Academic Appointments


Administrative Appointments


  • Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2013 - Present)
  • McCaw Senior Visiting Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford (2012 - 2012)
  • George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard University (2012 - Present)
  • George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School (1998 - 2012)
  • A.W. Mellon Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh (1982 - 1998)
  • Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (1983 - 1998)
  • Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh (1985 - 1998)
  • Professor, Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois (1979 - 1982)
  • Professor, Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1979 - 1982)
  • Beckman Associate, Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois (1981 - 1982)
  • Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration and Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1974 - 1979)
  • Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration and Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1977 - 1979)
  • Institute Associate, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. (1978 - 1978)
  • Mendes-France Visiting Professor of Economics, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1986 - 1986)
  • Bogen Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel (1995 - 1995)
  • Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Tel Aviv, Israel (1995 - 1995)
  • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (1998 - Present)
  • Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) (2013 - Present)

Honors & Awards


  • List of Excellent Teachers, University of Illinois. (1977-1980)
  • "College Educator of the Year" teaching award., University of Illinois. (1979)
  • Founders' Prize, Texas Instruments Foundation (1980)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society (1983)
  • Guggenheim Fellow, Guggenheim Foundation (1983-1984)
  • "Ten Outstanding Young Americans" award, United States Jaycees (1984)
  • Research Fellow, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1984-1986)
  • Lanchester Prize, Operations Research Society of America (1990)
  • Chancellor's Distinguished Research Award, University of Pittsburgh (1992)
  • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1998)
  • T.W. Schultz Prize, Dept. of Economics, University of Chicago (2006)
  • Wyss Award for Excellence in Mentoring, Harvard Business School (2008)
  • Charles M. Williams Award, Harvard Business School (2010-2011)
  • Excellence in Mentoring Doctoral Students Award, Harvard Business School (2011)
  • Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (2012)
  • NKR Terasaki Medical Innovation Award, American Transplant Congress (2012)
  • Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, Sveriges Riksbank (2012)
  • Doctor Honoris Causa, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology (2013)
  • Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) (2013)
  • Member, National Academy of Sciences (2013)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
  • Member, American Association for the Advancement of Science
  • member, American Economic Association
  • President, Economic Science Association (2011 - 2013)
  • Fellow, Econometric Society
  • Member, Game Theory Society
  • Member, Institute for Operations Research and Management Science
  • Member, NSF Economics Panel (1985 - 1987)
  • Member, Board of Editors, American Economic Review (1986 - 1988)
  • Member, Board of Editors, Games and Economic Behavior (1989 - 1992)
  • Member, Board of Editors, Economic Theory (1991 - 1998)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1988 - Present)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Experimental Economics (1996 - Present)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Game Theory Society (2000 - Present)
  • Member, Program Committee, 7th World Congress, Econometric Society (1995 - 1995)
  • Senior Honors Examiner, Oberlin College (1996 - 1996)
  • Member, Board of Governors, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology (2001 - 2007)
  • Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2003 - 2005)
  • Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2007 - 2009)
  • Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2013 - Present)
  • Member, Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meetings (2008 - 2008)
  • Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, American Economic Association (2005 - 2013)
  • President Elect, Economic Science Association (2009 - 2011)
  • Past President, Economic Science Association (2013 - Present)
  • Chairman of the Board of Directors, The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (2006 - Present)
  • Member, Advisory Board (NEPKE Advisory Committee), New England Program for Kidney Exchange (2006 - 2011)
  • Member, Advisory Board, New Orleans Exchange (2008 - Present)
  • At Large Representative, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Work Group Committee (2009 - 2011)
  • At Large Representative, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Work Group Committee (2012 - 2014)
  • Member, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program Strategic Planning Team (2011 - Present)
  • Director, Market Design Group, Inc. (2009 - Present)
  • Member, Advisory Board, Negotiation Journal (1984 - 1989)

Professional Education


  • B.S., Columbia University, Operations Research (1971)
  • M.S, Stanford University, Operations Research (1973)
  • Ph.D., Stanford University, Operations Research (1974)

2018-19 Courses


Stanford Advisees


  • Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)
    Erling Skancke, Qingyun Wu
  • Doctoral Dissertation Co-Advisor (AC)
    Ashutosh Thakur

All Publications


  • The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program - a retrospective study TRANSPLANT INTERNATIONAL Stepkowski, S. M., Mierzejewska, B., Fumo, D., Bekbolsynov, D., Khuder, S., Baum, C. E., Brunner, R. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2019; 32 (8): 839–53

    View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13423

    View details for Web of Science ID 000476936200009

  • How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Roth, A. E., Wilson, R. B. 2019; 33 (3): 118–43
  • Benefits of an interview match for breast fellowship positions Wapnir, I., Lo, I., Roth, A., Ashlagi, I., Melcher, M. SPRINGER. 2019: 279–80
  • The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program- a retrospective study. Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation Stepkowski, S. M., Mierzejewska, B., Fumo, D., Bekbolsynov, D., Khuder, S., Baum, C. E., Brunner, R. J., Kopke, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C. E., Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2019

    Abstract

    We examined what happened during a 6-year period to 1,121 end-stage renal disease patients who registered with their willing/incompatible living donors for kidney exchanges with the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). Of all patients, 65% were transplanted: 37% in kidney paired donation (APD-KPD, APD-other-KPD); 10% with compatible live donors (APD-LD); and 18% with deceased donors (APD-DD). The remaining patients were withdrawn (sick/died/others; 15%), or were still waiting (20%). For those patients with a cPRA 0-94%, 72% received a transplant. In contrast, only 49% of very highly sensitized (VHS; cPRA 95-100%) were transplanted. Of the VHS patients, 50% were transplanted by KPD/APD-LD while 50% benefited through prioritization of deceased donors in the modified kidney allocation system (KAS introduced in 2014). All APD transplanted groups had similar death-censored 4-year graft survivals as their relevant OPTN groups. It is noteworthy that VHS graft and patient survival results were comparable to less sensitized and non-sensitized patients. All patients should be encouraged to search for compatible donors through different options. Expanding the donor pool through KPD and the new KAS of the OPTN increases the likelihood of transplantation for VHS patients. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

    View details for PubMedID 30848501

  • Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 2018; 108 (7): 1609–58
  • The lattice of envy-free matchings GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Wu, Q., Roth, A. E. 2018; 109: 201–11
  • Complete Chain of the First Global Kidney Exchange Transplant and 3-yr Follow-up. European urology focus Bozek, D. N., Dunn, T. B., Kuhr, C. S., Marsh, C. L., Rogers, J., Rees, S. E., Basagoitia, L., Brunner, R. J., Roth, A. E., Ekwenna, O., Fumo, D. E., Krawiec, K. D., Kopke, J. E., Sindhwani, P., Ortiz, J., Tan, M., Paloyo, S. R., Punch, J. D., Rees, M. A. 2018; 4 (2): 190–97

    Abstract

    Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) offers an opportunity to expand living renal transplantation internationally to patients without financial means. These international pairs are entered into a US kidney exchange program that provides long-term financial support in an effort to identify opportunities for suitable exchanges for both these international pairs and US citizens.While the promise of GKE is significant, it has been met with ethical criticism since its inception in 2015. This paper aims to demonstrate the selection process and provide >3 yr of follow-up on the first GKE donor and recipient from the Philippines.The first GKE transplant occurred with a young Filipino husband and wife who were immunologically compatible, but lacked the financial means to continue hemodialysis or undergo a kidney transplant in their home country. The pair was enrolled in the Alliance for Paired Donation matching system, several alternative kidney exchanges were identified, and the pair subsequently underwent renal transplantation and donation in the USA financed by philanthropy. The resulting nonsimultaneous extended altruistic chain provided transplantation for the Filipino husband and 11 US patients.The Filipino donor and recipient were followed by transplant professionals in both the Philippines and the USA. Follow-up data were maintained as required by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network in the USA.The Filipino donor has normal blood pressure and renal function, and the Filipino recipient is doing well 3.5 yr after their donation and transplantation.While criticisms of GKE highlight concerns for possible exploitation of financially disadvantaged groups, these results demonstrate that these concerns did not come to fruition, and the outcome experienced by the GKE donor and recipient (and other US participants) was successful.The first Filipino Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) donor-recipient pair continues to be followed by both US and Filipino transplant centers. Both are in good health, support the GKE program, and advocate for its expansion.

