  Abstract

  We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.

  View details for DOI 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.877

  View details for PubMedID 21218182

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3016055

• Is Hanukkah Responsive to Christmas?* ECONOMIC JOURNAL Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Rigbi, O. 2010; 120 (545): 612-630

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02305.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000278307700002

• Recording discrepancies in Nielsen Homescan data: Are they present and do they matter? QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS Einav, L., Leibtag, E., Nevo, A. 2010; 8 (2): 207-239

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s11129-009-9073-0

  View details for Web of Science ID 000276079700003

• Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the UK Annuity Market ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2010; 78 (3): 1031-1092

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7245

  View details for Web of Science ID 000277980400006

• Optimal Mandates and The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from The U.K. Annuity Market. Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2010; 78 (3): 1031-1092

  Abstract

  Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost, or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs. To do so, we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options. We focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities. The results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about £127 million per year, or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth. We also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed, mandates could achieve the first-best allocation. However, we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare. Since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult, our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest.

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7245

  View details for PubMedID 20592943

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC2893418

• NOT ALL RIVALS LOOK ALIKE: ESTIMATING AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE RELEASE DATE TIMING GAME ECONOMIC INQUIRY Einav, L. 2010; 48 (2): 369-390

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00239.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000275918100010

• Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Levin, J. 2010; 24 (2): 145-162

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.24.2.145

  View details for Web of Science ID 000278981600010

• Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 2 Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J. 2010; 2: 311-336

  View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254

  View details for Web of Science ID 000290636900012

• Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets. Annual review of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J. 2010; 2: 311-336

  Abstract

  We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.

  View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254

  View details for PubMedID 21572939

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3092551

• Stock market response to changes in movies' opening dates JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS Einav, L., Ravid, S. A. 2009; 33 (4): 311-319

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s10824-009-9105-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000272176400005

• Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Adams, W., Einav, L., Levin, J. 2009; 99 (1): 49-84

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.1.49

  View details for Web of Science ID 000264785500003

• Discrete choice models of firms' strategic decisions MARKETING LETTERS Draganska, M., Misra, S., Aguirregabiria, V., Bajari, P., Einav, L., Ellickson, P., Horsky, D., Narayanan, S., Orhun, Y., Reiss, P., Seim, K., Singh, V., Thomadsen, R., Zhu, T. 2008; 19 (3-4): 399-416

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s11002-008-9060-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000260250300015

• A theory of endogenous commitment REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Caruana, G., Einav, L. 2008; 75 (1): 99-116

  View details for Web of Science ID 000251435100004

• Production Targets RAND Journal of Economics Einav, L., Caruana, G. 2008; 39 (4): 990-1017
• Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2007; 97 (3): 745-788

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600010

• Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Orbach, B. Y., Einav, L. 2007; 27 (2): 129-153

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000249741600002

• Seasonality in the US motion picture industry RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L. 2007; 38 (1): 127-145

  View details for Web of Science ID 000250674100008

• Equilibrium demand elasticities across quality segments INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Coibion, O., Einav, L., Hallak, J. C. 2007; 25 (1): 13-30

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.06.004

  View details for Web of Science ID 000244807200002

• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Caruana, G., Einav, L., Quint, D. 2007; 132 (1): 147-166

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.001

  View details for Web of Science ID 000243711600008

• What's in a surname? The effects of surname initials on academic success JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Yariv, L. 2006; 20 (1): 175-187

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236639000009

• Empirical Models of Imperfect Competition: A Discussion Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Ninth World Congress Einav, L., Nevo, A. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. Cambridge University Press. 2006: 86–96
• Efficient entry ECONOMICS LETTERS Quint, D., Einav, L. 2005; 88 (2): 278-283

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.015

  View details for Web of Science ID 000230236100022

• Informational asymmetries and observational learning in search JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY Einav, L. 2005; 30 (3): 241-259

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s11166-005-6563-7

  View details for Web of Science ID 000229935800003

• Determinants of international tourism: a three-dimensional panel data analysis APPLIED ECONOMICS Eilat, P., Einav, L. 2004; 36 (12): 1315-1327

  View details for DOI 10.1080/000368404000180897

  View details for Web of Science ID 000222898400006

• The effects of mandatory seat belt laws on driving behavior and traffic fatalities REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2003; 85 (4): 828-843

  View details for Web of Science ID 000186322400004

• Flawed Rankings: A Comment Journal of Economic Perspectives Einav, L., Griliches, Z. 1998; 12 (4): 233-235