Matthew O. Jackson

All Publications

• Multiplexing in networks and diffusion. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Chandrasekhar, A. G., Chaudhary, V., Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2026; 123 (28): e2534923123

  Abstract

  We study multiplexing-the extent to which people have multiple, distinct types of relationships with the same others. We document empirical multiplexing patterns in Indian village data. We show that relationships such as socializing, advising, helping, and lending are correlated but distinct, while commonly used proxies for networks based on ethnicity and geography are nearly uncorrelated with actual relationships. We also show that these layers and their overlap affect information diffusion in a field experiment. On the theoretical side, we show that increased overlap in people's different types of relationships impedes the spread of simple contagions-such as diseases or basic information that spread through a single interaction. In contrast, such higher levels of multiplexing enhance the spread of a complex contagion (e.g., a behavior or belief that requires multiple interactions for transmission) when infection rates are low, but impede complex contagion if infection rates are high. Finally, we identify empirical differences in multiplexing by gender and connectedness.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2534923123

  View details for PubMedID 42430354

• Peer influence on West Point cadets' Civil War allegiances. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Guo, Y., Jackson, M. O., Jia, R. 2026; 123 (22): e2529668123

  Abstract

  Do social networks and peer influence shape major life decisions in polarized settings? We explore this question by examining how peers influenced the allegiances of West Point cadets during the American Civil War. Leveraging quasi-random variations in the proportion of cadets from Free States, we analyze how cadets' decisions about which army to join depended on the composition of their peers. We have three main findings. First, there was a strong and significant peer effect: a higher proportion of classmates from Free States significantly increased the likelihood that cadets from Slave States joined the Union Army. Second, the peer effect varies with geography, most notably with the slave population share in cadets' home states or counties, and with cadets' own slave ownership in 1860. Third, peer effects were amplified by shared experiences such as having served together in the Mexican-American War, continuous military service, and belonging to the same cohort, suggesting that sustained interaction is important.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2529668123

  View details for PubMedID 42201964

• The Role of Referrals in Immobility, Inequality, and Inefficiency in Labor Markets JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS Bolte, L., Immorlica, N., Jackson, M. O. 2026

  View details for DOI 10.1086/733048

  View details for Web of Science ID 001689254300001

• Behavioral Communities and the Atomic Structure of Networks AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Jackson, M. O., Storms, E. C. 2026; 18 (1): 146-173

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.20230304

  View details for Web of Science ID 001682942600005

• Optimal regulation and investment incentives in financial networks JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O., Pernoud, A. 2025; 252

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105516

  View details for Web of Science ID 001619391300001

• Bridging the empathy perception gap fosters social connection. Nature human behaviour Pei, R., Grayson, S. J., Appel, R. E., Soh, S., Garcia, S. B., Bouwer, A., Huang, E., Jackson, M. O., Harari, G. M., Zaki, J. 2025

  Abstract

  Young adults face a rising tide of mental illness and loneliness. We propose that an overlooked barrier for social connection is how people perceive each other's empathy. Here, our longitudinal study of an undergraduate student community (N = 5,192) reveals that undergraduates who perceive their peers as empathic report better current and future well-being. Yet we document an 'empathy perception gap': people systematically see others as less empathic than others see themselves. Students who perceived their peers as less empathic were less willing to take social risks and grew more isolated over time. To disrupt this cycle, we conducted two field experiments that presented students with data on their peers' self-reported empathy and behavioural nudges to encourage social risk taking. These interventions reduced the empathy perception gap, increased social behaviours and expanded social networks months later. This work offers a promising, scalable strategy to cultivate social well-being, simply by presenting people with data about each other.

  View details for DOI 10.1038/s41562-025-02307-1

  View details for PubMedID 41102496

  View details for PubMedCentralID 12385385

• Using large language models to categorize strategic situations and decipher motivations behind human behaviors. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Xie, Y., Mei, Q., Yuan, W., Jackson, M. O. 2025; 122 (35): e2512075122

  Abstract

  By varying prompts to a large language model, we can elicit the full range of human behaviors in a variety of different scenarios in classic economic games. By analyzing which prompts elicit which behaviors, we can categorize and compare different strategic situations, which can also help provide insight into what different economic scenarios might induce people to think about. We discuss how this provides a step toward a nonstandard method of inferring (deciphering) the motivations behind the human behaviors. We also show how this deciphering process can be used to categorize differences in the behavioral tendencies of different populations.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2512075122

  View details for PubMedID 40875803

• Welfare optimization for resource allocation with peer effects. PNAS nexus Qiu, Z., Rosenkrantz, D. J., Jackson, M. O., Levin, S. A., Ravi, S. S., Stearns, R. E., Marathe, M. V. 2025; 4 (9): pgaf298

  Abstract

  Allocating students to schools or universities, people to teams or groups, people to urban housing, and matching users on social platforms are prominent examples of allocating limited goods, spaces, or positions to optimize social welfare. We study a welfare maximization problem that arises when such resource allocation scenarios involve peer effects, where people have preferences over the others who are nearby (e.g. their classmates, teammates, neighbors, or partners). We first develop a unified mathematical framework for this "position allocation problem," which assigns people to positions in a given network, with people caring about both their positions and their neighbors' attributes. We show that welfare maximization for the corresponding position allocation problem is computationally intractable, even when people have preferences that depend only on who is allocated to nearby positions, and those preferences satisfy simple constraints that arise naturally in urban and other real-world systems. In contrast to this computational lower bound, we show that if people can be classified into a fixed number of (demographic) groups and the network satisfies certain realistic spatial conditions, then efficiently computable allocations can be obtained for many natural scenarios. Importantly, the achieved social welfare is either optimal or arbitrarily close to optimal for natural forms of preferences. Our methods provide a foundation for position allocation with peer effects, and guide the design of optimal allocation strategies when people can be classified into a fixed number of groups in which members share similar preferences.

  View details for DOI 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf298

  View details for PubMedID 41017787

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC12461859

• Differences in perceived social connection help explain SES-based gaps in well-being SOCIAL NETWORKS Fang, W. M., Courtney, A., Jackson, M. O., Zaki, J. 2025; 82: 55-64

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.socnet.2025.03.004

  View details for Web of Science ID 001456274600001

• SELECTING THE MOST EFFECTIVE NUDGE: EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT ON IMMUNIZATION ECONOMETRICA Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Dalpath, S., Duflo, E., Floretta, J., Jackson, M. O., Kannan, H., Loza, F., Sankar, A., Schrimpf, A., Shrestha, M. 2025; 93 (4): 1183-1223

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA19739

  View details for Web of Science ID 001547202800002

• A Network Formation Model Based on Subgraphs REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Chandrasekhar, A. G., Jackson, M. O. 2025

  View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rdaf013

  View details for Web of Science ID 001457858200001

• Negotiations with Multidimensional Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Integrated Deals Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics Jackson, M. O., Sonnenschein, H. F., Xing, Y., Tombazos, C., Al-Ubaydli, O. 2025; 3 (4)