    View details for PubMedID 30145113

  • Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design. The American economic review Roth, A. E. 2018; 108 (7): 1609–58

    Abstract

    Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets. Marketplaces can have varying degrees of success, and there can be marketplace failures. I’ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists, and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins. Markets work best if they enjoy social support, but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned, even though others want to participate in them. Laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets, and this raises new issues for market designers. I’ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics, marijuana, sex, and surrogacy, and the design of markets for kidney transplants, in the face of widespread laws against (and broader repugnance for) compensating organ donors. I conclude with open questions and engineering challenges.

    View details for PubMedID 30091861

  • The promise of organ and tissue preservation to transform medicine. Nature biotechnology Giwa, S., Lewis, J. K., Alvarez, L., Langer, R., Roth, A. E., Church, G. M., Markmann, J. F., Sachs, D. H., Chandraker, A., Wertheim, J. A., Rothblatt, M., Boyden, E. S., Eidbo, E., Lee, W. P., Pomahac, B., Brandacher, G., Weinstock, D. M., Elliott, G., Nelson, D., Acker, J. P., Uygun, K., Schmalz, B., Weegman, B. P., Tocchio, A., Fahy, G. M., Storey, K. B., Rubinsky, B., Bischof, J., Elliott, J. A., Woodruff, T. K., Morris, G. J., Demirci, U., Brockbank, K. G., Woods, E. J., Ben, R. N., Baust, J. G., Gao, D., Fuller, B., Rabin, Y., Kravitz, D. C., Taylor, M. J., Toner, M. 2017; 35 (6): 530-542

    Abstract

    The ability to replace organs and tissues on demand could save or improve millions of lives each year globally and create public health benefits on par with curing cancer. Unmet needs for organ and tissue preservation place enormous logistical limitations on transplantation, regenerative medicine, drug discovery, and a variety of rapidly advancing areas spanning biomedicine. A growing coalition of researchers, clinicians, advocacy organizations, academic institutions, and other stakeholders has assembled to address the unmet need for preservation advances, outlining remaining challenges and identifying areas of underinvestment and untapped opportunities. Meanwhile, recent discoveries provide proofs of principle for breakthroughs in a family of research areas surrounding biopreservation. These developments indicate that a new paradigm, integrating multiple existing preservation approaches and new technologies that have flourished in the past 10 years, could transform preservation research. Capitalizing on these opportunities will require engagement across many research areas and stakeholder groups. A coordinated effort is needed to expedite preservation advances that can transform several areas of medicine and medical science.

    View details for DOI 10.1038/nbt.3889

    View details for PubMedID 28591112

  • Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority. Health economics Stoler, A., Kessler, J. B., Ashkenazi, T., Roth, A. E., Lavee, J. 2017; 26 (4): 500-510

    Abstract

    How donor organs are allocated for transplant can affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed an Organ Transplantation Law granting priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals who had previously registered as organ donors. Beginning in November 2010, public awareness campaigns advertised the priority policy to the public. Since April 2012, priority has been added to the routine medical criteria in organ allocation decisions. We evaluate the introduction of priority for registered organ donors using Israeli data on organ donor registration from 1992 to 2013. We find that registrations increased when information about the priority law was made widely available. We find an even larger increase in registration rates in the 2 months leading up to a program deadline, after which priority would only be granted with a 3-year delay. We also find that the registration rate responds positively to public awareness campaigns, to the ease of registration (i.e. allowing for registering online and by phone) and to an election drive that included placing registration opportunities in central voting locations. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    View details for DOI 10.1002/hec.3328

    View details for PubMedID 27125490

  • Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Rees, M. A., Dunn, T. B., Kuhr, C. S., Marsh, C. L., Rogers, J., Rees, S. E., Cicero, A., Reece, L. J., Roth, A. E., Ekwenna, O., FUMO, D. E., Krawiec, K. D., KOPKE, J. E., Jain, S., Tan, M., Paloyo, S. R. 2017; 17 (3)

    Abstract

    Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with end-stage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy-even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed-world patient-donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient-donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange-a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United states with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.14106

    View details for Web of Science ID 000397432100024

    View details for PubMedID 27992110

  • Effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Ashlagi, I., Bingaman, A., Burq, M., Manshadi, V., Gamarnik, D., Murphey, C., Roth, A. E., Melcher, M. L., Rees, M. A. 2017

    Abstract

    Numerous kidney exchange (kidney paired donation [KPD]) registries in the United States have gradually shifted to high-frequency match-runs, raising the question of whether this harms the number of transplants. We conducted simulations using clinical data from 2 KPD registries-the Alliance for Paired Donation, which runs multihospital exchanges, and Methodist San Antonio, which runs single-center exchanges-to study how the frequency of match-runs impacts the number of transplants and the average waiting times. We simulate the options facing each of the 2 registries by repeated resampling from their historical pools of patient-donor pairs and nondirected donors, with arrival and departure rates corresponding to the historical data. We find that longer intervals between match-runs do not increase the total number of transplants, and that prioritizing highly sensitized patients is more effective than waiting longer between match-runs for transplanting highly sensitized patients. While we do not find that frequent match-runs result in fewer transplanted pairs, we do find that increasing arrival rates of new pairs improves both the fraction of transplanted pairs and waiting times.

