Bio


Paul Milgrom is the Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University and professor, by courtesy, in the Stanford Graduate School of Business and in the Department of Management Sciences and Engineering. Born in Detroit, Michigan on April 20, 1948, he is a member of both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a winner of the 2008 Nemmers Prize in Economics, the 2012 BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge award, the 2017 CME-MSRI prize for Innovative Quantitative Applications, and the 2018 Carty Award for the Advancement of Science.

Milgrom is known for his work on innovative resource allocation methods, particularly in radio spectrum. He is coinventor of the simultaneous multiple round auction and the combinatorial clock auction. He also led the design team for the FCC's 2017 incentive auction, which reallocated spectrum from television broadcast to mobile broadband.

According to his BBVA Award citation: “Paul Milgrom has made seminal contributions to an unusually wide range of fields of economics including auctions, market design, contracts and incentives, industrial economics, economics of organizations, finance, and game theory.” As counted by Google Scholar, Milgrom’s books and articles have received more than 80,000 citations.

Finally, Milgrom has been a successful adviser of graduate students, winning the 2017 H&S Dean's award for Excellence in Graduate Education.

Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • Professor (by courtesy), Management Sciences and Engineering, Stanford University (2018 - Present)
  • Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University (1993 - Present)
  • Professor of Economics, Stanford University (1987 - Present)
  • Professor (by courtesy), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (1987 - Present)
  • Senior Fellow, SIEPR, Stanford University (2007 - Present)
  • Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford University (1989 - 1991)
  • Williams Brothers Professor of Management Studies and Professor of Economics, Yale University (1985 - 1987)
  • Professor of Economics and Management, Yale University (1983 - 1985)
  • Visiting Professor, Yale University (1982 - 1983)
  • Kellogg Graduate School of Management Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University (1979 - 1983)
  • Professor, Northwestern University (1982 - 1983)
  • Associate Professor, Northwestern University (1981 - 1982)
  • Assistant Professor, Northwestern University (1979 - 1981)
  • Honorary doctorate, Stockholm School of Economics (2001 - Present)
  • Taussig Visiting Research Professor, Harvard University (2000 - 2000)
  • Fellow (2nd time), Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1998 - 1998)
  • Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Reform (1993 - 1993)
  • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1992 - 1992)
  • International Guest Scholar, Kyoto University (1992 - 1992)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1991 - 1991)
  • Ford Visiting Professor of Economics, University of California-Berkeley (1986 - 1986)
  • Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1985 - Present)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (1984 - 1984)
  • Fellow, Morse College (of Yale University) (1984 - 1984)
  • Visiting Research Associate, Stanford University (1981 - 1981)
  • Fellow, Society of Actuaries (1974 - 1974)
  • Williams Brothers Chair in Management Studies, Yale University (1986 - 1986)
  • Fellowship to study "Economic Theories of Organization", John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship (1986 - 1986)