  View details for DOI 10.1086/733777

• Finding the Wise and the Wisdom in a Crowd: Estimating Underlying Qualities of Reviewers and Items ECONOMIC JOURNAL Carayol, N., Jackson, M. O. 2024; 134 (663): 2712-2745

  View details for DOI 10.1093/ej/ueae045

  View details for Web of Science ID 001262326900001

• The Incentive Complementarity Between Formal and Informal Enforcement JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Jackson, M. O., Xing, Y. 2024; 22 (5): 2294-2328

  View details for DOI 10.1093/jeea/jvae009

  View details for Web of Science ID 001195182500001

• A Turing test of whether AI chatbots are behaviorally similar to humans PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Mei, Q., Xie, Y., Yuan, W., Jackson, M. O. 2024; 121 (9): e2313925121

  Abstract

  We administer a Turing test to AI chatbots. We examine how chatbots behave in a suite of classic behavioral games that are designed to elicit characteristics such as trust, fairness, risk-aversion, cooperation, etc., as well as how they respond to a traditional Big-5 psychological survey that measures personality traits. ChatGPT-4 exhibits behavioral and personality traits that are statistically indistinguishable from a random human from tens of thousands of human subjects from more than 50 countries. Chatbots also modify their behavior based on previous experience and contexts "as if" they were learning from the interactions and change their behavior in response to different framings of the same strategic situation. Their behaviors are often distinct from average and modal human behaviors, in which case they tend to behave on the more altruistic and cooperative end of the distribution. We estimate that they act as if they are maximizing an average of their own and partner's payoffs.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2313925121

  View details for Web of Science ID 001208569300007

  View details for PubMedID 38386710

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC10907317

• Credit Freezes, Equilibrium Multiplicity, and Optimal Bailouts in Financial Networks REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Pernoud, A. 2024

  View details for DOI 10.1093/rfs/hhad096

  View details for Web of Science ID 001143310600001

• Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Gersbach, H., Jackson, M. O., Muller, P., Tejada, O. 2023; 214

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716

  View details for Web of Science ID 001123697900001

• Social microclimates and well-being. Emotion (Washington, D.C.) Courtney, A. L., Baltiansky, D., Fang, W. M., Roshanaei, M., Aybas, Y. C., Samuels, N. A., Wetchler, E., Wu, Z., Jackson, M. O., Zaki, J. 2023

  Abstract

  Emotional well-being has a known relationship with a person's direct social ties, including friendships; but do ambient social and emotional features of the local community also play a role? This work takes advantage of university students' assignment to different local networks-or "social microclimates"-to probe this question. Using Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) regression, we quantify the collective impact of individual, social network, and microclimate factors on the emotional well-being of a cohort of first-year college students. Results indicate that well-being tracks individual factors but also myriad social and microclimate factors, reflecting one's peers and social surroundings. Students who belonged to emotionally stable and tight-knit microclimates (i.e., had emotionally stable friends or resided in densely connected residence halls) reported lower levels of psychological distress and higher levels of life satisfaction, even when controlling for factors such as personality and social network size. Although rarely discussed or acknowledged in the policies that create them, social microclimates are consequential to well-being, especially during life transitions. The effects of microclimate factors are small relative to some individual factors; however, they explain unique variance in well-being that is not directly captured by emotional stability or other individual factors. These findings are novel, but preliminary, and should be replicated in new samples and contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

  View details for DOI 10.1037/emo0001277

  View details for PubMedID 37824222

• Changes in Social Network Structure in Response to Exposure to Formal Credit Markets REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Banerjee, A., Breza, E., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O., Kinnan, C. 2023

  View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rdad065

  View details for Web of Science ID 001186724000001

• Centrality measures in networks SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Bloch, F., Jackson, M. O., Tebaldi, P. 2023

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00355-023-01456-4

  View details for Web of Science ID 000976966300001

• Social Interactions and Legislative Activity JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Canen, N., Jackson, M. O., Trebbi, F. 2022

  View details for DOI 10.1093/jeea/jvac051

  View details for Web of Science ID 000862226000001

• Learning through the grapevine and the impact of the breadth and depth of social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Jackson, M. O., Malladi, S., McAdams, D. 2022; 119 (34): e2205549119

  Abstract

  We study how communication platforms can improve social learning without censoring or fact-checking messages, when they have members who deliberately and/or inadvertently distort information. Message fidelity depends on social network depth (how many times information can be relayed) and breadth (the number of others with whom a typical user shares information). We characterize how the expected number of true minus false messages depends on breadth and depth of the network and the noise structure. Message fidelity can be improved by capping depth or, if that is not possible, limiting breadth, e.g., by capping the number of people to whom someone can forward a given message. Although caps reduce total communication, they increase the fraction of received messages that have traveled shorter distances and have had less opportunity to be altered, thereby increasing the signal-to-noise ratio.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2205549119

  View details for PubMedID 35969767

• Social capital I: measurement and associations with economic mobility. Nature Chetty, R., Jackson, M. O., Kuchler, T., Stroebel, J., Hendren, N., Fluegge, R. B., Gong, S., Gonzalez, F., Grondin, A., Jacob, M., Johnston, D., Koenen, M., Laguna-Muggenburg, E., Mudekereza, F., Rutter, T., Thor, N., Townsend, W., Zhang, R., Bailey, M., Barbera, P., Bhole, M., Wernerfelt, N. 2022

  Abstract

  Social capital-the strength of an individual's social network and community-has been identified as a potential determinant of outcomes ranging from education to health1-8. However, efforts to understand what types of social capital matter for these outcomes have been hindered by a lack of social network data. Here, in the first of a pair of papers9, we use data on 21billion friendships from Facebook to study social capital. We measure and analyse three types of social capital by ZIP (postal) code in the United States: (1) connectedness between different types of people, such as those with low versus high socioeconomic status (SES); (2) social cohesion, such as the extent of cliques in friendship networks; and (3) civic engagement, such as rates of volunteering. These measures vary substantially across areas, but are not highly correlated with each other. We demonstrate the importance of distinguishing these forms of social capital by analysing their associations with economic mobility across areas. The share of high-SES friends among individuals with low SES-which we term economic connectedness-is among the strongest predictors of upward income mobility identified to date10,11. Other social capital measures are not strongly associated with economic mobility. If children with low-SES parents were to grow up in counties with economic connectedness comparable to that of the average child with high-SES parents, their incomes in adulthood would increase by 20% on average. Differences in economic connectedness can explain well-known relationships between upward income mobility and racial segregation, poverty rates, and inequality12-14. To support further research and policy interventions, we publicly release privacy-protected statistics on social capital by ZIP code at https://www.socialcapital.org .

