Bio


Johari is broadly interested in the design, economic analysis, and operation of online platforms, as well as statistical and machine learning techniques used by these platforms (such as search, recommendation, matching, and pricing algorithms).

Academic Appointments


Honors & Awards


  • George E. Nicholson Student Paper Competition (First Place), INFORMS (2003)
  • George M. Sprowls Doctoral Dissertation Award, MIT EECS (2004)
  • Doctoral Dissertation Award (Honorable Mention), ACM (2004)
  • Okawa Foundation Research Grant, Okawa Foundation (2005)
  • Telecommunications Dissertation Award, INFORMS (2006)
  • CAREER Award, National Science Foundation (2007)

Program Affiliations


  • Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering (ICME)

Professional Education


  • PhD, MIT (2004)

2018-19 Courses


Stanford Advisees


All Publications


  • Economic Modeling in Networking: A Primer. Foundations and Trends in Networking Berry, R., Johari , R. NOW Publishers.. 2013: 1
  • Resource management with semiautonomous users. To appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. DiPalantino, D., Johari, R. 2012
  • Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. Gummadi, R., Johari, R., Yu , J.-Y. 2012
  • Information and the value of execution guarantees. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Moallemi , C., C. 2012
  • Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Sundararajan, M. 2011
  • Heavy traffic approximation of equilibria in resource sharing games. Wu, Y., Bui, L., Johari, R. 2011
  • Committing bandits. Bui, L., Johari, R., Mannor, S.  2011
  • How many tiers? Pricing in the Internet transit market. Valancius, V., Lumezanu, C., Feamster, N., Johari, R., Vazirani, V. 2011
  • Mean field analysis for large population stochastic games. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith, A. 2010
  • Information theoretic operating regimes of large wireless networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory Ozgur, A., Johari, R., Tse, D., Leveque, O. 2010; 1 (56): 427-437
  • Mean field equilibrium in dynamic games with complementarities. Adlakha, S., Johari, R. 2010
  • Information aggregation in smooth markets. Iyer, K., Johari, R., Moallemi, C., C. 2010
  • Congestible services and network effects. Johari, R., Kumar, S. 2010
  • Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2009; 8 (54): 1765-1778
  • A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Peer-assisted content distribution with prices. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with unbounded costs. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith , A. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with concave costs. Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y., Goldsmith , A. 2008
  • A comparison of bilateral and multilateral exchanges for peer-assisted content distribution. Aperjis, C., Freedman, M., J., Johari, R. 2008
  • Local myopic dynamics in network formation games. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2008
  • Prices are right: aligning incentives for peer-assisted content distribution. Freedman, M., J., Aperjis, C., Johari, R. 2008
  • Oblivious equilibrium for general stochastic games with many players. Abhishek, V., Adlakha, S., Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Y. 2007
  • Network formation: bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics. Arcaute, E., Johari, R., Mannor, S. 2007
  • Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory Johari , R. edited by Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos,  E. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom.. 2007: 543–567
  • Revenue management for content delivery. Shakkottai, S., Johari, R. 2007
  • A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy. Aperjis, C., Johari, R. 2006
  • Positive externalities and optimal scale. Kumar, S., Johari, R. 2006
  • Communication requirements of VCG-like mechanisms in convex environments. Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2005
  • Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control Johari, R., Mannor, S., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2005; 11 (50): 1712-1724
  • Network resource allocation and a congestion game: the single link case. Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., N. 2003
  • End-to-end congestion control for the Internet: delays and stability. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking Johari, R., Tan, D., K.H. 2001; 6 (9): 818-832