Honors & Awards


  • John J Carty Award for the Advancement of Science, National Academy of Sciences (2018)
  • CME-MSRI Innovative Quantitative Methods in Economics & Finance, Chicago Mercantile Exchange & Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (2017)
  • Dean's Award for Excellence in Graduate Education, Stanford College of Humanities & Sciences (2017)
  • Foundations of Knowledge Award, BBVA Foundation (2012)
  • Phase IB Award for "Incorporating Bidder Budget Constraints in Multi-item Auctions'', National Science Foundation - Small Business Innovation Research (2010)
  • Phase I Award for "Incorporating Bidder Budget Constraints in Multi-Item'', National Science Foundation - Small Business Innovation Research (2010)
  • Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University (2008)
  • Landau economics teaching prize, Stanford University (2003)
  • Prize for Best Paper of the Year, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries (1987)
  • Research Award, Yale University (1983)
  • Honorary Master of Arts degree, Yale University (1983)
  • Thesis Award, Leonard J. Savage Memorial (1980)
  • Society of Actuaries Triennial Paper Prize, Best paper by an actuary within five of membership, for the period 1973-1975 (1976)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Chairman of Economics Section, National Academy of Sciences (2019 - Present)
  • President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2007 - 2007)
  • Elected member, National Academy of Sciences (2006 - 2006)
  • Elected member, Executive Committee of the Econometric Society (2005 - 2005)
  • Elected Vice President, Western Economic Association (2005 - 2005)
  • Council Member, Econometric Society (2004 - 2004)
  • Elected member, Game Theory Society (2003 - 2003)
  • IBM Research Chair, Northwestern University (1981 - 1981)
  • Member, Editorial Board of European Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics (2012)
  • Member, Editorial Board of AEJ-Microeconomics (2009)
  • President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2007 - 2008)
  • Member, National Academy of Sciences (2006 - 2007)
  • President-Elect, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2006 - 2007)
  • Vice President, Western Economic Association International (WEAl) (2005 - 2006)
  • Member, Executive Committee of the Econometric Society (2005 - 2008)
  • Member, Council, Econometric Society (2004)
  • Member, Council, Game Theory Society (2003)
  • Chief economist, Perfect Commerce (2000 - 2002)
  • Editorial Consultant, MIT Press (1997 - 2002)
  • Member, Editorial Board, Journal of Comparative Economics (1997 - 1999)
  • Founder, Market Design Inc. (1996)
  • Director, Market Design Inc. (1996)
  • Chairman, Market Design Inc. (1996 - 2002)
  • Member, Nemmers Prize Selection Committee, Northwestern University (1996 - 1996)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Microeconomics Abstracts (1996)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Economics Research Network (1995)
  • Member, Program Committee, 1995 World Congress of the Econometric Society (1994 - 1995)
  • Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy Reform (1993 - 1995)
  • Associate Editor, American Economic Review (1993 - 2000)
  • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1992)
  • Co-Editor, American Economic Review (1990 - 1993)
  • Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior (1990)
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation (1989 - 1992)
  • Associate Editor, Econometrica (1987 - 1990)
  • Associate Editor, Rand Journal of Economics (1985 - 1989)
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (1983 - 1987)
  • Chair, Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meetings (1984 - 1984)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (1984)
  • Member, American Economic Association (1980)
  • Member, Economic Association (2005 - 2005)

Professional Education


  • Ph.D, Stanford University, Business (1978)
  • M.S., Stanford University, Statistics (1978)
  • A.B., University of Michigan, Mathematics (1970)

2018-19 Courses


Stanford Advisees


All Publications


  • Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Mollner, J. 2018; 86 (1): 219–61

    View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA12536

    View details for Web of Science ID 000424165700008

  • Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Leyton-Brown, K., Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2017; 114 (28): 7202–9

    Abstract

    The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

    View details for PubMedID 28652335

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC5514724

  • Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Arnosti, N., Beck, M., Milgrom, P. 2016; 106 (10): 2852-2866
  • Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kagel, J. H., Lien, Y., Milgrom, P. 2014; 85: 210-231
  • Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Budish, E., Che, Y., Kojima, F., Milgrom, P. 2013; 103 (2): 585-623
  • CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN ECONOMIC INQUIRY Milgrom, P. 2011; 49 (2): 311-320
  • Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Milgrom, P. 2010; 70 (1): 62-70
  • Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Kagel, J. H., Lien, Y., Milgrom, P. 2010; 2 (3): 160-185
  • Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design 122nd Annual Meeting of the American-Economics-Association Levin, J., Milgrom, P. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2010: 603–7
  • Assignment Messages and Exchanges AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Milgrom, P. 2009; 1 (2): 95-113

    View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.1.2.95

    View details for Web of Science ID 000285178600006

  • Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Milgrom, P., Strulovici, B. 2009; 144 (1): 212-247
  • The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Hall, R. E., Milgrom, P. R. 2008; 98 (4): 1653-1674
  • Economics - The promise of prediction markets SCIENCE Arrow, K. J., Forsythe, R., Gorham, M., Hahn, R., Hanson, R., Ledyard, J. O., Levmore, S., Litan, R., Milgrom, P., Nelson, F. D., Neumann, G. R., Ottaviani, M., Schelling, T. C., Shiller, R. J., Smith, V. L., Snowberg, E., Sunstein, C. R., Tetlock, P. C., Tetlock, P. E., Varian, H. R., Wolfers, J., Zitzewitz, E. 2008; 320 (5878): 877-878

