Alvin Roth

All Publications

• Stability vs. no justified envy GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Romm, A., Roth, A. E., Shorrer, R. I. 2024; 148: 357-366

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 001342221600001

• Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Chan, A., Roth, A. E. 2024

  View details for DOI 10.1086/730546

  View details for Web of Science ID 001322844300001

• Markets in the Making: Rethinking Competition, Goods, and Innovation (Book Review) JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY Book Review Authored by: Callon, M., Langley, P., Maurer, B., Mitchell, T., Roth, A., Caliskan, K. 2024

  View details for DOI 10.1080/17530350.2024.2413105

  View details for Web of Science ID 001347099500001

• Impact of single centre kidney-exchange transplantation to increase living donor pool in India: A cohort study involving non-anonymous allocation. Nephrology (Carlton, Vic.) Kute, V. B., Patel, H. V., Banerjee, S., Engineer, D. P., Dave, R. B., Shah, N., Chauhan, S., Meshram, H., Tambi, P., Shah, A., Saxena, K., Balwani, M., Parmar, V., Shah, S., Prakash, V., Patel, S., Patel, D., Desai, S., Rizvi, J., Patel, H., Parikh, B., Kanodia, K., Gandhi, S., Rees, M. A., Roth, A. E., Modi, P. 2024

  Abstract

  In India, 85% of organ donations are from living donors and 15% are from deceased donors. One-third of living donors were rejected because of ABO or HLA incompatibility. Kidney exchange transplantation (KET) is a cost-effective and legal strategy to increase living donor kidney transplantation (LDKT) by 25%-35%.We report our experience with 539 KET cases and the evolution of a single-centre program to increase the use of LDKT.Between January 2000 and 13 March, 2024, 1382 deceased donor kidney transplantations and 5346 LDKT were performed at our centre, including 10% (n = 539) from KET. Of the 539 KET, 80.9% (n = 436) were ABO incompatible pairs, 11.1% (n = 60) were compatible pairs, and 8% (n = 43) were sensitized pairs. There were 75% 2-way (n = 2 × 202 = 404), 16.2% 3-way (n = 3 × 29 = 87), 3% 4-way (n = 4 × 4 = 16), 1.8% 5-way (n = 5 × 2 = 10), 2.2% 6-way (n = 6 × 2 = 12), and 1.8% 10-way KET (n = 10 × 1 = 10). Of the recipients 81.2% (n = 438) were male and 18.8% (n = 101) were female, while of the donors, 78.5% (n = 423) were female and 21.5% (n = 116) were male. All donors were near relatives; wives (54%, n = 291) and mothers (20%, n = 108) were the most common donors. At a median follow-up of 8.2 years, patient survival, death censored graft survival, acute rejection, and median serum creatinine levels of functioning grafts were 81.63% (n = 440), 91% (n = 494), 9.8% (n = 53) and 1.3 mg/dL respectively. We credited the success to maintaining a registry of incompatible pairs, high-volume LDKT programs, non-anonymous allocation and teamwork.This is the largest single-centre KET program in Asia. We report the challenges and solutions to replicate our success in other KET programs.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/nep.14380

  View details for PubMedID 39245449

• The first 63 global kidney exchange transplants: overcoming multiple barriers to transplantation. Rees, M., Roth, A., Marino, I., Krawiec, K., Rees, S., Sweeney, K., Leventhal, J., Alobaidli, A., Rege, A., Marsh, C., Doshi, M., Paloyo, S., Ekwenna, O. LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2024: 610

  View details for Web of Science ID 001317182702194

• Contemporary Pediatric Heart Transplant Waitlist Mortality. Journal of the American College of Cardiology Power, A., Sweat, K. R., Roth, A., Dykes, J. C., Kaufman, B., Ma, M., Chen, S., Hollander, S. A., Profita, E., Rosenthal, D. N., Barkoff, L., Chen, C. Y., Davies, R. R., Almond, C. S. 2024; 84 (7): 620-632

  Abstract

  In 2016, the United Network for Organ Sharing revised its pediatric heart transplant (HT) allocation policy.This study sought to determine whether the 2016 revisions are associated with reduced waitlist mortality and capture patient-specific risks.Children listed for HT from 1999 to 2023 were identified using Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network data and grouped into 3 eras (era 1: 1999-2006; era 2: 2006-2016; era 3: 2016-2023) based on when the United Network for Organ Sharing implemented allocation changes. Fine-Gray competing risks modeling was used to identify factors associated with death or delisting for deterioration. Fixed-effects analysis was used to determine whether allocation changes were associated with mortality.Waitlist mortality declined 8 percentage points (PP) across eras (21%, 17%, and 13%, respectively; P < 0.01). At listing, era 3 children were less sick than era 1 children, with 6 PP less ECMO use (P < 0.01), 11 PP less ventilator use (P < 0.01), and 1 PP less dialysis use (P < 0.01). Ventricular assist device (VAD) use was 13 PP higher, and VAD mortality decreased 9 PP (P < 0.01). Non-White mortality declined 10 PP (P < 0.01). ABO-incompatible listings increased 27 PP, and blood group O infant mortality decreased 13 PP (P < 0.01). In multivariable analyses, the 2016 revisions were not associated with lower waitlist mortality, whereas VAD use (in era 3), ABO-incompatible transplant, improved patient selection, and narrowing racial disparities were. Match-run analyses demonstrated poor correlation between individual waitlist mortality risk and the match-run order.The 2016 allocation revisions were not independently associated with the decline in pediatric HT waitlist mortality. The 3-tier classification system fails to adequately capture patient-specific risks. A more flexible allocation system that accurately reflects patient-specific risks and considers transplant benefit is urgently needed.

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jacc.2024.05.049

  View details for PubMedID 39111968

• Top trading cycles JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS Morrill, T., Roth, A. E. 2024; 112

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102984

  View details for Web of Science ID 001236259600001

• Quality and safety for substances of human origins: scientific evidence and the new EU regulations. BMJ global health Elias, J. J., Lacetera, N., Macis, M., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2024; 9 (4)

  View details for DOI 10.1136/bmjgh-2024-015122

  View details for PubMedID 38649180

• Report From a Multidisciplinary Symposium on the Future of Living Kidney Donor Transplantation. Progress in transplantation (Aliso Viejo, Calif.) Peters, T. G., Fung, J. J., Radcliffe-Richards, J., Satel, S., Roth, A. E., McCormick, F., Gershun, M., Matas, A. J., Roberts, J. P., Morrison, J., Chertow, G. M., Lee, L. D., Held, P. J., Ojo, A. 2023: 15269248231212911

  Abstract

  Virtually all clinicians agree that living donor renal transplantation is the optimal treatment for permanent loss of kidney function. Yet, living donor kidney transplantation has not grown in the United States for more than 2 decades. A virtual symposium gathered experts to examine this shortcoming and to stimulate and clarify issues salient to improving living donation. The ethical principles of rewarding kidney donors and the limits of altruism as the exclusive compelling stimulus for donation were emphasized. Concepts that donor incentives could save up to 40 000 lives annually and considerable taxpayer dollars were examined, and survey data confirmed voter support for donor compensation. Objections to rewarding donors were also presented. Living donor kidney exchanges and limited numbers of deceased donor kidneys were reviewed. Discussants found consensus that attempts to increase living donation should include removing artificial barriers in donor evaluation, expansion of living donor chains, affirming the safety of live kidney donation, and assurance that donors incur no expense. If the current legal and practice standards persist, living kidney donation will fail to achieve its true potential to save lives.

  View details for DOI 10.1177/15269248231212911

  View details for PubMedID 37968881

• Early vs Single Match in the Transition to Residency: Analysis Using NRMP Data From 2014 to 2021. Journal of graduate medical education Ashlagi, I., Love, E., Reminick, J. I., Roth, A. E. 2023; 15 (2): 219-227

  Abstract

  An Early Result Acceptance Program (ERAP) has been proposed for obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) to address challenges in the transition to residency. However, there are no available data-driven analyses on the effects of ERAP on the residency transition.We used National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) data to simulate the outcomes of ERAP and compare those to what occurred in the Match historically.We simulated ERAP outcomes in OB/GYN, using the de-identified applicant and program rank order lists from 2014 to 2021, and compared them to the actual NRMP Match outcomes. We report outcomes and sensitivity analyses and consider likely behavioral adaptations.Fourteen percent of applicants receive a less preferred match under ERAP, while only 8% of applicants receive a more preferred match. Less preferred matches disproportionately affect DOs and international medical graduates (IMGs) compared to US MD seniors. Forty-one percent of programs fill with more preferred sets of applicants, while 24% fill with less preferred sets of applicants. Twelve percent of applicants and 52% of programs are in mutually dissatisfied applicant-program pairs (a pair in which both prefer each other to the match each received). Seventy percent of applicants who receive less preferred matches are part of a mutually dissatisfied pair. In 75% of programs with more preferred outcomes, at least one assigned applicant is part of a mutually dissatisfied pair.In this simulation, ERAP fills most OB/GYN positions, but many applicants and programs receive less preferred matches, and disparities increase for DOs and IMGs. ERAP creates mutually dissatisfied applicant-program pairs and problems for mixed-specialty couples, which provides incentives for gamesmanship.

