![Alvin Roth](https://profiles.stanford.edu/proxy/api/cap/profiles/57996/resources/profilephoto/350x350.1402902000000.jpg)
Alvin Roth
Craig and Susan McCaw Professor and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Economics
Academic Appointments
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Professor, Economics
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Administrative Appointments
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Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2013 - Present)
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McCaw Senior Visiting Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford (2012 - 2012)
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George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus, Harvard University (2012 - Present)
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George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics, Harvard University, and Harvard Business School (1998 - 2012)
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A.W. Mellon Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh (1982 - 1998)
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Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (1983 - 1998)
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Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh (1985 - 1998)
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Professor, Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois (1979 - 1982)
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Professor, Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1979 - 1982)
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Beckman Associate, Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois (1981 - 1982)
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Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration and Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1974 - 1979)
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Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration and Department of Economics, University of Illinois (1977 - 1979)
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Institute Associate, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. (1978 - 1978)
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Mendes-France Visiting Professor of Economics, The Technion, Haifa, Israel (1986 - 1986)
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Bogen Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel (1995 - 1995)
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Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Tel Aviv, Israel (1995 - 1995)
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Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (1998 - Present)
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) (2013 - Present)
Honors & Awards
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Morse Lectureship Award, INFORMS (2021)
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Doctor Honoris Causa, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology (2013)
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Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) (2013)
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Member, National Academy of Sciences (2013)
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Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (2012)
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NKR Terasaki Medical Innovation Award, American Transplant Congress (2012)
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Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, Sveriges Riksbank (2012)
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Excellence in Mentoring Doctoral Students Award, Harvard Business School (2011)
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Charles M. Williams Award, Harvard Business School (2010-2011)
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Wyss Award for Excellence in Mentoring, Harvard Business School (2008)
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T.W. Schultz Prize, Dept. of Economics, University of Chicago (2006)
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Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1998)
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Chancellor's Distinguished Research Award, University of Pittsburgh (1992)
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Lanchester Prize, Operations Research Society of America (1990)
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Research Fellow, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1984-1986)
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"Ten Outstanding Young Americans" award, United States Jaycees (1984)
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Guggenheim Fellow, Guggenheim Foundation (1983-1984)
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Fellow, Econometric Society (1983)
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Founders' Prize, Texas Instruments Foundation (1980)
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"College Educator of the Year" teaching award., University of Illinois. (1979)
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List of Excellent Teachers, University of Illinois. (1977-1980)
Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations
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Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
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Chairman of the Board of Directors, The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (2006 - 2018)
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Member, Advisory Board, New Orleans Exchange (2008 - 2010)
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Member, American Association for the Advancement of Science
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member, American Economic Association
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President, Economic Science Association (2011 - 2013)
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Fellow, Econometric Society
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Member, Game Theory Society
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Member, Institute for Operations Research and Management Science
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Member, NSF Economics Panel (1985 - 1987)
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Member, Board of Editors, American Economic Review (1986 - 1988)
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Member, Board of Editors, Games and Economic Behavior (1989 - 1992)
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Member, Board of Editors, Economic Theory (1991 - 1998)
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Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1988 - Present)
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Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Experimental Economics (1996 - Present)
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Member, Advisory Board, Game Theory Society (2000 - Present)
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Member, Program Committee, 7th World Congress, Econometric Society (1995 - 1995)
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Senior Honors Examiner, Oberlin College (1996 - 1996)
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Member, Board of Governors, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology (2001 - 2007)
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Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2003 - 2005)
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Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2007 - 2009)
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Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2013 - Present)
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Member, Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meetings (2008 - 2008)
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Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, American Economic Association (2005 - 2013)
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President Elect, Economic Science Association (2009 - 2011)
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Past President, Economic Science Association (2013 - Present)
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Member, Advisory Board (NEPKE Advisory Committee), New England Program for Kidney Exchange (2006 - 2011)
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At Large Representative, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Work Group Committee (2009 - 2011)
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At Large Representative, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Work Group Committee (2012 - 2014)
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Member, OPTN/UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program Strategic Planning Team (2011 - Present)
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Director, Market Design Group, Inc. (2009 - Present)
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Member, Advisory Board, Negotiation Journal (1984 - 1989)
Professional Education
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B.S., Columbia University, Operations Research (1971)
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M.S, Stanford University, Operations Research (1973)
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Ph.D., Stanford University, Operations Research (1974)
2023-24 Courses
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics I
ECON 278 (Aut) - Behavioral and Experimental Economics III
ECON 280 (Spr) - Experimental/Behavioral Seminar
ECON 335 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Matching and Market Design
ECON 285 (Aut) -
Independent Studies (4)
- Directed Reading
ECON 139D (Aut, Win, Spr) - Directed Reading
ECON 239D (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Honors Thesis Research
ECON 199D (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Practical Training
ECON 299 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum)
- Directed Reading
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Prior Year Courses
2022-23 Courses
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics I
ECON 278 (Aut) - Behavioral and Experimental Economics III
ECON 280 (Spr) - Experimental/Behavioral Seminar
ECON 335 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Matching and Market Design
ECON 285 (Aut)
2021-22 Courses
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics I
ECON 278 (Aut) - Behavioral and Experimental Economics III
ECON 280 (Spr) - Experimental/Behavioral Seminar
ECON 335 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Matching and Market Design
ECON 285 (Aut)
2020-21 Courses
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics I
ECON 278 (Aut) - Experimental/Behavioral Seminar
ECON 335 (Aut, Win, Spr) - Matching and Market Design
ECON 285 (Aut)
- Behavioral and Experimental Economics I
Stanford Advisees
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Postdoctoral Faculty Sponsor
Oguzhan Celebi -
Doctoral Dissertation Co-Advisor (AC)
Hannu Kivimaeki, Ellie Tyger
All Publications
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Contemporary Pediatric Heart Transplant Waitlist Mortality.
Journal of the American College of Cardiology
2024; 84 (7): 620-632
Abstract
In 2016, the United Network for Organ Sharing revised its pediatric heart transplant (HT) allocation policy.This study sought to determine whether the 2016 revisions are associated with reduced waitlist mortality and capture patient-specific risks.Children listed for HT from 1999 to 2023 were identified using Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network data and grouped into 3 eras (era 1: 1999-2006; era 2: 2006-2016; era 3: 2016-2023) based on when the United Network for Organ Sharing implemented allocation changes. Fine-Gray competing risks modeling was used to identify factors associated with death or delisting for deterioration. Fixed-effects analysis was used to determine whether allocation changes were associated with mortality.Waitlist mortality declined 8 percentage points (PP) across eras (21%, 17%, and 13%, respectively; P < 0.01). At listing, era 3 children were less sick than era 1 children, with 6 PP less ECMO use (P < 0.01), 11 PP less ventilator use (P < 0.01), and 1 PP less dialysis use (P < 0.01). Ventricular assist device (VAD) use was 13 PP higher, and VAD mortality decreased 9 PP (P < 0.01). Non-White mortality declined 10 PP (P < 0.01). ABO-incompatible listings increased 27 PP, and blood group O infant mortality decreased 13 PP (P < 0.01). In multivariable analyses, the 2016 revisions were not associated with lower waitlist mortality, whereas VAD use (in era 3), ABO-incompatible transplant, improved patient selection, and narrowing racial disparities were. Match-run analyses demonstrated poor correlation between individual waitlist mortality risk and the match-run order.The 2016 allocation revisions were not independently associated with the decline in pediatric HT waitlist mortality. The 3-tier classification system fails to adequately capture patient-specific risks. A more flexible allocation system that accurately reflects patient-specific risks and considers transplant benefit is urgently needed.
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jacc.2024.05.049
View details for PubMedID 39111968
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Top trading cycles
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
2024; 112
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102984
View details for Web of Science ID 001236259600001
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Quality and safety for substances of human origins: scientific evidence and the new EU regulations.
BMJ global health
2024; 9 (4)
View details for DOI 10.1136/bmjgh-2024-015122
View details for PubMedID 38649180
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Report From a Multidisciplinary Symposium on the Future of Living Kidney Donor Transplantation.
Progress in transplantation (Aliso Viejo, Calif.)
2023: 15269248231212911
Abstract
Virtually all clinicians agree that living donor renal transplantation is the optimal treatment for permanent loss of kidney function. Yet, living donor kidney transplantation has not grown in the United States for more than 2 decades. A virtual symposium gathered experts to examine this shortcoming and to stimulate and clarify issues salient to improving living donation. The ethical principles of rewarding kidney donors and the limits of altruism as the exclusive compelling stimulus for donation were emphasized. Concepts that donor incentives could save up to 40 000 lives annually and considerable taxpayer dollars were examined, and survey data confirmed voter support for donor compensation. Objections to rewarding donors were also presented. Living donor kidney exchanges and limited numbers of deceased donor kidneys were reviewed. Discussants found consensus that attempts to increase living donation should include removing artificial barriers in donor evaluation, expansion of living donor chains, affirming the safety of live kidney donation, and assurance that donors incur no expense. If the current legal and practice standards persist, living kidney donation will fail to achieve its true potential to save lives.
