Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • Assistant Professor (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University (1988 - 1991)
  • Associate Professor (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University (1991 - 1993)
  • Professor (MEDS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University (1993 - 1994)
  • Mechthild E. Nemmers Distinguished Professor and Chairman of MEDS, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University (1995 - 1996)
  • IBM Distinguished Professor of Regularity and Competitive Practices and Chairman of MEDS department, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University (1996 - 1997)
  • Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology (1997 - 2002)
  • Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology (2002 - 2006)
  • Professor of Economics, Stanford University (2006 - 2008)
  • External Faculty Member, Santa Fe Institute (2007 - Present)
  • Senior Fellow, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (2010 - Present)
  • William D. Eberle Professor of Economics, Stanford University (2008 - Present)

Honors & Awards


  • Class of 1916 Cup, Princeton University (1984)
  • Wolf Balleisen Memorial Prize, Princeton University (1984)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (1998)
  • Social Choice and Welfare Prize, Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2001)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (2005-2006)
  • Guggenheim Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation (2005)
  • Arrow Prize for Senior Economists, BEPress (2007)
  • Outstanding Teaching Award, Stanford Graduate Economics Association (2008)
  • Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2009)
  • Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2011)
  • Distinguished Teaching Award, Stanford Department of Economics (2012)
  • Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching in Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University (2013)
  • Honorary Doctorate, Aix-Marseille University (2013)
  • Member, National Academy of Sciences (2015)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Co-Editor, Econometrica (2011 - 2015)
  • Editor, Games and Economic Behavior (2007 - 2011)
  • Co-Editor, Econometric Society Monograph Series (2001 - 2008)
  • Co-Editor, Review of Economic Design (1997 - 2006)
  • Associate Editor, Econometrica (1998 - 2007)
  • Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior (1996 - 2007)
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (1993 - 2001)
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Public Economic Theory (1997 - 2006)
  • Associate Editor, Mathematical Social Sciences (1995 - 2006)
  • Associate Editor, Not a Journal of Economics (2005 - Present)
  • Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics (2005 - 2008)
  • External Faculty Member, Santa Fe Institute (2007 - Present)
  • Vice Chair, Economics Department, Stanford University (2008 - 2011)
  • Chair, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, KGSM Northwestern University (1995 - 1997)
  • Director, Stanford Institute in Theoretical Economics (SITE) (2006 - 2010)
  • Director, CEME-NSF Decentralization Conference Series (2002 - 2010)
  • Director, Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech (2003 - 2005)
  • Executive Committee Member, Econometric Society (2010 - 2012)
  • Selection Committee, Chair, Calvó-Armengol International Prize in Economics (2010 - 2010)
  • Selection Committee, Chair, Calvó-Armengol International Prize in Economics (2012 - 2012)
  • Selection Committee, Chair, Calvó-Armengol International Prize in Economics (2014 - 2014)
  • Selection Committee Member, Nakahara Prize, Japanese Economic Association (2008 - 2012)
  • Fellowship Nominating Committee Member, Society for Advancement of Economic Theory (2012 - 2013)
  • Fellows Nominating Committee Member, Econometric Society (2007 - 2008)
  • Fellows Nominating Committee, Chair, Econometric Society (2009 - 2009)
  • Council Member, Econometric Society (2006 - 2012)
  • Council Member and Charter Member, Game Theory Society (2004 - 2009)
  • Council Member and Founding Member, Society for Social Choice and Welfare (1992 - 1997)
  • Council Member and Founding Member, Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2000 - 2005)
  • Council Member and Founding Member, Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2008 - 2013)
  • Scientific Advisory Board Member, Graduate School of Economics Barcelona (2007 - Present)
  • Scientific Advisory Board, Chair, MOVE (2010 - Present)
  • Advisory Board Member, Center for Research in Microeconomics, University of Cambridge (2008 - Present)
  • Economics Review Panel Member, National Science Foundation (NSF) (2000 - 2002)
  • Member, Economics Teaching Award Committee (2013 - 2013)
  • Member, Econometrica Co-editor Search Committee (2013 - 2013)
  • Member, Fellowship Nominating Committee, SAET (2012 - 2013)
  • Chair, Calvo-Armengol Prize Selection Committee (2013 - 2013)
  • Member, Santa Fe Institute Faculty Search Committee (2013 - 2013)
  • Member, Theoretical Economics, Co-editor search committee (2011 - 2011)
  • Member, Stanford Economics Senior Search committee (2011 - 2011)
  • Member, Econometric Society Transparency committee (2010 - 2010)
  • Chair, Committee to Structure Programming Course for economics PhD students (2009 - 2009)
  • Member, Theoretical Economics Advisory Committee, Econometric Society (2009 - 2009)
  • Member, Econometric Society Fellows Nomination Committee (2009 - 2009)
  • Chair, Antoni Calvo-Armengol Memorial Prize Selection Committee (2009 - 2009)
  • Co-Chair, Junior Recruiting Committee (2007 - 2008)
  • Member, International Economics Search Committee (2008 - 2008)
  • Co-Chair, Junior Recruiting Committee (2006 - 2007)
  • Member, Walras-Bowley Lecture Selection Committee, Econometric Society (2006 - 2006)
  • Member, New Journal Research Committee, Econometric Society (2005 - 2005)
  • Member, Louis-André Gerard-Varet Prize Selection Committee (2004 - 2004)
  • Member, Nemmers Prize Selection Committee (2004 - 2004)
  • Member, Social Choice and Welfare Prize Selection Committee (2003 - 2003)
  • Member, Koc Prize Selection Committee (1998 - 2004)