  View details for DOI 10.1038/s41586-022-04996-4

  View details for PubMedID 35915342

• Social capital II: determinants of economic connectedness. Nature Chetty, R., Jackson, M. O., Kuchler, T., Stroebel, J., Hendren, N., Fluegge, R. B., Gong, S., Gonzalez, F., Grondin, A., Jacob, M., Johnston, D., Koenen, M., Laguna-Muggenburg, E., Mudekereza, F., Rutter, T., Thor, N., Townsend, W., Zhang, R., Bailey, M., Barbera, P., Bhole, M., Wernerfelt, N. 2022

  Abstract

  Low levels of social interaction across class lines have generated widespread concern1-4 and are associated with worse outcomes, such as lower rates of upward income mobility4-7. Here we analyse the determinants of cross-class interaction using data from Facebook, building on the analysis in our companion paper7. We show that about half of the social disconnection across socioeconomic lines-measured as the difference in the share of high-socioeconomic status (SES)friends between people with low and high SES-is explained by differences in exposure to people with high SES in groups such as schools and religious organizations. The other half is explained by friending bias-the tendency for people with low SES to befriend people with high SES at lower rates even conditional on exposure. Friending bias is shaped by the structure of the groups in which people interact. For example, friending bias is higher in larger and more diverse groups and lower in religious organizations than in schools and workplaces. Distinguishing exposure from friending bias is helpful for identifying interventions to increase cross-SES friendships (economic connectedness). Using fluctuations in the share of students with high SES across high school cohorts, we show that increases in high-SESexposure leadlow-SES people to form more friendships with high-SES peoplein schools that exhibit low levels of friending bias. Thus, socioeconomic integration can increase economic connectedness in communities in which friending bias is low. By contrast, when friending bias is high, increasing cross-SES interactions among existing members may be necessary to increase economic connectedness. To support such efforts, we release privacy-protected statistics on economic connectedness, exposure and friending bias for each ZIP(postal) code, high school and college in the United States at https://www.socialcapital.org .

  View details for DOI 10.1038/s41586-022-04997-3

  View details for PubMedID 35915343

• COMMENT ON JACKSON AND SONNENSCHEIN (2007) "OVERCOMING INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS BY LINKING DECISIONS" ECONOMETRICA Ball, I., Jackson, M. O., Kattwinkel, D. 2022; 90 (4): O3-O7

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA20516

  View details for Web of Science ID 000831314400004

• Interacting regional policies in containing a disease. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Chandrasekhar, A. G., Goldsmith-Pinkham, P., Jackson, M. O., Thau, S. 2021; 118 (19)

  Abstract

  Regional quarantine policies, in which a portion of a population surrounding infections is locked down, are an important tool to contain disease. However, jurisdictional governments-such as cities, counties, states, and countries-act with minimal coordination across borders. We show that a regional quarantine policy's effectiveness depends on whether 1) the network of interactions satisfies a growth balance condition, 2) infections have a short delay in detection, and 3) the government has control over and knowledge of the necessary parts of the network (no leakage of behaviors). As these conditions generally fail to be satisfied, especially when interactions cross borders, we show that substantial improvements are possible if governments are outward looking and proactive: triggering quarantines in reaction to neighbors' infection rates, in some cases even before infections are detected internally. We also show that even a few lax governments-those that wait for nontrivial internal infection rates before quarantining-impose substantial costs on the whole system. Our results illustrate the importance of understanding contagion across policy borders and offer a starting point in designing proactive policies for decentralized jurisdictions.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2021520118

  View details for PubMedID 33906950

• Belief polarization in a complex world: A learning theory perspective PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Haghtalab, N., Jackson, M. O., Procaccia, A. D. 2021; 118 (19)

  Abstract

  We present two models of how people form beliefs that are based on machine learning theory. We illustrate how these models give insight into observed human phenomena by showing how polarized beliefs can arise even when people are exposed to almost identical sources of information. In our first model, people form beliefs that are deterministic functions that best fit their past data (training sets). In that model, their inability to form probabilistic beliefs can lead people to have opposing views even if their data are drawn from distributions that only slightly disagree. In the second model, people pay a cost that is increasing in the complexity of the function that represents their beliefs. In this second model, even with large training sets drawn from exactly the same distribution, agents can disagree substantially because they simplify the world along different dimensions. We discuss what these models of belief formation suggest for improving people's accuracy and agreement.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2010144118

  View details for Web of Science ID 000651329300009

  View details for PubMedID 33941683

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC8126847

• Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 13, 2021 Jackson, M. O., Pernoud, A. edited by Aghion, P., Rey, H. 2021; 13: 171-202

  View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-083120-111540

  View details for Web of Science ID 000685106100008

• Why understanding multiplex social network structuring processes will help us better understand the evolution of human behavior EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY Atkisson, C., Gorski, P. J., Jackson, M. O., Holyst, J. A., D'Souza, R. M. 2020; 29 (3): 102-107

  Abstract

  Social scientists have long appreciated that relationships between individuals cannot be described from observing a single domain, and that the structure across domains of interaction can have important effects on outcomes of interest (e.g., cooperation; Durkheim, 1893). One debate explicitly about this surrounds food sharing. Some argue that failing to find reciprocal food sharing means that some process other than reciprocity must be occurring, whereas others argue for models that allow reciprocity to span domains in the form of trade (Kaplan and Hill, 1985.). Multilayer networks, high-dimensional networks that allow us to consider multiple sets of relationships at the same time, are ubiquitous and have consequences, so processes giving rise to them are important social phenomena. The analysis of multi-dimensional social networks has recently garnered the attention of the network science community (Kivelä et al., 2014). Recent models of these processes show how ignoring layer interdependencies can lead one to miss why a layer formed the way it did, and/or draw erroneous conclusions (Górski et al., 2018). Understanding the structuring processes that underlie multiplex networks will help understand increasingly rich data sets, giving more accurate and complete pictures of social interactions.

  View details for DOI 10.1002/evan.21850

  View details for Web of Science ID 000540366000003

  View details for PubMedID 32544306

• A typology of social capital and associated network measures SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O. 2020; 54 (2-3): 311-336

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00355-019-01189-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000519626100008

• A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2020; 15 (3): 297-335

  View details for DOI 10.1561/100.00019002_app

  View details for Web of Science ID 000616855600001

• Using Gossips to Spread Information: Theory and Evidence from Two Randomized Controlled Trials REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O. 2019; 86 (6): 2453–90

  View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rdz008

  View details for Web of Science ID 000498169800005

• Updating Beliefs when Evidence is Open to Interpretation: Implications for Bias and Polarization JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Fryer, R. G., Harms, P., Jackson, M. O. 2019; 17 (5): 1470-1501

  View details for DOI 10.1093/jeea/jvy025

  View details for Web of Science ID 000491240800002

• Machine behaviour NATURE Rahwan, I., Cebrian, M., Obradovich, N., Bongard, J., Bonnefon, J., Breazeal, C., Crandall, J. W., Christakis, N. A., Couzin, I. D., Jackson, M. O., Jennings, N. R., Kamar, E., Kloumann, I. M., Larochelle, H., Lazer, D., McElreath, R., Mislove, A., Parkes, D. C., Pentland, A., Roberts, M. E., Shariff, A., Tenenbaum, J. B., Wellman, M. 2019; 568 (7753): 477-486

  Abstract

  Machines powered by artificial intelligence increasingly mediate our social, cultural, economic and political interactions. Understanding the behaviour of artificial intelligence systems is essential to our ability to control their actions, reap their benefits and minimize their harms. Here we argue that this necessitates a broad scientific research agenda to study machine behaviour that incorporates and expands upon the discipline of computer science and includes insights from across the sciences. We first outline a set of questions that are fundamental to this emerging field and then explore the technical, legal and institutional constraints on the study of machine behaviour.