View details for DOI 10.1177/15269248231212911
View details for PubMedID 37968881
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Early vs Single Match in the Transition to Residency: Analysis Using NRMP Data From 2014 to 2021.
Journal of graduate medical education
2023; 15 (2): 219-227
Abstract
An Early Result Acceptance Program (ERAP) has been proposed for obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) to address challenges in the transition to residency. However, there are no available data-driven analyses on the effects of ERAP on the residency transition.We used National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) data to simulate the outcomes of ERAP and compare those to what occurred in the Match historically.We simulated ERAP outcomes in OB/GYN, using the de-identified applicant and program rank order lists from 2014 to 2021, and compared them to the actual NRMP Match outcomes. We report outcomes and sensitivity analyses and consider likely behavioral adaptations.Fourteen percent of applicants receive a less preferred match under ERAP, while only 8% of applicants receive a more preferred match. Less preferred matches disproportionately affect DOs and international medical graduates (IMGs) compared to US MD seniors. Forty-one percent of programs fill with more preferred sets of applicants, while 24% fill with less preferred sets of applicants. Twelve percent of applicants and 52% of programs are in mutually dissatisfied applicant-program pairs (a pair in which both prefer each other to the match each received). Seventy percent of applicants who receive less preferred matches are part of a mutually dissatisfied pair. In 75% of programs with more preferred outcomes, at least one assigned applicant is part of a mutually dissatisfied pair.In this simulation, ERAP fills most OB/GYN positions, but many applicants and programs receive less preferred matches, and disparities increase for DOs and IMGs. ERAP creates mutually dissatisfied applicant-program pairs and problems for mixed-specialty couples, which provides incentives for gamesmanship.
View details for DOI 10.4300/JGME-D-22-00177.1
View details for PubMedID 37139220
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC10150816
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Impact of Single Centre 440 Kidney Exchange Transplantation Over 20 Years to Increase Living Donor Pool in India: A Cohort Study
LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2022: S467
View details for Web of Science ID 000889117001091
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The First 52 Global Kidney Exchange Transplants: Overcoming Multiple Barriers to Transplantation
LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2022: S469
View details for Web of Science ID 000889117001093
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Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
2022
View details for DOI 10.1287/moor.2021.1236
View details for Web of Science ID 000748656200001
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Criminal, Legal, and Ethical Kidney Donation and Transplantation: A Conceptual Framework to Enable Innovation.
Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation
2022; 35: 10551
View details for DOI 10.3389/ti.2022.10551
View details for PubMedID 35874307
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Explaining a Potential Interview Match for Graduate Medical Education.
Journal of graduate medical education
1800; 13 (6): 764-767
View details for DOI 10.4300/JGME-D-20-01422.1
View details for PubMedID 35070086
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Global kidney chains.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
2021; 118 (36)
Abstract
Kidney failure is a worldwide scourge, made more lethal by the shortage of transplants. We propose a way to organize kidney exchange chains internationally between middle-income countries with financial barriers to transplantation and high-income countries with many hard to match patients and patient-donor pairs facing lengthy dialysis. The proposal involves chains of exchange that begin in the middle-income country and end in the high-income country. We also propose a way of financing such chains using savings to US health care payers.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2106652118
View details for PubMedID 34462358
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Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2021; 67 (9): 5455-5478
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3954
View details for Web of Science ID 000696941500011
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Plumbing the Depths of Ethical Payment for Research Participation
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS
2021: 1–4
View details for DOI 10.1080/15265161.2021.1895364
View details for Web of Science ID 000627256300001
View details for PubMedID 33689566
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Promoting Ethical Payment in Human Infection Challenge Studies.
The American journal of bioethics : AJOB
2021: 1–45
Abstract
To prepare for potential human infection challenge studies (HICS) involving SARS-CoV-2, we convened a multidisciplinary working group to address ethical questions regarding whether and how much SARS-CoV-2 HICS participants should be paid. Because the goals of paying HICS participants, as well as the relevant ethical concerns, are the same as those arising for other types of clinical research, the same basic framework for ethical payment can apply. This framework divides payment into reimbursement, compensation, and incentives, focusing on fairness and promoting adequate recruitment and retention as counterweights to concerns about undue inducement. Within the basic framework, several factors are especially salient for HICS, and for SARS-CoV-2 HICS in particular, including the nature of participant confinement, anticipated discomfort, risks and uncertainty, participant motivations, and trust. These factors are reflected in a payment worksheet created to help sponsors, researchers, and ethics reviewers systematically develop and assess ethically justifiable payment amounts.
View details for DOI 10.1080/15265161.2020.1854368
View details for PubMedID 33541252
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Non-simultaneous kidney exchange cycles in resource-restricted countries without non-directed donation - a prospective single-center cohort study.
Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation
2021
Abstract
The first "bridge-donor" was trusted to donate their kidney after their immunologically incompatible recipient had received a kidney as part of a non-simultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chain in 2007. This concept was reported in The New England Journal of Medicine in 2009 and has since led to more than 10,000 kidney-exchange transplants worldwide. Accordingly, the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Alvin Roth in part for developing this concept. Unfortunately, in much of the world, altruistic kidney donation, which is essential for initiating NEAD chains, is not allowed. Furthermore, the limited availability of operating rooms and staff often constrains the use of simultaneous kidney-exchange cycles.
View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13833
View details for PubMedID 33527555
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Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in -Priority-Based Matching
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW-INSIGHTS
2020; 2 (4): 425-441
View details for DOI 10.1257/aeri.20190307
View details for Web of Science ID 000672750800002
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Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective.
Journal of medical ethics
2020
View details for DOI 10.1136/medethics-2020-106891
View details for PubMedID 33115857
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Popular repugnance contrasts with legal bans on controversial markets.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
2020
Abstract
We study popular attitudes in Germany, Spain, the Philippines, and the United States toward three controversial markets-prostitution, surrogacy, and global kidney exchange (GKE). Of those markets, only prostitution is banned in the United States and the Philippines, and only prostitution is allowed in Germany and Spain. Unlike prostitution, majorities support legalization of surrogacy and GKE in all four countries. So, there is not a simple relation between public support for markets, or bans, and their legal and regulatory status. Because both markets and bans on markets require social support to work well, this sheds light on the prospects for effective regulation of controversial markets.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.2005828117
View details for PubMedID 32727903
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Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed
NATURE
2020; 582 (7812): 316–18
View details for Web of Science ID 000542694900002
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Handbook of the Shapley Value Foreword
HANDBOOK OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE
2020: XVII-XXII
View details for Web of Science ID 000569096700001
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Global Kidney Exchange Should Expand Wisely.
Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation
2020
Abstract
We read with great interest and appreciation the careful consideration and analysis by Ambagtsheer et al. of the most critical ethical objections to Global Kidney Exchange (GKE). Ambagtsheer et al. conclude that implementation of GKE is a means to increase access to transplantation ethically and effectively.1,2 These conclusions by their European Society of Transplantation (ESOT) committee on Ethical, Legal and Psychological Aspects of Transplantation (ELPAT) represent a step forward toward a greater understanding and an open, honest debate about GKE.
View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13656
View details for PubMedID 32430941
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INTERNATIONAL KIDNEY EXCHANGES PROVIDING LIVING DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS FOR 38 PATIENTS INVOLVING 18 TRANSPLANT CENTERS FROM SIX COUNTRIES
WILEY. 2019: 131
View details for Web of Science ID 000491488702014
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The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program - a retrospective study
TRANSPLANT INTERNATIONAL
2019; 32 (8): 839–53
View details for DOI 10.1111/tri.13423
View details for Web of Science ID 000476936200009
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How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2019; 33 (3): 118–43
View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.33.3.118
View details for Web of Science ID 000478070800006
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Benefits of an interview match for breast fellowship positions
SPRINGER. 2019: 279–80
View details for Web of Science ID 000467382700224
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The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program- a retrospective study.
Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation
2019
Abstract
We examined what happened during a 6-year period to 1,121 end-stage renal disease patients who registered with their willing/incompatible living donors for kidney exchanges with the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). Of all patients, 65% were transplanted: 37% in kidney paired donation (APD-KPD, APD-other-KPD); 10% with compatible live donors (APD-LD); and 18% with deceased donors (APD-DD). The remaining patients were withdrawn (sick/died/others; 15%), or were still waiting (20%). For those patients with a cPRA 0-94%, 72% received a transplant. In contrast, only 49% of very highly sensitized (VHS; cPRA 95-100%) were transplanted. Of the VHS patients, 50% were transplanted by KPD/APD-LD while 50% benefited through prioritization of deceased donors in the modified kidney allocation system (KAS introduced in 2014). All APD transplanted groups had similar death-censored 4-year graft survivals as their relevant OPTN groups. It is noteworthy that VHS graft and patient survival results were comparable to less sensitized and non-sensitized patients. All patients should be encouraged to search for compatible donors through different options. Expanding the donor pool through KPD and the new KAS of the OPTN increases the likelihood of transplantation for VHS patients. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
View details for PubMedID 30848501
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Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2018; 108 (7): 1609–58
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.108.7.1609
View details for Web of Science ID 000436969700001
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Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design.
The American economic review
2018; 108 (7): 1609-58
Abstract
Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets. Marketplaces can have varying degrees of success, and there can be marketplace failures. I’ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists, and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins. Markets work best if they enjoy social support, but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned, even though others want to participate in them. Laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets, and this raises new issues for market designers. I’ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics, marijuana, sex, and surrogacy, and the design of markets for kidney transplants, in the face of widespread laws against (and broader repugnance for) compensating organ donors. I conclude with open questions and engineering challenges.
View details for PubMedID 30091861
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The lattice of envy-free matchings
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2018; 109: 201–11
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.016
View details for Web of Science ID 000437997600012
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Complete Chain of the First Global Kidney Exchange Transplant and 3-yr Follow-up.
European urology focus
2018; 4 (2): 190–97
Abstract
Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) offers an opportunity to expand living renal transplantation internationally to patients without financial means. These international pairs are entered into a US kidney exchange program that provides long-term financial support in an effort to identify opportunities for suitable exchanges for both these international pairs and US citizens.While the promise of GKE is significant, it has been met with ethical criticism since its inception in 2015. This paper aims to demonstrate the selection process and provide >3 yr of follow-up on the first GKE donor and recipient from the Philippines.The first GKE transplant occurred with a young Filipino husband and wife who were immunologically compatible, but lacked the financial means to continue hemodialysis or undergo a kidney transplant in their home country. The pair was enrolled in the Alliance for Paired Donation matching system, several alternative kidney exchanges were identified, and the pair subsequently underwent renal transplantation and donation in the USA financed by philanthropy. The resulting nonsimultaneous extended altruistic chain provided transplantation for the Filipino husband and 11 US patients.The Filipino donor and recipient were followed by transplant professionals in both the Philippines and the USA. Follow-up data were maintained as required by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network in the USA.The Filipino donor has normal blood pressure and renal function, and the Filipino recipient is doing well 3.5 yr after their donation and transplantation.While criticisms of GKE highlight concerns for possible exploitation of financially disadvantaged groups, these results demonstrate that these concerns did not come to fruition, and the outcome experienced by the GKE donor and recipient (and other US participants) was successful.The first Filipino Global Kidney Exchange (GKE) donor-recipient pair continues to be followed by both US and Filipino transplant centers. Both are in good health, support the GKE program, and advocate for its expansion.
View details for PubMedID 30145113
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Some Memories of My Academic Grandfather
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL
2017; 33 (4): 373-374
View details for DOI 10.1111/nejo.12203
View details for Web of Science ID 000413400000017
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GLOBAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE: A CASE STUDY
WILEY. 2017: 171
View details for Web of Science ID 000411688502022
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The promise of organ and tissue preservation to transform medicine.
Nature biotechnology
2017; 35 (6): 530-542
Abstract
The ability to replace organs and tissues on demand could save or improve millions of lives each year globally and create public health benefits on par with curing cancer. Unmet needs for organ and tissue preservation place enormous logistical limitations on transplantation, regenerative medicine, drug discovery, and a variety of rapidly advancing areas spanning biomedicine. A growing coalition of researchers, clinicians, advocacy organizations, academic institutions, and other stakeholders has assembled to address the unmet need for preservation advances, outlining remaining challenges and identifying areas of underinvestment and untapped opportunities. Meanwhile, recent discoveries provide proofs of principle for breakthroughs in a family of research areas surrounding biopreservation. These developments indicate that a new paradigm, integrating multiple existing preservation approaches and new technologies that have flourished in the past 10 years, could transform preservation research. Capitalizing on these opportunities will require engagement across many research areas and stakeholder groups. A coordinated effort is needed to expedite preservation advances that can transform several areas of medicine and medical science.
View details for DOI 10.1038/nbt.3889
View details for PubMedID 28591112
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Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2017; 103: 1-18
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.011
View details for Web of Science ID 000404821700001
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Foreword
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2017; 107 (5): XI
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.107.5.xi
View details for Web of Science ID 000402551700001
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Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority.
Health economics
2017; 26 (4): 500-510
Abstract
How donor organs are allocated for transplant can affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed an Organ Transplantation Law granting priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals who had previously registered as organ donors. Beginning in November 2010, public awareness campaigns advertised the priority policy to the public. Since April 2012, priority has been added to the routine medical criteria in organ allocation decisions. We evaluate the introduction of priority for registered organ donors using Israeli data on organ donor registration from 1992 to 2013. We find that registrations increased when information about the priority law was made widely available. We find an even larger increase in registration rates in the 2 months leading up to a program deadline, after which priority would only be granted with a 3-year delay. We also find that the registration rate responds positively to public awareness campaigns, to the ease of registration (i.e. allowing for registering online and by phone) and to an election drive that included placing registration opportunities in central voting locations. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
View details for DOI 10.1002/hec.3328
View details for PubMedID 27125490
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Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2017; 17 (3)
Abstract
Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with end-stage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy-even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed-world patient-donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient-donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange-a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United states with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.
View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.14106
View details for Web of Science ID 000397432100024
View details for PubMedID 27992110
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Effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange.
American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons
2017
Abstract
Numerous kidney exchange (kidney paired donation [KPD]) registries in the United States have gradually shifted to high-frequency match-runs, raising the question of whether this harms the number of transplants. We conducted simulations using clinical data from 2 KPD registries-the Alliance for Paired Donation, which runs multihospital exchanges, and Methodist San Antonio, which runs single-center exchanges-to study how the frequency of match-runs impacts the number of transplants and the average waiting times. We simulate the options facing each of the 2 registries by repeated resampling from their historical pools of patient-donor pairs and nondirected donors, with arrival and departure rates corresponding to the historical data. We find that longer intervals between match-runs do not increase the total number of transplants, and that prioritizing highly sensitized patients is more effective than waiting longer between match-runs for transplanting highly sensitized patients. While we do not find that frequent match-runs result in fewer transplanted pairs, we do find that increasing arrival rates of new pairs improves both the fraction of transplanted pairs and waiting times.
View details for PubMedID 29087017
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Deceased Donor Initiated Nonsimultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chains Through the Military Share Program
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2017: 60-61
View details for Web of Science ID 000392621100111
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Global Kidney Exchange
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2017: 60
View details for Web of Science ID 000392621100110
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Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy.
American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons
2017; 17 (10): 2749
View details for PubMedID 28862794
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People should not be banned from transplantation only because of their country of origin.
American journal of transplantation : official journal of the American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons
2017; 17 (10): 2747–48
View details for PubMedID 28862804
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Minimax across a population of games
JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION-JESA
2016; 2 (2): 144-156
View details for DOI 10.1007/s40881-016-0029-3
View details for Web of Science ID 000445153600005
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Incentivizing Authorization for Deceased Organ Donation With Organ Allocation Priority: The First 5 Years
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2016; 16 (9): 2639-2645
Abstract
The allocation system of donor organs for transplantation may affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed the Organ Transplantation Law, which grants priority on waiting lists for transplants to candidates who are first-degree relatives of deceased organ donors or who previously registered as organ donors themselves. Several public campaigns have advertised the existence of the law since November 2010. We evaluated the effect of the law using all deceased donation requests made in Israel during the period 1998-2015. We use logistic regression to compare the authorization rates of the donors' next of kin in the periods before (1998-2010) and after (2011-2015) the public was made aware of the law. The authorization rate for donation in the period after awareness was substantially higher (55.1% vs. 45.0%, odds ratio [OR] 1.43, p = 0.0003) and reached an all-time high rate of 60.2% in 2015. This increase was mainly due to an increase in the authorization rate of next of kin of unregistered donors (51.1% vs. 42.2%). We also found that the likelihood of next-of-kin authorization for donation was approximately twice as high when the deceased relative was a registered donor rather than unregistered (89.4% vs. 44.6%, OR 14.27, p < 0.0001). We concluded that the priority law is associated with an increased authorization rate for organ donation.