Professional Education


  • Ph.D., Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Economics (1988)
  • B.A., Princeton University, Economics (1984)

2017-18 Courses


All Publications


  • Present Bias and Collective Dynamic Choice in the Lab AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Yariv, L. 2014; 104 (12): 4184-4204
  • Financial Networks and Contagion AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Elliott, M., Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2014; 104 (10): 3115-3153
  • Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Jackson, M. O. 2014; 28 (4): 3-22

    View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.28.4.3

    View details for Web of Science ID 000345130400001

  • Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Jackson, M. O., Xing, Y. 2014; 111: 10889-10896

    Abstract

    We examine different populations' play in coordination games in online experiments with over 1,000 study participants. Study participants played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff. Study participants were predominantly from India and the United States. Study participants residing in India played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study participants residing in the United States who showed a greater play of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs. In addition, when prompted to play asymmetrically, the population from India responded even more significantly than those from the United States. Overall, study participants' predictions of how others would play were more accurate when the other player was from their own populations, and they coordinated significantly more frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from their own population than when matched across populations.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1400826111

    View details for PubMedID 25024196

  • The Diffusion of Microfinance SCIENCE Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O. 2013; 341 (6144): 363-?
  • The diffusion of microfinance. Science Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O. 2013; 341 (6144): 1236498-?

    Abstract

    To study the impact of the choice of injection points in the diffusion of a new product in a society, we developed a model of word-of-mouth diffusion and then applied it to data on social networks and participation in a newly available microfinance loan program in 43 Indian villages. Our model allows us to distinguish information passing among neighbors from direct influence of neighbors' participation decisions, as well as information passing by participants versus nonparticipants. The model estimates suggest that participants are seven times as likely to pass information compared to informed nonparticipants, but information passed by nonparticipants still accounts for roughly one-third of eventual participation. An informed household is not more likely to participate if its informed friends participate. We then propose two new measures of how effective a given household would be as an injection point. We show that the centrality of the injection points according to these measures constitutes a strong and significant predictor of eventual village-level participation.

    View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1236498

    View details for PubMedID 23888042

  • Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Tan, X. 2013; 148 (1): 2-30
  • Unraveling Peers and Peer Effects: Comments on Goldsmith-Pinkham and lmbens' "Social Networks and the Identification of Peer Effects" Journal of Business and Economic Statistics Jackson, M. 2013; 31 (3): 270-273
  • Economic Analyses of Social Networks edited by Jackson, M., Zenou, Y. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2013
  • Economic Engineering and the Design of Matching Markets: The Contributions of Alvin E. Roth SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 2013; 115 (3): 619-639

    View details for DOI 10.1111/sjoe.12026

    View details for Web of Science ID 000320665700003

  • Homophily and long-run integration in social networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bramoulle, Y., Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P., Rogers, B. W. 2012; 147 (5): 1754-1786
  • Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Rodriguez-Barraquer, T., Tan, X. 2012; 102 (5): 1857-1897
  • How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2012; 127 (3): 1287-1338