    View details for PubMedID 29087017

  • Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Marino, I. R., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A., Doria, C. 2017; 17 (10): 2749

    View details for PubMedID 28862794

  • People should not be banned from transplantation only because of their country of origin. American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons Roth, A. E., Krawiec, K. D., Paloyo, S., Ekwenna, O., Marsh, C. L., Wenig, A. J., Dunn, T. B., Rees, M. A. 2017; 17 (10): 2747–48

    View details for PubMedID 28862804

  • Incentivizing Authorization for Deceased Organ Donation With Organ Allocation Priority: The First 5 Years AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Stoler, A., Kessler, J. B., Ashkenazi, T., Roth, A. E., Lavee, J. 2016; 16 (9): 2639-2645

    Abstract

    The allocation system of donor organs for transplantation may affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed the Organ Transplantation Law, which grants priority on waiting lists for transplants to candidates who are first-degree relatives of deceased organ donors or who previously registered as organ donors themselves. Several public campaigns have advertised the existence of the law since November 2010. We evaluated the effect of the law using all deceased donation requests made in Israel during the period 1998-2015. We use logistic regression to compare the authorization rates of the donors' next of kin in the periods before (1998-2010) and after (2011-2015) the public was made aware of the law. The authorization rate for donation in the period after awareness was substantially higher (55.1% vs. 45.0%, odds ratio [OR] 1.43, p = 0.0003) and reached an all-time high rate of 60.2% in 2015. This increase was mainly due to an increase in the authorization rate of next of kin of unregistered donors (51.1% vs. 42.2%). We also found that the likelihood of next-of-kin authorization for donation was approximately twice as high when the deceased relative was a registered donor rather than unregistered (89.4% vs. 44.6%, OR 14.27, p < 0.0001). We concluded that the priority law is associated with an increased authorization rate for organ donation.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13802

    View details for Web of Science ID 000383774700017

    View details for PubMedID 27013023

  • Lloyd Shapley (1923-2016). Nature Roth, A. E. 2016; 532 (7598): 178

    View details for PubMedID 27075091

  • Historical Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation: The 7-Year Evolution of a Web-Based Virtual Matching System. American journal of transplantation FUMO, D. E., Kapoor, V., Reece, L. J., Stepkowski, S. M., KOPKE, J. E., Rees, S. E., Smith, C., Roth, A. E., Leichtman, A. B., Rees, M. A. 2015; 15 (10): 2646-2654

    Abstract

    Failure to convert computer-identified possible kidney paired donation (KPD) exchanges into transplants has prohibited KPD from reaching its full potential. This study analyzes the progress of exchanges in moving from "offers" to completed transplants. Offers were divided into individual segments called 1-way transplants in order to calculate success rates. From 2007 to 2014, the Alliance for Paired Donation performed 243 transplants, 31 in collaboration with other KPD registries and 194 independently. Sixty-one of 194 independent transplants (31.4%) occurred via cycles, while the remaining 133 (68.6%) resulted from nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains. Thirteen of 35 (37.1%) NEAD chains with at least three NEAD segments accounted for 68% of chain transplants (8.6 tx/chain). The "offer" and 1-way success rates were 21.9 and 15.5%, respectively. Three reasons for failure were found that could be prospectively prevented by changes in protocol or software: positive laboratory crossmatch (28%), transplant center declined donor (17%) and pair transplanted outside APD (14%). Performing a root cause analysis on failures in moving from offer to transplant has allowed the APD to improve protocols and software. These changes have improved the success rate and the number of transplants performed per year.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13337

    View details for PubMedID 26015291

  • More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant? AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ambuehl, S., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2015; 105 (5): 357-360
  • Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D., Roth, A. E. 2015; 112 (3): 663-668

    Abstract

    As of May 2014 there were more than 100,000 patients on the waiting list for a kidney transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant, every year there are fewer donors than new patients, so the wait for a transplant continues to grow. To address this shortage, kidney paired donation (KPD) programs allow patients with living but biologically incompatible donors to exchange donors through cycles or chains initiated by altruistic (nondirected) donors, thereby increasing the supply of kidneys in the system. In many KPD programs a centralized algorithm determines which exchanges will take place to maximize the total number of transplants performed. This optimization problem has proven challenging both in theory, because it is NP-hard, and in practice, because the algorithms previously used were unable to optimally search over all long chains. We give two new algorithms that use integer programming to optimally solve this problem, one of which is inspired by the techniques used to solve the traveling salesman problem. These algorithms provide the tools needed to find optimal solutions in practice.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1421853112

    View details for Web of Science ID 000348040700026

    View details for PubMedID 25561535

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4311855

  • Transplantation: One Economist's Perspective. Transplantation Roth, A. E. 2015; 99 (2): 261–64

    View details for PubMedID 25651112

  • The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel. Israel journal of health policy research Roth, A. E., Shorrer, R. I. 2015; 4: 11

    Abstract

    A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in "market design" had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and almost all students get a better chance of getting what they want. Continued monitoring of the new mechanism is required to verify that it is not abused, and explore whether it can be improved. Other organizations in Israel may also be able to profit from the experience that accumulates from market design, both in Israel and abroad.

    View details for PubMedID 25821580

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4377047

  • Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted INTERFACES Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D., Rees, M., Roth, A. E., Soenmez, T., Uenver, M. U. 2015; 45 (1): 26-42
  • How Werner Guth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION van Damme, E., Binmore, K. G., Roth, A. E., Samuelson, L., Winter, E., Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., Gneezy, U., Kocher, M. G., Sutter, M., Sanfey, A. G., Kliemt, H., Selten, R., Nagel, R., Azar, O. H. 2014; 108: 292-318
  • Is avatar-to-avatar communication as effective as face-to-face communication? An Ultimatum Game experiment in First and Second Life JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Greiner, B., Caravella, M., Roth, A. E. 2014; 108: 374-382
  • Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange THEORETICAL ECONOMICS Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E. 2014; 9 (3): 817-863

    View details for DOI 10.3982/TE1357

    View details for Web of Science ID 000342908500008

  • Maximization, learning, and economic behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2014; 111: 10818-10825

    Abstract

    The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1402846111

    View details for PubMedID 25024182

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4113920

  • Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 114: 19-28
  • Getting More Organs for Transplantation AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 104 (5): 425-430
  • Getting More Organs for Transplantation. The American economic review Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2014; 104 (5): 425–30

    View details for PubMedID 29115805

  • Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Kojima, F., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. 2013; 128 (4): 1585-1632

    View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt019

    View details for Web of Science ID 000325776900004

  • Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation Games Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2013; 4 (2): 243-282
  • Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kessler, J. B., Roth, A. E. 2012; 102 (5): 2018-2047
  • Call to Develop a Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Rees, M. A., Schnitzler, M. A., Zavala, E. Y., Cutler, J. A., Roth, A. E., IRWIN, F. D., Crawford, S. W., Leichtman, A. B. 2012; 12 (6): 1392-1397

    Abstract

    We propose a Medicare Demonstration Project to develop a standard acquisition charge for kidney paired donation. A new payment strategy is required because Medicare and commercial insurance companies may not directly pay living donor costs intended to lead to transplantation of a beneficiary of a different insurance provider. Until the 1970s, when organ procurement organizations were empowered to serve as financial intermediaries to pay the upfront recovery expenses for deceased donor kidneys before knowing the identity of the recipient, there existed similar limitations in the recovery and placement of deceased donor organs. Analogous to the recovery of deceased donor kidneys, kidney paired donation requires the evaluation of living donors before identifying their recipient. Tissue typing, crossmatching and transportation of living donors or their kidneys represent additional financial barriers. Finally, the administrative expenses of the organizations that identify and coordinate kidney paired donation transplantation require reimbursement akin to that necessary for organ procurement organizations. To expand access to kidney paired donation for more patients, we propose a model to reimburse paired donation expenses analogous to the proven strategy used for over 30 years to pay for deceased donor solid organ transplantation in America.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2012.04034.x

    View details for Web of Science ID 000304522900010

    View details for PubMedID 22487555

  • New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ashlagi, I., Roth, A. E. 2012; 102 (3): 354-359
  • Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS Roth, A. E. 2012; 30 (2): 479-494

    View details for DOI 10.1086/663621

    View details for Web of Science ID 000301779400007

  • NEAD Chains in Transplantation AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Ashlagi, I., Gilchrist, D. S., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 11 (12): 2780-2781
  • Kidney paired donation NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION Wallis, C. B., Samy, K. P., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 26 (7): 2091-2099

    Abstract

    Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the USA. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the USA and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the USA, now 5 years into its development.