View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13802
View details for Web of Science ID 000383774700017
View details for PubMedID 27013023
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Simulation of international kidney exchange between Saudi Arabia and the United States using actual incompatible pair data
LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 2016: S185
View details for Web of Science ID 000436953200288
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Lloyd Shapley (1923-2016).
Nature
2016; 532 (7598): 178
View details for PubMedID 27075091
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REASONS FOR FAILING OFFERS IN A KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PROGRAM: A 7-YEAR ANALYSIS
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 18-19
View details for Web of Science ID 000367726700051
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ADVANTAGES OF CHAINS VS. CYCLES IN A KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PROGRAM: A 7-YEAR ANALYSIS
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 18
View details for Web of Science ID 000367726700050
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Historical Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation: The 7-Year Evolution of a Web-Based Virtual Matching System.
American journal of transplantation
2015; 15 (10): 2646-2654
Abstract
Failure to convert computer-identified possible kidney paired donation (KPD) exchanges into transplants has prohibited KPD from reaching its full potential. This study analyzes the progress of exchanges in moving from "offers" to completed transplants. Offers were divided into individual segments called 1-way transplants in order to calculate success rates. From 2007 to 2014, the Alliance for Paired Donation performed 243 transplants, 31 in collaboration with other KPD registries and 194 independently. Sixty-one of 194 independent transplants (31.4%) occurred via cycles, while the remaining 133 (68.6%) resulted from nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains. Thirteen of 35 (37.1%) NEAD chains with at least three NEAD segments accounted for 68% of chain transplants (8.6 tx/chain). The "offer" and 1-way success rates were 21.9 and 15.5%, respectively. Three reasons for failure were found that could be prospectively prevented by changes in protocol or software: positive laboratory crossmatch (28%), transplant center declined donor (17%) and pair transplanted outside APD (14%). Performing a root cause analysis on failures in moving from offer to transplant has allowed the APD to improve protocols and software. These changes have improved the success rate and the number of transplants performed per year.
View details for DOI 10.1111/ajt.13337
View details for PubMedID 26015291
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WHY DO STABLE CLEARINGHOUSES WORK SO WELL? - SMALL SETS OF STABLE MATCHINGS IN TYPICAL ENVIRONMENTS, AND THE LIMITS-ON-MANIPULATION THEOREM OF DEMANGE, GALE AND SOTOMAYOR
JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES
2015; 2 (3-4): 331-340
View details for DOI 10.3934/jdg.2015009
View details for Web of Science ID 000218573200009
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More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2015; 105 (5): 357-360
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.p20151034
View details for Web of Science ID 000357929400066
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Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2015; 112 (3): 663-668
Abstract
As of May 2014 there were more than 100,000 patients on the waiting list for a kidney transplant from a deceased donor. Although the preferred treatment is a kidney transplant, every year there are fewer donors than new patients, so the wait for a transplant continues to grow. To address this shortage, kidney paired donation (KPD) programs allow patients with living but biologically incompatible donors to exchange donors through cycles or chains initiated by altruistic (nondirected) donors, thereby increasing the supply of kidneys in the system. In many KPD programs a centralized algorithm determines which exchanges will take place to maximize the total number of transplants performed. This optimization problem has proven challenging both in theory, because it is NP-hard, and in practice, because the algorithms previously used were unable to optimally search over all long chains. We give two new algorithms that use integer programming to optimally solve this problem, one of which is inspired by the techniques used to solve the traveling salesman problem. These algorithms provide the tools needed to find optimal solutions in practice.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1421853112
View details for Web of Science ID 000348040700026
View details for PubMedID 25561535
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4311855
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Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted
INTERFACES
2015; 45 (1): 26-42
View details for DOI 10.1287/inte.2014.0766
View details for Web of Science ID 000349378000003
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Improving Matching Strategies in Kidney Paired Donation
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2015: 68
View details for Web of Science ID 000348030600064
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Transplantation: One Economist's Perspective.
Transplantation
2015; 99 (2): 261–64
View details for PubMedID 25651112
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The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel.
Israel journal of health policy research
2015; 4: 11
Abstract
A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in "market design" had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and almost all students get a better chance of getting what they want. Continued monitoring of the new mechanism is required to verify that it is not abused, and explore whether it can be improved. Other organizations in Israel may also be able to profit from the experience that accumulates from market design, both in Israel and abroad.
View details for PubMedID 25821580
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4377047
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How Werner Guth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
2014; 108: 292-318
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.014
View details for Web of Science ID 000347599300022
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Is avatar-to-avatar communication as effective as face-to-face communication? An Ultimatum Game experiment in First and Second Life
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
2014; 108: 374-382
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.011
View details for Web of Science ID 000347599300028
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Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
2014; 9 (3): 817-863
View details for DOI 10.3982/TE1357
View details for Web of Science ID 000342908500008
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Maximization, learning, and economic behavior.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
2014; 111: 10818-10825
Abstract
The rationality assumption that underlies mainstream economic theory has proved to be a useful approximation, despite the fact that systematic violations to its predictions can be found. That is, the assumption of rational behavior is useful in understanding the ways in which many successful economic institutions function, although it is also true that actual human behavior falls systematically short of perfect rationality. We consider a possible explanation of this apparent inconsistency, suggesting that mechanisms that rest on the rationality assumption are likely to be successful when they create an environment in which the behavior they try to facilitate leads to the best payoff for all agents on average, and most of the time. Review of basic learning research suggests that, under these conditions, people quickly learn to maximize expected return. This review also shows that there are many situations in which experience does not increase maximization. In many cases, experience leads people to underweight rare events. In addition, the current paper suggests that it is convenient to distinguish between two behavioral approaches to improve economic analyses. The first, and more conventional approach among behavioral economists and psychologists interested in judgment and decision making, highlights violations of the rational model and proposes descriptive models that capture these violations. The second approach studies human learning to clarify the conditions under which people quickly learn to maximize expected return. The current review highlights one set of conditions of this type and shows how the understanding of these conditions can facilitate market design.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1402846111
View details for PubMedID 25024182
View details for PubMedCentralID PMC4113920
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Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
2014; 114: 19-28
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.006
View details for Web of Science ID 000336707100004
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Getting More Organs for Transplantation
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2014; 104 (5): 425-430
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.104.5.425
View details for Web of Science ID 000338925400072
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Getting More Organs for Transplantation.
The American economic review
2014; 104 (5): 425-30
View details for PubMedID 29115805
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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2013; 128 (4): 1585-1632
View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt019
View details for Web of Science ID 000325776900004
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TRANSCONTINENTAL INTERNATIONAL KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION
WILEY. 2013: 144-145
View details for Web of Science ID 000328232001184
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COLLABORATIONS IN KIDNEY PAIRED EXCHANGE, LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2013: 145
View details for Web of Science ID 000328232001185
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Some memories of Cy Derman
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
2013; 208 (1): 3
View details for DOI 10.1007/s10479-013-1436-y
View details for Web of Science ID 000323414400002
- Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation Games 2013; 4 (2): 243-282
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In 100 Years
IN 100 YEARS: LEADING ECONOMISTS PREDICT THE FUTURE
2013: 109-119
View details for Web of Science ID 000334368200008
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Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2012; 102 (5): 2018-2047
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.5.2018
View details for Web of Science ID 000307471600009
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Call to Develop a Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2012; 12 (6): 1392-1397
Abstract
We propose a Medicare Demonstration Project to develop a standard acquisition charge for kidney paired donation. A new payment strategy is required because Medicare and commercial insurance companies may not directly pay living donor costs intended to lead to transplantation of a beneficiary of a different insurance provider. Until the 1970s, when organ procurement organizations were empowered to serve as financial intermediaries to pay the upfront recovery expenses for deceased donor kidneys before knowing the identity of the recipient, there existed similar limitations in the recovery and placement of deceased donor organs. Analogous to the recovery of deceased donor kidneys, kidney paired donation requires the evaluation of living donors before identifying their recipient. Tissue typing, crossmatching and transportation of living donors or their kidneys represent additional financial barriers. Finally, the administrative expenses of the organizations that identify and coordinate kidney paired donation transplantation require reimbursement akin to that necessary for organ procurement organizations. To expand access to kidney paired donation for more patients, we propose a model to reimburse paired donation expenses analogous to the proven strategy used for over 30 years to pay for deceased donor solid organ transplantation in America.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2012.04034.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000304522900010
View details for PubMedID 22487555
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New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2012; 102 (3): 354-359
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.3.354
View details for Web of Science ID 000304262000061
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Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2012; 30 (2): 479-494
View details for DOI 10.1086/663621
View details for Web of Science ID 000301779400007
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NEAD Chains in Transplantation
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2011; 11 (12): 2780-2781
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03800.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000297411800036
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Kidney paired donation
NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION
2011; 26 (7): 2091-2099
Abstract
Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the USA. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the USA and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the USA, now 5 years into its development.