    View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjs021

    View details for Web of Science ID 000307835000006

  • Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Rodriguez-Barraquer, T., Tan, X. 2012; 75 (1): 198-216
  • Does Homophily Predict Consensus Times? Testing a Model of Network Structure via a Dynamic Process REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2012; 11 (3)
  • Network Structure and the Speed of Learning: Measuring Homophily Based on its Consequences Annals of Economics and Statistics Jackson, M. 2012; 107/108
  • The Reasons for Warss - an Updated Survey Handbook on the Political Economy of War Jackson, M., Morelli, M. edited by Coyne, C., Mathers, R. Elgar Publishing. 2011
  • An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications Handbook of Social Economics Jackson, M. edited by Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M. North Holland. 2011
  • Handbook of Social Economics edited by Jackson, M., Benhabib, J., Bisin, A. North Holland. 2011
  • Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure Handbook of Social Economics Jackson, M., Yariv, L. edited by Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M. North Holland. 2011
  • Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2010; 70 (1): 170-191
  • Using selection bias to explain the observed structure of Internet diffusions PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 107 (24): 10833-10836

    Abstract

    Recently, large datasets stored on the Internet have enabled the analysis of processes, such as large-scale diffusions of information, at new levels of detail. In a recent study, Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [(2008) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105:4633-4638] observed that the flow of information on the Internet exhibits surprising patterns whereby a chain letter reaches its typical recipient through long paths of hundreds of intermediaries. We show that a basic Galton-Watson epidemic model combined with the selection bias of observing only large diffusions suffices to explain these patterns. Thus, selection biases of which data we observe can radically change the estimation of classical diffusion processes.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1000814107

    View details for Web of Science ID 000278807400013

    View details for PubMedID 20534439

  • Identifying the roles of race-based choice and chance in high school friendship network formation PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P. 2010; 107 (11): 4857-4861

    Abstract

    Homophily, the tendency of people to associate with others similar to themselves, is observed in many social networks, ranging from friendships to marriages to business relationships, and is based on a variety of characteristics, including race, age, gender, religion, and education. We present a technique for distinguishing two primary sources of homophily: biases in the preferences of individuals over the types of their friends and biases in the chances that people meet individuals of other types. We use this technique to analyze racial patterns in friendship networks in a set of American high schools from the Add Health dataset. Biases in preferences and biases in meeting rates are both highly significant in these data, and both types of biases differ significantly across races. Asians and Blacks are biased toward interacting with their own race at rates >7 times higher than Whites, whereas Hispanics exhibit an intermediate bias in meeting opportunities. Asians exhibit the least preference bias, valuing friendships with other types 90% as much as friendships with Asians, whereas Blacks and Hispanics value friendships with other types 55% and 65% as much as same-type friendships, respectively, and Whites fall in between, valuing other-type friendships 75% as much as friendships with Whites. Meetings are significantly more biased in large schools (>1,000 students) than in small schools (<1,000 students), and biases in preferences exhibit some significant variation with the median household income levels in the counties surrounding the schools.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0911793107

    View details for Web of Science ID 000275714300013

    View details for PubMedID 20212129

  • PEER PRESSURE JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 8 (1): 62-89
  • Naive Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 2 (1): 112-149
  • Network Games REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Galeotti, A., Goyal, S., Jackson, M. O., Vega-Redondo, F., Yariv, L. 2010; 77 (1): 218-244
  • An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation 62nd European Meeting of the Econometric-Society Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2009: 1003–45

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7528

    View details for Web of Science ID 000268218600001

  • Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN Jackson, M. O. 2009; 13 (1-2): 137-145
  • The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Charness, G., Jackson, M. O. 2009; 69 (3): 241-247
  • Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2009; 1 (1): 124-150
  • Networks and Economic Behavior ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 2009; 1: 489-511
  • Social Networks in Economics The Annual Review of Economics Jackson, M. 2009; 1: 489-513
  • Commentary "Do We Inherit Our Positions in Life? Genetic Influences on Social Network Characteristics" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jackson, M. 2009: 1687–1688

