Bio


Johari is interested in the design and management of large-scale complex networks, such as the Internet. Using tools from operations research, engineering, and economics, he has developed models to analyze efficient market mechanisms for resource allocation in networks.

Academic Appointments


Honors & Awards


  • CAREER Award, National Science Foundation (2007)
  • Telecommunications Dissertation Award, INFORMS (2006)
  • Okawa Foundation Research Grant, Okawa Foundation (2005)
  • Doctoral Dissertation Award (Honorable Mention), ACM (2004)
  • George M. Sprowls Doctoral Dissertation Award, MIT EECS (2004)
  • George E. Nicholson Student Paper Competition (First Place), INFORMS (2003)

Professional Education


  • PhD, MIT (2004)

2013-14 Courses


Postdoctoral Advisees


Journal Articles


  • Resource management with semiautonomous users. To appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. DiPalantino, D., Johari, R. 2012
  • Information theoretic operating regimes of large wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory Ozgur, A., Johari, R., Tse, D., Leveque, O. 2010; 1 (56): 427-437
  • Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2009; 8 (54): 1765-1778
  • Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control Johari, R., Mannor, S., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2005; 11 (50): 1712-1724
  • End-to-end congestion control for the Internet: delays and stability. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking Johari, R., Tan, D., K.H. 2001; 6 (9): 818-832

Books and Book Chapters


  • Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer. Foundations and Trends in Networking Berry, R., Johari , R. NOW Publishers.. 2013: 1
  • Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory Johari , R. edited by Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos,  E. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom.. 2007: 543-567

Conference Proceedings


  • Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. Gummadi, R., Johari, R., Yu , J.-Y. 2012
  • Information and the value of execution guarantees. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Moallemi , C., C. 2012
  • Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Sundararajan, M. 2011
  • Heavy traffic approximation of equilibria in resource sharing games. Wu, Y., Bui, L., Johari, R. 2011
  • Committing bandits. Bui, L., Johari, R., Mannor, S.  2011
  • How many tiers? Pricing in the Internet transit market. Valancius, V., Lumezanu, C., Feamster, N., Johari, R., Vazirani, V. 2011
  • Mean field analysis for large population stochastic games. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith, A. 2010
  • Mean field equilibrium in dynamic games with complementarities. Adlakha, S., Johari, R. 2010
  • Information aggregation in smooth markets. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Moallemi, C., C. 2010
  • Congestible services and network effects. Johari, R., Kumar, S. 2010
  • A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Local myopic dynamics in network formation games. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2008
  • Peer-assisted content distribution with prices. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with unbounded costs. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith , A. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with concave costs. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith , A. 2008
  • A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Prices are right: aligning incentives for peer-assisted content distribution. Freedman, M., J., Aperjis, C., Johari, R. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with many players. Abhishek, V., Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y. 2007
  • Revenue management for content delivery. Shakkottai, S., Johari, R. 2007
  • Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2007
  • A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy. Aperjis, C., Johari, R. 2006
  • Positive externalities and optimal scale. Kumar, S., Johari, R. 2006
  • Communication requirements of VCG-like mechanisms in convex environments. Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2005
  • Network resource allocation and a congestion game: the single link case. Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2003