    View details for DOI 10.1093/ndt/gfr155

    View details for Web of Science ID 000292329500008

    View details for PubMedID 21454351

  • Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney- Paired Donation-Revisited AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Ashlagi, I., Gilchrist, D. S., Roth, A. E., Rees, M. A. 2011; 11 (5): 984-994

    Abstract

    Since 2008, kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of nondirected donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously 'domino-paired donation', (DPD) or nonsimultaneously 'nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor, chains (NEAD). NEAD chains create 'bridge donors' whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants, and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this finding contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney-paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 transplants are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03481.x

    View details for Web of Science ID 000289897000019

    View details for PubMedID 21521469

  • A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games Ert, E., Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2011; 2: 257-276
  • Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings Roth, A. E. 2011; 101 (3): 744-746
  • ¿QUÉ HEMOS APRENDIDO DEL DISEÑO DE MERCADOS El Trimestre Económico Roth, A. E. 2011; 78 (2): 259-314
  • The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Coles, P., Cawley, J., Levine, P. B., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Siegfried, J. J. 2010; 24 (4): 187-206
  • Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why? AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Leider, S., Roth, A. E. 2010; 10 (5): 1221-1227

    Abstract

    The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney market, and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval toward certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, and between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. A total of 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval toward certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally nonmarket exchanges, such as food preparation.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2010.03019.x

    View details for Web of Science ID 000276921600016

    View details for PubMedID 20148809

  • Six Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains. 10th American Transplant Congress Rees, M. A., KOPKE, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Roth, A. E., Taber, T. E., Unver, M. U., Nibhanupudy, B., Leichtman, A. B., Van Buren, C. T., Young, C. J., Montgomery, R. A. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2010: 275–275
  • A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E., Haruvy, E., Herzog, S. M., Hau, R., Hertwig, R., Stewart, T., West, R., Lebiere, C. 2010; 23 (1): 15-47

    View details for DOI 10.1002/bdm.683

    View details for Web of Science ID 000273541400002

  • An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
  • Social Behavior in Economic Games The Selten School of Behavioral Economics: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten Ockenfels, A., Bolton, G. E., Guth, W., Roth, A. E. edited by Ockenfels, A., Sadrieh, A. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 2010: 183–200
  • Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Kihlstrom, R., Roth, A. E., Shmeidler, D. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
  • New Sources in Living Kidney Donation Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients Hanto, R. L., Roth, A. E., Ünver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L. edited by McKay, D. Springer. 2010: 103–117
  • A choice prediction competition for market entry games: An introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games Erev, I., Ert, E., Roth, A. E. 2010; 1 (2): 117-136
  • Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games With Risky Outcomes Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
  • Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice Better Living Through Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Siegfried, J. Harvard University Press. 2010: 206–222
  • Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Elgar, E. Edward Elgar. 2010
  • Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond Roth, A. E. edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
  • Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. 2009; 99 (5): 1954-1978
  • Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2009; 1 (2): 199-219
  • A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain. NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE Rees, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Rutter, M. E., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Hiller, J., Roth, A. E., Sandholm, T., Uenver, M. U., Montgomery, R. A. 2009; 360 (11): 1096-1101

    Abstract

    We report a chain of 10 kidney transplantations, initiated in July 2007 by a single altruistic donor (i.e., a donor without a designated recipient) and coordinated over a period of 8 months by two large paired-donation registries. These transplantations involved six transplantation centers in five states. In the case of five of the transplantations, the donors and their coregistered recipients underwent surgery simultaneously. In the other five cases, "bridge donors" continued the chain as many as 5 months after the coregistered recipients in their own pairs had received transplants. This report of a chain of paired kidney donations, in which the transplantations were not necessarily performed simultaneously, illustrates the potential of this strategy.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000264051000007

    View details for PubMedID 19279341

  • Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria Judgement and Decision Making Erev, I., Roth, A. E. edited by Chater, N. Sage. 2009
  • Four Never-Ending Altruistic Donor Chains 9th Joint Meeting of the American-Society-of-Transplant-Surgeon/American-Society-of-Transplantation Rees, M., Kopke, J., Pelletier, R., Segev, D., Fabrega, A., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O., Hiller, J., Roth, A., Sandholm, T., Unver, M. U., Nibhunupudy, B., Bowers, V., VanBuren, C., Montgomery, R. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2009: 389–389
  • What have we learned from market design? Innovation Policy and the Economy Roth, A. E. edited by Jaffe, A. B., Lerner, J., Stern, S. University of Chicago Press. 2009: 79–112
  • Six Nonsimultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains American Transplant Congress Raes, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Fabrega, A. J., Rogers, J., Pankewycz, O. G., Hiller, J., Roth, A. E., Sandholm, T., Unver, M. U., NIbhanubpudy, B., Bowers, V., VanBuren, C., Montgomery, R. A. 2009
  • The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices Labor Market Intermediation Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. edited by Autor, D. The University of Chicago Press. 2009: 273–306
  • If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Grosskopf, B., Roth, A. E. 2009; 65 (1): 176-204
  • The gastroenterology fellowship Match - The first two years GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Proctor, D. D., Roth, A. E. 2008; 135 (2): 344-346

    View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2008.06.075

    View details for Web of Science ID 000258439900006

    View details for PubMedID 18619966

  • AOA symposium. Current state of fellowship hiring: is a universal match necessary? Is it possible? journal of bone and joint surgery. American volume Harner, C. D., Ranawat, A. S., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Stern, P. J., Hurwitz, S. R., Levine, W. N., DeRosa, G. P., Hu, S. S. 2008; 90 (6): 1375-1384

    View details for DOI 10.2106/JBJS.G.01582

    View details for PubMedID 18519333

  • The never-ending altruistic donor 8th American Transplant Congress Rees, M. A., KOPKE, J. E., Hil, G., Reitsma, W., Pankewycz, O. G., Miller, A. L., Hawxby, A. M., Montgomery, R. A., Abraham, D., Sandholm, T., Roth, A. R., Somnez, T., Unver, M. U. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 288–288
  • What have we learned from market design? Annual Meeting of the Royal-Economic-Society Roth, A. E. WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 285–310
  • Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY Roth, A. E. 2008; 36 (3-4): 537-569
  • Matching and market design The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T. edited by Durlauf, S. N., Blume, L. E. Palgrave Macmillan. 2008; 2nd
  • 实验室实验经济学:六个观点看 edited by Roth, A. E. 2008
  • What have we learned from market design? Innovations Roth, A. E. 2008: 119–147
  • Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games ECONOMIC THEORY Erev, I., Roth, A. E., Slonim, R. L., Barron, G. 2007; 33 (1): 29-51
  • The art of designing markets HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Roth, A. E. 2007; 85 (10): 118-?

