Bio


https://leinav.people.stanford.edu/bio

Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2012 - Present)
  • Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2007 - 2012)
  • Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2002 - 2007)
  • PER Visitor, Columbia University (2011 - 2011)
  • Ben Porath Visiting Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2011 - 2011)
  • Distinguished Visitor, Boston University (2011 - 2011)
  • Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2006 - 2006)
  • Visiting Fellow, Center of Studies in Industrial Organization, Northwestern University (2006 - 2006)
  • Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, Harvard University (1998 - 2002)
  • Research Assistant for Zvi Griliches, Harvard University (1998 - 1999)
  • Research Assistant for Ariel Pakes, Harvard University (1999 - 2000)
  • Teaching Assistant, School of Economics and Dept. of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University (1995 - 1997)
  • Research Assistant, Tel-Aviv University, for Manuel Trajtenberg (1995 - 1997)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (2012 - 2012)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2009 - 2010)
  • National Fellow, Hoover Institution (2005 - 2006)
  • Graduate Society Fellowship, Harvard University (1999 - 1999)
  • Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (2005 - 2008)
  • Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2011 - Present)

Honors & Awards


  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2010)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2011)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2012)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, American Economic Review (2013)
  • Excellence in Refereeing Award, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011)
  • Guggenhime Faculty Scholar, Stanford University (2007-2010)
  • Rector's List, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1994)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Dean's List, Tel Aviv University (1996)
  • University-wide, Program for Excellency scholarship, Tel Aviv University (1994-1997)
  • Jump Start Honors Program, Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University (1995)
  • Best Economic Inquiry Article of 2010, Best Economic Inquiry Article (2010)
  • Emerald Management Reviews Citation of Excellence, Emerald Management Reviews (2007)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Co-organizer, NBER Insurance working group, National Bureau of Economic Research (2012 - Present)
  • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (2008 - Present)
  • Co-Editor, Econometrica (2013 - Present)
  • Co-Editor, American Economic Journals: Applied Economics (2010 - 2013)
  • Associate Editor, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics (2007 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Rand Journal of Economics (2007 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Quantitative Economics (2009 - Present)
  • Referee, American Economic Review
  • Referee, Berkeley Electronic Press
  • Referee, Econometrica
  • Referee, Economic Inquiry
  • Referee, Economic Journal
  • Referee, Economic Quarterly (in Hebrew)
  • Referee, Economica
  • Referee, Economics Letters
  • Referee, European Economic Review
  • Referee, International Economic Review
  • Referee, Israeli Science Foundation
  • Referee, International Journal of Industrial Organization
  • Referee, Jotirnal of Business and Economic Statistics
  • Referee, Journal of Cultural Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
  • Referee, Journal of European Economic Association
  • Referee, Journal of Health Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Industrial Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Law and Economics
  • Referee, Journal of Law Economics and Organizations
  • Refereee, Journal of Marketing Research
  • Referee, Journal of Political Economy
  • Referee, Journal of Public Economics
  • Referee, Management and Decision Economics
  • Referee, Marketing Science
  • Referee, National Science Foundation
  • Referee, Quantitative Economics
  • Referee, Quarterly Journal of Economics
  • Referee, Rand Journal of Economics
  • Referee, Review of Economic Studies
  • Referee, Review of Economics and Statistics
  • Referee, Review of Industrial Organization
  • Referee, Sloan Foundation
  • Referee, Theoretical Economics
  • Referee, U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation
  • Scientific Committee, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (2012 - 2013)
  • Program Committee, World Congress of the Econometric Society (2010 - 2010)
  • Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meeting (2010 - 2010)
  • Co-Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, "Credit and Insurance Markets" (2008 - 2008)
  • Program Committee, Society of Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting (2006 - 2007)
  • Co-Organizer, NBER Industrial Organization Winter Meeting (2006 - 2006)
  • Member, American Economic Association
  • Member, Econometric Society
  • Teaching matrix coordinator, Stanford University (2012 - Present)
  • Department vice chair, Stanford University (2011 - 2012)
  • Chair of graduate admissions, Stanford University (2009 - 2009)
  • Member, Graduate policy committee, Stanford University (2008 - 2008)
  • Member, Transfer credit policy, Stanford University (2006 - 2007)

Professional Education


  • B.A., Tel Aviv University, Israel, Computer Science and Economics (1997)
  • M.A., Harvard University, Economics (2000)
  • Ph.D., Harvard University, Economics (2002)

2018-19 Courses


All Publications


  • Prediction Accuracy With Electronic Medical Records Versus Administrative Claims. Medical care Zeltzer, D., Balicer, R. D., Shir, T., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Shadmi, E. 2019