  View details for DOI 10.4300/JGME-D-22-00177.1

  View details for PubMedID 37139220

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC10150816

• Impact of Single Centre 440 Kidney Exchange Transplantation Over 20 Years to Increase Living Donor Pool in India: A Cohort Study Meshram, H., Kute, V., Mishra, V., Patel, H., Banerjee, S., Parikh, G., Rizvi, S., Patel, A., Rees, M., Roth, A. LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2022: S467

  View details for Web of Science ID 000889117001091

• The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: Overcoming Multiple Barriers to Transplantation Rees, M., Roth, A. E., Marino, I., Krawiak, K., Rees, S., Sweeeney, K., Dunn, T., Punch, J., Zimmerman, M., Aziz, F., Al Obaidli, A., Ashlagi, I., Whittaker, V., Rege, A., Forbes, R., Kuhr, C., Correa-Rotter, R., Franco, C., Okwenna, O., Paloyo, S., Sung, R., Leventhall, J., Mor, E., Rogers, J., Tan, M., Basagoitia, L., Ellis, M., Anwar, S., Romagnoli, J. LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2022: S469

  View details for Web of Science ID 000889117001093

• Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Gu, C., Roth, A., Wu, Q. 2022

  View details for DOI 10.1287/moor.2021.1236

  View details for Web of Science ID 000748656200001

• Criminal, Legal, and Ethical Kidney Donation and Transplantation: A Conceptual Framework to Enable Innovation. Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation Roth, A. E., Marino, I. R., Krawiec, K. D., Rees, M. A. 2022; 35: 10551

  View details for DOI 10.3389/ti.2022.10551

  View details for PubMedID 35874307

• Explaining a Potential Interview Match for Graduate Medical Education. Journal of graduate medical education Wapnir, I., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Skancke, E., Vohra, A., Lo, I., Melcher, M. L. 1800; 13 (6): 764-767

  View details for DOI 10.4300/JGME-D-20-01422.1

  View details for PubMedID 35070086

• Global kidney chains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Nikzad, A., Akbarpour, M., Rees, M. A., Roth, A. E. 2021; 118 (36)

  Abstract

  Kidney failure is a worldwide scourge, made more lethal by the shortage of transplants. We propose a way to organize kidney exchange chains internationally between middle-income countries with financial barriers to transplantation and high-income countries with many hard to match patients and patient-donor pairs facing lengthy dialysis. The proposal involves chains of exchange that begin in the middle-income country and end in the high-income country. We also propose a way of financing such chains using savings to US health care payers.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2106652118

  View details for PubMedID 34462358

• Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E. 2021; 67 (9): 5455-5478

  View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3954

  View details for Web of Science ID 000696941500011

• Plumbing the Depths of Ethical Payment for Research Participation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS Fernandez Lynch, H., Darton, T. C., Levy, J., McCormick, F., Ogbogu, U., Payne, R. O., Roth, A. E., Shah, A., Smiley, T., Largent, E. A. 2021: 1–4

  View details for DOI 10.1080/15265161.2021.1895364

  View details for Web of Science ID 000627256300001

  View details for PubMedID 33689566

• Promoting Ethical Payment in Human Infection Challenge Studies. The American journal of bioethics : AJOB Lynch, H. F., Darton, T. C., Levy, J., McCormick, F., Ogbogu, U., Payne, R. O., Roth, A. E., Shah, A. J., Smiley, T., Largent, E. A. 2021: 1–45

  Abstract

  To prepare for potential human infection challenge studies (HICS) involving SARS-CoV-2, we convened a multidisciplinary working group to address ethical questions regarding whether and how much SARS-CoV-2 HICS participants should be paid. Because the goals of paying HICS participants, as well as the relevant ethical concerns, are the same as those arising for other types of clinical research, the same basic framework for ethical payment can apply. This framework divides payment into reimbursement, compensation, and incentives, focusing on fairness and promoting adequate recruitment and retention as counterweights to concerns about undue inducement. Within the basic framework, several factors are especially salient for HICS, and for SARS-CoV-2 HICS in particular, including the nature of participant confinement, anticipated discomfort, risks and uncertainty, participant motivations, and trust. These factors are reflected in a payment worksheet created to help sponsors, researchers, and ethics reviewers systematically develop and assess ethically justifiable payment amounts.

  View details for DOI 10.1080/15265161.2020.1854368

  View details for PubMedID 33541252

• Non-simultaneous kidney exchange cycles in resource-restricted countries without non-directed donation - a prospective single-center cohort study. Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation Kute, V. B., Patel, H. V., Modi, P. R., Rizvi, S. J., Shah, P. R., Engineer, D. P., Banerjee, S., Meshram, H. S., Butala, B. P., Modi, M. P., Gnadhi, S., Patel, A. H., Mishra, V., Roth, A. E., Kopke, J. E., Rees, M. 2021

  Abstract

  The first "bridge-donor" was trusted to donate their kidney after their immunologically incompatible recipient had received a kidney as part of a non-simultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chain in 2007. This concept was reported in The New England Journal of Medicine in 2009 and has since led to more than 10,000 kidney-exchange transplants worldwide. Accordingly, the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Alvin Roth in part for developing this concept. Unfortunately, in much of the world, altruistic kidney donation, which is essential for initiating NEAD chains, is not allowed. Furthermore, the limited availability of operating rooms and staff often constrains the use of simultaneous kidney-exchange cycles.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13833

  View details for PubMedID 33527555

• Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in -Priority-Based Matching AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW-INSIGHTS Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., Tercieux, O. 2020; 2 (4): 425-441

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aeri.20190307

  View details for Web of Science ID 000672750800002

• Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective. Journal of medical ethics Ambuehl, S., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2020

  View details for DOI 10.1136/medethics-2020-106891

  View details for PubMedID 33115857

• Popular repugnance contrasts with legal bans on controversial markets. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Roth, A. E., Wang, S. W. 2020

  Abstract

  We study popular attitudes in Germany, Spain, the Philippines, and the United States toward three controversial markets-prostitution, surrogacy, and global kidney exchange (GKE). Of those markets, only prostitution is banned in the United States and the Philippines, and only prostitution is allowed in Germany and Spain. Unlike prostitution, majorities support legalization of surrogacy and GKE in all four countries. So, there is not a simple relation between public support for markets, or bans, and their legal and regulatory status. Because both markets and bans on markets require social support to work well, this sheds light on the prospects for effective regulation of controversial markets.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2005828117

  View details for PubMedID 32727903

• Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed NATURE Cramton, P., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E., Wilson, R. B. 2020; 582 (7812): 316–18

  View details for Web of Science ID 000542694900002

• Handbook of the Shapley Value Foreword HANDBOOK OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE Roth, A. E., Algaba, E., Fragnelli, SanchezSoriano, J. 2020: XVII-XXII

  View details for Web of Science ID 000569096700001

• Global Kidney Exchange Should Expand Wisely. Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation Roth, A. E., Marino, I. R., Ekwenna, O. n., Dunn, T. B., Paloyo, S. R., Tan, M. n., Correa-Rotter, R. n., Kuhr, C. S., Marsh, C. L., Ortiz, J. n., Testa, G. n., Sindhwani, P. n., Segev, D. L., Rogers, J. n., Punch, J. D., Forbes, R. C., Zimmerman, M. A., Ellis, M. J., Rege, A. n., Basagoitia, L. n., Krawiec, K. D., Rees, M. A. 2020

  Abstract

  We read with great interest and appreciation the careful consideration and analysis by Ambagtsheer et al. of the most critical ethical objections to Global Kidney Exchange (GKE). Ambagtsheer et al. conclude that implementation of GKE is a means to increase access to transplantation ethically and effectively.1,2 These conclusions by their European Society of Transplantation (ESOT) committee on Ethical, Legal and Psychological Aspects of Transplantation (ELPAT) represent a step forward toward a greater understanding and an open, honest debate about GKE.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13656

  View details for PubMedID 32430941

• INTERNATIONAL KIDNEY EXCHANGES PROVIDING LIVING DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS FOR 38 PATIENTS INVOLVING 18 TRANSPLANT CENTERS FROM SIX COUNTRIES Rees, M., Ekwenna, O., Paloyo, S., Dunn, T., Krawiec, K., Rees, S., Roth, A., Ashlagi, I., Zimmerman, M., Punch, J., Forbes, R., Marsh, C., Kuhr, C., Rogers, J., Tan, M., Boelkins, M., Basagoitia, L., Correa, R., Ortiz, J., Sindhwani, P., Thomas, I., Romagnoli, J., Marino, I., Citterio, F. WILEY. 2019: 131

  View details for Web of Science ID 000491488702014

• The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program - a retrospective study TRANSPLANT INTERNATIONAL Stepkowski, S. M., Mierzejewska, B., Fumo, D., Bekbolsynov, D., Khuder, S., Baum, C. E., Brunner, R. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2019; 32 (8): 839–53

  View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13423

  View details for Web of Science ID 000476936200009

• How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Roth, A. E., Wilson, R. B. 2019; 33 (3): 118–43

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.33.3.118

  View details for Web of Science ID 000478070800006

• Benefits of an interview match for breast fellowship positions Wapnir, I., Lo, I., Roth, A., Ashlagi, I., Melcher, M. SPRINGER. 2019: 279–80

  View details for Web of Science ID 000467382700224

• The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program- a retrospective study. Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation Stepkowski, S. M., Mierzejewska, B., Fumo, D., Bekbolsynov, D., Khuder, S., Baum, C. E., Brunner, R. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C. E., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2019

  Abstract

  We examined what happened during a 6-year period to 1,121 end-stage renal disease patients who registered with their willing/incompatible living donors for kidney exchanges with the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). Of all patients, 65% were transplanted: 37% in kidney paired donation (APD-KPD, APD-other-KPD); 10% with compatible live donors (APD-LD); and 18% with deceased donors (APD-DD). The remaining patients were withdrawn (sick/died/others; 15%), or were still waiting (20%). For those patients with a cPRA 0-94%, 72% received a transplant. In contrast, only 49% of very highly sensitized (VHS; cPRA 95-100%) were transplanted. Of the VHS patients, 50% were transplanted by KPD/APD-LD while 50% benefited through prioritization of deceased donors in the modified kidney allocation system (KAS introduced in 2014). All APD transplanted groups had similar death-censored 4-year graft survivals as their relevant OPTN groups. It is noteworthy that VHS graft and patient survival results were comparable to less sensitized and non-sensitized patients. All patients should be encouraged to search for compatible donors through different options. Expanding the donor pool through KPD and the new KAS of the OPTN increases the likelihood of transplantation for VHS patients. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

  View details for PubMedID 30848501

• Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 2018; 108 (7): 1609–58

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.108.7.1609

  View details for Web of Science ID 000436969700001

• Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design. The American economic review Roth, A. E. 2018; 108 (7): 1609-58

  Abstract

  Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets. Marketplaces can have varying degrees of success, and there can be marketplace failures. I’ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists, and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins. Markets work best if they enjoy social support, but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned, even though others want to participate in them. Laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets, and this raises new issues for market designers. I’ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics, marijuana, sex, and surrogacy, and the design of markets for kidney transplants, in the face of widespread laws against (and broader repugnance for) compensating organ donors. I conclude with open questions and engineering challenges.