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0813169106

  • Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 2009; 4 (2): 103-128
  • Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Jackson, M. O., Morelli, M. 2009; 4 (4): 279-313
  • Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Copic, J., Jackson, M. O., Kirman, A. 2009; 9 (1)
  • Vote buying: General elections JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 2008; 116 (2): 351-380
  • Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics Jackson, M. O. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2008: 4–11
  • Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings Economics Bulletin Jackson, M., Watts, A. 2008; 3 (12): 1-8
  • A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein: Foundations in Microeconomic Theory edited by Jackson, M., McLennan, A. Springer Heidelberg. 2008
  • Social and Economic Networks Jackson, M. Princeton University Press. 2008
  • A categorical model of cognition and biased decision making B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Fryer, R., Jackson, M. O. 2008; 8 (1)
  • Network Formation The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law Jackson, M. MacMillian Press. 2008
  • Political bias and war AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Morelli, M. 2007; 97 (4): 1353-1373
  • Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Charness, G., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 136 (1): 417-445
  • Meeting strangers and friends of friends: How random are social networks? AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. 2007; 97 (3): 890-915
  • Diffusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in network games 119th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Jackson, M. O., Yariv, L. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2007: 92–98
  • The formation of networks with transfers among players JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bloch, F., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 133 (1): 83-110
  • Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Sonnenschein, H. F. 2007; 75 (1): 241-257
  • The Study of Social Networks in Economics The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networks Jackson, M. edited by Rauch, J. E. Russell Sage Foundation. 2007
  • Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies The Review of Economic Design Jackson, M., Kremer, I. 2007; 11 (3): 185-198
  • Nomination processes and policy outcomes QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Jackson, M. O., Mathevet, L., Mattes, K. 2007; 2 (1): 67-94
  • Relating network structure to diffusion properties through stochastic dominance B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. 2007; 7 (1)
  • On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. 2007; 132 (1): 507-517
  • Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 132 (1): 27-46
  • The relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. 2006; 73 (4): 961-981
  • Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY Bloch, F., Jackson, M. O. 2006; 34 (3): 305-318
  • On the weights of nations: Assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2006; 114 (2): 317-339
  • Social Networks and the Diffusion of Behavior Yale Economic Review Jackson, M., Yariv, L. 2006; 3 (2): 42-47
  • On the Weight of Nations: Assigning Voting Power to Heterogeneous Voters Journal of Political Economy Jackson, M., Barbera, S. 2006; 114 (2): 317-339
  • The economics of social networks 9th World Congress of the Econometric-Society Jackson, M. O. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. 2006: 1–56
  • Strongly stable networks GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., van den Nouweland, A. 2005; 51 (2): 420-444
  • Allocation rules for network games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O. 2005; 51 (1): 128-154
  • Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Wilkie, S. 2005; 72 (2): 543-566
  • The economics of small worlds 19th Annual Congress of the European-Economic-Association Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2005: 617–27
  • Existence of Equilibria in Single and Double Auctions Econometrica Jackson, M., Swinkels, J. 2005; 73 (1): 93-139
  • A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency Group Formation in Economics; Networks, Clubs and Coalitions Jackson, M. edited by Demange, G., Wooders, M. Cambridge University Press. 2005
  • Diffusion on Social Networks Économie Publique Jackson, M., Yariv, L. 2005; 16 (1): 3-16
  • Existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Swinkels, J. M. 2005; 73 (1): 93-139
  • The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks Jackson, M., Dutta, B., Breton, M. L. edited by Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. Springer Verlag. 2005
  • Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 119 (3): 1011-1048
  • Equilibrium agenda formation SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2004; 23 (1): 21-57
  • The effects of social networks on employment and inequality AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 94 (3): 426-454
  • The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue Workshop on Economic Theory Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. 2004: 371–92
  • The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Nicolo, A. 2004; 115 (2): 278-308
  • La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Cabrales, A., Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2003; 111 (2): 425-458
  • The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks Advances in Economic Design Jackson, M. edited by Sertel, M., Koray, S. Springer-Verlag. 2003
  • Strategic Stability and Efficiency in Directed Communication Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M., Dutta, B. edited by Jackson, M., Dutta, B. Springer-Verlag. 2003
  • Mechanism Theory in Optimization and Operation Research Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems Jackson, M. edited by Derigs, U. EOLSS Publishers. 2003
  • A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M., Wolinsky, A. edited by Jackson, M., Dutta, B. Springer-Verlag. 2003