  View details for DOI 10.1038/s41586-019-1138-y

  View details for Web of Science ID 000465594200038

  View details for PubMedID 31019318

  View details for PubMedCentralID 5777393

• The Friendship Paradox and Systematic Biases in Perceptions and Social Norms JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Jackson, M. O. 2019; 127 (2): 777-818

  View details for DOI 10.1086/701031

  View details for Web of Science ID 000463838300008

• The Human Network: How your social position determines your power, beliefs, and behaviors Jackson, M. O. Vintage. 2019
• Tragedy revisited. Science (New York, N.Y.) Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., Meinzen-Dick, R., De Moor, T., Jackson, M. O., Gjerde, K. M., Harden-Davies, H., Frischmann, B. M., Madison, M. J., Strandburg, K. J., McLean, A. R., Dye, C. 2018; 362 (6420): 1236-1241

  View details for DOI 10.1126/science.aaw0911

  View details for PubMedID 30545871

• Diffusion in networks and the virtue of burstiness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Akbarpour, M., Jackson, M. O. 2018

  Abstract

  Whether an idea, information, or infection diffuses throughout a society depends not only on the structure of the network of interactions, but also on the timing of those interactions. People are not always available to interact with others, and people differ in the timing of when they are active. Some people are active for long periods and then inactive for long periods, while others switch more frequently from being active to inactive and back. We show that maximizing diffusion in classic contagion processes requires heterogeneous activity patterns across agents. In particular, maximizing diffusion comes from mixing two extreme types of people: those who are stationary for long periods of time, changing from active to inactive or back only infrequently, and others who alternate frequently between being active and inactive.

  View details for PubMedID 29987048

• Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Leduc, M. V., Jackson, M. O., Johari, R. 2017; 104: 568–94

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.011

  View details for Web of Science ID 000408296200034

• SOCIAL NORMS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Acemoglu, D., Jackson, M. O. 2017; 15 (2): 245-295

  View details for DOI 10.1093/jeea/jvw006

  View details for Web of Science ID 000399673600001

• The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W., Zenou, Y. 2017; 55 (1): 49–95

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jel.20150694

  View details for Web of Science ID 000395946000002

• Empathy and well-being correlate with centrality in different social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Morelli, S. A., Ong, D. C., Makati, R. n., Jackson, M. O., Zaki, J. n. 2017; 114 (37): 9843–47

  Abstract

  Individuals benefit from occupying central roles in social networks, but little is known about the psychological traits that predict centrality. Across four college freshman dorms (n = 193), we characterized individuals with a battery of personality questionnaires and also asked them to nominate dorm members with whom they had different types of relationships. This revealed several social networks within dorm communities with differing characteristics. In particular, additional data showed that networks varied in the degree to which nominations depend on (i) trust and (ii) shared fun and excitement. Networks more dependent upon trust were further defined by fewer connections than those more dependent on fun. Crucially, network and personality features interacted to predict individuals' centrality: people high in well-being (i.e., life satisfaction and positive emotion) were central to networks characterized by fun, whereas people high in empathy were central to networks characterized by trust. Together, these findings provide network-based corroboration of psychological evidence that well-being is socially attractive, whereas empathy supports close relationships. More broadly, these data highlight how an individual's personality relates to the roles that they play in sustaining their community.

  View details for PubMedID 28851835

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5604000

• Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness Akbarpour, M., Jackson, M. O., Assoc Comp Machinery ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY. 2017: 543

  View details for DOI 10.1145/3033274.3085105

  View details for Web of Science ID 000628648900056

• Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Aghion, P., Jackson, M. O. 2016; 8 (3): 1-38

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.20150083

  View details for Web of Science ID 000380910900001

• History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Acemoglu, D., Jackson, M. O. 2015; 82 (2): 423-456

  View details for DOI 10.1093/restud/rdu039

  View details for Web of Science ID 000353544900001

• THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORTS REPORT OF THE EDITORS 2013-2014 ECONOMETRICA Acemoglu, D., Einav, L., Hansen, L., Jackson, M. O., Jehiel, P., Sobel, J., Tamer, E. 2015; 83 (1): 403-406

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA831EDS

  View details for Web of Science ID 000349962900018

• Present Bias and Collective Dynamic Choice in the Lab AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Yariv, L. 2014; 104 (12): 4184-4204

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.12.4184

  View details for Web of Science ID 000345906900012

• Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Jackson, M. O. 2014; 28 (4): 3-22

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.28.4.3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000345130400001

• Financial Networks and Contagion AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Elliott, M., Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2014; 104 (10): 3115-3153

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.10.3115

  View details for Web of Science ID 000343310800006

• Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Jackson, M. O., Xing, Y. 2014; 111: 10889-10896

  Abstract

  We examine different populations' play in coordination games in online experiments with over 1,000 study participants. Study participants played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff. Study participants were predominantly from India and the United States. Study participants residing in India played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study participants residing in the United States who showed a greater play of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs. In addition, when prompted to play asymmetrically, the population from India responded even more significantly than those from the United States. Overall, study participants' predictions of how others would play were more accurate when the other player was from their own populations, and they coordinated significantly more frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from their own population than when matched across populations.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1400826111

  View details for PubMedID 25024196

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4113921

• The Diffusion of Microfinance SCIENCE Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O. 2013; 341 (6144): 363-?

  Abstract

  To study the impact of the choice of injection points in the diffusion of a new product in a society, we developed a model of word-of-mouth diffusion and then applied it to data on social networks and participation in a newly available microfinance loan program in 43 Indian villages. Our model allows us to distinguish information passing among neighbors from direct influence of neighbors' participation decisions, as well as information passing by participants versus nonparticipants. The model estimates suggest that participants are seven times as likely to pass information compared to informed nonparticipants, but information passed by nonparticipants still accounts for roughly one-third of eventual participation. An informed household is not more likely to participate if its informed friends participate. We then propose two new measures of how effective a given household would be as an injection point. We show that the centrality of the injection points according to these measures constitutes a strong and significant predictor of eventual village-level participation.

  View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1236498

  View details for Web of Science ID 000322259200039

• The diffusion of microfinance. Science Banerjee, A., Chandrasekhar, A. G., Duflo, E., Jackson, M. O. 2013; 341 (6144): 1236498-?