    Abstract

    Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design--a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created marketlike allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets--like those for jobs and dating--proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000249682100021

    View details for PubMedID 17972500

  • Repugnance as a constraint on markets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Roth, A. E. 2007; 21 (3): 37-58
  • Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2007; 97 (3): 828-851
  • Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 2007; 171 (7): 423-428
  • The new market for federal judicial law clerks UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Avery, C., Jolls, C., Posner, R. A., Roth, A. E. 2007; 74 (2): 447-486
  • Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post-season college football bowls RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Frechette, G. R., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2007; 38 (4): 967-982
  • An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions New Developments in Experimental Economics Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
  • Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria New Developments in Experimental Economics Erev, I., Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
  • Kidney Paired Donation With Compatible Pairs American Journal of Transplantation Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U. 2007; 7 (1)
  • Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second- Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet New Developments in Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
  • Utilizing list exchange and nondirected donation through 'Chain' paired kidney donations AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION Roth, A. E., Soenmez, T., Uenver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L., Saidman, S. L. 2006; 6 (11): 2694-2705

    Abstract

    In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a DD-waitlist candidate. A nondirected donor's (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to a DD-waitlist candidate. These two established practices would help even more transplant candidates if they were integrated with kidney paired donation (KPD). We consider a scenario in which the donor of an LE intended recipient (LE-IR) donates to a compatible KPD intended recipient (KPD-IR), and the KPD donor (KPD-D) donates to the waitlist (an LE-chain). We consider a similar scenario in which an ND-D donates to a KPD-IR and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist (an ND-chain). Using data derived from the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and from OPTN/SRTR recipient-donor distributions, simulations are presented to evaluate the potential impact of chain exchanges coordinated with KPD. LE donors (LE-D) and ND-D who are ABO-O result in the highest number of additional transplants, while results for ABO-A and B donors are similar to each other. We recommend that both LE and ND donations be utilized through chain exchanges.

    View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2006.01515.x

    View details for Web of Science ID 000241240700023

    View details for PubMedID 16981911

  • The speed of learning in noisy games: Partial reinforcement and the sustainability of cooperation AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Bereby-Meyer, Y., Roth, A. E. 2006; 96 (4): 1029-1042
  • Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction Workshop on Electronic Market Design Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. 2006: 297–320
  • Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two- and three-way exchanges TRANSPLANTATION Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U., Delmonico, F. L. 2006; 81 (5): 773-782

    Abstract

    To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for transplantation.Demographic data of patients who had been evaluated for live donor kidney transplantation but found to be incompatible with their potential donor (because of ABO blood group or positive crossmatch) were submitted for computer analysis and matching. Data included ABO and HLA types of donor and recipient, %PRA and specificity of recipient alloantibody, donor/recipient relationship, and the reason the donor was incompatible. The data set used for the initial simulation included 29 patients with one donor each and 16 patients with multiple donors for a total of 45 patients and 68 donor/patient pairs. In addition, a simulation based on OPTN/SRTR data was used to further assess the practical importance of multiple exchange combinations.If only exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs were allowed, a maximum of 8 patient-donor pairs in the data set could exchange kidneys. If three-way exchanges were also allowed, a maximum of 11 pairs could exchange kidneys. Simulations with OPTN/SRTR data demonstrate that the increase in the number of potential transplants if three-way exchanges are allowed is robust, and does not depend on the particular patients in our sample.A computerized matching protocol can be used to identify donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs who can potentially enter into donor exchanges that otherwise would not readily occur.

    View details for DOI 10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25

    View details for Web of Science ID 000236229900020

    View details for PubMedID 16534482

  • The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL Haruvy, E., Roth, A. E., Unver, M. U. 2006; 30 (3): 457-486
  • What will be needed for the new gastroenterology fellowship match to succeed? GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Proctor, D. D., Roth, A. E. 2006; 130 (1): 218-224

    View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2005.10.058

    View details for Web of Science ID 000234525200027

    View details for PubMedID 16401484

  • Some of the Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration Social Psychology and Economics Murnighan, J. K., Roth, A. E. edited by Cremer, D. D., Zeelenberg, M., Murnighan, J. K. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.: Mahwah, NJ.. 2006: 321–333
  • Pairwise kidney exchange JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2005; 125 (2): 151-188
  • The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (3): 878-889
  • The Boston Public School match 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 368–71
  • The gastroenterology fellowship market: Should there be a match? 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 372–75
  • A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 376–80
  • The New York City high school match 117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 364–67
  • Restarting the gastroenterology match AMERICAN JOURNAL OF GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 100 (5): 1202-1203

    View details for Web of Science ID 000228489900036

    View details for PubMedID 15842603

  • An experimental analysis of ending rules in Internet auctions RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2005; 36 (4): 890-907
  • Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership Roth, A. E. edited by Reid, C., Grossman, F. National Academy of Engineering and Institute of Medicine, National Academies Press. 2005: 237–239
  • The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Roth, A. E. edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
  • The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match? The American economic review Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (2): 372–75

    Abstract

    We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a "match." This market used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s. Starting in 1996, participation in the match declined precipitously, and it was formally abandoned after 1999. Consequently, the experience of this market when the match was in place, in comparison to the periods before and since, allows an assessment of the effects of the match. An analysis of how the match failed in the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for success of a new match. These events offer economists a rare window on how decentralized labor markets clear, and on how market clearinghouses succeed and fail.

    View details for PubMedID 29115791

  • The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare). The American economic review McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2005; 95 (3): 878–89

    View details for PubMedID 29125725

  • Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Roth, A. E., Xing, X. edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
  • Negoziazione e Comportamento di Mercato a Gerusalemme, Lubiana, Pittsburgh e Tokio: Uno Studio Sperimentale Economia Cognitiva e Sperimentale Roth, A. E. edited by Motterline, M., Guala, F. Milan: Universita' Bocconi Editore. 2005
  • Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION Asker, J., Grosskopf, B., McKinney, C. N., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Weizsacker, G. 2004; 35 (4): 330-342
  • The gastroenterology fellowship match: How it failed and why it could succeed once again GASTROENTEROLOGY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2004; 127 (2): 658-666

    Abstract

    The market for gastroenterology (GI) fellows adopted a centralized Match in 1986, and abandoned it in the late 1990s. We discuss why the Match initially was adopted, how and why it broke down, what differences this has made in the market for fellows, and what would be needed to restart the Match successfully. We assess the effects of the Match by comparing the GI fellows market now with when the Match was operating, and with the fellowship markets for internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. The breakdown of a well-functioning Match is rare, but may be caused by unusual shifts in market conditions, such as those experienced by gastroenterology in the late 1990s. The problems the gastroenterology Match originally was designed to solve re-emerged with the demise of the Match. The market has become more local and less national, than when there was a Match in place, and program recruitment of fellows occurs earlier and is more dispersed in time than internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. There is no evidence that the demise of the Match has had any effect on wages. The evidence strongly suggests that the Match could be reintroduced successfully, which would increase the mobility of potential GI fellows, allow potential fellows to compete for the widest range of programs, and allow programs to compete for the widest range of fellows.