  View details for PubMedID 30091861

• The lattice of envy-free matchings GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Wu, Q., Roth, A. E. 2018; 109: 201–11

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016

  View details for Web of Science ID 000437997600012

• Complete Chain of the First Global Kidney Exchange Transplant and 3-yr Follow-up. European urology focus Bozek, D. N., Dunn, T. B., Kuhr, C. S., Marsh, C. L., Rogers, J. n., Rees, S. E., Basagoitia, L. n., Brunner, R. J., Roth, A. E., Ekwenna, O. n., Fumo, D. E., Krawiec, K. D., Kopke, J. E., Sindhwani, P. n., Ortiz, J. n., Tan, M. n., Paloyo, S. R., Punch, J. D., Rees, M. A. 2018; 4 (2): 190–97

  Abstract

  Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) offers an opportunity to expand living renal transplantation internationally to patients without financial means. These international pairs are entered into a US kidney exchange program that provides long-term financial support in an effort to identify opportunities for suitable exchanges for both these international pairs and US citizens.While the promise of GKE is significant, it has been met with ethical criticism since its inception in 2015. This paper aims to demonstrate the selection process and provide >3 yr of follow-up on the first GKE donor and recipient from the Philippines.The first GKE transplant occurred with a young Filipino husband and wife who were immunologically compatible, but lacked the financial means to continue hemodialysis or undergo a kidney transplant in their home country. The pair was enrolled in the Alliance for Paired Donation matching system, several alternative kidney exchanges were identified, and the pair subsequently underwent renal transplantation and donation in the USA financed by philanthropy. The resulting nonsimultaneous extended altruistic chain provided transplantation for the Filipino husband and 11 US patients.The Filipino donor and recipient were followed by transplant professionals in both the Philippines and the USA. Follow-up data were maintained as required by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network in the USA.The Filipino donor has normal blood pressure and renal function, and the Filipino recipient is doing well 3.5 yr after their donation and transplantation.While criticisms of GKE highlight concerns for possible exploitation of financially disadvantaged groups, these results demonstrate that these concerns did not come to fruition, and the outcome experienced by the GKE donor and recipient (and other US participants) was successful.The first Filipino Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) donor-recipient pair continues to be followed by both US and Filipino transplant centers. Both are in good health, support the GKE program, and advocate for its expansion.

  View details for PubMedID 30145113

• Some Memories of My Academic Grandfather NEGOTIATION JOURNAL Roth, A. E. 2017; 33 (4): 373-374

  View details for DOI 10.1111/nejo.12203

  View details for Web of Science ID 000413400000017

• GLOBAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE: A CASE STUDY Paloyo, S., Dunn, T., Kuhn, C., Marsh, C., Rogers, J., Rees, S., Cicero, A., Reece, L., Roth, A., Ekwenna, O., Fumo, D., Krawiec, K., Kopke, J., Jain, S., Tan, M., Rees, M. WILEY. 2017: 171

  View details for Web of Science ID 000411688502022

• The promise of organ and tissue preservation to transform medicine. Nature biotechnology Giwa, S., Lewis, J. K., Alvarez, L., Langer, R., Roth, A. E., Church, G. M., Markmann, J. F., Sachs, D. H., Chandraker, A., Wertheim, J. A., Rothblatt, M., Boyden, E. S., Eidbo, E., Lee, W. P., Pomahac, B., Brandacher, G., Weinstock, D. M., Elliott, G., Nelson, D., Acker, J. P., Uygun, K., Schmalz, B., Weegman, B. P., Tocchio, A., Fahy, G. M., Storey, K. B., Rubinsky, B., Bischof, J., Elliott, J. A., Woodruff, T. K., Morris, G. J., Demirci, U., Brockbank, K. G., Woods, E. J., Ben, R. N., Baust, J. G., Gao, D., Fuller, B., Rabin, Y., Kravitz, D. C., Taylor, M. J., Toner, M. 2017; 35 (6): 530-542

  Abstract

  The ability to replace organs and tissues on demand could save or improve millions of lives each year globally and create public health benefits on par with curing cancer. Unmet needs for organ and tissue preservation place enormous logistical limitations on transplantation, regenerative medicine, drug discovery, and a variety of rapidly advancing areas spanning biomedicine. A growing coalition of researchers, clinicians, advocacy organizations, academic institutions, and other stakeholders has assembled to address the unmet need for preservation advances, outlining remaining challenges and identifying areas of underinvestment and untapped opportunities. Meanwhile, recent discoveries provide proofs of principle for breakthroughs in a family of research areas surrounding biopreservation. These developments indicate that a new paradigm, integrating multiple existing preservation approaches and new technologies that have flourished in the past 10 years, could transform preservation research. Capitalizing on these opportunities will require engagement across many research areas and stakeholder groups. A coordinated effort is needed to expedite preservation advances that can transform several areas of medicine and medical science.

  View details for DOI 10.1038/nbt.3889

  View details for PubMedID 28591112

• Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Kalai, E., Battaglini, M., Charness, G., Crawford, V., Forges, F., Parkes, D., Byrd, J., Milnor, J., Arrow, K. J., Aumann, R. J., Dixit, A. K., Dubey, P., Maskin, E., Meltzer, H. Y., Myerson, R., Roth, A. E., Shubik, M., Smith, V. L., Spence, M., Sudderth, B., Valenciano, F. 2017; 103: 1-18

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.011

  View details for Web of Science ID 000404821700001

• Foreword AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 2017; 107 (5): XI

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.107.5.xi

  View details for Web of Science ID 000402551700001

• Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority. Health economics Stoler, A., Kessler, J. B., Ashkenazi, T., Roth, A. E., Lavee, J. 2017; 26 (4): 500-510

  Abstract

  How donor organs are allocated for transplant can affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed an Organ Transplantation Law granting priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals who had previously registered as organ donors. Beginning in November 2010, public awareness campaigns advertised the priority policy to the public. Since April 2012, priority has been added to the routine medical criteria in organ allocation decisions. We evaluate the introduction of priority for registered organ donors using Israeli data on organ donor registration from 1992 to 2013. We find that registrations increased when information about the priority law was made widely available. We find an even larger increase in registration rates in the 2 months leading up to a program deadline, after which priority would only be granted with a 3-year delay. We also find that the registration rate responds positively to public awareness campaigns, to the ease of registration (i.e. allowing for registering online and by phone) and to an election drive that included placing registration opportunities in central voting locations. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  View details for DOI 10.1002/hec.3328

  View details for PubMedID 27125490

• Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Rees, M. A., Dunn, T. B., Kuhr, C. S., Marsh, C. L., Rogers, J., Rees, S. E., Cicero, A., Reece, L. J., Roth, A. E., Ekwenna, O., FUMO, D. E., Krawiec, K. D., KOPKE, J. E., Jain, S., Tan, M., Paloyo, S. R. 2017; 17 (3)

  Abstract

  Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with end-stage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy-even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed-world patient-donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient-donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange-a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United states with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.14106

  View details for Web of Science ID 000397432100024

  View details for PubMedID 27992110

• Effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Ashlagi, I. n., Bingaman, A. n., Burq, M. n., Manshadi, V. n., Gamarnik, D. n., Murphey, C. n., Roth, A. E., Melcher, M. L., Rees, M. A. 2017

  Abstract

  Numerous kidney exchange (kidney paired donation [KPD]) registries in the United States have gradually shifted to high-frequency match-runs, raising the question of whether this harms the number of transplants. We conducted simulations using clinical data from 2 KPD registries-the Alliance for Paired Donation, which runs multihospital exchanges, and Methodist San Antonio, which runs single-center exchanges-to study how the frequency of match-runs impacts the number of transplants and the average waiting times. We simulate the options facing each of the 2 registries by repeated resampling from their historical pools of patient-donor pairs and nondirected donors, with arrival and departure rates corresponding to the historical data. We find that longer intervals between match-runs do not increase the total number of transplants, and that prioritizing highly sensitized patients is more effective than waiting longer between match-runs for transplanting highly sensitized patients. While we do not find that frequent match-runs result in fewer transplanted pairs, we do find that increasing arrival rates of new pairs improves both the fraction of transplanted pairs and waiting times.