    Abstract

    OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to evaluate the incremental predictive power of electronic medical record (EMR) data, relative to the information available in more easily accessible and standardized insurance claims data.DATA AND METHODS: Using both EMR and Claims data, we predicted outcomes for 118,510 patients with 144,966 hospitalizations in 8 hospitals, using widely used prediction models. We use cross-validation to prevent overfitting and tested predictive performance on separate data that were not used for model training.MAIN OUTCOMES: We predict 4 binary outcomes: length of stay (≥7d), death during the index admission, 30-day readmission, and 1-year mortality.RESULTS: We achieve nearly the same prediction accuracy using both EMR and claims data relative to using claims data alone in predicting 30-day readmissions [area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC): 0.698 vs. 0.711; positive predictive value (PPV) at top 10% of predicted risk: 37.2% vs. 35.7%], and 1-year mortality (AUC: 0.902 vs. 0.912; PPV: 64.6% vs. 57.6%). EMR data, especially from the first 2 days of the index admission, substantially improved prediction of length of stay (AUC: 0.786 vs. 0.837; PPV: 58.9% vs. 55.5%) and inpatient mortality (AUC: 0.897 vs. 0.950; PPV: 24.3% vs. 14.0%). Results were similar for sensitivity, specificity, and negative predictive value across alternative cutoffs and for using alternative types of predictive models.CONCLUSION: EMR data are useful in predicting short-term outcomes. However, their incremental value for predicting longer-term outcomes is smaller. Therefore, for interventions that are based on long-term predictions, using more broadly available claims data is equally effective.

    View details for DOI 10.1097/MLR.0000000000001135

    View details for PubMedID 31135691

  • Health Care Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Curto, V., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2019; 11 (2): 302–32
  • Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts (Reprinted from Journal of Public Economics vol 146, pg 27-40, 2017) JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2019; 171: 117–30
  • Health Care Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare. American economic journal. Applied economics Curto, V., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J., Bhattacharya, J. 2019; 11 (2): 302–32

    Abstract

    We compare healthcare spending in public and private Medicare using newly available claims data from Medicare Advantage (MA) insurers. MA insurer revenues are 30 percent higher than their healthcare spending. Adjusting for enrollee mix, healthcare spending per enrollee in MA is 9 to 30 percent lower than in traditional Medicare (TM), depending on the way we define "comparable" enrollees. Spending differences primarily reflect differences in healthcare utilization, with similar reductions for "high value" and "low value" care, rather than healthcare prices. We present evidence consistent with MA plans encouraging substitution to less expensive care and engaging in utilization management. (JEL H11, H42, H51, I11, I13).

    View details for DOI 10.1257/app.20170295

    View details for PubMedID 31131073

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6532061

  • The impact of financial incentives on health and health care: Evidence from a large wellness program. Health economics Einav, L., Lee, S., Levin, J. 2018

    Abstract

    Workplace wellness programs have become increasingly common in the United States, although there is not yet consensus regarding the ability of such programs to improve employees' health and reduce health care costs. In this paper, we study a program offered by a large U.S. employer that provides substantial financial incentives directly tied to employees' health. The program has a high participation rate among eligible employees, around 80%, and we analyze the data on the first 4years of the program, linked to health care claims. We document robust improvements in employee health and a correlation between certain health improvements and reductions in health care cost. Despite the latter association, we cannot find direct evidence causally linking program participation to reduced health care costs, although it seems plausible that such a relationship will arise over longer horizons.

    View details for PubMedID 30450769

  • Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence From Long-Term Care Hospitals ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2018; 86 (6): 2161–2219

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA15022

    View details for Web of Science ID 000452859800009

  • Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-Specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Polyakova, M. 2018; 10 (3): 122–53
  • Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It. Journal of the European Economic Association Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2018; 16 (4): 957–82

    Abstract

    We describe research on the impact of health insurance on healthcare spending ("moral hazard"), and use this context to illustrate the value of and important complementarities between different empirical approaches. One common approach is to emphasize a credible research design; we review results from two randomized experiments, as well as some quasi-experimental studies. This work has produced compelling evidence that moral hazard in health insurance exists-that is, individuals, on average, consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket-as well as qualitative evidence about its nature. These studies alone, however, provide little guidance for forecasting healthcare spending under contracts not directly observed in the data. Therefore, a second and complementary approach is to develop an economic model that can be used out of sample. We note that modeling choices can be consequential: different economic models may fit the reduced form but deliver different counterfactual predictions. An additional role of the more descriptive analyses is therefore to provide guidance regarding model choice.