    View details for DOI 10.1126/science.1157679

    View details for PubMedID 18487176

  • What the seller won't tell you: Persuasion and disclosure in markets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Milgrom, P. 2008; 22 (2): 115-131
  • Core-selecting package auctions INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY Day, R., Milgrom, P. 2008; 36 (3-4): 393-407
  • Package auctions and exchanges ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P. 2007; 75 (4): 935-965
  • Matching with contracts AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Hatfield, J. W., Milgrom, P. R. 2005; 95 (4): 913-935
  • Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Segal, I. 2002; 70 (2): 583-601
  • Advances in routing technologies and Internet peering agreements 113th Annual Meeting of the American-Economics-Association Besen, S., Milgrom, P., Mitchell, B., SRINAGESH, P. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2001: 292–96
  • Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Milgrom, P. 2000; 108 (2): 245-272
  • Combination bidding in spectrum auctions 26th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC) Milgrom, P. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1999: 19–26
  • Game theory and the spectrum auctions 12th Annual Congress of the European-Economic-Association Milgrom, P. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 1998: 771–78
  • Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1996; 17 (1): 113-128
  • The LeChatelier principle AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1996; 86 (1): 173-179
  • COMPLEMENTARITIES AND FIT - STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1995; 19 (2-3): 179-208
  • Continuous adjustment and fundamental change in business strategy and organization International Workshop on Trends in Business Organization - Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. J C B MOHR (PAUL SIEBECK). 1995: 231–258
  • THE FIRM AS AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. 1994; 84 (4): 972-991
  • COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT - THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Greif, A., Milgrom, P., Weingast, B. R. 1994; 102 (4): 745-776
  • COMPARING EQUILIBRIA AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1994; 84 (3): 441-459
  • COMPARING OPTIMA - DO SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS AFFECT CONCLUSIONS JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Milgrom, P. 1994; 102 (3): 607-615
  • MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICS ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Shannon, C. 1994; 62 (1): 157-180
  • ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS, INFLUENCE COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP CHANGES JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY Meyer, M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1992; 1 (1): 9-35
  • INFORMATION AND TIMING IN REPEATED PARTNERSHIPS ECONOMETRICA Abreu, D., Milgrom, P., Pearce, D. 1991; 59 (6): 1713-1733
  • A THEORY OF HIERARCHIES BASED ON LIMITED MANAGERIAL ATTENTION JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES Geanakoplos, J., Milgrom, P. 1991; 5 (3): 205-225
  • COMPLEMENTARITIES, MOMENTUM, AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN MANUFACTURING 103RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC Milgrom, P., Qian, Y. Y., Roberts, J. AMER ECON ASSN. 1991: 84–88
  • ADAPTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED LEARNING IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1991; 3 (1): 82-100
  • MULTITASK PRINCIPAL AGENT ANALYSES - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND JOB DESIGN JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. 1991; 7: 24-52
  • RATIONALIZABILITY, LEARNING, AND EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1990; 58 (6): 1255-1277
  • SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS AND LONG-TERM AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Fudenberg, D., Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. 1990; 51 (1): 1-31
  • THE ECONOMICS OF MODERN MANUFACTURING - TECHNOLOGY, STRATEGY, AND ORGANIZATION AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1990; 80 (3): 511-528
  • THE EFFICIENCY OF EQUITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-PROCESSES 102 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOC Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 1990: 154–59
  • REGULATING TRADE AMONG AGENTS SYMP ON THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS : DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. J C B MOHR. 1990: 85–105
  • AUCTIONS AND BIDDING - A PRIMER JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Milgrom, P. 1989; 3 (3): 3-22
  • ECONOMIC-THEORIES OF THE FIRM - PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1988; 21 (3): 444-458
  • EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES, AND EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION DESIGN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY MILGROM, P. R. 1988; 96 (1): 42-60
  • AN ECONOMIC-APPROACH TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN ORGANIZATIONS AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1988; 94: S154-S179
  • COMMUNICATION AND INVENTORY AS SUBSTITUTES IN ORGANIZING PRODUCTION SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1988; 90 (3): 275-289
  • JOB DISCRIMINATION, MARKET FORCES, AND THE INVISIBILITY HYPOTHESIS QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Milgrom, P., Oster, S. 1987; 102 (3): 453-476
  • INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, AND INDUSTRIAL-ORGANIZATION AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1987; 77 (2): 184-193
  • AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES ECONOMETRICA Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. 1987; 55 (2): 303-328
  • PRICE AND ADVERTISING SIGNALS OF PRODUCT QUALITY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1986; 94 (4): 796-821
  • RELYING ON THE INFORMATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1986; 17 (1): 18-32
  • RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY KREPS, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R. 1982; 27 (2): 245-252
  • PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1982; 27 (2): 280-312
  • LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS ECONOMETRICA Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. 1982; 50 (2): 443-459
  • CONVERGENCE THEOREM FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION ECONOMETRICA MILGROM, P. R. 1979; 47 (3): 679-688