Bio


https://leinav.people.stanford.edu/bio

Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2012 - Present)
  • Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2007 - 2012)
  • Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2002 - 2007)
  • PER Visitor, Columbia University (2011 - 2011)
  • Ben Porath Visiting Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2011 - 2011)
  • Distinguished Visitor, Boston University (2011 - 2011)
  • Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2006 - 2006)
  • Visiting Fellow, Center of Studies in Industrial Organization, Northwestern University (2006 - 2006)
  • Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, Harvard University (1998 - 2002)
  • Research Assistant for Zvi Griliches, Harvard University (1998 - 1999)
  • Research Assistant for Ariel Pakes, Harvard University (1999 - 2000)
  • Teaching Assistant, School of Economics and Dept. of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University (1995 - 1997)
  • Research Assistant, Tel-Aviv University, for Manuel Trajtenberg (1995 - 1997)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (2012 - 2012)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2009 - 2010)
  • National Fellow, Hoover Institution (2005 - 2006)
  • Graduate Society Fellowship, Harvard University (1999 - 1999)
  • Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (2005 - 2008)
  • Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2011 - Present)

Honors & Awards


  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2010)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2011)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2012)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2013)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011)
  • Guggenhime Faculty Scholar, Stanford University (2007-2010)
  • Rector's List, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1994)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1996)
  • University-wide, Program for Excellency scholarship, Tel Aviv University (1994-1997)
  • Jump Start Honors Program, Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Best Economic Inquiry Article of 2010, Best Economic Inquiry Article (2010)
  • Emerald Management Reviews Citation of Excellence, Emerald Management Reviews (2007)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Co-organizer, NBER Insurance working group, National Bureau of Economic Research (2012 - Present)
  • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (2008 - Present)
  • Co-Editor, Econometrica (2013 - Present)
  • Co-Editor, American Economic Journals: Applied Economics (2010 - 2013)
  • Associate Editor, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics (2007 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Rand Journal of Economics (2007 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Quantitative Economics (2009 - Present)
  • Referee, American Economic Review
  • Referee, Berkeley Electronic Press
  • Referee, Econometrica
  • Referee, Economic Inquiry
  • Referee, Economic Journal
  • Referee, Economic Quarterly (in Hebrew)
  • Referee, Economica
  • Referee, Economics Letters
  • Referee, European Economic Review
  • Referee, International Economic Review
  • Referee, Israeli Science Foundation
  • Referee, International Journal of Industrial Organization
  • Referee, Jotirnal of Business and Economic Statistics
  • Referee, Journal of Cultural Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
  • Referee, Journal of European Economic Association
  • Referee, Journal of Health Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Industrial Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Law and Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Law Economics and Organizations
  • Refereee, Journal of Marketing Research
  • Referee, Journal of Political Economy
  • Referee, Journal of Public Economics
  • Referee, Management and Decision Economics
  • Referee, Marketing Science
  • Referee, National Science Foundation
  • Referee, Quantitative Economics
  • Referee, Quarterly Journal of Economics
  • Referee, Rand Journal of Economics
  • Referee, Review of Economic Studies
  • Referee, Review of Economics and Statistics
  • Referee, Review of Industrial Organization
  • Referee, Sloan Foundation
  • Referee, Theoretical Economics
  • Referee, U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation
  • Scientific Committee, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (2012 - 2013)
  • Program Committee, World Congress of the Econometric Society (2010 - 2010)
  • Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meeting (2010 - 2010)
  • Co-Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, "Credit and Insurance Markets" (2008 - 2008)
  • Program Committee, Society of Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting (2006 - 2007)
  • Co-Organizer, NBER Industrial Organization Winter Meeting (2006 - 2006)
  • Member, American Economic Association
  • Member, Econometric Society
  • Teaching matrix coordinator, Stanford University (2012 - Present)
  • Department vice chair, Stanford University (2011 - 2012)
  • Chair of graduate admissions, Stanford University (2009 - 2009)
  • Member, Graduate policy committee, Stanford University (2008 - 2008)
  • Member, Transfer credit policy, Stanford University (2006 - 2007)

Professional Education


  • B.A., Tel Aviv University, Israel, Computer Science and Economics (1997)
  • M.A., Harvard University, Economics (2000)
  • Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (2002)

2018-19 Courses


All Publications


  • The impact of financial incentives on health and health care: Evidence from a large wellness program. Health economics Einav, L., Lee, S., Levin, J. 2018

    Abstract

    Workplace wellness programs have become increasingly common in the United States, although there is not yet consensus regarding the ability of such programs to improve employees' health and reduce health care costs. In this paper, we study a program offered by a large U.S. employer that provides substantial financial incentives directly tied to employees' health. The program has a high participation rate among eligible employees, around 80%, and we analyze the data on the first 4years of the program, linked to health care claims. We document robust improvements in employee health and a correlation between certain health improvements and reductions in health care cost. Despite the latter association, we cannot find direct evidence causally linking program participation to reduced health care costs, although it seems plausible that such a relationship will arise over longer horizons.

