Lisa Ouellette
Deane F. Johnson Professor of Law and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Stanford Law School
Academic Appointments
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Professor, Stanford Law School
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
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Faculty Affiliate, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI)
2023-24 Courses
- Intellectual Property: International and Comparative Patent Law
LAW 4009 (Spr) - Intellectual Property: Patents
LAW 4010 (Spr) - Introduction to Intellectual Property
LAW 4005 (Win) -
Independent Studies (1)
- Directed Research
LAW 400 (Aut)
- Directed Research
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Prior Year Courses
2022-23 Courses
- Biomedical Innovation Law and Policy
LAW 3011 (Spr) - Intellectual Property: Patents
LAW 4010 (Spr) - Introduction to Intellectual Property
LAW 4005 (Aut)
2021-22 Courses
- Intellectual Property: Patents
LAW 4010 (Spr) - Introduction to Intellectual Property
LAW 4005 (Aut)
2020-21 Courses
- Intellectual Property: Patents
LAW 4010 (Spr) - Introduction to Intellectual Property
LAW 4005 (Aut)
- Biomedical Innovation Law and Policy
All Publications
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The NBER Orange Book Dataset: A user's guide
RESEARCH POLICY
2023; 52 (7)
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.respol.2023.104791
View details for Web of Science ID 001012370900001
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Responding to the opioid crisis in North America and beyond: recommendations of the Stanford-Lancet Commission.
Lancet (London, England)
2022; 399 (10324): 555-604
View details for DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02252-2
View details for PubMedID 35122753
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Trademark Law Pluralism
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
2021; 88 (5): 1025-1080
View details for Web of Science ID 000697565600001
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Private and Public Investments in Biomedical Research
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2021: 341-345
View details for DOI 10.1257/pandp.20211105
View details for Web of Science ID 000655908100065
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Private and Public Investments in Biomedical Research.
AEA papers and proceedings. American Economic Association
2021; 111: 341-345
View details for DOI 10.1257/pandp.20211105
View details for PubMedID 34386715
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8356751
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Improving Scientific Judgments in Law and Government: A Field Experiment of Patent Peer Review
JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES
2020; 17 (2): 190–223
View details for DOI 10.1111/jels.12249
View details for Web of Science ID 000534645700001
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THE MEDICARE INNOVATION SUBSIDY
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2020; 95 (1): 75–129
View details for Web of Science ID 000523565300002
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How do patent incentives affect university researchers?
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
2020; 61
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105883
View details for Web of Science ID 000527941600009
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Innovation policy and the market for vaccines.
Journal of law and the biosciences
2020; 7 (1): lsaa026
Abstract
Vaccines play a crucial role in improving global public health, with the ability to stem the spread of infectious diseases and the potential to eradicate them completely. Compared with pharmaceuticals that treat disease, however, preventative vaccines have received less attention from both biomedical researchers and innovation scholars. This neglect has substantial human and financial costs, as vividly illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, we argue that the large number of ``missing'' vaccines is likely due to more than lack of scientific opportunities. Two key aspects of vaccines help account for their anemic development pipeline: (1) they are preventatives rather than treatments; and (2) they are generally durable goods with long-term effects rather than products purchased repeatedly. We explain how both aspects make vaccines less profitable than repeat-purchase treatments, even given comparable IP protection. We conclude by arguing that innovation policy should address these market distortions by experimenting with larger government-set rewards for vaccine production and use. Most modestly, policymakers should increase direct funding-including no grants and public-private partnerships-and insurance-based market subsidies for vaccine development. We also make the case for a large cash prize for any new vaccine made available at low or zero cost.
View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsaa026
View details for PubMedID 32733687
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC7381976
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Innovation institutions and the opioid crisis.
Journal of law and the biosciences
2020; 7 (1): lsaa001
Abstract
The US has recently-and belatedly-come to recognize opioid addiction as a public health crisis. What has gone mostly unrecognized is the degree to which this crisis is intertwined with US intellectual property law and related elements of US innovation policy. Innovation institutions-the legal arrangements that structure incentives for production and allocation of knowledge goods-encouraged the development and commercialization of addictive painkillers, restricted access to opioid antidotes, and (perhaps most importantly) failed to facilitate investments in alternative, nonaddictive treatments for chronic pain. Although innovation policy does not bear all the blame for the opioid wave that has washed over communities across the country, innovation institutions are bound up in the ongoing epidemic to a degree that so far has gone underappreciated. This article examines the proliferation of opioid use and abuse through the lens of innovation policy, and it envisions ways in which innovation institutions could help to contain the crisis. Along the way, it seeks to derive broader lessons for innovation policy scholarship as well as recommendations for institutional reform. The opioid crisis challenges the conventional understanding of IP law as a trade-off between allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency; it highlights the potentially pernicious role of IP protection for addictive and habit-forming products; and it exposes deep flaws in the structure of federal subsidies for and regulation of prescription drugs. It also draws attention to the political and cultural factors that contribute to innovation policy failures. Ultimately, the opioid crisis underscores both the urgency and the limits of institutional change in the innovation policy domain.
View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsaa001
View details for PubMedID 34221414
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Innovation Policy Pluralism
YALE LAW JOURNAL
2019; 128 (3): 544–614
View details for Web of Science ID 000457342900001
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Science fiction: Fictitious experiments in patents.
Science (New York, N.Y.)
2019; 364 (6445): 1036–37
View details for DOI 10.1126/science.aax0748
View details for PubMedID 31197002
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Selling Patents to Indian Tribes to Delay the Market Entry of Generic Drugs
JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE
2018; 178 (2): 179–80
View details for DOI 10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.7463
View details for Web of Science ID 000424261600003
View details for PubMedID 29297039
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2017
2018: 33–92
View details for Web of Science ID 000437078300002
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Bayh-Dole beyond borders
JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE BIOSCIENCES
2017; 4 (2): 282–310
View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsx011
View details for Web of Science ID 000417361000003
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Who reads patents?
Nature biotechnology
2017; 35 (5): 421-424
View details for DOI 10.1038/nbt.3864
View details for PubMedID 28486445
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A MARKET TEST FOR BAYH-DOLE PATENTS
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
2017; 102 (2): 271-334
View details for Web of Science ID 000393359400001
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Knowledge Goods and Nation-States
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
2017; 101 (1): 167-243
View details for Web of Science ID 000400083900004
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Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2016; 69 (6): 1825-1848
View details for Web of Science ID 000393222600012
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HOW COURTS ADJUDICATE PATENT DEFINITENESS AND DISCLOSURE
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
2016; 65 (4): 609-695
View details for Web of Science ID 000368202700001
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Deference Mistakes
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
2015; 82 (2): 643-731
View details for Web of Science ID 000357841800002
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PATENT EXPERIMENTALISM
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
2015; 101 (1): 65-128
View details for Web of Science ID 000351116700002