View details for DOI 10.1093/ndt/gfr155
View details for Web of Science ID 000292329500008
View details for PubMedID 21454351
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Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney- Paired Donation-Revisited
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2011; 11 (5): 984-994
Abstract
Since 2008, kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of nondirected donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously 'domino-paired donation', (DPD) or nonsimultaneously 'nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor, chains (NEAD). NEAD chains create 'bridge donors' whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants, and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this finding contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney-paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 transplants are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2011.03481.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000289897000019
View details for PubMedID 21521469
- A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games 2011; 2: 257-276
- Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 2011; 101 (3): 744-746
- ¿QUÉ HEMOS APRENDIDO DEL DISEÑO DE MERCADOS El Trimestre Económico 2011; 78 (2): 259-314
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The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2010; 24 (4): 187-206
View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.24.4.187
View details for Web of Science ID 000284159400010
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Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2010; 10 (5): 1221-1227
Abstract
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney market, and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval toward certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, and between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal. A total of 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval toward certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally nonmarket exchanges, such as food preparation.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2010.03019.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000276921600016
View details for PubMedID 20148809
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Six Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains.
10th American Transplant Congress
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2010: 275–275
View details for Web of Science ID 000275921702226
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A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING
2010; 23 (1): 15-47
View details for DOI 10.1002/bdm.683
View details for Web of Science ID 000273541400002
- Social Behavior in Economic Games The Selten School of Behavioral Economics: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten edited by Ockenfels, A., Sadrieh, A. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 2010: 183–200
- An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
- Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
- New Sources in Living Kidney Donation Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients edited by McKay, D. Springer. 2010: 103–117
- A choice prediction competition for market entry games: An introduction Games, Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games 2010; 1 (2): 117-136
- Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games With Risky Outcomes Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
- Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice Better Living Through Economics edited by Siegfried, J. Harvard University Press. 2010: 206–222
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond edited by Elgar, E. Edward Elgar. 2010
- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond edited by Thomson, W. Edward Elgar. 2010
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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2009; 99 (5): 1954-1978
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
View details for Web of Science ID 000272977300011
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Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2009; 1 (2): 199-219
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.1.2.199
View details for Web of Science ID 000285178600011
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A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain.
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE
2009; 360 (11): 1096-1101
Abstract
We report a chain of 10 kidney transplantations, initiated in July 2007 by a single altruistic donor (i.e., a donor without a designated recipient) and coordinated over a period of 8 months by two large paired-donation registries. These transplantations involved six transplantation centers in five states. In the case of five of the transplantations, the donors and their coregistered recipients underwent surgery simultaneously. In the other five cases, "bridge donors" continued the chain as many as 5 months after the coregistered recipients in their own pairs had received transplants. This report of a chain of paired kidney donations, in which the transplantations were not necessarily performed simultaneously, illustrates the potential of this strategy.
View details for Web of Science ID 000264051000007
View details for PubMedID 19279341
- Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria Judgement and Decision Making edited by Chater, N. Sage. 2009
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Four Never-Ending Altruistic Donor Chains
9th Joint Meeting of the American-Society-of-Transplant-Surgeon/American-Society-of-Transplantation
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2009: 389–389
View details for Web of Science ID 000265068800682
- What have we learned from market design? Innovation Policy and the Economy edited by Jaffe, A. B., Lerner, J., Stern, S. University of Chicago Press. 2009: 79–112
- Six Nonsimultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD) Chains American Transplant Congress 2009
- The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices Labor Market Intermediation edited by Autor, D. The University of Chicago Press. 2009: 273–306
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If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2009; 65 (1): 176-204
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.013
View details for Web of Science ID 000263217200010
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The gastroenterology fellowship Match - The first two years
GASTROENTEROLOGY
2008; 135 (2): 344-346
View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2008.06.075
View details for Web of Science ID 000258439900006
View details for PubMedID 18619966
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AOA symposium. Current state of fellowship hiring: is a universal match necessary? Is it possible?
journal of bone and joint surgery. American volume
2008; 90 (6): 1375-1384
View details for DOI 10.2106/JBJS.G.01582
View details for PubMedID 18519333
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The never-ending altruistic donor
8th American Transplant Congress
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 288–288
View details for Web of Science ID 000255763200410
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What have we learned from market design?
Annual Meeting of the Royal-Economic-Society
WILEY-BLACKWELL. 2008: 285–310
View details for Web of Science ID 000253477600001
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Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
2008; 36 (3-4): 537-569
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6
View details for Web of Science ID 000253625400015
- What have we learned from market design? Innovations 2008: 119–147
- 实验室实验经济学:六个观点看 edited by Roth, A. E. 2008
- Matching and market design The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics edited by Durlauf, S. N., Blume, L. E. Palgrave Macmillan. 2008; 2nd
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Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games
ECONOMIC THEORY
2007; 33 (1): 29-51
View details for DOI 10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y
View details for Web of Science ID 000248186700003
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The art of designing markets
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
2007; 85 (10): 118-?
Abstract
Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design--a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created marketlike allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets--like those for jobs and dating--proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.
View details for Web of Science ID 000249682100021
View details for PubMedID 17972500
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Repugnance as a constraint on markets
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2007; 21 (3): 37-58
View details for Web of Science ID 000249349000003
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Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2007; 97 (3): 828-851
View details for Web of Science ID 000248070600013
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Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
2007; 171 (7): 423-428
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.001
View details for Web of Science ID 000247811500009
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The new market for federal judicial law clerks
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
2007; 74 (2): 447-486
View details for Web of Science ID 000248035800011
- Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second- Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet New Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
- An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions New Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
- Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria New Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Carbone, E., Starmer, C. Edward Elgar. 2007
- Kidney Paired Donation With Compatible Pairs American Journal of Transplantation 2007; 7 (1)
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Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: evidence from post-season college football bowls
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2007; 38 (4): 967-982
View details for Web of Science ID 000253045000006
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Utilizing list exchange and nondirected donation through 'Chain' paired kidney donations
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION
2006; 6 (11): 2694-2705
Abstract
In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a DD-waitlist candidate. A nondirected donor's (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to a DD-waitlist candidate. These two established practices would help even more transplant candidates if they were integrated with kidney paired donation (KPD). We consider a scenario in which the donor of an LE intended recipient (LE-IR) donates to a compatible KPD intended recipient (KPD-IR), and the KPD donor (KPD-D) donates to the waitlist (an LE-chain). We consider a similar scenario in which an ND-D donates to a KPD-IR and the KPD-D donates to the DD-waitlist (an ND-chain). Using data derived from the New England Program for Kidney Exchange (NEPKE) and from OPTN/SRTR recipient-donor distributions, simulations are presented to evaluate the potential impact of chain exchanges coordinated with KPD. LE donors (LE-D) and ND-D who are ABO-O result in the highest number of additional transplants, while results for ABO-A and B donors are similar to each other. We recommend that both LE and ND donations be utilized through chain exchanges.
View details for DOI 10.1111/j.1600-6143.2006.01515.x
View details for Web of Science ID 000241240700023
View details for PubMedID 16981911
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The speed of learning in noisy games: Partial reinforcement and the sustainability of cooperation
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2006; 96 (4): 1029-1042
View details for Web of Science ID 000240789200006
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Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
Workshop on Electronic Market Design
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. 2006: 297–320
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.010
View details for Web of Science ID 000237518500005
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Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two- and three-way exchanges
TRANSPLANTATION
2006; 81 (5): 773-782
Abstract
To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for transplantation.Demographic data of patients who had been evaluated for live donor kidney transplantation but found to be incompatible with their potential donor (because of ABO blood group or positive crossmatch) were submitted for computer analysis and matching. Data included ABO and HLA types of donor and recipient, %PRA and specificity of recipient alloantibody, donor/recipient relationship, and the reason the donor was incompatible. The data set used for the initial simulation included 29 patients with one donor each and 16 patients with multiple donors for a total of 45 patients and 68 donor/patient pairs. In addition, a simulation based on OPTN/SRTR data was used to further assess the practical importance of multiple exchange combinations.If only exchanges involving two patient-donor pairs were allowed, a maximum of 8 patient-donor pairs in the data set could exchange kidneys. If three-way exchanges were also allowed, a maximum of 11 pairs could exchange kidneys. Simulations with OPTN/SRTR data demonstrate that the increase in the number of potential transplants if three-way exchanges are allowed is robust, and does not depend on the particular patients in our sample.A computerized matching protocol can be used to identify donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs who can potentially enter into donor exchanges that otherwise would not readily occur.