    View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2004.05.034

    View details for Web of Science ID 000223431200035

    View details for PubMedID 15300596

  • Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative "Dutch" auctions MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Katok, E., Roth, A. E. 2004; 50 (8): 1044-1063
  • Kidney exchange QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, M. U. 2004; 119 (2): 457-488
  • The nash equilibrium: A perspective PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Holt, C. A., Roth, A. E. 2004; 101 (12): 3999-4002

    Abstract

    In 1950, John Nash contributed a remarkable one-page PNAS article that defined and characterized a notion of equilibrium for n- person games. This notion, now called the "Nash equilibrium," has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences. Indeed, game theory, with the Nash equilibrium as its centerpiece, is becoming the most prominent unifying theory of social science. In this perspective, we summarize the historical context and subsequent impact of Nash's contribution.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0308738101

    View details for Web of Science ID 000220472200004

    View details for PubMedID 15024100

  • Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 111 (6): 1342-1352
  • Effect of a match on salaries for medical fellows - Reply JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 290 (18): 2408-2408
  • Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Gneezy, U., Haruvy, E., Roth, A. E. 2003; 45 (2): 347-368
  • Relationship between wages and presence of a match in medical fellowships JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Niederle, M., Roth, A. E. 2003; 290 (9): 1153-1154

    View details for Web of Science ID 000185090400008

    View details for PubMedID 12952995

  • The origins, history, and design of the resident match JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Roth, A. E. 2003; 289 (7): 909-912

    Abstract

    In the early 1900s, competition among hospitals for interns and among medical students for good internships led to increasingly early offers of internships to students. By the 1940s, appointments were often made as early as the beginning of the junior year of medical school. Hospitals thus had little information about students' performance, and students frequently had to make a final decision to accept or reject an offer without knowing which other offers might be forthcoming. From 1945 through 1951, efforts were made to enforce a uniform date for accepting offers. However, students were still faced with offers having very short deadlines, compelling them to accept or reject offers without knowing what other offers might be forthcoming. Hospitals often had to scramble for available students, since if an offer was rejected, it was often too late for them to reach their next preferred candidate. A centralized clearinghouse was thus developed as a way of alleviating this chaos and allowing a larger role to the preferences of both students and hospitals. This evolved into the current matching program, whose algorithm continues to be updated to take account of changing needs of applicants, such as growth in the number of couples who seek 2 positions in the same vicinity.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000181072200038

    View details for PubMedID 12588278

  • Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games Experimental Economics Cooper, D. J., Feltovich, N., Roth, A. E., Zwick, R. 2003; 6 (2): 181-207
  • An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Experiments in Environmental Economics Ochs, J., Roth, A. E. edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
  • Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experiments in Environmental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
  • Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study Trust Roth, A. E., Prasnika, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Zamir, S. edited by Khalil, E. Edward Elgar. 2003
  • The timing of bids in Internet auctions - Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents AI MAGAZINE Ockenfels, A., Roth, A. E. 2002; 23 (3): 79-87
  • Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Ockenfels, A. 2002; 92 (4): 1093-1103
  • Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING Erev, I., Roth, A. E., Slonim, R. L., Barron, G. 2002; 18 (3): 359-368
  • The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics European Meeting of the Econometric-Society Roth, A. E. WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2002: 1341–78
  • The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson Roth, A. E., Peranson, E. edited by Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., Roth, A. E. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
  • Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson edited by Roth, A. E., Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, P. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
  • Interview on Experimental Economics (conducted by Fredrik Andersson and Hakan Holm) Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making. Roth, A. E. edited by Andersson, F., Holm, H. Kluwer. 2002: 49–65
  • The market for federal judicial law clerks UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Avery, C., Jolls, C., Posner, R. A., Roth, A. E. 2001; 68 (3): 793-902
  • Form and function in experimental design BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES Roth, A. E. 2001; 24 (3): 427-?
  • ‘‘Modeling repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma with reinforcement learning over an enriched strategy set,’’ Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox Roth, A. E., Erev, I. edited by Gigerenzer, G., Selten, R. MIT Press. 2001
  • Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Critical Perspectives on Game Theory Roth, A. E. edited by Varoufakis, Y. 2001
  • Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game 84th Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality Erev, I., Roth, A. E. M I T PRESS. 2001: 215–231
  • The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. 2000; 115 (1): 201-235
  • Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Aumann, Robert Collected Papers Roth, A. E. MIT Press. 2000: 485–494
  • On the Non-Transferable Utility Value Aumann, Robert Collected Papers Rothe, A. E. MIT Press. 2000
  • Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory Roth, A. E. edited by Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. Kluwer. 2000: 7–18
  • The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., PERANSON, E. 1999; 89 (4): 748-780
  • The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Erev, I., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Roth, A. E. 1999; 39 (1): 111-128
  • Truncation strategies in matching markets - In search of advice for participants ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1999; 67 (1): 21-43
  • On the role of reinforcement learning in experimental games: The cognitive game-theoretic approach Workshop in Honor of Professor Amnon Rapoports 60th Birthday Erev, I., Roth, A. E. LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1999: 53–77
  • Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Erev, I., Roth, A. E. 1998; 88 (4): 848-881
  • Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic ECONOMETRICA Slonim, R., Roth, A. E. 1998; 66 (3): 569-596
  • New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization Price Theory and Its Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Scherer, F. M., Saffran, B. Edward Elgar. 1998: 165–169
  • Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Blum, Y., Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1997; 76 (2): 362-411
  • The effects of the change in the NRMP Matching algorithm JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION Roth, A. E., PERANSON, E. 1997; 278 (9): 729-732

    Abstract

    Following 2 years of heated controversy about the resident match, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) recently voted to replace the existing matching algorithm with a newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm.To design an applicant-proposing algorithm for the match and compare it with the existing NRMP algorithm to determine how many applicants and residency programs could be expected to receive better or worse matches from the 2 algorithms, how the different algorithms influence the opportunity for strategic behavior, and what advice can be given to participants.Computational experiments compared the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm with the existing NRMP algorithm on the rank order lists (ROLs) submitted by all applicants and residency programs in the 1987 and 1993 through 1996 NRMP matches.Differences in the matchings produced by the 2 algorithms are small: fewer than 1 in 1000 applicants would have received a different match. Most (but not all) of the few applicants who are matched to different positions by the 2 algorithms do better when the applicant-proposing algorithm is used; the opposite is true for programs. Opportunities for profitable strategic behavior are very rare for both applicants and programs under either algorithm. With either algorithm, both applicants and programs can be advised that trying to get a preferred match by behaving strategically is far more likely to harm than to help them.The existing NRMP algorithm and the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm perform similarly. Both algorithms make it sensible for applicants and residency programs to arrange their ROLs based solely on their preferences for possible matches. The choice of algorithms will systematically affect the matches of only a small group of applicants (<0.1%). The NRMP's recent decision to use the applicant-proposing algorithm starting in 1998 reflects a judgment about the impact of this difference on applicants and programs.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1997XT70900025