  View details for PubMedID 29087017

• Deceased Donor Initiated Nonsimultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chains Through the Military Share Program Rees, M., Ekwenna, O., Elster, E., Patel, A., Murtagh, D., Kopke, J., Arrington, J., Krawiec, K., Roth, A., Hawksworth, J. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2017: 60-61

  View details for Web of Science ID 000392621100111

• Global Kidney Exchange Rees, M., Dunn, T., Rees, S., Rogers, J., Reece, L., Roth, A., Kuhr, C., Ekwenna, O., Fumo, D., Krawiec, K., Jain, S., Marsh, C., Cicero, A., Kopke, J., Tan, M., Paloyo, S. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2017: 60

  View details for Web of Science ID 000392621100110

• Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Marino, I. R., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A., Doria, C. n. 2017; 17 (10): 2749

  View details for PubMedID 28862794

• People should not be banned from transplantation only because of their country of origin. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Roth, A. E., Krawiec, K. D., Paloyo, S. n., Ekwenna, O. n., Marsh, C. L., Wenig, A. J., Dunn, T. B., Rees, M. A. 2017; 17 (10): 2747–48

  View details for PubMedID 28862804

• Minimax across a population of games JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION-JESA Erev, I., Roth, A. E., Slonim, R. 2016; 2 (2): 144-156

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s40881-016-0029-3

  View details for Web of Science ID 000445153600005

• Incentivizing Authorization for Deceased Organ Donation With Organ Allocation Priority: The First 5 Years AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Stoler, A., Kessler, J. B., Ashkenazi, T., Roth, A. E., Lavee, J. 2016; 16 (9): 2639-2645

  Abstract

  The allocation system of donor organs for transplantation may affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed the Organ Transplantation Law, which grants priority on waiting lists for transplants to candidates who are first-degree relatives of deceased organ donors or who previously registered as organ donors themselves. Several public campaigns have advertised the existence of the law since November 2010. We evaluated the effect of the law using all deceased donation requests made in Israel during the period 1998-2015. We use logistic regression to compare the authorization rates of the donors' next of kin in the periods before (1998-2010) and after (2011-2015) the public was made aware of the law. The authorization rate for donation in the period after awareness was substantially higher (55.1% vs. 45.0%, odds ratio [OR] 1.43, p = 0.0003) and reached an all-time high rate of 60.2% in 2015. This increase was mainly due to an increase in the authorization rate of next of kin of unregistered donors (51.1% vs. 42.2%). We also found that the likelihood of next-of-kin authorization for donation was approximately twice as high when the deceased relative was a registered donor rather than unregistered (89.4% vs. 44.6%, OR 14.27, p < 0.0001). We concluded that the priority law is associated with an increased authorization rate for organ donation.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13802

  View details for Web of Science ID 000383774700017

  View details for PubMedID 27013023

• Simulation of international kidney exchange between Saudi Arabia and the United States using actual incompatible pair data Alabadi, A., Akkari, K. B., Alotaibi, F., Hamawi, K., Albugami, M., Roth, A. E., Kopke, J. E., Rees, M. A. LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2016: S185

  View details for Web of Science ID 000436953200288

• Lloyd Shapley (1923-2016). Nature Roth, A. E. 2016; 532 (7598): 178

  View details for PubMedID 27075091

• REASONS FOR FAILING OFFERS IN A KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PROGRAM: A 7-YEAR ANALYSIS Stepkowski, S., Fumo, D. E., Reese, L. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Roth, A. E., Leichtman, A. B., Rees, M. A. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 18-19

  View details for Web of Science ID 000367726700051

• ADVANTAGES OF CHAINS VS. CYCLES IN A KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PROGRAM: A 7-YEAR ANALYSIS Stepkowski, S., Fumo, D. E., Reese, L. J., Kopke, J. E., Roth, A. E., Leichtman, A. B., Rees, M. A. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 18

  View details for Web of Science ID 000367726700050

• Historical Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation: The 7-Year Evolution of a Web-Based Virtual Matching System. American journal of transplantation FUMO, D. E., Kapoor, V., Reece, L. J., Stepkowski, S. M., KOPKE, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C., Roth, A. E., Leichtman, A. B., Rees, M. A. 2015; 15 (10): 2646-2654

  Abstract

  Failure to convert computer-identified possible kidney paired donation (KPD) exchanges into transplants has prohibited KPD from reaching its full potential. This study analyzes the progress of exchanges in moving from "offers" to completed transplants. Offers were divided into individual segments called 1-way transplants in order to calculate success rates. From 2007 to 2014, the Alliance for Paired Donation performed 243 transplants, 31 in collaboration with other KPD registries and 194 independently. Sixty-one of 194 independent transplants (31.4%) occurred via cycles, while the remaining 133 (68.6%) resulted from nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains. Thirteen of 35 (37.1%) NEAD chains with at least three NEAD segments accounted for 68% of chain transplants (8.6 tx/chain). The "offer" and 1-way success rates were 21.9 and 15.5%, respectively. Three reasons for failure were found that could be prospectively prevented by changes in protocol or software: positive laboratory crossmatch (28%), transplant center declined donor (17%) and pair transplanted outside APD (14%). Performing a root cause analysis on failures in moving from offer to transplant has allowed the APD to improve protocols and software. These changes have improved the success rate and the number of transplants performed per year.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13337

  View details for PubMedID 26015291

• WHY DO STABLE CLEARINGHOUSES WORK SO WELL? - SMALL SETS OF STABLE MATCHINGS IN TYPICAL ENVIRONMENTS, AND THE LIMITS-ON-MANIPULATION THEOREM OF DEMANGE, GALE AND SOTOMAYOR JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES Roth, A. E. 2015; 2 (3-4): 331-340

  View details for DOI 10.3934/jdg.2015009

  View details for Web of Science ID 000218573200009

• More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant? AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ambuehl, S., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2015; 105 (5): 357-360

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.p20151034

  View details for Web of Science ID 000357929400066

• Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D., Roth, A. E. 2015; 112 (3): 663-668

  Abstract

  As of May 2014 there were more than 100,000 patients on the waiting list for a kidney transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant, every year there are fewer donors than new patients, so the wait for a transplant continues to grow. To address this shortage, kidney paired donation (KPD) programs allow patients with living but biologically incompatible donors to exchange donors through cycles or chains initiated by altruistic (nondirected) donors, thereby increasing the supply of kidneys in the system. In many KPD programs a centralized algorithm determines which exchanges will take place to maximize the total number of transplants performed. This optimization problem has proven challenging both in theory, because it is NP-hard, and in practice, because the algorithms previously used were unable to optimally search over all long chains. We give two new algorithms that use integer programming to optimally solve this problem, one of which is inspired by the techniques used to solve the traveling salesman problem. These algorithms provide the tools needed to find optimal solutions in practice.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1421853112

  View details for Web of Science ID 000348040700026

  View details for PubMedID 25561535

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4311855

• Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted INTERFACES Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D., Rees, M., Roth, A. E., Soenmez, T., Uenver, M. U. 2015; 45 (1): 26-42

  View details for DOI 10.1287/inte.2014.0766

  View details for Web of Science ID 000349378000003

• Improving Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation Fumo, D., Kapoor, V., Reece, L., Stepkowski, S., Kopke, J., Rees, S., Smith, C., Roth, A., Leichtman, A., Rees, M. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 68

  View details for Web of Science ID 000348030600064

• Transplantation: One Economist's Perspective. Transplantation Roth, A. E. 2015; 99 (2): 261–64

  View details for PubMedID 25651112

• The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel. Israel journal of health policy research Roth, A. E., Shorrer, R. I. 2015; 4: 11

  Abstract

  A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in "market design" had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and almost all students get a better chance of getting what they want. Continued monitoring of the new mechanism is required to verify that it is not abused, and explore whether it can be improved. Other organizations in Israel may also be able to profit from the experience that accumulates from market design, both in Israel and abroad.

  View details for PubMedID 25821580

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4377047

• How Werner Guth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION van Damme, E., Binmore, K. G., Roth, A. E., Samuelson, L., Winter, E., Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., Gneezy, U., Kocher, M. G., Sutter, M., Sanfey, A. G., Kliemt, H., Selten, R., Nagel, R., Azar, O. H. 2014; 108: 292-318

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.014

  View details for Web of Science ID 000347599300022

• Is avatar-to-avatar communication as effective as face-to-face communication? An Ultimatum Game experiment in First and Second Life JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Greiner, B., Caravella, M., Roth, A. E. 2014; 108: 374-382

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.011

  View details for Web of Science ID 000347599300028

• Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E. 2014; 9 (3): 817-863

  View details for DOI 10.3982/TE1357

  View details for Web of Science ID 000342908500008

• Maximization, learning, and economic behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2014; 111: 10818-10825

  Abstract

  The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1402846111

  View details for PubMedID 25024182

  View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4113920

• Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 114: 19-28

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.006

  View details for Web of Science ID 000336707100004

• Getting More Organs for Transplantation AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 104 (5): 425-430

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.5.425

  View details for Web of Science ID 000338925400072

• Getting More Organs for Transplantation. The American economic review Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 104 (5): 425-30

  View details for PubMedID 29115805

• Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. 2013; 128 (4): 1585-1632

  View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt019

  View details for Web of Science ID 000325776900004

• TRANSCONTINENTAL INTERNATIONAL KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION Rees, M., Boletis, J., Gupta, M., Eng, M., Marsh, C., Tan, M., Wiseman, A., Bennett, W., Roth, A., Leichtman, A. WILEY. 2013: 144-145

  View details for Web of Science ID 000328232001184

• COLLABORATIONS IN KIDNEY PAIRED EXCHANGE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL Ashlagi, I., Kim, D., Bingaman, A., Lee, S., Murphey, C., Roth, A., Rees, M. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2013: 145

  View details for Web of Science ID 000328232001185

• Some memories of Cy Derman ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E. 2013; 208 (1): 3

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s10479-013-1436-y

  View details for Web of Science ID 000323414400002

• Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation Games Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2013; 4 (2): 243-282
• In 100 Years IN 100 YEARS: LEADING ECONOMISTS PREDICT THE FUTURE Roth, A. E., PalaciosHuerta 2013: 109-119

  View details for Web of Science ID 000334368200008

• Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2012; 102 (5): 2018-2047

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.5.2018

  View details for Web of Science ID 000307471600009

• Call to Develop a Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Rees, M. A., Schnitzler, M. A., Zavala, E. Y., Cutler, J. A., Roth, A. E., IRWIN, F. D., Crawford, S. W., Leichtman, A. B. 2012; 12 (6): 1392-1397

  Abstract

  We propose a Medicare Demonstration Project to develop a standard acquisition charge for kidney paired donation. A new payment strategy is required because Medicare and commercial insurance companies may not directly pay living donor costs intended to lead to transplantation of a beneficiary of a different insurance provider. Until the 1970s, when organ procurement organizations were empowered to serve as financial intermediaries to pay the upfront recovery expenses for deceased donor kidneys before knowing the identity of the recipient, there existed similar limitations in the recovery and placement of deceased donor organs. Analogous to the recovery of deceased donor kidneys, kidney paired donation requires the evaluation of living donors before identifying their recipient. Tissue typing, crossmatching and transportation of living donors or their kidneys represent additional financial barriers. Finally, the administrative expenses of the organizations that identify and coordinate kidney paired donation transplantation require reimbursement akin to that necessary for organ procurement organizations. To expand access to kidney paired donation for more patients, we propose a model to reimburse paired donation expenses analogous to the proven strategy used for over 30 years to pay for deceased donor solid organ transplantation in America.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2012.04034.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000304522900010

  View details for PubMedID 22487555

• New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E. 2012; 102 (3): 354-359

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.3.354

  View details for Web of Science ID 000304262000061

• Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS Roth, A. E. 2012; 30 (2): 479-494

  View details for DOI 10.1086/663621

  View details for Web of Science ID 000301779400007

• NEAD Chains in Transplantation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Ashlagi, I., Gilchrist, D. S., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 11 (12): 2780-2781

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03800.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000297411800036

• Kidney paired donation NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION Wallis, C. B., Samy, K. P., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 26 (7): 2091-2099

  Abstract

  Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the USA. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the USA and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the USA, now 5 years into its development.