View details for DOI 10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25
View details for Web of Science ID 000236229900020
View details for PubMedID 16534482
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The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL
2006; 30 (3): 457-486
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jedc.2005.02.002
View details for Web of Science ID 000235813900005
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What will be needed for the new gastroenterology fellowship match to succeed?
GASTROENTEROLOGY
2006; 130 (1): 218-224
View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2005.10.058
View details for Web of Science ID 000234525200027
View details for PubMedID 16401484
- Some of the Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration Social Psychology and Economics edited by Cremer, D. D., Zeelenberg, M., Murnighan, J. K. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.: Mahwah, NJ.. 2006: 321–333
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Pairwise kidney exchange
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
2005; 125 (2): 151-188
View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
View details for Web of Science ID 000234153100002
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The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2005; 95 (3): 878-889
View details for Web of Science ID 000233223400022
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The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare).
The American economic review
2005; 95 (3): 878-89
View details for PubMedID 29125725
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The Boston Public School match
117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 368–71
View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500069
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The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
The American economic review
2005; 95 (2): 372-5
Abstract
We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a "match." This market used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s. Starting in 1996, participation in the match declined precipitously, and it was formally abandoned after 1999. Consequently, the experience of this market when the match was in place, in comparison to the periods before and since, allows an assessment of the effects of the match. An analysis of how the match failed in the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for success of a new match. These events offer economists a rare window on how decentralized labor markets clear, and on how market clearinghouses succeed and fail.
View details for PubMedID 29115791
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The gastroenterology fellowship market: Should there be a match?
117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 372–75
Abstract
We are helping a task force of the American Gastroenterology Association to evaluate the current state of the (decentralized) market for gastroenterology fellows, and to assess the prospects of reorganizing it via a suitably designed centralized clearinghouse, a "match." This market used a match from 1986 until the late 1990s. Starting in 1996, participation in the match declined precipitously, and it was formally abandoned after 1999. Consequently, the experience of this market when the match was in place, in comparison to the periods before and since, allows an assessment of the effects of the match. An analysis of how the match failed in the 1990s yields insights into the prospects for success of a new match. These events offer economists a rare window on how decentralized labor markets clear, and on how market clearinghouses succeed and fail.
View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500070
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Restarting the gastroenterology match
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF GASTROENTEROLOGY
2005; 100 (5): 1202-1203
View details for Web of Science ID 000228489900036
View details for PubMedID 15842603
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A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England
117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 376–80
View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500071
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The New York City high school match
117th Annual Meeting of the American-Economic-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2005: 364–67
View details for Web of Science ID 000233172500068
- Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
- Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership edited by Reid, C., Grossman, F. National Academy of Engineering and Institute of Medicine, National Academies Press. 2005: 237–239
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management edited by Bazerman, M. Edward Elgar. 2005
- Negoziazione e Comportamento di Mercato a Gerusalemme, Lubiana, Pittsburgh e Tokio: Uno Studio Sperimentale Economia Cognitiva e Sperimentale edited by Motterline, M., Guala, F. Milan: Universita' Bocconi Editore. 2005
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An experimental analysis of ending rules in Internet auctions
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2005; 36 (4): 890-907
View details for Web of Science ID 000237400400009
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Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the Internet
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION
2004; 35 (4): 330-342
View details for Web of Science ID 000224710300002
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The gastroenterology fellowship match: How it failed and why it could succeed once again
GASTROENTEROLOGY
2004; 127 (2): 658-666
Abstract
The market for gastroenterology (GI) fellows adopted a centralized Match in 1986, and abandoned it in the late 1990s. We discuss why the Match initially was adopted, how and why it broke down, what differences this has made in the market for fellows, and what would be needed to restart the Match successfully. We assess the effects of the Match by comparing the GI fellows market now with when the Match was operating, and with the fellowship markets for internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. The breakdown of a well-functioning Match is rare, but may be caused by unusual shifts in market conditions, such as those experienced by gastroenterology in the late 1990s. The problems the gastroenterology Match originally was designed to solve re-emerged with the demise of the Match. The market has become more local and less national, than when there was a Match in place, and program recruitment of fellows occurs earlier and is more dispersed in time than internal medicine subspecialties that continue to use a Match. There is no evidence that the demise of the Match has had any effect on wages. The evidence strongly suggests that the Match could be reintroduced successfully, which would increase the mobility of potential GI fellows, allow potential fellows to compete for the widest range of programs, and allow programs to compete for the widest range of fellows.
View details for DOI 10.1053/j.gastro.2004.05.034
View details for Web of Science ID 000223431200035
View details for PubMedID 15300596
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Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative "Dutch" auctions
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
2004; 50 (8): 1044-1063
View details for DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0254
View details for Web of Science ID 000223405500004
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Kidney exchange
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2004; 119 (2): 457-488
View details for Web of Science ID 000221453300003
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The nash equilibrium: A perspective
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2004; 101 (12): 3999-4002
Abstract
In 1950, John Nash contributed a remarkable one-page PNAS article that defined and characterized a notion of equilibrium for n- person games. This notion, now called the "Nash equilibrium," has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences. Indeed, game theory, with the Nash equilibrium as its centerpiece, is becoming the most prominent unifying theory of social science. In this perspective, we summarize the historical context and subsequent impact of Nash's contribution.
View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.0308738101
View details for Web of Science ID 000220472200004
View details for PubMedID 15024100
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Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2003; 111 (6): 1342-1352
View details for Web of Science ID 000186719400007
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Effect of a match on salaries for medical fellows - Reply
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
2003; 290 (18): 2408-2408
View details for Web of Science ID 000186518300025
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Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
2003; 45 (2): 347-368
View details for DOI 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)000151-9
View details for Web of Science ID 000186408200005
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Relationship between wages and presence of a match in medical fellowships
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
2003; 290 (9): 1153-1154
View details for Web of Science ID 000185090400008
View details for PubMedID 12952995
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The origins, history, and design of the resident match
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
2003; 289 (7): 909-912
Abstract
In the early 1900s, competition among hospitals for interns and among medical students for good internships led to increasingly early offers of internships to students. By the 1940s, appointments were often made as early as the beginning of the junior year of medical school. Hospitals thus had little information about students' performance, and students frequently had to make a final decision to accept or reject an offer without knowing which other offers might be forthcoming. From 1945 through 1951, efforts were made to enforce a uniform date for accepting offers. However, students were still faced with offers having very short deadlines, compelling them to accept or reject offers without knowing what other offers might be forthcoming. Hospitals often had to scramble for available students, since if an offer was rejected, it was often too late for them to reach their next preferred candidate. A centralized clearinghouse was thus developed as a way of alleviating this chaos and allowing a larger role to the preferences of both students and hospitals. This evolved into the current matching program, whose algorithm continues to be updated to take account of changing needs of applicants, such as growth in the number of couples who seek 2 positions in the same vicinity.
View details for Web of Science ID 000181072200038
View details for PubMedID 12588278
- Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study Trust edited by Khalil, E. Edward Elgar. 2003
- An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Experiments in Environmental Economics edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
- Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experiments in Environmental Economics edited by Shogren, J. F. Ashgate, Aldershot. 2003
- Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games Experimental Economics 2003; 6 (2): 181-207
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The timing of bids in Internet auctions - Market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents
AI MAGAZINE
2002; 23 (3): 79-87
View details for Web of Science ID 000180288600007
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Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2002; 92 (4): 1093-1103
View details for Web of Science ID 000178976700021
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Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING
2002; 18 (3): 359-368
View details for Web of Science ID 000177466400005
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The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics
European Meeting of the Econometric-Society
WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC. 2002: 1341–78
View details for Web of Science ID 000176529300002
- The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson edited by Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., Roth, A. E. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
- Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson edited by Roth, A. E., Holmstrom, Bengt, Milgrom, P. Berkeley Electronic Press. 2002
- Interview on Experimental Economics (conducted by Fredrik Andersson and Hakan Holm) Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making. edited by Andersson, F., Holm, H. Kluwer. 2002: 49–65
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The market for federal judicial law clerks
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
2001; 68 (3): 793-902
View details for Web of Science ID 000169098400010
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Form and function in experimental design
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
2001; 24 (3): 427-?
