Academic Appointments

  • Assistant Professor, Philosophy
  • Assistant Professor (By courtesy), Computer Science

Program Affiliations

  • Symbolic Systems Program

Contact

  • Academic
    icard@stanford.edu
    University - Faculty Department: Philosophy Position: Asst Professor

Additional Info

  • Mail Code: 2155
  • SUNet ID(s):
    icard

Links

2019-20 Courses

Stanford Advisees

  • Doctoral Dissertation Reader (AC)
    J.T. Chipman, John Turman, Yafeng Wang, Francesca Zaffora Blando
  • Postdoctoral Faculty Sponsor
    Joshua ORourke
  • Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)
    Chris Mierzewski
  • Doctoral (Program)
    David Gottlieb, Duligur Ibeling, Declan Thompson

All Publications

  • Expectations Affect Physical Causation Judgments JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL Gerstenberg, T., Icard, T. 2020; 149 (3): 599–607

    Abstract

    When several causes contributed to an outcome, people often single out one as "the" cause. What explains this selection? Previous work has argued that people select abnormal events as causes, though recent work has shown that sometimes normal events are preferred over abnormal ones. Existing studies have relied on vignettes that commonly feature agents committing immoral acts. An important challenge to the thesis that norms permeate causal reasoning is that people's responses may merely reflect pragmatic or social reasoning rather than arising from causal cognition per se. We tested this hypothesis by asking whether the previously observed patterns of causal selection emerge in tasks that recruit participants' causal reasoning about physical systems. Strikingly, we found that the same patterns observed in vignette studies with intentional agents arise in visual animations of physical interactions. Our results demonstrate how deeply normative expectations affect causal cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

    View details for DOI 10.1037/xge0000670

    View details for Web of Science ID 000512302600015

    View details for PubMedID 31512904

  • Why Be Random? Mind Icard, T. 2020

    View details for DOI 10.1093/mind/fzz065

  • Calibrating Generative Models: The Probabilistic Chomsky-Schützenberger Hierarchy Journal of Mathematical Psychology Icard, T. 2020; 95

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jmp.2019.102308

  • Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Icard, T. F. 2018; 85 (1): 79–101

    View details for DOI 10.1086/694837

    View details for Web of Science ID 000419596500004

  • Inferring probability comparisons MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES Harrison-Trainor, M., Holliday, W. H., Icard, T. F. 2018; 91: 62–70

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.003

    View details for Web of Science ID 000424960600009

  • Normality and actual causal strength. Cognition Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F., Knobe, J. 2017; 161: 80-93

    Abstract

    Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation.

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.010

    View details for PubMedID 28157584

  • Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE Holliday, W. H., Icard, T. F. 2017: 337–51

    View details for DOI 10.4204/EPTCS.251.24

    View details for Web of Science ID 000439339700025

  • Pragmatic Considerations on Comparative Probability PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Icard, T. F. 2016; 83 (3): 348-370

    View details for Web of Science ID 000378293100003

  • A note on cancellation axioms for comparative probability THEORY AND DECISION Harrison-Trainor, M., Holliday, W. H., Icard, T. F. 2016; 80 (1): 159-166

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s11238-015-9491-2

    View details for Web of Science ID 000369017600007

  • Higher-Order Syllogistics 19th International Conference on Formal Grammar (FG) Icard, T. F. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2014: 1–14

    View details for Web of Science ID 000348363900001

  • Information dynamics and uniform substitution SYNTHESE Holliday, W. H., Hoshi, T., Icard, T. F. 2013; 190: 31-55

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0278-0

    View details for Web of Science ID 000330623500003

  • Iterating semantic automata LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY Steinert-Threlkeld, S., Icard, T. F. 2013; 36 (2): 151-173

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s10988-013-9132-6

    View details for Web of Science ID 000323661000002

  • Inclusion and Exclusion in Natural Language STUDIA LOGICA Icard, T. F. 2012; 100 (4): 705-725

    View details for DOI 10.1007/s11225-012-9425-8

    View details for Web of Science ID 000309056000004

  • Provability and Interpretability Logics with Restricted Realizations NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF FORMAL LOGIC Icard, T. F., Joosten, J. J. 2012; 53 (2): 133-154

    View details for DOI 10.1215/00294527-1715653

    View details for Web of Science ID 000305371100001

  • A Topological Study of the Closed Fragment of GLP JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION Icard, T. 2011; 21 (4): 683-696

    View details for DOI 10.1093/logcom/exp043

    View details for Web of Science ID 000293303900008

  • Schematic Validity in Dynamic Epistemic Logic: Decidability 3rd International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction Holliday, W. H., Hoshi, T., Icard, T. F. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN. 2011: 87–96

    View details for Web of Science ID 000308839700006