    View details for PubMedID 9286832

  • Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Roth, A. E., Xing, X. L. 1997; 105 (2): 284-329
  • Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics ECONOMIC GAMES, BARGAINING AND SOLUTIONS Roth, A. E. edited by Hamouda, O. F., Rowley, J. R. Edward Elgar. 1997
  • Matching Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2
  • Bargaining Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2nd: 46–47
  • Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Roth, A. E. edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 255–273
  • Experimental Economics Social Science Encyclopedia Roth, A. E. edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2: 279–280
  • Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two- Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment Revista de Econometria, The Brazilian Review of Econometrics Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1996; 16: 1-24
  • Individual Rationality as a Useful Approximation: Comments on Tversky's 'Rational Theory and Constructive Choice' The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Roth, A. E. edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 198–202
  • The National Resident Matching Program as a labor market JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association Roth, A. E. 1996; 275 (13): 1054-1056
  • Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
  • Introduction to Experimental Economics Handbook of Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press,. 1995: 3–109
  • Bargaining Experiments Handbook of Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
  • LEARNING IN EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA AND SIMPLE DYNAMIC-MODELS IN THE INTERMEDIATE-TERM Nobel Symposium on Game Theory Roth, A. E., Erev, I. ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS. 1995: 164–212
  • JUMPING THE GUN - IMPERFECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., Xing, X. L. 1994; 84 (4): 992-1044
  • Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Empirical Economics (Special Issue on Experimental Economics) Roth, A. E. 1994; 19: 279-289
  • Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D. Physica Verlag, Heidelberg. 1994: 99–109
  • STABLE MATCHINGS, OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENTS, AND LINEAR-PROGRAMMING MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., VANDEVATE, J. H. 1993; 18 (4): 803-828
  • LOCAL JUSTICE - HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS - ELSTER,J (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1993; 31 (3): 1445-1446
  • 1ST JOBS AND COLLEGE BOWL BIDS - PATTERNS AND PATHOLOGIES IN THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS Roth, A. E. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 1993: 305–6
  • On the Early History of Experimental Economics Journal of the History of Economic Thought Rothe, A. E. 1993; 15: 184-209
  • Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Prasnikar, V., Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 58–84
  • Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Ochs, J., Roths, A. E., Loomes, G. edited by Hey, J. D. Edward Elgar. 1993: 28–57
  • Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Recent Developments in Experimental Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 3–60
  • THEORY AND MISBEHAVIOR IN 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS - COMMENT AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. 1992; 82 (5): 1379-1391
  • CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL GAMES QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS PRASNIKAR, V., Roth, A. E. 1992; 107 (3): 865-888
  • Two Sided Matching Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. edited by Aumann, R., Hart, S. North Holland. 1992: 485–541
  • Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. Cambridge University Press. 1992
  • Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts Foundations of Insurance Economics Kihlstrom, R., Harrington, S. E. edited by Roth, A. E., Dioone, G. Kluwer. 1992: 264–279
  • Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics The Future of Economics Roth, A. E. edited by Hey, J. Basil Blackwell. 1992
  • Stable Marriages: Substituting Linearity for Discreteness Linear Algebra and Its Applications Rothe, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., Vande Vate, J. H. 1992; 167: 252-257
  • Spieltheorie als Teil der empirischen Wirtschaftswissenschaft Die okonomische Wissenschaft in der Zunkunft-- Ansichten fuhrender Okonomen (Economic Science in the Future--Perspectives by Leading Economists) Roth, A. E. edited by Hanusch, H. 1992: 334–345
  • BARGAINING AND MARKET BEHAVIOR IN JERUSALEM, LJUBLJANA, PITTSBURGH, AND TOKYO - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., PRASNIKAR, V., OKUNOFUJIWARA, M., Zamir, S. 1991; 81 (5): 1068-1095
  • A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF ENTRY-LEVEL LABOR-MARKETS - REGIONAL MARKETS FOR NEW PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS IN THE UNITED-KINGDOM AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 1991; 81 (3): 415-440

    Abstract

    The histories of seven regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom are considered. Like the American market, these markets have experienced failures that led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms. Because different regions employ different centralized mechanisms, these markets provide a test of the hypothesis that the success of the American market is related to the fact that it produces matches which are stable in the sense that no two agents mutually prefer to be matched to one another than to their assigned partners. Even in the more complex U.K. markets, this kind of stability plays an important role. Centralized markets that produced unstable matches in environments in which agents could act upon instabilities fared no better than the decentralized markets they replaced.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1991FP88800003

    View details for PubMedID 10115049

  • SORORITY RUSH AS A 2-SIDED MATCHING MECHANISM AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONGELL, S., Roth, A. E. 1991; 81 (3): 441-464
  • Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements Negotiation Theory and Practice Roth, A. E. edited by Breslin, J. W., Rubin, J. Z. PON Books, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School. 1991: 327–329
  • An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining Handbook of Negotiation Research, Volume III of Research on Negotiations in Organizations Roth, A. E. edited by Bazerman, M. H., Lewicki, R. J., Sheppard, B. H. JAI Press. 1991: 35–67
  • GAME-THEORY AS A PART OF EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMIC JOURNAL Roth, A. E. 1991; 101 (404): 107-114
  • Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms Economic Theory Roth, A. E., Vande Vate, J. H. 1991; 1 (1): 31-44
  • Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Surveys in Economics, On Behalf of the Royal Economic Society Roth, A. E. edited by Oswald, A. J. Basil Blackwell. 1991: 90–147
  • NEW PHYSICIANS - A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN MARKET ORGANIZATION SCIENCE Roth, A. E. 1990; 250 (4987): 1524-1528

    Abstract

    The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1990EM93100028

    View details for PubMedID 2274783

  • BOUNDED RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES AND MARKETS - TIETZ,R, ALBERS,W, SELTEN,R (Book Review) JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT Book Review Authored by: ALVIN, E. R. 1990; 146 (4): 758-760
  • RANDOM-PATHS TO STABILITY IN 2-SIDED MATCHING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., VANDEVATE, J. H. 1990; 58 (6): 1475-1480
  • Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. Cambridge University Press. 1990
  • STABILITY AND PERFECTION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA - VANDAMME,E (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. 1990; 51 (3): 308-309
  • Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence Game Theory and Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., tauman, Y. Academic Press. 1990: 232–251
  • AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Ochs, J., Roth, A. E. 1989; 79 (3): 355-384
  • THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM REVISITED ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1989; 57 (3): 559-570
  • Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Roth, A. E. 1989; 2: 353-365
  • Final Report to the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Research Council, Ten-Year Outlook on Research Opportunities in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Working Group on Information and Decision-Making Leading Edges in Social and Behavioral Sciences Hogarth, R., MacCrimmon, K., Machina, M., Roberts, J., Roth, A. E., Slovic, P. edited by Luce, R. D., Smelser, N. J., Gerstein, D. R. New York, Russell Sage Foundation. 1989
  • Two Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences Games and Economic Behavior Roth, A. E. 1989; 1: 191-209
  • LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS - A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW ECONOMIC JOURNAL Roth, A. E. 1988; 98 (393): 974-1031
  • THE DEADLINE EFFECT IN BARGAINING - SOME EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1988; 78 (4): 806-823
  • INTERIOR POINTS IN THE CORE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E., Sotomayor, M. 1988; 45 (1): 85-101
  • THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING, VOL 2 - BINMORE,K, DASGUPTA,P (Book Review) ECONOMICA Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1988; 55 (218): 277-278
  • Introduction to the Shapley Value The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 1–27
  • Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Murnighan, J. K., Roth, A. E., Shoumaker, F. 1988; 1: 101-124
  • The Expected Utility of Playing a Game The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 51–70
  • The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988
  • RISK-AVERSION AND BARGAINING - SOME PRELIMINARY-RESULTS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1987; 31 (1-2): 265-271
  • Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 14–41
  • Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987
  • Editor's Introduction and Overview Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 1–13
  • Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective Roth, A. E. edited by Rescher, N. Lanham, University Press of America. 1987: 147–167
  • Laboratory Experimentation in Economics Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress Roth, A. E. edited by Bewley, T. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 269–299
  • LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY Roth, A. E. 1986; 2 (2): 245-273
  • ON THE NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - A REPLY ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1986; 54 (4): 981-984
  • ON THE ALLOCATION OF RESIDENTS TO RURAL HOSPITALS - A GENERAL PROPERTY OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1986; 54 (2): 425-427
  • A NOTE ON JOB MATCHING WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ECONOMICS LETTERS MONGELL, S. J., Roth, A. E. 1986; 21 (2): 135-138
  • FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE POWER OF ALTERNATIVES - AN EXAMPLE FROM LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Roth, A. E. 1985; 1 (4): 359-362
  • Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985
  • THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1985; 36 (2): 277-288
  • A NOTE ON RISK-AVERSION IN A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF BARGAINING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1985; 53 (1): 207-211
  • CONFLICT AND COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST IN JOB MATCHING - SOME NEW RESULTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E. 1985; 10 (3): 379-389
  • Editor's Introduction and Overview Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Rothe, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985: 1–7
  • Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Roth, A. E. edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985: 259–268
  • COMMON AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E. 1985; 27 (1): 75-96
  • SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON POST-SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENTS NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Roth, A. E. 1985; 1 (3): 245-247
  • STABILITY AND POLARIZATION OF INTERESTS IN JOB MATCHING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1984; 52 (1): 47-57
  • THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR-MARKET FOR MEDICAL INTERNS AND RESIDENTS - A CASE-STUDY IN GAME-THEORY JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Roth, A. E. 1984; 92 (6): 991-1016
  • MISREPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1984; 34 (2): 383-387
  • Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory Coalitions and Collective Action Roth, A. E. edited by Holler, M. Wuerzberg, Physica-Verlag. 1984: 228–234
  • EXPECTATIONS AND REPUTATIONS IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1983; 73 (3): 362-372
  • Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making Roth, A. E., Murnighan, J. K. edited by Tietz, R. Springer. 1983
  • EXPECTING CONTINUED PLAY IN PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAMES - A TEST OF SEVERAL MODELS JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1983; 27 (2): 279-300
  • THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION - RAIFFA,H (Book Review) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE Book Review Authored by: Roth, A. E. 1983; 21 (4): 1537-1538
  • SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY AND THE THEORY OF GAMES - SOME FURTHER COMMENTS MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Roth, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. 1983; 29 (11): 1337-1340
  • INFORMATION AND ASPIRATIONS IN 2-PERSON BARGAINING LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1983; 213: 91-103
  • TOWARD A THEORY OF BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY IN ECONOMICS SCIENCE Roth, A. E. 1983; 220 (4598): 687-691