View details for Web of Science ID 000171155500029
- ‘‘Modeling repeated play of the prisoners’ dilemma with reinforcement learning over an enriched strategy set,’’ Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox edited by Gigerenzer, G., Selten, R. MIT Press. 2001
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Critical Perspectives on Game Theory edited by Varoufakis, Y. 2001
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Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game
84th Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality
M I T PRESS. 2001: 215–231
View details for Web of Science ID 000175774300012
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The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2000; 115 (1): 201-235
View details for Web of Science ID 000085761200006
- Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory edited by Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. Kluwer. 2000: 7–18
- On the Non-Transferable Utility Value Aumann, Robert Collected Papers MIT Press. 2000
- Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Aumann, Robert Collected Papers MIT Press. 2000: 485–494
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The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1999; 89 (4): 748-780
View details for Web of Science ID 000082825100004
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The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
1999; 39 (1): 111-128
View details for Web of Science ID 000080955400007
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Truncation strategies in matching markets - In search of advice for participants
ECONOMETRICA
1999; 67 (1): 21-43
View details for Web of Science ID 000077931400002
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On the role of reinforcement learning in experimental games: The cognitive game-theoretic approach
Workshop in Honor of Professor Amnon Rapoports 60th Birthday
LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOC PUBL. 1999: 53–77
View details for Web of Science ID 000077602500004
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Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1998; 88 (4): 848-881
View details for Web of Science ID 000076265000010
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Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic
ECONOMETRICA
1998; 66 (3): 569-596
View details for Web of Science ID 000073446900003
- New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization Price Theory and Its Applications edited by Scherer, F. M., Saffran, B. Edward Elgar. 1998: 165–169
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Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1997; 76 (2): 362-411
View details for Web of Science ID A1997YA79600007
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The effects of the change in the NRMP Matching algorithm
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
1997; 278 (9): 729-732
Abstract
Following 2 years of heated controversy about the resident match, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) recently voted to replace the existing matching algorithm with a newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm.To design an applicant-proposing algorithm for the match and compare it with the existing NRMP algorithm to determine how many applicants and residency programs could be expected to receive better or worse matches from the 2 algorithms, how the different algorithms influence the opportunity for strategic behavior, and what advice can be given to participants.Computational experiments compared the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm with the existing NRMP algorithm on the rank order lists (ROLs) submitted by all applicants and residency programs in the 1987 and 1993 through 1996 NRMP matches.Differences in the matchings produced by the 2 algorithms are small: fewer than 1 in 1000 applicants would have received a different match. Most (but not all) of the few applicants who are matched to different positions by the 2 algorithms do better when the applicant-proposing algorithm is used; the opposite is true for programs. Opportunities for profitable strategic behavior are very rare for both applicants and programs under either algorithm. With either algorithm, both applicants and programs can be advised that trying to get a preferred match by behaving strategically is far more likely to harm than to help them.The existing NRMP algorithm and the newly designed applicant-proposing algorithm perform similarly. Both algorithms make it sensible for applicants and residency programs to arrange their ROLs based solely on their preferences for possible matches. The choice of algorithms will systematically affect the matches of only a small group of applicants (<0.1%). The NRMP's recent decision to use the applicant-proposing algorithm starting in 1998 reflects a judgment about the impact of this difference on applicants and programs.
View details for Web of Science ID A1997XT70900025
View details for PubMedID 9286832
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Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1997; 105 (2): 284-329
View details for Web of Science ID A1997WT04200003
- Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics ECONOMIC GAMES, BARGAINING AND SOLUTIONS edited by Hamouda, O. F., Rowley, J. R. Edward Elgar. 1997
- The National Resident Matching Program as a labor market JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association 1996; 275 (13): 1054-1056
- Bargaining Social Science Encyclopedia edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2nd: 46–47
- Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 255–273
- Experimental Economics Social Science Encyclopedia edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2: 279–280
- Matching Social Science Encyclopedia edited by Kuper, A., Kuper, J. 1996; 2
- Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two- Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment Revista de Econometria, The Brazilian Review of Econometrics 1996; 16: 1-24
- Individual Rationality as a Useful Approximation: Comments on Tversky's 'Rational Theory and Constructive Choice' The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference edited by Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M., Schmidt, C. 1996: 198–202
- Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
- Introduction to Experimental Economics Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press,. 1995: 3–109
- Bargaining Experiments Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by Kagel, J., Roth, A. E. Princeton University Press. 1995
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LEARNING IN EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA AND SIMPLE DYNAMIC-MODELS IN THE INTERMEDIATE-TERM
Nobel Symposium on Game Theory
ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS. 1995: 164–212
View details for Web of Science ID A1995QG07000008
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JUMPING THE GUN - IMPERFECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1994; 84 (4): 992-1044
View details for Web of Science ID A1994PJ23200014
- Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Empirical Economics (Special Issue on Experimental Economics) 1994; 19: 279-289
- Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ Experimental Economics edited by Hey, J. D. Physica Verlag, Heidelberg. 1994: 99–109
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STABLE MATCHINGS, OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENTS, AND LINEAR-PROGRAMMING
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
1993; 18 (4): 803-828
View details for Web of Science ID A1993MG32500003
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LOCAL JUSTICE - HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS - ELSTER,J (Book Review)
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE
1993; 31 (3): 1445-1446
View details for Web of Science ID A1993MA03000013
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1ST JOBS AND COLLEGE BOWL BIDS - PATTERNS AND PATHOLOGIES IN THE TIMING OF MARKET TRANSACTIONS
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. 1993: 305–6
View details for Web of Science ID A1993LB06600012
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Recent Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 3–60
- Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games Recent Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Hey, J. D., Loomes, G. Edward Elgar. 1993: 58–84
- Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Recent Developments in Experimental Economics edited by Hey, J. D. Edward Elgar. 1993: 28–57
- On the Early History of Experimental Economics Journal of the History of Economic Thought 1993; 15: 184-209
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THEORY AND MISBEHAVIOR IN 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS - COMMENT
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1992; 82 (5): 1379-1391
View details for Web of Science ID A1992KB22900019
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CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL GAMES
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1992; 107 (3): 865-888
View details for Web of Science ID A1992JJ86300003
- Spieltheorie als Teil der empirischen Wirtschaftswissenschaft Die okonomische Wissenschaft in der Zunkunft-- Ansichten fuhrender Okonomen (Economic Science in the Future--Perspectives by Leading Economists) edited by Hanusch, H. 1992: 334–345
- Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Cambridge University Press. 1992
- Two Sided Matching Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications edited by Aumann, R., Hart, S. North Holland. 1992: 485–541
- Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts Foundations of Insurance Economics edited by Roth, A. E., Dioone, G. Kluwer. 1992: 264–279
- Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics The Future of Economics edited by Hey, J. Basil Blackwell. 1992
- Stable Marriages: Substituting Linearity for Discreteness Linear Algebra and Its Applications 1992; 167: 252-257
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BARGAINING AND MARKET BEHAVIOR IN JERUSALEM, LJUBLJANA, PITTSBURGH, AND TOKYO - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1991; 81 (5): 1068-1095
View details for Web of Science ID A1991GV93500002
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A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF ENTRY-LEVEL LABOR-MARKETS - REGIONAL MARKETS FOR NEW PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS IN THE UNITED-KINGDOM
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1991; 81 (3): 415-440
Abstract
The histories of seven regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom are considered. Like the American market, these markets have experienced failures that led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms. Because different regions employ different centralized mechanisms, these markets provide a test of the hypothesis that the success of the American market is related to the fact that it produces matches which are stable in the sense that no two agents mutually prefer to be matched to one another than to their assigned partners. Even in the more complex U.K. markets, this kind of stability plays an important role. Centralized markets that produced unstable matches in environments in which agents could act upon instabilities fared no better than the decentralized markets they replaced.
View details for Web of Science ID A1991FP88800003
View details for PubMedID 10115049
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SORORITY RUSH AS A 2-SIDED MATCHING MECHANISM
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1991; 81 (3): 441-464
View details for Web of Science ID A1991FP88800004
- Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements Negotiation Theory and Practice edited by Breslin, J. W., Rubin, J. Z. PON Books, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School. 1991: 327–329
- An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining Handbook of Negotiation Research, Volume III of Research on Negotiations in Organizations edited by Bazerman, M. H., Lewicki, R. J., Sheppard, B. H. JAI Press. 1991: 35–67
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GAME-THEORY AS A PART OF EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
1991; 101 (404): 107-114
View details for Web of Science ID A1991EY95800017
- Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms Economic Theory 1991; 1 (1): 31-44
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview Surveys in Economics, On Behalf of the Royal Economic Society edited by Oswald, A. J. Basil Blackwell. 1991: 90–147
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NEW PHYSICIANS - A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN MARKET ORGANIZATION
SCIENCE
1990; 250 (4987): 1524-1528
Abstract
The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.