  View details for DOI 10.1093/ndt/gfr155

  View details for Web of Science ID 000292329500008

  View details for PubMedID 21454351

• Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney- Paired Donation-Revisited AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Ashlagi, I., Gilchrist, D. S., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 11 (5): 984-994

  Abstract

  Since 2008, kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of nondirected donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously 'domino-paired donation', (DPD) or nonsimultaneously 'nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor, chains (NEAD). NEAD chains create 'bridge donors' whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants, and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this finding contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney-paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 transplants are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03481.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000289897000019

  View details for PubMedID 21521469

• A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games Ert, E., Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2011; 2: 257-276
• Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings Roth, A. E. 2011; 101 (3): 744-746
• ¿QUÉ HEMOS APRENDIDO DEL DISEÑO DE MERCADOS El Trimestre Económico Roth, A. E. 2011; 78 (2): 259-314
• The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Coles, P., Cawley, J., Levine, P. B., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Siegfried, J. J. 2010; 24 (4): 187-206

  View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.24.4.187

  View details for Web of Science ID 000284159400010

• Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why? AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Leider, S., Roth, A. E. 2010; 10 (5): 1221-1227

  Abstract

  The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney market, and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval toward certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, and between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. A total of 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval toward certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally nonmarket exchanges, such as food preparation.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2010.03019.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000276921600016

  View details for PubMedID 20148809

• Six Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains. 10th American Transplant Congress Rees, M. A., KOPKE, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Roth, A. E., Taber, T. E., Unver, M. U., Nibhanupudy, B., Leichtman, A. B., Van Buren, C. T., Young, C. J., Montgomery, R. A. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2010: 275–275

  View details for Web of Science ID 000275921702226

• A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R., Hertwig, R., Stewart, T., West, R., Lebiere, C. 2010; 23 (1): 15-47

  View details for DOI 10.1002/bdm.683

  View details for Web of Science ID 000273541400002

• Social Behavior in Economic Games The Selten School of Behavioral Economics: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten Ockenfels, A., Bolton, G. E., Guth, W., Roth, A. E. edited by Ockenfels, A., Sadrieh, A. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 2010: 183–200
• An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
• Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Kihlstrom, R., Roth, A. E., Shmeidler, D. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
• New Sources in Living Kidney Donation Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients Hanto, R. L., Roth, A. E., Ünver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L. edited by McKay, D. Springer. 2010: 103–117
• A choice prediction competition for market entry games: An introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E. 2010; 1 (2): 117-136
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games With Risky Outcomes Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
• Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice Better Living Through Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Siegfried, J. Harvard University Press. 2010: 206–222
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Elgar, E. Edward Elgar. 2010
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
• Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. 2009; 99 (5): 1954-1978

  View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954

  View details for Web of Science ID 000272977300011

• Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2009; 1 (2): 199-219

  View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.1.2.199

  View details for Web of Science ID 000285178600011

• A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain. NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE Rees, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Rutter, M. E., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Hiller, J., Roth, A. E., Sandholm, T., Uenver, M. U., Montgomery, R. A. 2009; 360 (11): 1096-1101

  Abstract

  We report a chain of 10 kidney transplantations, initiated in July 2007 by a single altruistic donor (i.e., a donor without a designated recipient) and coordinated over a period of 8 months by two large paired-donation registries. These transplantations involved six transplantation centers in five states. In the case of five of the transplantations, the donors and their coregistered recipients underwent surgery simultaneously. In the other five cases, "bridge donors" continued the chain as many as 5 months after the coregistered recipients in their own pairs had received transplants. This report of a chain of paired kidney donations, in which the transplantations were not necessarily performed simultaneously, illustrates the potential of this strategy.

  View details for Web of Science ID 000264051000007

  View details for PubMedID 19279341

• Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria Judgement and Decision Making Erev, I., Roth, A. E. edited by Chater, N. Sage. 2009
• Four Never-Ending Altruistic Donor Chains 9th Joint Meeting of the American-Society-of-Transplant-Surgeon/American-Society-of-Transplantation Rees, M., Kopke, J., Pelletier, R., Segev, D., Fabrega, A., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O., Hiller, J., Roth, A., Sandholm, T., Unver, M. U., Nibhunupudy, B., Bowers, V., VanBuren, C., Montgomery, R. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2009: 389–389

  View details for Web of Science ID 000265068800682

• What have we learned from market design? Innovation Policy and the Economy Roth, A. E. edited by Jaffe, A. B., Lerner, J., Stern, S. University of Chicago Press. 2009: 79–112
• Six Nonsimultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains American Transplant Congress Raes, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Hiller, J., Roth, A. E., Sandholm, T., Unver, M. U., NIbhanubpudy, B., Bowers, V., VanBuren, C., Montgomery, R. A. 2009
• The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices Labor Market Intermediation Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. edited by Autor, D. The University of Chicago Press. 2009: 273–306
• If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Grosskopf, B., Roth, A. E. 2009; 65 (1): 176-204

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.013

  View details for Web of Science ID 000263217200010

• The gastroenterology fellowship Match - The first two years GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Proctor, D. D., Roth, A. E. 2008; 135 (2): 344-346

  View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2008.06.075

  View details for Web of Science ID 000258439900006

  View details for PubMedID 18619966

• AOA symposium. Current state of fellowship hiring: is a universal match necessary? Is it possible? journal of bone and joint surgery. American volume Harner, C. D., Ranawat, A. S., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Stern, P. J., Hurwitz, S. R., Levine, W. N., DeRosa, G. P., Hu, S. S. 2008; 90 (6): 1375-1384

  View details for DOI 10.2106/JBJS.G.01582

  View details for PubMedID 18519333

• The never-ending altruistic donor 8th American Transplant Congress Rees, M. A., KOPKE, J. E., Hil, G., Reitsma, W., Pankewycz, O. G., Miller, A. L., Hawxby, A. M., Montgomery, R. A., Abraham, D., Sandholm, T., Roth, A. R., Somnez, T., Unver, M. U. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 288–288

  View details for Web of Science ID 000255763200410

• What have we learned from market design? Annual Meeting of the Royal-Economic-Society Roth, A. E. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 285–310

  View details for Web of Science ID 000253477600001

• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY Roth, A. E. 2008; 36 (3-4): 537-569

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6

  View details for Web of Science ID 000253625400015

• What have we learned from market design? Innovations Roth, A. E. 2008: 119–147
• 实验室实验经济学：六个观点看 edited by Roth, A. E. 2008
• Matching and market design The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T. edited by Durlauf, S. N., Blume, L. E. Palgrave Macmillan. 2008; 2nd
• Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games ECONOMIC THEORY Erev, I., Roth, A. E., Slonim, R. L., Barron, G. 2007; 33 (1): 29-51

  View details for DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248186700003

• The art of designing markets HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Roth, A. E. 2007; 85 (10): 118-?

  Abstract

  Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design--a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created marketlike allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets--like those for jobs and dating--proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.

  View details for Web of Science ID 000249682100021

  View details for PubMedID 17972500

• Repugnance as a constraint on markets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Roth, A. E. 2007; 21 (3): 37-58

  View details for Web of Science ID 000249349000003

• Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2007; 97 (3): 828-851

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600013

• Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2007; 171 (7): 423-428

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.001

  View details for Web of Science ID 000247811500009

• The new market for federal judicial law clerks UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Avery, C., Jolls, C., Posner, R. A., Roth, A. E. 2007; 74 (2): 447-486

  View details for Web of Science ID 000248035800011

• Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second- Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet New Developments in Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
• An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions New Developments in Experimental Economics Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
• Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria New Developments in Experimental Economics Erev, I., Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
• Kidney Paired Donation With Compatible Pairs American Journal of Transplantation Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U. 2007; 7 (1)
• Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post-season college football bowls RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Frechette, G. R., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2007; 38 (4): 967-982

  View details for Web of Science ID 000253045000006

• Utilizing list exchange and nondirected donation through 'Chain' paired kidney donations AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Roth, A. E., Soenmez, T., Uenver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L., Saidman, S. L. 2006; 6 (11): 2694-2705

  Abstract

  In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a DD-waitlist candidate. A nondirected donor's (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to a DD-waitlist candidate. These two established practices would help even more transplant candidates if they were integrated with kidney paired donation (KPD). We consider a scenario in which the donor of an LE intended recipient (LE-IR) donates to a compatible KPD intended recipient (KPD-IR), and the KPD donor (KPD-D) donates to the waitlist (an LE-chain). We consider a similar scenario in which an ND-D donates to a KPD-IR and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist (an ND-chain). Using data derived from the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and from OPTN/SRTR recipient-donor distributions, simulations are presented to evaluate the potential impact of chain exchanges coordinated with KPD. LE donors (LE-D) and ND-D who are ABO-O result in the highest number of additional transplants, while results for ABO-A and B donors are similar to each other. We recommend that both LE and ND donations be utilized through chain exchanges.