    Abstract

    Contemporary economic theories of bargaining depend on aspects of the bargainers' preferences that are difficult to observe. This makes these theories difficult to test in natural environments. It has proved possible, however, to design experiments to test these theories in a controlled, laboratory environment. The results of these experiments reveal shortcomings and incompleteness in the descriptive power of currently available theories of bargaining. However, these results also suggest important regularities in bargaining behavior. Together with recent theoretical developments, these results suggest some directions in which a more descriptively powerful theory of bargaining might be developed.

    View details for Web of Science ID A1983QN77100008

    View details for PubMedID 17813861

  • RISK-AVERSION AND NASH SOLUTION FOR BARGAINING GAMES WITH RISKY OUTCOMES ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G. 1982; 50 (3): 639-647
  • SCALE CHANGES AND SHARED INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. 1982; 3 (2): 157-177
  • THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1982; 50 (5): 1123-1142
  • A NOTE ON THE MAXIMIN VALUE OF 2-PERSON, ZERO-SUM GAMES NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1982; 29 (3): 521-527
  • RISK-AVERSION AND THE NEGOTIATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE KIHLSTROM, R. E., Roth, A. E. 1982; 49 (3): 372-387
  • INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS ECONOMICS LETTERS Roth, A. E. 1982; 9 (2): 127-132
  • THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING - STABILITY AND INCENTIVES MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Roth, A. E. 1982; 7 (4): 617-628
  • DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MALOUF, M. W., Roth, A. E. 1981; 25 (2): 329-348
  • STRIKE 2 - LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS DEBROCK, L. M., Roth, A. E. 1981; 12 (2): 413-425
  • Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Kihlstrom, R., Roth, A. E., Schmeidler, D. edited by Moeschlin, O., Pallaschke, D. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 1981: 65–71
  • SOCIOLOGICAL VERSUS STRATEGIC FACTORS IN BARGAINING JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1981; 2 (2): 153-177
  • VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS - SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT CONCEPTS ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1980; 48 (2): 457-465
  • EFFECTS OF GROUP-SIZE AND COMMUNICATION AVAILABILITY ON COALITION-BARGAINING IN A VETO GAME JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1980; 39 (1): 92-103
  • The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis Roth, A. E. edited by Fiacco, A. V., Kortanek, K. O. Springer Verlag. 1980: 306–311
  • Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Econometrica Roth, A. E. 1980; 48: 457-465
  • SHAPLEY VALUE AS APPLIED TO COST ALLOCATION - REINTERPRETATION JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH Roth, A. E., VERRECCHIA, R. E. 1979; 17 (1): 295-303
  • PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1979; 47 (3): 775-778
  • GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW Roth, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. 1979; 86 (6): 574-594
  • An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games International Journal of Game Theory Roth, A. E. 1979; 8: 129-132
  • An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem Algebra Universalis Balir, C., Roth, A. E. 1979; 9: 131-132
  • Axiomatic Models of Bargaining Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Roth, A. E. Springer Verlag. 1979; 170
  • LARGE GROUP BARGAINING IN A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1978; 22 (2): 299-317
  • EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR AND REPEATED PLAY OF PRISONERS-DILEMMA JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY Roth, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1978; 17 (2): 189-198
  • NASH SOLUTION AND UTILITY OF BARGAINING ECONOMETRICA Roth, A. E. 1978; 46 (3): 587-594
  • CONCERNING ASYMMETRIC GAMES ON GRAPHS NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1978; 25 (2): 365-367
  • 2-PERSON GAMES ON GRAPHS JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL THEORY SERIES B Roth, A. E. 1978; 24 (2): 238-241
  • Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game Game Theory and Political Science Roth, A. E. edited by Ordeshook, P. C. New York University Press, New York. 1978: 463–475
  • Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods Journal of Mathematical Economics Roth, A. E., Postlewaite, A. 1977; 4: 131-137
  • A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications Roth, A. E. edited by Karamardian, S. Academic Press. 1977: 165–180
  • EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF A 3-PERSON GAME MANAGEMENT SCIENCE MURNIGHAN, J. K., Roth, A. E. 1977; 23 (12): 1336-1348
  • INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, AND SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 247-251
  • UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR SIMPLE GAMES JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 481-489
  • BARGAINING ABILITY, UTILITY OF PLAYING A GAME, AND MODELS OF COALITION FORMATION JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY Roth, A. E. 1977; 16 (2): 153-160
  • Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Mathematics of Operations Research Roth, A. E. 1977; 2: 64-65
  • The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Econometrica Roth, A. E. 1977; 45: 657-664
  • NOTE ON VALUES AND MULTILINEAR EXTENSIONS NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS Roth, A. E. 1977; 24 (3): 517-520
  • Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games Mathematics of Operations Research Roth, A. E. 1976; 1: 43-49
  • LATTICE FIXED-POINT THEOREM WITH CONSTRAINTS BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY Roth, A. E. 1975; 81 (1): 136-138