    View details for PubMedID 30220888

  • Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Dinerstein, M., Einav, L., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 108 (7): 1820–59
  • Predictive modeling of US health care spending in late life SCIENCE Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mullainathan, S., Obermeyer, Z. 2018; 360 (6396): 1462-+

    Abstract

    That one-quarter of Medicare spending in the United States occurs in the last year of life is commonly interpreted as waste. But this interpretation presumes knowledge of who will die and when. Here we analyze how spending is distributed by predicted mortality, based on a machine-learning model of annual mortality risk built using Medicare claims. Death is highly unpredictable. Less than 5% of spending is accounted for by individuals with predicted mortality above 50%. The simple fact that we spend more on the sick-both on those who recover and those who die-accounts for 30 to 50% of the concentration of spending on the dead. Our results suggest that spending on the ex post dead does not necessarily mean that we spend on the ex ante "hopeless."

    View details for PubMedID 29954980

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6038121

  • Auctions versus Posted Prices in Online Markets JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2018; 126 (1): 178–215

    View details for DOI 10.1086/695529

    View details for Web of Science ID 000424291500005

  • Private provision of social insurance: drug-specific price elasticities and cost sharing in Medicare Part D. American economic journal. Economic policy Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Polyakova, M. 2018; 10 (3): 122–53

    Abstract

    We explore how private drug plans set cost-sharing in the context of Medicare Part D. While publicly-provided drug coverage typically involves uniform cost-sharing across drugs, we document substantial heterogeneity in the cost-sharing for different drugs within privately-provided plans. We also document that private plans systematically set higher consumer cost sharing for drugs or classes associated with more elastic demand; to do so we estimate price elasticities of demand across more than 150 drugs and across more than 100 therapeutic classes. We conclude by discussing the various channels that likely affect private plans' cost-sharing decisions.

    View details for PubMedID 30233766

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6141206

  • Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals. Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Mahoney, N. 2018; 86 (6): 2161–2219

    Abstract

    We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting - a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. When we conservatively limit ourselves to alternative contracts that hold the LTCH harmless, we find that an alternative contract can generate Medicare savings of about $2,100 per admission, or about 5% of total payments. More aggressive payment reforms can generate substantially greater savings, but the accompanying reduction in LTCH profits has potential out-of-sample consequences. Our results highlight how improved financial incentives may be able to reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for industry profits or patient health.

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA15022

    View details for PubMedID 31130738

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC6529222

  • Outpatient Office Wait Times And Quality Of Care For Medicaid Patients HEALTH AFFAIRS Oostrom, T., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2017; 36 (5): 826-832

    Abstract

    The time patients spend in a doctor's waiting room prior to a scheduled appointment is an important component of the quality of the overall health care experience. We analyzed data on twenty-one million outpatient visits obtained from electronic health record systems, which allowed us to measure time spent in the waiting room beyond the scheduled appointment time. Median wait time was a little more than four minutes. Almost one-fifth of visits had waits longer than twenty minutes, and 10 percent were more than thirty minutes. Waits were shorter for early-morning appointments, for younger patients, and at larger practices. Median wait time was 4.1 minutes for privately insured patients and 4.6 minutes for Medicaid patients. After adjustment for patient and appointment characteristics, Medicaid patients were 20 percent more likely than the privately insured patients to wait longer than twenty minutes, with most of this disparity explained by differences in practices and providers they saw. Wait times for Medicaid patients relative to privately insured patients were longer in states with relatively lower Medicaid reimbursement rates. The study complements other work that suggests that Medicaid patients face some additional barriers in the receipt of care.

    View details for DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1478

    View details for Web of Science ID 000400394900008

    View details for PubMedID 28461348

  • Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2017; 146: 27-40
  • Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts. Journal of public economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2017; 146: 27–40

    Abstract

    A large literature in empirical public finance relies on "bunching" to identify a behavioral response to non-linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually. We conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in Medicare Part D, where a kink in the individual's budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous "donut hole". We show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern, but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts. These findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest.

