Stanford Advisees


All Publications


  • The NBER Orange Book Dataset: A user's guide RESEARCH POLICY Durvasula, M., Hemphill, C., Ouellette, L., Sampat, B., Williams, H. L. 2023; 52 (7)
  • Responding to the opioid crisis in North America and beyond: recommendations of the Stanford-Lancet Commission. Lancet (London, England) Humphreys, K., Shover, C. L., Andrews, C. M., Bohnert, A. S., Brandeau, M. L., Caulkins, J. P., Chen, J. H., Cuellar, M., Hurd, Y. L., Juurlink, D. N., Koh, H. K., Krebs, E. E., Lembke, A., Mackey, S. C., Larrimore Ouellette, L., Suffoletto, B., Timko, C. 2022; 399 (10324): 555-604

    View details for DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02252-2

    View details for PubMedID 35122753

  • Trademark Law Pluralism UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L. 2021; 88 (5): 1025-1080
  • Private and Public Investments in Biomedical Research Durvasula, M., Ouellette, L., Williams, H. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2021: 341-345
  • Private and Public Investments in Biomedical Research. AEA papers and proceedings. American Economic Association Durvasula, M., Ouellette, L. L., Williams, H. 2021; 111: 341-345

    View details for DOI 10.1257/pandp.20211105

    View details for PubMedID 34386715

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8356751

  • Improving Scientific Judgments in Law and Government: A Field Experiment of Patent Peer Review JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES Ho, D. E., Ouellette, L. 2020; 17 (2): 190–223

    View details for DOI 10.1111/jels.12249

    View details for Web of Science ID 000534645700001

  • THE MEDICARE INNOVATION SUBSIDY NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Ouellette, L., Sachs, R. E. 2020; 95 (1): 75–129
  • How do patent incentives affect university researchers? INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Ouellette, L., Tutt, A. 2020; 61
  • Innovation policy and the market for vaccines. Journal of law and the biosciences Xue, Q. C., Ouellette, L. L. 2020; 7 (1): lsaa026

    Abstract

    Vaccines play a crucial role in improving global public health, with the ability to stem the spread of infectious diseases and the potential to eradicate them completely. Compared with pharmaceuticals that treat disease, however, preventative vaccines have received less attention from both biomedical researchers and innovation scholars. This neglect has substantial human and financial costs, as vividly illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, we argue that the large number of ``missing'' vaccines is likely due to more than lack of scientific opportunities. Two key aspects of vaccines help account for their anemic development pipeline: (1) they are preventatives rather than treatments; and (2) they are generally durable goods with long-term effects rather than products purchased repeatedly. We explain how both aspects make vaccines less profitable than repeat-purchase treatments, even given comparable IP protection. We conclude by arguing that innovation policy should address these market distortions by experimenting with larger government-set rewards for vaccine production and use. Most modestly, policymakers should increase direct funding-including no grants and public-private partnerships-and insurance-based market subsidies for vaccine development. We also make the case for a large cash prize for any new vaccine made available at low or zero cost.

    View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsaa026

    View details for PubMedID 32733687

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC7381976

  • Innovation institutions and the opioid crisis. Journal of law and the biosciences Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L. L. 2020; 7 (1): lsaa001

    Abstract

    The US has recently-and belatedly-come to recognize opioid addiction as a public health crisis. What has gone mostly unrecognized is the degree to which this crisis is intertwined with US intellectual property law and related elements of US innovation policy. Innovation institutions-the legal arrangements that structure incentives for production and allocation of knowledge goods-encouraged the development and commercialization of addictive painkillers, restricted access to opioid antidotes, and (perhaps most importantly) failed to facilitate investments in alternative, nonaddictive treatments for chronic pain. Although innovation policy does not bear all the blame for the opioid wave that has washed over communities across the country, innovation institutions are bound up in the ongoing epidemic to a degree that so far has gone underappreciated. This article examines the proliferation of opioid use and abuse through the lens of innovation policy, and it envisions ways in which innovation institutions could help to contain the crisis. Along the way, it seeks to derive broader lessons for innovation policy scholarship as well as recommendations for institutional reform. The opioid crisis challenges the conventional understanding of IP law as a trade-off between allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency; it highlights the potentially pernicious role of IP protection for addictive and habit-forming products; and it exposes deep flaws in the structure of federal subsidies for and regulation of prescription drugs. It also draws attention to the political and cultural factors that contribute to innovation policy failures. Ultimately, the opioid crisis underscores both the urgency and the limits of institutional change in the innovation policy domain.

    View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsaa001

    View details for PubMedID 34221414

  • Innovation Policy Pluralism YALE LAW JOURNAL Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L. 2019; 128 (3): 544–614
  • Science fiction: Fictitious experiments in patents. Science (New York, N.Y.) Freilich, J. n., Ouellette, L. L. 2019; 364 (6445): 1036–37

    View details for DOI 10.1126/science.aax0748

    View details for PubMedID 31197002

  • Selling Patents to Indian Tribes to Delay the Market Entry of Generic Drugs JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE Ablavsky, G., Ouellette, L. 2018; 178 (2): 179–80
  • PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2017 Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L., Hutchinson, D. J., Strauss, D. A., Stone, G. R. 2018: 33–92
  • Bayh-Dole beyond borders JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE BIOSCIENCES Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L. 2017; 4 (2): 282–310

    View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsx011

    View details for Web of Science ID 000417361000003

  • Who reads patents? Nature biotechnology Ouellette, L. L. 2017; 35 (5): 421-424

    View details for DOI 10.1038/nbt.3864

    View details for PubMedID 28486445

  • A MARKET TEST FOR BAYH-DOLE PATENTS CORNELL LAW REVIEW Ayres, I., Ouellette, L. L. 2017; 102 (2): 271-334
  • Knowledge Goods and Nation-States MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW Hemel, D. J., Ouellette, L. L. 2017; 101 (1): 167-243
  • Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW Ouellette, L. L. 2016; 69 (6): 1825-1848
  • HOW COURTS ADJUDICATE PATENT DEFINITENESS AND DISCLOSURE DUKE LAW JOURNAL Allison, J. R., Ouellette, L. L. 2016; 65 (4): 609-695
  • Deference Mistakes UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Masur, J. S., Ouellette, L. L. 2015; 82 (2): 643-731
  • PATENT EXPERIMENTALISM VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW Ouellette, L. L. 2015; 101 (1): 65-128