  View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2006.01515.x

  View details for Web of Science ID 000241240700023

  View details for PubMedID 16981911

• The speed of learning in noisy games: Partial reinforcement and the sustainability of cooperation AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Bereby-Meyer, Y., Roth, A. E. 2006; 96 (4): 1029-1042

  View details for Web of Science ID 000240789200006

• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction Workshop on Electronic Market Design Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. 2006: 297–320

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.010

  View details for Web of Science ID 000237518500005

• Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two- and three-way exchanges TRANSPLANTATION Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L. 2006; 81 (5): 773-782

  Abstract

  To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for transplantation.Demographic data of patients who had been evaluated for live donor kidney transplantation but found to be incompatible with their potential donor (because of ABO blood group or positive crossmatch) were submitted for computer analysis and matching. Data included ABO and HLA types of donor and recipient, %PRA and specificity of recipient alloantibody, donor/recipient relationship, and the reason the donor was incompatible. The data set used for the initial simulation included 29 patients with one donor each and 16 patients with multiple donors for a total of 45 patients and 68 donor/patient pairs. In addition, a simulation based on OPTN/SRTR data was used to further assess the practical importance of multiple exchange combinations.If only exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs were allowed, a maximum of 8 patient-donor pairs in the data set could exchange kidneys. If three-way exchanges were also allowed, a maximum of 11 pairs could exchange kidneys. Simulations with OPTN/SRTR data demonstrate that the increase in the number of potential transplants if three-way exchanges are allowed is robust, and does not depend on the particular patients in our sample.A computerized matching protocol can be used to identify donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs who can potentially enter into donor exchanges that otherwise would not readily occur.

  View details for DOI 10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25

  View details for Web of Science ID 000236229900020

  View details for PubMedID 16534482

• The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL Haruvy, E., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2006; 30 (3): 457-486

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jedc.2005.02.002

  View details for Web of Science ID 000235813900005

• What will be needed for the new gastroenterology fellowship match to succeed? GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Proctor, D. D., Roth, A. E. 2006; 130 (1): 218-224

  View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2005.10.058

  View details for Web of Science ID 000234525200027

  View details for PubMedID 16401484

• Some of the Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration Social Psychology and Economics Murnighan, J. K., Roth, A. E. edited by Cremer, D. D., Zeelenberg, M., Murnighan, J. K. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.: Mahwah, NJ.. 2006: 321–333
• Pairwise kidney exchange JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2005; 125 (2): 151-188

  View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004

  View details for Web of Science ID 000234153100002

• The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (3): 878-889

  View details for Web of Science ID 000233223400022

• The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare). The American economic review McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (3): 878-89

  View details for PubMedID 29125725

• The Boston Public School match 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 368–71

  View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500069

• The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match? The American economic review Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (2): 372-5

  Abstract

  We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a "match." This market used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s. Starting in 1996, participation in the match declined precipitously, and it was formally abandoned after 1999. Consequently, the experience of this market when the match was in place, in comparison to the periods before and since, allows an assessment of the effects of the match. An analysis of how the match failed in the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for success of a new match. These events offer economists a rare window on how decentralized labor markets clear, and on how market clearinghouses succeed and fail.

  View details for PubMedID 29115791

• The gastroenterology fellowship market: Should there be a match? 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 372–75

  Abstract

  We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a "match." This market used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s. Starting in 1996, participation in the match declined precipitously, and it was formally abandoned after 1999. Consequently, the experience of this market when the match was in place, in comparison to the periods before and since, allows an assessment of the effects of the match. An analysis of how the match failed in the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for success of a new match. These events offer economists a rare window on how decentralized labor markets clear, and on how market clearinghouses succeed and fail.

  View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500070

• Restarting the gastroenterology match AMERICAN JOURNAL OF GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 100 (5): 1202-1203

  View details for Web of Science ID 000228489900036

  View details for PubMedID 15842603

• A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 376–80

  View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500071

• The New York City high school match 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 364–67

  View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500068

• Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Roth, A. E., Xing, X. edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
• Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership Roth, A. E. edited by Reid, C., Grossman, F. National Academy of Engineering and Institute of Medicine, National Academies Press. 2005: 237–239
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Roth, A. E. edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
• Negoziazione e Comportamento di Mercato a Gerusalemme, Lubiana, Pittsburgh e Tokio: Uno Studio Sperimentale Economia Cognitiva e Sperimentale Roth, A. E. edited by Motterline, M., Guala, F. Milan: Universita' Bocconi Editore. 2005
• An experimental analysis of ending rules in Internet auctions RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2005; 36 (4): 890-907

  View details for Web of Science ID 000237400400009

• Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION Asker, J., Grosskopf, B., McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Weizsacker, G. 2004; 35 (4): 330-342

  View details for Web of Science ID 000224710300002

• The gastroenterology fellowship match: How it failed and why it could succeed once again GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2004; 127 (2): 658-666

  Abstract

  The market for gastroenterology (GI) fellows adopted a centralized Match in 1986, and abandoned it in the late 1990s. We discuss why the Match initially was adopted, how and why it broke down, what differences this has made in the market for fellows, and what would be needed to restart the Match successfully. We assess the effects of the Match by comparing the GI fellows market now with when the Match was operating, and with the fellowship markets for internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. The breakdown of a well-functioning Match is rare, but may be caused by unusual shifts in market conditions, such as those experienced by gastroenterology in the late 1990s. The problems the gastroenterology Match originally was designed to solve re-emerged with the demise of the Match. The market has become more local and less national, than when there was a Match in place, and program recruitment of fellows occurs earlier and is more dispersed in time than internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. There is no evidence that the demise of the Match has had any effect on wages. The evidence strongly suggests that the Match could be reintroduced successfully, which would increase the mobility of potential GI fellows, allow potential fellows to compete for the widest range of programs, and allow programs to compete for the widest range of fellows.

  View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2004.05.034

  View details for Web of Science ID 000223431200035

  View details for PubMedID 15300596

• Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative "Dutch" auctions MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Katok, E., Roth, A. E. 2004; 50 (8): 1044-1063

  View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0254

  View details for Web of Science ID 000223405500004

• Kidney exchange QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2004; 119 (2): 457-488

  View details for Web of Science ID 000221453300003

• The nash equilibrium: A perspective PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Holt, C. A., Roth, A. E. 2004; 101 (12): 3999-4002

  Abstract

  In 1950, John Nash contributed a remarkable one-page PNAS article that defined and characterized a notion of equilibrium for n- person games. This notion, now called the "Nash equilibrium," has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences. Indeed, game theory, with the Nash equilibrium as its centerpiece, is becoming the most prominent unifying theory of social science. In this perspective, we summarize the historical context and subsequent impact of Nash's contribution.

  View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0308738101

  View details for Web of Science ID 000220472200004

  View details for PubMedID 15024100

• Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 111 (6): 1342-1352

  View details for Web of Science ID 000186719400007

• Effect of a match on salaries for medical fellows - Reply JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 290 (18): 2408-2408

  View details for Web of Science ID 000186518300025

• Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Gneezy, U., Haruvy, E., Roth, A. E. 2003; 45 (2): 347-368

  View details for DOI 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)000151-9

  View details for Web of Science ID 000186408200005

• Relationship between wages and presence of a match in medical fellowships JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 290 (9): 1153-1154

  View details for Web of Science ID 000185090400008

  View details for PubMedID 12952995

• The origins, history, and design of the resident match JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Roth, A. E. 2003; 289 (7): 909-912

  Abstract

  In the early 1900s, competition among hospitals for interns and among medical students for good internships led to increasingly early offers of internships to students. By the 1940s, appointments were often made as early as the beginning of the junior year of medical school. Hospitals thus had little information about students' performance, and students frequently had to make a final decision to accept or reject an offer without knowing which other offers might be forthcoming. From 1945 through 1951, efforts were made to enforce a uniform date for accepting offers. However, students were still faced with offers having very short deadlines, compelling them to accept or reject offers without knowing what other offers might be forthcoming. Hospitals often had to scramble for available students, since if an offer was rejected, it was often too late for them to reach their next preferred candidate. A centralized clearinghouse was thus developed as a way of alleviating this chaos and allowing a larger role to the preferences of both students and hospitals. This evolved into the current matching program, whose algorithm continues to be updated to take account of changing needs of applicants, such as growth in the number of couples who seek 2 positions in the same vicinity.

  View details for Web of Science ID 000181072200038

  View details for PubMedID 12588278

• Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study Trust Roth, A. E., Prasnika, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Zamir, S. edited by Khalil, E. Edward Elgar. 2003
• An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Experiments in Environmental Economics Ochs, J., Roth, A. E. edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
• Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experiments in Environmental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
• Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games Experimental Economics Cooper, D. J., Feltovich, N., Roth, A. E., Zwick, R. 2003; 6 (2): 181-207
• The timing of bids in Internet auctions - Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents AI MAGAZINE Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2002; 23 (3): 79-87

  View details for Web of Science ID 000180288600007

• Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Ockenfels, A. 2002; 92 (4): 1093-1103

  View details for Web of Science ID 000178976700021

• Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING Erev, I., Roth, A. E., Slonim, R. L., Barron, G. 2002; 18 (3): 359-368

  View details for Web of Science ID 000177466400005

• The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics European Meeting of the Econometric-Society Roth, A. E. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2002: 1341–78

  View details for Web of Science ID 000176529300002

• The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson Roth, A. E., Peranson, E. edited by Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., Roth, A. E. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
• Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson edited by Roth, A. E., Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, P. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
• Interview on Experimental Economics (conducted by Fredrik Andersson and Hakan Holm) Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making. Roth, A. E. edited by Andersson, F., Holm, H. Kluwer. 2002: 49–65
• The market for federal judicial law clerks UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Avery, C., Jolls, C., Posner, R. A., Roth, A. E. 2001; 68 (3): 793-902

  View details for Web of Science ID 000169098400010

• Form and function in experimental design BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES Roth, A. E. 2001; 24 (3): 427-?