    View details for DOI 10.1002/hec.3840

    View details for PubMedID 30450769

  • Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence From Long-Term Care Hospitals ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2018; 86 (6): 2161–2219

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA15022

    View details for Web of Science ID 000452859800009

  • Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-Specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Polyakova, M. 2018; 10 (3): 122–53
  • Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Dinerstein, M., Einav, L., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 108 (7): 1820–59
  • Predictive modeling of US health care spending in late life SCIENCE Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mullainathan, S., Obermeyer, Z. 2018; 360 (6396): 1462-+

    Abstract

    That one-quarter of Medicare spending in the United States occurs in the last year of life is commonly interpreted as waste. But this interpretation presumes knowledge of who will die and when. Here we analyze how spending is distributed by predicted mortality, based on a machine-learning model of annual mortality risk built using Medicare claims. Death is highly unpredictable. Less than 5% of spending is accounted for by individuals with predicted mortality above 50%. The simple fact that we spend more on the sick-both on those who recover and those who die-accounts for 30 to 50% of the concentration of spending on the dead. Our results suggest that spending on the ex post dead does not necessarily mean that we spend on the ex ante "hopeless."

    View details for DOI 10.1126/science.aar5045

    View details for Web of Science ID 000436598000077

    View details for PubMedID 29954980

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6038121

  • Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 126 (1): 178–215

    View details for DOI 10.1086/695529

    View details for Web of Science ID 000424291500005

  • Outpatient Office Wait Times And Quality Of Care For Medicaid Patients HEALTH AFFAIRS Oostrom, T., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2017; 36 (5): 826-832

    Abstract

    The time patients spend in a doctor's waiting room prior to a scheduled appointment is an important component of the quality of the overall health care experience. We analyzed data on twenty-one million outpatient visits obtained from electronic health record systems, which allowed us to measure time spent in the waiting room beyond the scheduled appointment time. Median wait time was a little more than four minutes. Almost one-fifth of visits had waits longer than twenty minutes, and 10 percent were more than thirty minutes. Waits were shorter for early-morning appointments, for younger patients, and at larger practices. Median wait time was 4.1 minutes for privately insured patients and 4.6 minutes for Medicaid patients. After adjustment for patient and appointment characteristics, Medicaid patients were 20 percent more likely than the privately insured patients to wait longer than twenty minutes, with most of this disparity explained by differences in practices and providers they saw. Wait times for Medicaid patients relative to privately insured patients were longer in states with relatively lower Medicaid reimbursement rates. The study complements other work that suggests that Medicaid patients face some additional barriers in the receipt of care.

    View details for DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1478

    View details for Web of Science ID 000400394900008

    View details for PubMedID 28461348

  • Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2017; 146: 27-40
  • Reducing Readmission Rates: Evidence from a Large Intervention in Israel Shadmi, E., Zeltzer, D., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Balicer, R., Engelbrecht, R., Balicer, R., HercigonjaSzekeres, M. IOS PRESS. 2017: 109–10
  • Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R., Schrimpf, P. 2016; 8 (2): 195-224
  • Paying on the Margin for Medical Care: Evidence from Breast Cancer Treatments AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Williams, H. 2016; 8 (1): 52-79
  • Peer-to-Peer Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 8 Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J. 2016; 8: 615-635
  • MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Einav, L., Levin, J. 2015; 13 (6): 998-1021

    View details for DOI 10.1111/jeea.12146

    View details for Web of Science ID 000367685300002

  • MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER? REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. 2015; 97 (4): 725-741
  • Assessing Sale Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Einav, L., Kuchler, T., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2015; 7 (2): 215-247
  • THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NONLINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2015; 130 (2): 841-899

    View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjv005

    View details for Web of Science ID 000354733000008

  • Economics in the age of big data SCIENCE Einav, L., Levin, J. 2014; 346 (6210): 715-?
  • Growth, Adoption, and Use of Mobile E-Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Levin, J., Popov, I., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (5): 489-494
  • Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Knoepfle, D., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (1): 1-26
  • A MODEL OF MARKET POWER IN CUSTOMER MARKETS JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS Somaini, P., Einav, L. 2013; 61 (4): 938-986