  • On the Formation of Networks and Groups Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M. edited by Dutta, B., Jackson, M. Springer-Verlag. 2003
  • The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M. edited by Dutta, B., Jackson, M. Springer-Verlag. 2003
  • On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2002; 41 (2): 265-291
  • The evolution of social and economic networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2002; 106 (2): 265-295
  • Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Simon, L. K., Swinkels, J. M., Zame, W. R. 2002; 70 (5): 1711-1740
  • Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bali, V., Jackson, M. 2002; 106 (1): 161-176
  • Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2002; 103 (1): 190-218
  • Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Moselle, B. 2002; 103 (1): 49-87
  • The stability of hedonic coalition structures GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Bogomolnaia, A., Jackson, M. O. 2002; 38 (2): 201-230
  • A crash course in implementation theory SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O. 2001; 18 (4): 655-708
  • Strategic candidacy and voting procedures ECONOMETRICA Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2001; 69 (4): 1013-1037
  • Voluntary implementation JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 2001; 98 (1): 1-25
  • The Existence of Pairwise Stable Networks Seoul Journal of Economics Jackson, M., Watts, A. 2001; 14 (3): 299-321
  • Strategic Stability and Efficiency in Directed Communication Networks Review of Economic Design Jackson, M., Dutta, B. 2000; 5 (3): 251-272
  • Reputation versus social learning JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. 1999; 88 (1): 40-59
  • Bayesian representation of stochastic processes under learning: De Finetti revisited ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E., Smorodinsky, R. 1999; 67 (4): 875-893
  • Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Peck, J. 1999; 13 (3): 603-628
  • Bayesian Implementation Recent Developments in Game Theory Jackson, M. edited by Maskin, E. Edward Elgar Publishers. 1999
  • Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 1998; 66 (6): 1353-1388
  • Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition Among Specialists Journal of Financial Markets Jackson, M., Gehrig, T. 1998; 1 (1): 89-119
  • Social Learning in Recurring Games Social Organization and Mechanism Design Jackson, M., Kalai, E. edited by d'Aspremont, C. Francqui Foundation. 1998
  • Social learning in recurring games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. K. 1997; 21 (1-2): 102-134
  • Approximate Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies Journal of Economic Theory Jackson, M., Manelli, A. 1997; 77 (2): 354-376
  • Strategy-proof allotment rules GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O., Neme, A. 1997; 18 (1): 1-21
  • Recurring bullies, trembling and learning Jerusalem Conference on Understanding Strategic Interaction Jackson, M., Kalai, E. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 1997: 171–184
  • A strategic model of social and economic networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 1996; 71 (1): 44-74
  • A characterization of game-theoretic solutions which lead to impossibility theorems REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1996; 63 (1): 23-38
  • Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solution Concepts which Lead to Impossibility Theorems Review of Economic Studies Jackson, M., Srivastava, S. 1996; 63 (1): 23-28
  • STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE ECONOMETRICA Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 1995; 63 (1): 51-87
  • A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O. 1994; 64 (1): 221-233
  • A CHARACTERIZATION OF STRATEGY-PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC-GOODS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Barbera, S., Jackson, M. 1994; 11 (3): 241-252
  • ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES FOR 2 PERSON, FINITE GAMES ECONOMICS LETTERS Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1994; 45 (3): 315-318
  • UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R., Srivastava, S. 1994; 6 (3): 474-501
  • INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS ECONOMICS LETTERS Jackson, M. O. 1992; 40 (3): 299-302
  • IMPLEMENTATION IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - A LOOK AT BOUNDED MECHANISMS REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O. 1992; 59 (4): 757-775
  • ON 2-PERSON NASH IMPLEMENTABLE CHOICE FUNCTIONS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1992; 9 (3): 263-264
  • IMPLEMENTING A PUBLIC PROJECT AND DISTRIBUTING ITS COST JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M., Moulin, H. 1992; 57 (1): 125-140
  • SPECULATION AND PRICE FLUCTUATIONS WITH PRIVATE, EXTRINSIC SIGNALS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M., Peck, J. 1991; 55 (2): 274-295
  • BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O. 1991; 59 (2): 461-477
  • Stock, Options, and Deferred Compensation Research in Labor Economics Jackson, M., Lazear, E. 1991; 12: 41-62
  • EQUILIBRIUM, PRICE FORMATION, AND THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Jackson, M. O. 1991; 4 (1): 1-16
  • OPTIMAL HEDGING AND EQUILIBRIUM IN A DYNAMIC FUTURES MARKET JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL Duffie, D., Jackson, M. O. 1990; 14 (1): 21-33
  • Optimal Innovation of Futures Contracts REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Duffie, D., Jackson, M. O. 1989; 2 (3): 275-296
  • MAXIMIN, LEXIMIN, AND THE PROTECTIVE CRITERION - CHARACTERIZATIONS AND COMPARISONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Barbara, S., Jackson, M. 1988; 46 (1): 34-44
  • INTEGRATION OF DEMAND AND CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O. 1986; 38 (2): 298-312
  • CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS IN CONSUMER THEORY - A SET OF DUALITY THEOREMS JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 1986; 15 (1): 63-77