  Abstract

  To study the impact of the choice of injection points in the diffusion of a new product in a society, we developed a model of word-of-mouth diffusion and then applied it to data on social networks and participation in a newly available microfinance loan program in 43 Indian villages. Our model allows us to distinguish information passing among neighbors from direct influence of neighbors' participation decisions, as well as information passing by participants versus nonparticipants. The model estimates suggest that participants are seven times as likely to pass information compared to informed nonparticipants, but information passed by nonparticipants still accounts for roughly one-third of eventual participation. An informed household is not more likely to participate if its informed friends participate. We then propose two new measures of how effective a given household would be as an injection point. We show that the centrality of the injection points according to these measures constitutes a strong and significant predictor of eventual village-level participation.

  View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1236498

  View details for PubMedID 23888042

• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Tan, X. 2013; 148 (1): 2-30

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000316152100001

• Unraveling Peers and Peer Effects: Comments on Goldsmith-Pinkham and lmbens' "Social Networks and the Identification of Peer Effects" Journal of Business and Economic Statistics Jackson, M. 2013; 31 (3): 270-273

  View details for DOI 10.1080/07350015.2013.794095

• Economic Analyses of Social Networks edited by Jackson, M., Zenou, Y. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2013
• Economic Engineering and the Design of Matching Markets: The Contributions of Alvin E. Roth SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 2013; 115 (3): 619-639

  View details for DOI 10.1111/sjoe.12026

  View details for Web of Science ID 000320665700003

• Homophily and long-run integration in social networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bramoulle, Y., Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P., Rogers, B. W. 2012; 147 (5): 1754-1786

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000308576500004

• Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Rodriguez-Barraquer, T., Tan, X. 2012; 102 (5): 1857-1897

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.5.1857

  View details for Web of Science ID 000307471600004

• How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2012; 127 (3): 1287-1338

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjs021

  View details for Web of Science ID 000307835000006

• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Rodriguez-Barraquer, T., Tan, X. 2012; 75 (1): 198-216

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000303900300013

• Does Homophily Predict Consensus Times? Testing a Model of Network Structure via a Dynamic Process REVIEW OF NETWORK ECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2012; 11 (3)

  View details for DOI 10.1515/1446-9022.1367

  View details for Web of Science ID 000313219200009

• Network Structure and the Speed of Learning: Measuring Homophily Based on its Consequences Annals of Economics and Statistics Jackson, M. 2012; 107/108
• Introduction to the Special Issues in Honor of Salvador BarberA 's 65th birthday SERIES-JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Jackson, M. O., Sonnenschein, H. F. 2011; 2 (4): 423-430

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s13209-011-0081-4

  View details for Web of Science ID 000297543800001

• The Reasons for Warss - an Updated Survey Handbook on the Political Economy of War Jackson, M., Morelli, M. edited by Coyne, C., Mathers, R. Elgar Publishing. 2011
• The reasons for wars: an updated survey HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR Jackson, M. O., Morelli, M. edited by Coyne, C. J., Mathers, R. L. 2011: 34-57

  View details for Web of Science ID 000288708800003

• An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications Handbook of Social Economics Jackson, M. edited by Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M. North Holland. 2011
• Handbook of Social Economics edited by Jackson, M., Benhabib, J., Bisin, A. North Holland. 2011
• Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure Handbook of Social Economics Jackson, M., Yariv, L. edited by Benhabib, J., Bisin, A., Jackson, M. North Holland. 2011
• Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2010; 70 (1): 170-191

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.004

  View details for Web of Science ID 000281341000013

• Introduction to the special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Lehrer, E. 2010; 70 (1): 1-3

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000281341000001

• Using selection bias to explain the observed structure of Internet diffusions PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 107 (24): 10833-10836

  Abstract

  Recently, large datasets stored on the Internet have enabled the analysis of processes, such as large-scale diffusions of information, at new levels of detail. In a recent study, Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [(2008) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105:4633-4638] observed that the flow of information on the Internet exhibits surprising patterns whereby a chain letter reaches its typical recipient through long paths of hundreds of intermediaries. We show that a basic Galton-Watson epidemic model combined with the selection bias of observing only large diffusions suffices to explain these patterns. Thus, selection biases of which data we observe can radically change the estimation of classical diffusion processes.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1000814107

  View details for Web of Science ID 000278807400013

  View details for PubMedID 20534439

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC2890733

• Identifying the roles of race-based choice and chance in high school friendship network formation PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P. 2010; 107 (11): 4857-4861

  Abstract

  Homophily, the tendency of people to associate with others similar to themselves, is observed in many social networks, ranging from friendships to marriages to business relationships, and is based on a variety of characteristics, including race, age, gender, religion, and education. We present a technique for distinguishing two primary sources of homophily: biases in the preferences of individuals over the types of their friends and biases in the chances that people meet individuals of other types. We use this technique to analyze racial patterns in friendship networks in a set of American high schools from the Add Health dataset. Biases in preferences and biases in meeting rates are both highly significant in these data, and both types of biases differ significantly across races. Asians and Blacks are biased toward interacting with their own race at rates >7 times higher than Whites, whereas Hispanics exhibit an intermediate bias in meeting opportunities. Asians exhibit the least preference bias, valuing friendships with other types 90% as much as friendships with Asians, whereas Blacks and Hispanics value friendships with other types 55% and 65% as much as same-type friendships, respectively, and Whites fall in between, valuing other-type friendships 75% as much as friendships with Whites. Meetings are significantly more biased in large schools (>1,000 students) than in small schools (<1,000 students), and biases in preferences exhibit some significant variation with the median household income levels in the counties surrounding the schools.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0911793107

  View details for Web of Science ID 000275714300013

  View details for PubMedID 20212129

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC2841897

• PEER PRESSURE JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 8 (1): 62-89

  View details for Web of Science ID 000274329900004

• SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PEER EFFECTS: AN INTRODUCTION JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION Jackson, M. O., Vives, X. 2010; 8 (1): 1-6

  View details for DOI 10.1162/jeea.2010.8.1.1

  View details for Web of Science ID 000274329900001

• Naive Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Golub, B., Jackson, M. O. 2010; 2 (1): 112-149

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.2.1.112

  View details for Web of Science ID 000285178900007

• Network Games REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Galeotti, A., Goyal, S., Jackson, M. O., Vega-Redondo, F., Yariv, L. 2010; 77 (1): 218-244

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000273239400009

• An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation 62nd European Meeting of the Econometric-Society Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., Pin, P. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2009: 1003–45

  View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7528

  View details for Web of Science ID 000268218600001

• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN Jackson, M. O. 2009; 13 (1-2): 137-145

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s10058-008-0059-2

  View details for Web of Science ID 000282934200009

• The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Charness, G., Jackson, M. O. 2009; 69 (3): 241-247

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.006

  View details for Web of Science ID 000264595200004

• Commentary "Do We Inherit Our Positions in Life? Genetic Influences on Social Network Characteristics" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jackson, M. 2009: 1687–1688

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0813169106

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC2644096

• Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2009; 1 (1): 124-150

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.1.1.124

  View details for Web of Science ID 000284507300006

• Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Copic, J., Jackson, M. O., Kirman, A. 2009; 9 (1)