  View details for Web of Science ID 000171155500029

• ‘‘Modeling repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma with reinforcement learning over an enriched strategy set,’’ Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox Roth, A. E., Erev, I. edited by Gigerenzer, G., Selten, R. MIT Press. 2001
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Critical Perspectives on Game Theory Roth, A. E. edited by Varoufakis, Y. 2001
• Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game 84th Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality Erev, I., Roth, A. E. M I T PRESS. 2001: 215–231

  View details for Web of Science ID 000175774300012

• The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. 2000; 115 (1): 201-235

  View details for Web of Science ID 000085761200006

• Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory Roth, A. E. edited by Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. Kluwer. 2000: 7–18
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value Aumann, Robert Collected Papers Rothe, A. E. MIT Press. 2000
• Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Aumann, Robert Collected Papers Roth, A. E. MIT Press. 2000: 485–494
• The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., PERANSON, E. 1999; 89 (4): 748-780

  View details for Web of Science ID 000082825100004

• The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Erev, I., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Roth, A. E. 1999; 39 (1): 111-128

  View details for Web of Science ID 000080955400007

• Truncation strategies in matching markets - In search of advice for participants ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1999; 67 (1): 21-43

  View details for Web of Science ID 000077931400002

• On the role of reinforcement learning in experimental games: The cognitive game-theoretic approach Workshop in Honor of Professor Amnon Rapoports 60th Birthday Erev, I., Roth, A. E. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1999: 53–77

  View details for Web of Science ID 000077602500004

• Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 1998; 88 (4): 848-881

  View details for Web of Science ID 000076265000010

• Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic ECONOMETRICA Slonim, R., Roth, A. E. 1998; 66 (3): 569-596

  View details for Web of Science ID 000073446900003

• New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization Price Theory and Its Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Scherer, F. M., Saffran, B. Edward Elgar. 1998: 165–169
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Blum, Y., Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1997; 76 (2): 362-411

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997YA79600007

• The effects of the change in the NRMP Matching algorithm JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Roth, A. E., PERANSON, E. 1997; 278 (9): 729-732

  Abstract

  Following 2 years of heated controversy about the resident match, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) recently voted to replace the existing matching algorithm with a newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm.To design an applicant-proposing algorithm for the match and compare it with the existing NRMP algorithm to determine how many applicants and residency programs could be expected to receive better or worse matches from the 2 algorithms, how the different algorithms influence the opportunity for strategic behavior, and what advice can be given to participants.Computational experiments compared the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm with the existing NRMP algorithm on the rank order lists (ROLs) submitted by all applicants and residency programs in the 1987 and 1993 through 1996 NRMP matches.Differences in the matchings produced by the 2 algorithms are small: fewer than 1 in 1000 applicants would have received a different match. Most (but not all) of the few applicants who are matched to different positions by the 2 algorithms do better when the applicant-proposing algorithm is used; the opposite is true for programs. Opportunities for profitable strategic behavior are very rare for both applicants and programs under either algorithm. With either algorithm, both applicants and programs can be advised that trying to get a preferred match by behaving strategically is far more likely to harm than to help them.The existing NRMP algorithm and the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm perform similarly. Both algorithms make it sensible for applicants and residency programs to arrange their ROLs based solely on their preferences for possible matches. The choice of algorithms will systematically affect the matches of only a small group of applicants (<0.1%). The NRMP's recent decision to use the applicant-proposing algorithm starting in 1998 reflects a judgment about the impact of this difference on applicants and programs.

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997XT70900025

  View details for PubMedID 9286832

• Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Roth, A. E., Xing, X. L. 1997; 105 (2): 284-329

  View details for Web of Science ID A1997WT04200003

• Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics ECONOMIC GAMES, BARGAINING AND SOLUTIONS Roth, A. E. edited by Hamouda, O. F., Rowley, J. R. Edward Elgar. 1997
• The National Resident Matching Program as a labor market JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association Roth, A. E. 1996; 275 (13): 1054-1056
• Bargaining Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2nd: 46–47
• Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Roth, A. E. edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 255–273
• Experimental Economics Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2: 279–280
• Matching Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2
• Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two- Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment Revista de Econometria, The Brazilian Review of Econometrics Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1996; 16: 1-24
• Individual Rationality as a Useful Approximation: Comments on Tversky's 'Rational Theory and Constructive Choice' The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Roth, A. E. edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 198–202
• Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
• Introduction to Experimental Economics Handbook of Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press,. 1995: 3–109
• Bargaining Experiments Handbook of Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
• LEARNING IN EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA AND SIMPLE DYNAMIC-MODELS IN THE INTERMEDIATE-TERM Nobel Symposium on Game Theory Roth, A. E., Erev, I. ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS. 1995: 164–212

  View details for Web of Science ID A1995QG07000008

• JUMPING THE GUN - IMPERFECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Xing, X. L. 1994; 84 (4): 992-1044

  View details for Web of Science ID A1994PJ23200014

• Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Empirical Economics (Special Issue on Experimental Economics) Roth, A. E. 1994; 19: 279-289
• Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D. Physica Verlag, Heidelberg. 1994: 99–109
• STABLE MATCHINGS, OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENTS, AND LINEAR-PROGRAMMING MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., VANDEVATE, J. H. 1993; 18 (4): 803-828

  View details for Web of Science ID A1993MG32500003

• LOCAL JUSTICE - HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS - ELSTER,J (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1993; 31 (3): 1445-1446

  View details for Web of Science ID A1993MA03000013

• 1ST JOBS AND COLLEGE BOWL BIDS - PATTERNS AND PATHOLOGIES IN THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS Roth, A. E. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 1993: 305–6

  View details for Web of Science ID A1993LB06600012

• Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 3–60
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Prasnikar, V., Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 58–84
• Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Ochs, J., Roths, A. E., Loomes, G. edited by Hey, J. D. Edward Elgar. 1993: 28–57
• On the Early History of Experimental Economics Journal of the History of Economic Thought Rothe, A. E. 1993; 15: 184-209
• THEORY AND MISBEHAVIOR IN 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS - COMMENT AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. 1992; 82 (5): 1379-1391

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992KB22900019

• CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL GAMES QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS PRASNIKAR, V., Roth, A. E. 1992; 107 (3): 865-888

  View details for Web of Science ID A1992JJ86300003

• Spieltheorie als Teil der empirischen Wirtschaftswissenschaft Die okonomische Wissenschaft in der Zunkunft-- Ansichten fuhrender Okonomen (Economic Science in the Future--Perspectives by Leading Economists) Roth, A. E. edited by Hanusch, H. 1992: 334–345
• Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. Cambridge University Press. 1992
• Two Sided Matching Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. edited by Aumann, R., Hart, S. North Holland. 1992: 485–541
• Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts Foundations of Insurance Economics Kihlstrom, R., Harrington, S. E. edited by Roth, A. E., Dioone, G. Kluwer. 1992: 264–279
• Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics The Future of Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. Basil Blackwell. 1992
• Stable Marriages: Substituting Linearity for Discreteness Linear Algebra and Its Applications Rothe, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., Vande Vate, J. H. 1992; 167: 252-257
• BARGAINING AND MARKET BEHAVIOR IN JERUSALEM, LJUBLJANA, PITTSBURGH, AND TOKYO - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., PRASNIKAR, V., OKUNOFUJIWARA, M., Zamir, S. 1991; 81 (5): 1068-1095

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991GV93500002

• A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF ENTRY-LEVEL LABOR-MARKETS - REGIONAL MARKETS FOR NEW PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS IN THE UNITED-KINGDOM AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 1991; 81 (3): 415-440

  Abstract

  The histories of seven regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom are considered. Like the American market, these markets have experienced failures that led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms. Because different regions employ different centralized mechanisms, these markets provide a test of the hypothesis that the success of the American market is related to the fact that it produces matches which are stable in the sense that no two agents mutually prefer to be matched to one another than to their assigned partners. Even in the more complex U.K. markets, this kind of stability plays an important role. Centralized markets that produced unstable matches in environments in which agents could act upon instabilities fared no better than the decentralized markets they replaced.

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FP88800003

  View details for PubMedID 10115049

• SORORITY RUSH AS A 2-SIDED MATCHING MECHANISM AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONGELL, S., Roth, A. E. 1991; 81 (3): 441-464

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991FP88800004

• Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements Negotiation Theory and Practice Roth, A. E. edited by Breslin, J. W., Rubin, J. Z. PON Books, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School. 1991: 327–329
• An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining Handbook of Negotiation Research, Volume III of Research on Negotiations in Organizations Roth, A. E. edited by Bazerman, M. H., Lewicki, R. J., Sheppard, B. H. JAI Press. 1991: 35–67
• GAME-THEORY AS A PART OF EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMIC JOURNAL Roth, A. E. 1991; 101 (404): 107-114

  View details for Web of Science ID A1991EY95800017

• Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms Economic Theory Roth, A. E., Vande Vate, J. H. 1991; 1 (1): 31-44
• Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Surveys in Economics, On Behalf of the Royal Economic Society Roth, A. E. edited by Oswald, A. J. Basil Blackwell. 1991: 90–147
• NEW PHYSICIANS - A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN MARKET ORGANIZATION SCIENCE Roth, A. E. 1990; 250 (4987): 1524-1528

  Abstract

  The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990EM93100028

  View details for PubMedID 2274783

• BOUNDED RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES AND MARKETS - TIETZ,R, ALBERS,W, SELTEN,R (Book Review) JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT Book Review Authored by: ALVIN, E. R. 1990; 146 (4): 758-760

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990ER81000018

• RANDOM-PATHS TO STABILITY IN 2-SIDED MATCHING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., VANDEVATE, J. H. 1990; 58 (6): 1475-1480

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990EL31000011

• Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. Cambridge University Press. 1990
• STABILITY AND PERFECTION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA - VANDAMME,E (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. 1990; 51 (3): 308-309

  View details for Web of Science ID A1990DM58200005

• Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence Game Theory and Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., tauman, Y. Academic Press. 1990: 232–251
• AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ochs, J., Roth, A. E. 1989; 79 (3): 355-384

  View details for Web of Science ID A1989AA08900005

• THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM REVISITED ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1989; 57 (3): 559-570