    View details for PubMedID 28785121

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5544036

  • Reducing Readmission Rates: Evidence from a Large Intervention in Israel Shadmi, E., Zeltzer, D., Flaks-Manov, N., Einav, L., Balicer, R., Engelbrecht, R., Balicer, R., HercigonjaSzekeres, M. IOS PRESS. 2017: 109–10
  • Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R., Schrimpf, P. 2016; 8 (2): 195-224
  • Paying on the Margin for Medical Care: Evidence from Breast Cancer Treatments AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Williams, H. 2016; 8 (1): 52-79
  • Peer-to-Peer Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 8 Einav, L., Farronato, C., Levin, J. 2016; 8: 615-635
  • Beyond Statistics: The Economic Content of Risk Scores. American economic journal. Applied economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Kluender, R., Schrimpf, P. 2016; 8 (2): 195–224

    Abstract

    "Big data" and statistical techniques to score potential transactions have transformed insurance and credit markets. In this paper, we observe that these widely-used statistical scores summarize a much richer heterogeneity, and may be endogenous to the context in which they get applied. We demonstrate this point empirically using data from Medicare Part D, showing that risk scores confound underlying health and endogenous spending response to insurance. We then illustrate theoretically that when individuals have heterogeneous behavioral responses to contracts, strategic incentives for cream skimming can still exist, even in the presence of "perfect" risk scoring under a given contract.

    View details for PubMedID 27429712

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4945120

  • MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Einav, L., Levin, J. 2015; 13 (6): 998-1021

    View details for DOI 10.1111/jeea.12146

    View details for Web of Science ID 000367685300002

  • MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER? REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. 2015; 97 (4): 725-741
  • Assessing Sale Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Einav, L., Kuchler, T., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2015; 7 (2): 215-247
  • THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NONLINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2015; 130 (2): 841-899

    View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjv005

    View details for Web of Science ID 000354733000008

  • THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D. The quarterly journal of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2015; 130 (2): 841–99

    Abstract

    We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire non-linear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from "filling" the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that "filling" the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects "anticipatory" behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows - in a highly stylized way - for individuals to engage in such cross year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 per year.

    View details for PubMedID 26769984

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4710380

  • MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER? The review of economics and statistics Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. 2015; 97 (4): 725–41

    Abstract

    Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.

    View details for PubMedID 26769985

  • Economics in the age of big data SCIENCE Einav, L., Levin, J. 2014; 346 (6210): 715-?
  • Growth, Adoption, and Use of Mobile E-Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Levin, J., Popov, I., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (5): 489-494
  • Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Knoepfle, D., Levin, J., Sundaresan, N. 2014; 104 (1): 1-26
  • Economics in the age of big data. Science (New York, N.Y.) Einav, L., Levin, J. 2014; 346 (6210): 1243089

    Abstract

    The quality and quantity of data on economic activity are expanding rapidly. Empirical research increasingly relies on newly available large-scale administrative data or private sector data that often is obtained through collaboration with private firms. Here we highlight some challenges in accessing and using these new data. We also discuss how new data sets may change the statistical methods used by economists and the types of questions posed in empirical research.

    View details for PubMedID 25378629

  • A MODEL OF MARKET POWER IN CUSTOMER MARKETS JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS Somaini, P., Einav, L. 2013; 61 (4): 938-986

    View details for DOI 10.1111/joie.12039

    View details for Web of Science ID 000328937700004

  • The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2013; 44 (2): 249-274
  • Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S. P., Schrimpf, P., Cullen, M. R. 2013; 103 (1): 178-219
  • The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2013; 27 (1): 197-222
  • Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance. The American economic review Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Ryan, S., Schrimpf, P., Cullen, M. R. 2013; 103 (1): 178–219

    Abstract

    We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

    View details for PubMedID 24748682

  • The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, three decades later. The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2013; 27 (1): 197–222

    View details for PubMedID 24610973

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3943162

  • How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., Cullen, M. R. 2012; 102 (6): 2606-2638
  • ON THE OPTIMALITY OF LINE CALL CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL TENNIS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Kolkowitz, S., Mill, R. 2012; 53 (3): 939-963
  • Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Jenkins, M., Levin, J. 2012; 80 (4): 1387-1432

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7677

    View details for Web of Science ID 000306761800002

  • Jonathan Levin: 2011 John Bates Clark Medalist JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Tadelis, S. 2012; 26 (2): 207-221
  • How General are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains. The American economic review Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Pascu, I., Cullen, M. R. 2012; 102 (6): 2606–2038

    Abstract

    We analyze the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" individuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to thirty percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all six domains.

    View details for PubMedID 24634517

  • Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. 2011; 25 (1): 115-138

    Abstract

    Government intervention in insurance markets is ubiquitous and the theoretical basis for such intervention, based on classic work from the 1970s, has been the problem of adverse selection. Over the last decade, empirical work on selection in insurance markets has gained considerable momentum. This research finds that adverse selection exists in some insurance markets but not in others. And it has uncovered examples of markets that exhibit "advantageous selection"—a phenomenon not considered by the original theory, and one that has different consequences for equilibrium insurance allocation and optimal public policy than the classical case of adverse selection. Advantageous selection arises when the individuals who are willing to pay the most for insurance are those who are the most risk averse (and so have the lowest expected cost). Indeed, it is natural to think that in many instances individuals who value insurance more may also take action to lower their expected costs: drive more carefully, invest in preventive health care, and so on. Researchers have taken steps toward estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential public policy interventions. In this essay, we present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets. This graphical approach provides both a useful and intuitive depiction of the basic theory of selection and its implications for welfare and public policy, as well as a lens through which one can understand the ideas and limitations of existing empirical work on this topic.