  View details for Web of Science ID 000270380600003

• Social Networks in Economics The Annual Review of Economics Jackson, M. 2009; 1: 489-513
• Networks and Economic Behavior ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 2009; 1: 489-511

  View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143238

  View details for Web of Science ID 000273630000019

• Vote Buying: Legislatures and Lobbying QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 2009; 4 (2): 103-128

  View details for DOI 10.1561/100.00008063

  View details for Web of Science ID 000270725300002

• Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Jackson, M. O., Morelli, M. 2009; 4 (4): 279-313

  View details for DOI 10.1561/100.00009047

  View details for Web of Science ID 000275244600001

• Vote buying: General elections JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 2008; 116 (2): 351-380

  View details for Web of Science ID 000255441500005

• A categorical model of cognition and biased decision making B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Fryer, R., Jackson, M. O. 2008; 8 (1)

  View details for Web of Science ID 000256302500001

• Social and Economic Networks SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS Jackson, M. O. 2008: 1-504

  View details for Web of Science ID 000288018200016

• Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings ECONOMICS BULLETIN Jackson, M., Watts, A. 2008; 3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000216932900066

• Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings Economics Bulletin Jackson, M., Watts, A. 2008; 3 (12): 1-8
• A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein: Foundations in Microeconomic Theory edited by Jackson, M., McLennan, A. Springer Heidelberg. 2008
• Social and Economic Networks Jackson, M. Princeton University Press. 2008
• Network Formation The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law Jackson, M. MacMillian Press. 2008
• Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics Jackson, M. O. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2008: 4–11

  View details for Web of Science ID 000262046200001

• Political bias and war AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Morelli, M. 2007; 97 (4): 1353-1373

  View details for Web of Science ID 000250217300013

• Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Charness, G., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 136 (1): 417-445

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.006

  View details for Web of Science ID 000249744200018

• Meeting strangers and friends of friends: How random are social networks? AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. 2007; 97 (3): 890-915

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600016

• Diffusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in network games 119th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Jackson, M. O., Yariv, L. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2007: 92–98

  View details for Web of Science ID 000246986500013

• The formation of networks with transfers among players JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bloch, F., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 133 (1): 83-110

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.10.003

  View details for Web of Science ID 000245185300004

• Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Sonnenschein, H. F. 2007; 75 (1): 241-257

  View details for Web of Science ID 000243407500007

• The Study of Social Networks in Economics The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networks Jackson, M. edited by Rauch, J. E. Russell Sage Foundation. 2007
• Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2007; 132 (1): 27-46

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.007

  View details for Web of Science ID 000243711600002

• Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies The Review of Economic Design Jackson, M., Kremer, I. 2007; 11 (3): 185-198
• Nomination processes and policy outcomes QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Jackson, M. O., Mathevet, L., Mattes, K. 2007; 2 (1): 67-94

  View details for DOI 10.0561/100.00006043

  View details for Web of Science ID 000250778000005

• Relating network structure to diffusion properties through stochastic dominance B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. 2007; 7 (1)

  View details for Web of Science ID 000256302400027

• On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. 2007; 132 (1): 507-517

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.011

  View details for Web of Science ID 000243711600024

• The relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. 2006; 73 (4): 961-981

  View details for Web of Science ID 000240736900006

• Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY Bloch, F., Jackson, M. O. 2006; 34 (3): 305-318

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9

  View details for Web of Science ID 000240981300002

• On the weights of nations: Assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2006; 114 (2): 317-339

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236794900005

• On the weights of nations: Assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Barberà, S., Jackson, M. O. 2006; 114 (2): 317-339

  View details for DOI 10.1086/501172

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236794900005

• Social Networks and the Diffusion of Behavior Yale Economic Review Jackson, M., Yariv, L. 2006; 3 (2): 42-47
• The economics of social networks Jackson, M. O. edited by Blundell, R., Newey, W. K., Persson, T. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. 2006: 1-56

  View details for DOI 10.1017/CCOL0521871522.001

  View details for Web of Science ID 000245433300001

• On the Weight of Nations: Assigning Voting Power to Heterogeneous Voters Journal of Political Economy Jackson, M., Barbera, S. 2006; 114 (2): 317-339
• The economics of social networks 9th World Congress of the Econometric-Society Jackson, M. O. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. 2006: 1–56

  View details for Web of Science ID 000245433300001

• Strongly stable networks GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., van den Nouweland, A. 2005; 51 (2): 420-444

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.004

  View details for Web of Science ID 000229481500009

• The economics of small worlds 19th Annual Congress of the European-Economic-Association Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2005: 617–27

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236936300038

• Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Wilkie, S. 2005; 72 (2): 543-566

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000228157100010

• The economics of small worlds Jackson, M. O., Rogers, B. W. M I T PRESS. 2005: 617-627

  View details for DOI 10.1162/1542476054473440

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236936300038

• Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Wilkie, S. 2005; 72 (2): 543-566

  View details for Web of Science ID 000228157100010

• Allocation rules for network games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O. 2005; 51 (1): 128-154

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.009

  View details for Web of Science ID 000227895600007

• Existence of Equilibria in Single and Double Auctions Econometrica Jackson, M., Swinkels, J. 2005; 73 (1): 93-139
• Existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Swinkels, J. M. 2005; 73 (1): 93-139

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00566.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000226895700004

• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems SOCIAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEFFREY S. BANKS Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. edited by AustenSmith, D., Duggan, J. 2005: 163-199

  View details for DOI 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7

  View details for Web of Science ID 000270353600008

• A Survey of Network Formation Models: Stability and Efficiency GROUP FORMATION IN ECONOMICS: NETWORKS, CLUBS, AND COALITIONS Jackson, M. O. edited by Demange, G., Wooders, M. 2005: 11-57

  View details for DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000313909500002

• A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency Group Formation in Economics; Networks, Clubs and Coalitions Jackson, M. edited by Demange, G., Wooders, M. Cambridge University Press. 2005
• Diffusion on Social Networks Économie Publique Jackson, M., Yariv, L. 2005; 16 (1): 3-16
• Existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Swinkels, J. M. 2005; 73 (1): 93-139

  View details for Web of Science ID 000226895700004

• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks Jackson, M., Dutta, B., Breton, M. L. edited by Austen-Smith, D., Duggan, J. Springer Verlag. 2005
• Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information (vol 70, pg 1711, 2002) ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Simon, L. K., Swinkels, J. M., Zame, W. R. 2004; 72 (6): 1927-1929

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00559.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000224697000011

• Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 119 (3): 1011-1048

  View details for Web of Science ID 000223100200007

• Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 119 (3): 1011-1048

  View details for DOI 10.1162/0033553041502207

  View details for Web of Science ID 000223100200007

• Equilibrium agenda formation SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2004; 23 (1): 21-57

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y

  View details for Web of Science ID 000222978600002

• The effects of social networks on employment and inequality AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 94 (3): 426-454

  View details for Web of Science ID 000222559400003

• The effects of social networks on employment and inequality AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Calvó-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2004; 94 (3): 426-454