  View details for Web of Science ID A1989U965000003

• Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Roth, A. E. 1989; 2: 353-365
• Final Report to the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Research Council, Ten-Year Outlook on Research Opportunities in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Working Group on Information and Decision-Making Leading Edges in Social and Behavioral Sciences Hogarth, R., MacCrimmon, K., Machina, M., Roberts, J., Roth, A. E., Slovic, P. edited by Luce, R. D., Smelser, N. J., Gerstein, D. R. New York, Russell Sage Foundation. 1989
• Two Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences Games and Economic Behavior Roth, A. E. 1989; 1: 191-209
• LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS - A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW ECONOMIC JOURNAL Roth, A. E. 1988; 98 (393): 974-1031

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988R441000002

• THE DEADLINE EFFECT IN BARGAINING - SOME EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1988; 78 (4): 806-823

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988Q139100018

• INTERIOR POINTS IN THE CORE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1988; 45 (1): 85-101

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988P078200005

• THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING, VOL 2 - BINMORE,K, DASGUPTA,P (Book Review) ECONOMICA Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1988; 55 (218): 277-278

  View details for Web of Science ID A1988N665700010

• Introduction to the Shapley Value The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 1–27
• Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Murnighan, J. K., Roth, A. E., Shoumaker, F. 1988; 1: 101-124
• The Expected Utility of Playing a Game The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 51–70
• The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988
• RISK-AVERSION AND BARGAINING - SOME PRELIMINARY-RESULTS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1987; 31 (1-2): 265-271

  View details for Web of Science ID A1987G824100029

• Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 14–41
• Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987
• Editor's Introduction and Overview Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 1–13
• Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective Roth, A. E. edited by Rescher, N. Lanham, University Press of America. 1987: 147–167
• Laboratory Experimentation in Economics Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress Roth, A. E. edited by Bewley, T. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 269–299
• LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY Roth, A. E. 1986; 2 (2): 245-273

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986E867400005

• ON THE NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - A REPLY ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1986; 54 (4): 981-984

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986D603900013

• ON THE ALLOCATION OF RESIDENTS TO RURAL HOSPITALS - A GENERAL PROPERTY OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1986; 54 (2): 425-427

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986D638900011

• A NOTE ON JOB MATCHING WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ECONOMICS LETTERS MONGELL, S. J., Roth, A. E. 1986; 21 (2): 135-138

  View details for Web of Science ID A1986D180700008

• SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON POST-SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENTS NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Roth, A. E. 1985; 1 (3): 245-247

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985ANB9900006

• Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985
• THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1985; 36 (2): 277-288

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985ARR2300005

• A NOTE ON RISK-AVERSION IN A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF BARGAINING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1985; 53 (1): 207-211

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985TZ98500013

• FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE POWER OF ALTERNATIVES - AN EXAMPLE FROM LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Roth, A. E. 1985; 1 (4): 359-362

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985AVX5400007

• CONFLICT AND COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST IN JOB MATCHING - SOME NEW RESULTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E. 1985; 10 (3): 379-389

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985APB3400002

• Editor's Introduction and Overview Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Rothe, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985: 1–7
• Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985: 259–268
• COMMON AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 1985; 27 (1): 75-96

  View details for Web of Science ID A1985AFR3800006

• STABILITY AND POLARIZATION OF INTERESTS IN JOB MATCHING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1984; 52 (1): 47-57

  View details for Web of Science ID A1984SQ16200003

• THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR-MARKET FOR MEDICAL INTERNS AND RESIDENTS - A CASE-STUDY IN GAME-THEORY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Roth, A. E. 1984; 92 (6): 991-1016

  View details for Web of Science ID A1984TX01200001

• MISREPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1984; 34 (2): 383-387

  View details for Web of Science ID A1984TX69300013

• Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory Coalitions and Collective Action Roth, A. E. edited by Holler, M. Wuerzberg, Physica-Verlag. 1984: 228–234
• EXPECTATIONS AND REPUTATIONS IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1983; 73 (3): 362-372

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983QT44100009

• Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Roth, A. E., Murnighan, J. K. edited by Tietz, R. Springer. 1983
• EXPECTING CONTINUED PLAY IN PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAMES - A TEST OF SEVERAL MODELS JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1983; 27 (2): 279-300

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983QY52700004

• THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION - RAIFFA,H (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1983; 21 (4): 1537-1538

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983RV87300031

• SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY AND THE THEORY OF GAMES - SOME FURTHER COMMENTS MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1983; 29 (11): 1337-1340

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983RR12500009

• INFORMATION AND ASPIRATIONS IN 2-PERSON BARGAINING LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1983; 213: 91-103

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983QQ86800008

• TOWARD A THEORY OF BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY IN ECONOMICS SCIENCE Roth, A. E. 1983; 220 (4598): 687-691

  Abstract

  Contemporary economic theories of bargaining depend on aspects of the bargainers' preferences that are difficult to observe. This makes these theories difficult to test in natural environments. It has proved possible, however, to design experiments to test these theories in a controlled, laboratory environment. The results of these experiments reveal shortcomings and incompleteness in the descriptive power of currently available theories of bargaining. However, these results also suggest important regularities in bargaining behavior. Together with recent theoretical developments, these results suggest some directions in which a more descriptively powerful theory of bargaining might be developed.

  View details for Web of Science ID A1983QN77100008

  View details for PubMedID 17813861

• RISK-AVERSION AND NASH SOLUTION FOR BARGAINING GAMES WITH RISKY OUTCOMES ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1982; 50 (3): 639-647

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982NP85000006

• SCALE CHANGES AND SHARED INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. 1982; 3 (2): 157-177

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982PH57900004

• THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1982; 50 (5): 1123-1142

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982PH48100002

• A NOTE ON THE MAXIMIN VALUE OF 2-PERSON, ZERO-SUM GAMES NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1982; 29 (3): 521-527

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982QB75800013

• RISK-AVERSION AND THE NEGOTIATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE KIHLSTROM, R. E., Roth, A. E. 1982; 49 (3): 372-387

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982PK41700002

• INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS ECONOMICS LETTERS Roth, A. E. 1982; 9 (2): 127-132

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982NR48000003

• THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING - STABILITY AND INCENTIVES MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E. 1982; 7 (4): 617-628

  View details for Web of Science ID A1982PS24400011

• DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MALOUF, M. W., Roth, A. E. 1981; 25 (2): 329-348

  View details for Web of Science ID A1981NM24900006

• STRIKE 2 - LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS DEBROCK, L. M., Roth, A. E. 1981; 12 (2): 413-425

  View details for Web of Science ID A1981MM21300005

• Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Kihlstrom, R., Roth, A. E., Schmeidler, D. edited by Moeschlin, O., Pallaschke, D. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 1981: 65–71
• SOCIOLOGICAL VERSUS STRATEGIC FACTORS IN BARGAINING JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1981; 2 (2): 153-177

  View details for Web of Science ID A1981MM60100003

• VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS - SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT CONCEPTS ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1980; 48 (2): 457-465

  View details for Web of Science ID A1980JJ56500012

• EFFECTS OF GROUP-SIZE AND COMMUNICATION AVAILABILITY ON COALITION-BARGAINING IN A VETO GAME JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1980; 39 (1): 92-103

  View details for Web of Science ID A1980KB93400008

• The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis Roth, A. E. edited by Fiacco, A. V., Kortanek, K. O. Springer Verlag. 1980: 306–311
• Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Econometrica Roth, A. E. 1980; 48: 457-465
• Axiomatic Models of Bargaining Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Roth, A. E. Springer Verlag. 1979; 170
• PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1979; 47 (3): 775-778

  View details for Web of Science ID A1979GY04100019

• GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. 1979; 86 (6): 574-594

  View details for Web of Science ID A1979HU08100003

• SHAPLEY VALUE AS APPLIED TO COST ALLOCATION - REINTERPRETATION JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH Roth, A. E., VERRECCHIA, R. E. 1979; 17 (1): 295-303

  View details for Web of Science ID A1979HF32600017

• An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games International Journal of Game Theory Roth, A. E. 1979; 8: 129-132
• An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem Algebra Universalis Balir, C., Roth, A. E. 1979; 9: 131-132
• LARGE GROUP BARGAINING IN A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1978; 22 (2): 299-317

  View details for Web of Science ID A1978FH01100006

• EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR AND REPEATED PLAY OF PRISONERS-DILEMMA JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1978; 17 (2): 189-198

  View details for Web of Science ID A1978EX77600006

• NASH SOLUTION AND UTILITY OF BARGAINING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1978; 46 (3): 587-594

  View details for Web of Science ID A1978FJ62200008

• CONCERNING ASYMMETRIC GAMES ON GRAPHS NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1978; 25 (2): 365-367

  View details for Web of Science ID A1978FV59900014

• 2-PERSON GAMES ON GRAPHS JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL THEORY SERIES B Roth, A. E. 1978; 24 (2): 238-241

  View details for Web of Science ID A1978EV77300014

• Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game Game Theory and Political Science Roth, A. E. edited by Ordeshook, P. C. New York University Press, New York. 1978: 463–475
• Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods Journal of Mathematical Economics Roth, A. E., Postlewaite, A. 1977; 4: 131-137
• A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Karamardian, S. Academic Press. 1977: 165–180
• EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF A 3-PERSON GAME MANAGEMENT SCIENCE MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1977; 23 (12): 1336-1348

  View details for Web of Science ID A1977DV05200009

• BARGAINING ABILITY, UTILITY OF PLAYING A GAME, AND MODELS OF COALITION FORMATION JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 153-160

  View details for Web of Science ID A1977EC53000004

• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Mathematics of Operations Research Roth, A. E. 1977; 2: 64-65
• INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, AND SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 247-251

  View details for Web of Science ID A1977EM40500008

• UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR SIMPLE GAMES JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 481-489

  View details for Web of Science ID A1977EM40500022

• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Econometrica Roth, A. E. 1977; 45: 657-664
• NOTE ON VALUES AND MULTILINEAR EXTENSIONS NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1977; 24 (3): 517-520

  View details for Web of Science ID A1977ED89900015

• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games Mathematics of Operations Research Roth, A. E. 1976; 1: 43-49
• LATTICE FIXED-POINT THEOREM WITH CONSTRAINTS BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY Roth, A. E. 1975; 81 (1): 136-138

  View details for Web of Science ID A1975V665800019