    View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.25.1.115

    View details for Web of Science ID 000287303900006

    View details for PubMedID 21595322

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3248809

  • ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R. 2010; 125 (3): 877-921

    Abstract

    We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000281353500001

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3016055

  • Is Hanukkah Responsive to Christmas?* ECONOMIC JOURNAL Abramitzky, R., Einav, L., Rigbi, O. 2010; 120 (545): 612-630
  • Recording discrepancies in Nielsen Homescan data: Are they present and do they matter? QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS Einav, L., Leibtag, E., Nevo, A. 2010; 8 (2): 207-239
  • Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the UK Annuity Market ECONOMETRICA Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2010; 78 (3): 1031-1092

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7245

    View details for Web of Science ID 000277980400006

  • NOT ALL RIVALS LOOK ALIKE: ESTIMATING AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE RELEASE DATE TIMING GAME ECONOMIC INQUIRY Einav, L. 2010; 48 (2): 369-390
  • Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Levin, J. 2010; 24 (2): 145-162
  • Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 2 Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J. 2010; 2: 311-336
  • ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES. The quarterly journal of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Cullen, M. R. 2010; 125 (3): 877–921

    Abstract

    We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.

    View details for PubMedID 21218182

  • Optimal Mandates and The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from The U.K. Annuity Market. Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Schrimpf, P. 2010; 78 (3): 1031–92

    Abstract

    Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost, or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs. To do so, we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options. We focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities. The results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about £127 million per year, or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth. We also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed, mandates could achieve the first-best allocation. However, we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare. Since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult, our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest.

    View details for PubMedID 20592943

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC2893418

  • Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets. Annual review of economics Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., Levin, J. 2010; 2: 311–36

    Abstract

    We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.

    View details for PubMedID 21572939

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC3092551

  • Stock market response to changes in movies' opening dates JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMICS Einav, L., Ravid, S. A. 2009; 33 (4): 311-319
  • Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Adams, W., Einav, L., Levin, J. 2009; 99 (1): 49-84
  • Discrete choice models of firms' strategic decisions MARKETING LETTERS Draganska, M., Misra, S., Aguirregabiria, V., Bajari, P., Einav, L., Ellickson, P., Horsky, D., Narayanan, S., Orhun, Y., Reiss, P., Seim, K., Singh, V., Thomadsen, R., Zhu, T. 2008; 19 (3-4): 399-416
  • A theory of endogenous commitment REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Caruana, G., Einav, L. 2008; 75 (1): 99-116
  • Production Targets RAND Journal of Economics Einav, L., Caruana, G. 2008; 39 (4): 990-1017
  • Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2007; 97 (3): 745-788
  • Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Orbach, B. Y., Einav, L. 2007; 27 (2): 129-153
  • Seasonality in the US motion picture industry RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Einav, L. 2007; 38 (1): 127-145
  • Equilibrium demand elasticities across quality segments INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Coibion, O., Einav, L., Hallak, J. C. 2007; 25 (1): 13-30
  • Multilateral bargaining with concession costs JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Caruana, G., Einav, L., Quint, D. 2007; 132 (1): 147-166
  • What's in a surname? The effects of surname initials on academic success JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Einav, L., Yariv, L. 2006; 20 (1): 175-187
  • Empirical Models of Imperfect Competition: A Discussion Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Ninth World Congress Einav, L., Nevo, A. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. Cambridge University Press. 2006: 86–96
  • Efficient entry ECONOMICS LETTERS Quint, D., Einav, L. 2005; 88 (2): 278-283
  • Informational asymmetries and observational learning in search JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY Einav, L. 2005; 30 (3): 241-259
  • Determinants of international tourism: a three-dimensional panel data analysis APPLIED ECONOMICS Eilat, P., Einav, L. 2004; 36 (12): 1315-1327
  • The effects of mandatory seat belt laws on driving behavior and traffic fatalities REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Cohen, A., Einav, L. 2003; 85 (4): 828-843
  • Flawed Rankings: A Comment Journal of Economic Perspectives Einav, L., Griliches, Z. 1998; 12 (4): 233-235