    View details for DOI 10.1111/joie.12039

    View details for Web of Science ID 000328937700004

  • The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2013; 44 (2): 249-274
  • Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S. P., Schrimpf, P., Cullen, M. R. 2013; 103 (1): 178-219
  • The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2013; 27 (1): 197-222
  • How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., Cullen, M. R. 2012; 102 (6): 2606-2638
  • ON THE OPTIMALITY OF LINE CALL CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL TENNIS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Kolkowitz, S., Mill, R. 2012; 53 (3): 939-963
  • Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2012; 80 (4): 1387-1432

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7677

    View details for Web of Science ID 000306761800002

  • Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Tadelis, S. 2012; 26 (2): 207-221
  • Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2011; 25 (1): 115-138

    Abstract

    Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such intervention, based on classic work from the 1970s, has been the problem of adverse selection. Over the last decade, empirical work on selection in insurance markets has gained considerable momentum. This research finds that adverse selection exists in some insurance markets but not in others. And it has uncovered examples of markets that exhibit "advantageous selection"—a phenomenon not considered by the original theory, and one that has different consequences for equilibrium insurance allocation and optimal public policy than the classical case of adverse selection. Advantageous selection arises when the individuals who are willing to pay the most for insurance are those who are the most risk averse (and so have the lowest expected cost). Indeed, it is natural to think that in many instances individuals who value insurance more may also take action to lower their expected costs: drive more carefully, invest in preventive health care, and so on. Researchers have taken steps toward estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential public policy interventions. In this essay, we present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets. This graphical approach provides both a useful and intuitive depiction of the basic theory of selection and its implications for welfare and public policy, as well as a lens through which one can understand the ideas and limitations of existing empirical work on this topic.

    View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.25.1.115

    View details for Web of Science ID 000287303900006

    View details for PubMedID 21595322

  • ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R. 2010; 125 (3): 877-921

    Abstract

    We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000281353500001

  • Is Hanukkah Responsive to Christmas?* ECONOMIC JOURNAL Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Rigbi, O. 2010; 120 (545): 612-630
  • Recording discrepancies in Nielsen Homescan data: Are they present and do they matter? QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS Einav, L., Leibtag, E., Nevo, A. 2010; 8 (2): 207-239
  • Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the UK Annuity Market ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2010; 78 (3): 1031-1092

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7245

    View details for Web of Science ID 000277980400006

  • NOT ALL RIVALS LOOK ALIKE: ESTIMATING AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE RELEASE DATE TIMING GAME ECONOMIC INQUIRY Einav, L. 2010; 48 (2): 369-390
  • Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Levin, J. 2010; 24 (2): 145-162
  • Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 2 Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J. 2010; 2: 311-336
  • Stock market response to changes in movies' opening dates JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS Einav, L., Ravid, S. A. 2009; 33 (4): 311-319
  • Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Adams, W., Einav, L., Levin, J. 2009; 99 (1): 49-84
  • Discrete choice models of firms' strategic decisions MARKETING LETTERS Draganska, M., Misra, S., Aguirregabiria, V., Bajari, P., Einav, L., Ellickson, P., Horsky, D., Narayanan, S., Orhun, Y., Reiss, P., Seim, K., Singh, V., Thomadsen, R., Zhu, T. 2008; 19 (3-4): 399-416
  • A theory of endogenous commitment REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Caruana, G., Einav, L. 2008; 75 (1): 99-116
  • Production Targets RAND Journal of Economics Einav, L., Caruana, G. 2008; 39 (4): 990-1017
  • Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2007; 97 (3): 745-788
  • Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Orbach, B. Y., Einav, L. 2007; 27 (2): 129-153
  • Seasonality in the US motion picture industry RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L. 2007; 38 (1): 127-145
  • Equilibrium demand elasticities across quality segments INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Coibion, O., Einav, L., Hallak, J. C. 2007; 25 (1): 13-30
  • Multilateral bargaining with concession costs JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Caruana, G., Einav, L., Quint, D. 2007; 132 (1): 147-166
  • What's in a surname? The effects of surname initials on academic success JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Yariv, L. 2006; 20 (1): 175-187
  • Empirical Models of Imperfect Competition: A Discussion Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Ninth World Congress Einav, L., Nevo, A. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. Cambridge University Press. 2006: 86–96
  • Efficient entry ECONOMICS LETTERS Quint, D., Einav, L. 2005; 88 (2): 278-283
  • Informational asymmetries and observational learning in search JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY Einav, L. 2005; 30 (3): 241-259
  • Determinants of international tourism: a three-dimensional panel data analysis APPLIED ECONOMICS Eilat, P., Einav, L. 2004; 36 (12): 1315-1327
  • The effects of mandatory seat belt laws on driving behavior and traffic fatalities REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2003; 85 (4): 828-843
  • Flawed Rankings: A Comment Journal of Economic Perspectives Einav, L., Griliches, Z. 1998; 12 (4): 233-235