  View details for DOI 10.1257/0002828041464542

  View details for Web of Science ID 000222559400003

• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue Workshop on Economic Theory Jackson, M. O., Kremer, I. ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. 2004: 371–92

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000221071300008

• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Nicolo, A. 2004; 115 (2): 278-308

  View details for DOI 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00223-0

  View details for Web of Science ID 000220570500003

• Voluntary implementation (vol 98, pg 1, 2001) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 2003; 110 (1): 204-205

  View details for DOI 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00032-7

  View details for Web of Science ID 000183371200010

• La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Cabrales, A., Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2003; 111 (2): 425-458

  View details for Web of Science ID 000181379800006

• <i>La Crema</i>:: A case study of mutual fire insurance JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Cabrales, A., Calvó-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O. 2003; 111 (2): 425-458

  View details for DOI 10.1086/367680

  View details for Web of Science ID 000181379800006

• The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks Advances in Economic Design Jackson, M. edited by Sertel, M., Koray, S. Springer-Verlag. 2003
• Strategic Stability and Efficiency in Directed Communication Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M., Dutta, B. edited by Jackson, M., Dutta, B. Springer-Verlag. 2003
• Mechanism Theory in Optimization and Operation Research Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems Jackson, M. edited by Derigs, U. EOLSS Publishers. 2003
• A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M., Wolinsky, A. edited by Jackson, M., Dutta, B. Springer-Verlag. 2003
• On the Formation of Networks and Groups Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M. edited by Dutta, B., Jackson, M. Springer-Verlag. 2003
• The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation Jackson, M. edited by Dutta, B., Jackson, M. Springer-Verlag. 2003
• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2002; 41 (2): 265-291

  View details for Web of Science ID 000179800000005

• On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2002; 41 (2): 265-291

  View details for DOI 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00504-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000179800000005

• The evolution of social and economic networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Watts, A. 2002; 106 (2): 265-295

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2001.2903

  View details for Web of Science ID 000179521300003

• Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Simon, L. K., Swinkels, J. M., Zame, W. R. 2002; 70 (5): 1711-1740

  View details for Web of Science ID 000177639900001

• Communication and equilibrium in discontinuous games of incomplete information ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Simon, L. K., Swinkels, J. M., Zame, W. R. 2002; 70 (5): 1711-1740

  View details for DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00351

  View details for Web of Science ID 000177639900001

• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Bali, V., Jackson, M. 2002; 106 (1): 161-176

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2001.2870

  View details for Web of Science ID 000178448300008

• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2002; 103 (1): 190-218

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2001.2862

  View details for Web of Science ID 000174465700009

• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Moselle, B. 2002; 103 (1): 49-87

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2000.2688

  View details for Web of Science ID 000174465700004

• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Moselle, B. 2002; 103 (1): 49-87

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2002.2688

  View details for Web of Science ID 000174465700004

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Bogomolnaia, A., Jackson, M. O. 2002; 38 (2): 201-230

  View details for DOI 10.1006/game.2001.0877

  View details for Web of Science ID 000173574900001

• A crash course in implementation theory SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O. 2001; 18 (4): 655-708

  View details for Web of Science ID 000172065600002

• A crash course in implementation theory SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O. 2001; 18 (4): 655-708

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s003550100152

  View details for Web of Science ID 000172065600002

• Strategic candidacy and voting procedures ECONOMETRICA Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2001; 69 (4): 1013-1037

  View details for Web of Science ID 000169578000007

• Strategic candidacy and voting procedures ECONOMETRICA Dutta, B., Jackson, M. O., Le Breton, M. 2001; 69 (4): 1013-1037

  View details for DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00228

  View details for Web of Science ID 000169578000007

• Voluntary implementation JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 2001; 98 (1): 1-25

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.2000.2752

  View details for Web of Science ID 000169036300001

• The Existence of Pairwise Stable Networks Seoul Journal of Economics Jackson, M., Watts, A. 2001; 14 (3): 299-321
• Strategic Stability and Efficiency in Directed Communication Networks Review of Economic Design Jackson, M., Dutta, B. 2000; 5 (3): 251-272
• Reputation versus social learning JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. 1999; 88 (1): 40-59

  View details for Web of Science ID 000082876800002

• The optimal design of a market JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Brusco, S., Jackson, M. O. 1999; 88 (1): 1-39

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.1999.2536

  View details for Web of Science ID 000082876800001

• Reputation versus social learning JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. 1999; 88 (1): 40-59

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.1999.2538

  View details for Web of Science ID 000082876800002

• Bayesian representation of stochastic processes under learning: De Finetti revisited ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E., Smorodinsky, R. 1999; 67 (4): 875-893

  View details for Web of Science ID 000081236200004

• Bayesian representation of stochastic processes under learning: De Finetti revisited ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E., Smorodinsky, R. 1999; 67 (4): 875-893

  View details for DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00055

  View details for Web of Science ID 000081236200004

• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Peck, J. 1999; 13 (3): 603-628

  View details for Web of Science ID 000080312600005

• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Peck, J. 1999; 13 (3): 603-628

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s001990050272

  View details for Web of Science ID 000080312600005

• Bayesian Implementation Recent Developments in Game Theory Jackson, M. edited by Maskin, E. Edward Elgar Publishers. 1999
• Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 1998; 66 (6): 1353-1388

  View details for Web of Science ID 000076699600005

• Efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R. 1998; 66 (6): 1353-1388

  View details for DOI 10.2307/2999620

  View details for Web of Science ID 000076699600005

• Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition Among Specialists Journal of Financial Markets Jackson, M., Gehrig, T. 1998; 1 (1): 89-119
• Social Learning in Recurring Games Social Organization and Mechanism Design Jackson, M., Kalai, E. edited by d'Aspremont, C. Francqui Foundation. 1998
• Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Manelli, A. M. 1997; 77 (2): 354-376

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.1997.2327

  View details for Web of Science ID 000071850100006

• Social learning in recurring games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. K. 1997; 21 (1-2): 102-134

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997YL45200008

• Social learning in recurring games GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Kalai, E. K. 1997; 21 (1-2): 102-134

  View details for DOI 10.1006/game.1997.0583

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997YL45200008

• Approximate Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies Journal of Economic Theory Jackson, M., Manelli, A. 1997; 77 (2): 354-376
• Strategy-proof allotment rules GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O., Neme, A. 1997; 18 (1): 1-21

  View details for DOI 10.1006/game.1997.0511

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997WG31900001

• Recurring bullies, trembling and learning Jackson, M., Kalai, E. edited by Albers, W., Guth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., vanDamme, E. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 1997: 171-184

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997BG66M00013

• Strategy-proof allotment rules GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O., Neme, A. 1997; 18 (1): 1-21

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997WG31900001

• Recurring bullies, trembling and learning Jerusalem Conference on Understanding Strategic Interaction Jackson, M., Kalai, E. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 1997: 171–184

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997BG66M00013

• A strategic model of social and economic networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 1996; 71 (1): 44-74

  View details for Web of Science ID A1996VM52100003

• A strategic model of social and economic networks JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O., Wolinsky, A. 1996; 71 (1): 44-74

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.1996.0108

  View details for Web of Science ID A1996VM52100003

• A characterization of game-theoretic solutions which lead to impossibility theorems REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1996; 63 (1): 23-38

  View details for Web of Science ID A1996TR21200002

• A characterization of game-theoretic solutions which lead to impossibility theorems REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1996; 63 (1): 23-38

  View details for DOI 10.2307/2298113

  View details for Web of Science ID A1996TR21200002

• Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solution Concepts which Lead to Impossibility Theorems Review of Economic Studies Jackson, M., Srivastava, S. 1996; 63 (1): 23-28
• STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE ECONOMETRICA Barbera, S., Jackson, M. O. 1995; 63 (1): 51-87

  View details for Web of Science ID A1995QC86900003

• STRATEGY-PROOF EXCHANGE ECONOMETRICA BARBERA, S., JACKSON, M. O. 1995; 63 (1): 51-87

  View details for DOI 10.2307/2951697

  View details for Web of Science ID A1995QC86900003

• A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O. 1994; 64 (1): 221-233

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994PM47900013

• A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY JACKSON, M. O. 1994; 64 (1): 221-233

  View details for DOI 10.1006/jeth.1994.1063

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994PM47900013

• A CHARACTERIZATION OF STRATEGY-PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC-GOODS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Barbera, S., Jackson, M. 1994; 11 (3): 241-252

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994PA58700006

• ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES FOR 2 PERSON, FINITE GAMES ECONOMICS LETTERS JACKSON, M. O., SRIVASTAVA, S. 1994; 45 (3): 315-318

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(94)90030-2

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994NY36900009

• A CHARACTERIZATION OF STRATEGY-PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC-GOODS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE BARBERA, S., JACKSON, M. 1994; 11 (3): 241-252

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994PA58700006

• ON THE RELATION BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA AND UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES FOR 2 PERSON, FINITE GAMES ECONOMICS LETTERS Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1994; 45 (3): 315-318

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994NY36900009

• UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Jackson, M. O., Palfrey, T. R., Srivastava, S. 1994; 6 (3): 474-501

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994NH42400009

• UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION IN BOUNDED MECHANISMS GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR JACKSON, M. O., PALFREY, T. R., SRIVASTAVA, S. 1994; 6 (3): 474-501

  View details for DOI 10.1006/game.1994.1028

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994NH42400009

• INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS ECONOMICS LETTERS Jackson, M. O. 1992; 40 (3): 299-302

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992KZ19900008

• INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS ECONOMICS LETTERS JACKSON, M. O. 1992; 40 (3): 299-302

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90008-M

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992KZ19900008

• IMPLEMENTATION IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - A LOOK AT BOUNDED MECHANISMS REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Jackson, M. O. 1992; 59 (4): 757-775

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JR53400006

• IMPLEMENTATION IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES - A LOOK AT BOUNDED MECHANISMS REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES JACKSON, M. O. 1992; 59 (4): 757-775

  View details for DOI 10.2307/2297996

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JR53400006

• ON 2-PERSON NASH IMPLEMENTABLE CHOICE FUNCTIONS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE Jackson, M. O., Srivastava, S. 1992; 9 (3): 263-264

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JF13100007

• ON 2-PERSON NASH IMPLEMENTABLE CHOICE FUNCTIONS SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE JACKSON, M. O., SRIVASTAVA, S. 1992; 9 (3): 263-264

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JF13100007

• IMPLEMENTING A PUBLIC PROJECT AND DISTRIBUTING ITS COST JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M., Moulin, H. 1992; 57 (1): 125-140

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JD33000007

• IMPLEMENTING A PUBLIC PROJECT AND DISTRIBUTING ITS COST JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY JACKSON, M., MOULIN, H. 1992; 57 (1): 125-140

  View details for DOI 10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JD33000007

• SPECULATION AND PRICE FLUCTUATIONS WITH PRIVATE, EXTRINSIC SIGNALS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M., Peck, J. 1991; 55 (2): 274-295

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991GW75700003

• SPECULATION AND PRICE FLUCTUATIONS WITH PRIVATE, EXTRINSIC SIGNALS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY JACKSON, M., PECK, J. 1991; 55 (2): 274-295

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90041-2

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991GW75700003

• BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION ECONOMETRICA Jackson, M. O. 1991; 59 (2): 461-477

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FD85700008

• BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION ECONOMETRICA JACKSON, M. O. 1991; 59 (2): 461-477

  View details for DOI 10.2307/2938265

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FD85700008

• Stock, Options, and Deferred Compensation Research in Labor Economics Jackson, M., Lazear, E. 1991; 12: 41-62
• EQUILIBRIUM, PRICE FORMATION, AND THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES JACKSON, M. O. 1991; 4 (1): 1-16

  View details for DOI 10.1093/rfs/4.1.1

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FU33700002

• EQUILIBRIUM, PRICE FORMATION, AND THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Jackson, M. O. 1991; 4 (1): 1-16

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FU33700002

• OPTIMAL HEDGING AND EQUILIBRIUM IN A DYNAMIC FUTURES MARKET JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL Duffie, D., Jackson, M. O. 1990; 14 (1): 21-33

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990CZ72400002

• OPTIMAL HEDGING AND EQUILIBRIUM IN A DYNAMIC FUTURES MARKET JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL DUFFIE, D., JACKSON, M. O. 1990; 14 (1): 21-33

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0165-1889(90)90003-Y

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990CZ72400002

• Optimal Innovation of Futures Contracts REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Duffie, D., Jackson, M. O. 1989; 2 (3): 275-296

  View details for DOI 10.1093/rfs/2.3.275

  View details for Web of Science ID 000208799100001

• MAXIMIN, LEXIMIN, AND THE PROTECTIVE CRITERION - CHARACTERIZATIONS AND COMPARISONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Barbara, S., Jackson, M. 1988; 46 (1): 34-44

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988Q579600003

• MAXIMIN, LEXIMIN, AND THE PROTECTIVE CRITERION - CHARACTERIZATIONS AND COMPARISONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY BARBARA, S., JACKSON, M. 1988; 46 (1): 34-44

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90148-2

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988Q579600003

• INTEGRATION OF DEMAND AND CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Jackson, M. O. 1986; 38 (2): 298-312

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986C178300007

• INTEGRATION OF DEMAND AND CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY JACKSON, M. O. 1986; 38 (2): 298-312

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90120-1

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986C178300007

• CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS IN CONSUMER THEORY - A SET OF DUALITY THEOREMS JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS Jackson, M. O. 1986; 15 (1): 63-77

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986C672800005

• CONTINUOUS UTILITY-FUNCTIONS IN CONSUMER THEORY - A SET OF DUALITY THEOREMS JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS JACKSON, M. O. 1986; 15 (1): 63-77

  View details for DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(86)90024-8

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986C672800005