View details for Web of Science ID A1990EM93100028
View details for PubMedID 2274783
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BOUNDED RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES AND MARKETS - TIETZ,R, ALBERS,W, SELTEN,R (Book Review)
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
1990; 146 (4): 758-760
View details for Web of Science ID A1990ER81000018
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RANDOM-PATHS TO STABILITY IN 2-SIDED MATCHING
ECONOMETRICA
1990; 58 (6): 1475-1480
View details for Web of Science ID A1990EL31000011
- Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series Cambridge University Press. 1990
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STABILITY AND PERFECTION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA - VANDAMME,E (Book Review)
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE
1990; 51 (3): 308-309
View details for Web of Science ID A1990DM58200005
- Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence Game Theory and Applications edited by Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., tauman, Y. Academic Press. 1990: 232–251
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AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1989; 79 (3): 355-384
View details for Web of Science ID A1989AA08900005
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THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM REVISITED
ECONOMETRICA
1989; 57 (3): 559-570
View details for Web of Science ID A1989U965000003
- Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1989; 2: 353-365
- Final Report to the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences of the National Research Council, Ten-Year Outlook on Research Opportunities in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Working Group on Information and Decision-Making Leading Edges in Social and Behavioral Sciences edited by Luce, R. D., Smelser, N. J., Gerstein, D. R. New York, Russell Sage Foundation. 1989
- Two Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences Games and Economic Behavior 1989; 1: 191-209
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LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS - A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
1988; 98 (393): 974-1031
View details for Web of Science ID A1988R441000002
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THE DEADLINE EFFECT IN BARGAINING - SOME EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1988; 78 (4): 806-823
View details for Web of Science ID A1988Q139100018
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INTERIOR POINTS IN THE CORE OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1988; 45 (1): 85-101
View details for Web of Science ID A1988P078200005
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THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING, VOL 2 - BINMORE,K, DASGUPTA,P (Book Review)
ECONOMICA
1988; 55 (218): 277-278
View details for Web of Science ID A1988N665700010
- Introduction to the Shapley Value The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 1–27
- Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1988; 1: 101-124
- The Expected Utility of Playing a Game The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988: 51–70
- The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1988
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RISK-AVERSION AND BARGAINING - SOME PRELIMINARY-RESULTS
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1987; 31 (1-2): 265-271
View details for Web of Science ID A1987G824100029
- Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 14–41
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1987
- Editor's Introduction and Overview Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View Cambridge University Press. 1987: 1–13
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective edited by Rescher, N. Lanham, University Press of America. 1987: 147–167
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress edited by Bewley, T. Cambridge University Press. 1987: 269–299
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LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS
ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY
1986; 2 (2): 245-273
View details for Web of Science ID A1986E867400005
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ON THE NONTRANSFERABLE UTILITY VALUE - A REPLY
ECONOMETRICA
1986; 54 (4): 981-984
View details for Web of Science ID A1986D603900013
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ON THE ALLOCATION OF RESIDENTS TO RURAL HOSPITALS - A GENERAL PROPERTY OF 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS
ECONOMETRICA
1986; 54 (2): 425-427
View details for Web of Science ID A1986D638900011
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A NOTE ON JOB MATCHING WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
ECONOMICS LETTERS
1986; 21 (2): 135-138
View details for Web of Science ID A1986D180700008
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SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON POST-SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENTS
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1985; 1 (3): 245-247
View details for Web of Science ID A1985ANB9900006
- Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985
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THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1985; 36 (2): 277-288
View details for Web of Science ID A1985ARR2300005
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A NOTE ON RISK-AVERSION IN A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF BARGAINING
ECONOMETRICA
1985; 53 (1): 207-211
View details for Web of Science ID A1985TZ98500013
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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE POWER OF ALTERNATIVES - AN EXAMPLE FROM LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL-ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1985; 1 (4): 359-362
View details for Web of Science ID A1985AVX5400007
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CONFLICT AND COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST IN JOB MATCHING - SOME NEW RESULTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
1985; 10 (3): 379-389
View details for Web of Science ID A1985APB3400002
- Editor's Introduction and Overview Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining Cambridge University Press. 1985: 1–7
- Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining edited by Roth, A. E. Cambridge University Press. 1985: 259–268
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COMMON AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1985; 27 (1): 75-96
View details for Web of Science ID A1985AFR3800006
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STABILITY AND POLARIZATION OF INTERESTS IN JOB MATCHING
ECONOMETRICA
1984; 52 (1): 47-57
View details for Web of Science ID A1984SQ16200003
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR-MARKET FOR MEDICAL INTERNS AND RESIDENTS - A CASE-STUDY IN GAME-THEORY
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
1984; 92 (6): 991-1016
View details for Web of Science ID A1984TX01200001
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MISREPRESENTATION AND STABILITY IN THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1984; 34 (2): 383-387
View details for Web of Science ID A1984TX69300013
- Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory Coalitions and Collective Action edited by Holler, M. Wuerzberg, Physica-Verlag. 1984: 228–234
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EXPECTATIONS AND REPUTATIONS IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
1983; 73 (3): 362-372
View details for Web of Science ID A1983QT44100009
- Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making edited by Tietz, R. Springer. 1983
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EXPECTING CONTINUED PLAY IN PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAMES - A TEST OF SEVERAL MODELS
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1983; 27 (2): 279-300
View details for Web of Science ID A1983QY52700004
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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION - RAIFFA,H (Book Review)
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE
1983; 21 (4): 1537-1538
View details for Web of Science ID A1983RV87300031
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SUBJECTIVE-PROBABILITY AND THE THEORY OF GAMES - SOME FURTHER COMMENTS
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
1983; 29 (11): 1337-1340
View details for Web of Science ID A1983RR12500009
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INFORMATION AND ASPIRATIONS IN 2-PERSON BARGAINING
LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS
1983; 213: 91-103
View details for Web of Science ID A1983QQ86800008
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TOWARD A THEORY OF BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY IN ECONOMICS
SCIENCE
1983; 220 (4598): 687-691
Abstract
Contemporary economic theories of bargaining depend on aspects of the bargainers' preferences that are difficult to observe. This makes these theories difficult to test in natural environments. It has proved possible, however, to design experiments to test these theories in a controlled, laboratory environment. The results of these experiments reveal shortcomings and incompleteness in the descriptive power of currently available theories of bargaining. However, these results also suggest important regularities in bargaining behavior. Together with recent theoretical developments, these results suggest some directions in which a more descriptively powerful theory of bargaining might be developed.
View details for Web of Science ID A1983QN77100008
View details for PubMedID 17813861
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RISK-AVERSION AND NASH SOLUTION FOR BARGAINING GAMES WITH RISKY OUTCOMES
ECONOMETRICA
1982; 50 (3): 639-647
View details for Web of Science ID A1982NP85000006
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SCALE CHANGES AND SHARED INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
1982; 3 (2): 157-177
View details for Web of Science ID A1982PH57900004
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THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY
ECONOMETRICA
1982; 50 (5): 1123-1142
View details for Web of Science ID A1982PH48100002
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A NOTE ON THE MAXIMIN VALUE OF 2-PERSON, ZERO-SUM GAMES
NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
1982; 29 (3): 521-527
View details for Web of Science ID A1982QB75800013
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RISK-AVERSION AND THE NEGOTIATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE
1982; 49 (3): 372-387
View details for Web of Science ID A1982PK41700002
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INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN A MARKET WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS
ECONOMICS LETTERS
1982; 9 (2): 127-132
View details for Web of Science ID A1982NR48000003
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THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING - STABILITY AND INCENTIVES
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
1982; 7 (4): 617-628
View details for Web of Science ID A1982PS24400011
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DISAGREEMENT IN BARGAINING - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1981; 25 (2): 329-348
View details for Web of Science ID A1981NM24900006
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STRIKE 2 - LABOR-MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
1981; 12 (2): 413-425
View details for Web of Science ID A1981MM21300005
- Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem Game Theory and Mathematical Economics edited by Moeschlin, O., Pallaschke, D. Amsterdam, North-Holland. 1981: 65–71
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SOCIOLOGICAL VERSUS STRATEGIC FACTORS IN BARGAINING
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
1981; 2 (2): 153-177
View details for Web of Science ID A1981MM60100003
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VALUES FOR GAMES WITHOUT SIDEPAYMENTS - SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT CONCEPTS
ECONOMETRICA
1980; 48 (2): 457-465
View details for Web of Science ID A1980JJ56500012
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EFFECTS OF GROUP-SIZE AND COMMUNICATION AVAILABILITY ON COALITION-BARGAINING IN A VETO GAME
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
1980; 39 (1): 92-103
View details for Web of Science ID A1980KB93400008
- The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis edited by Fiacco, A. V., Kortanek, K. O. Springer Verlag. 1980: 306–311
- Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties With Current Concepts Econometrica 1980; 48: 457-465
- Axiomatic Models of Bargaining Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Springer Verlag. 1979; 170
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PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
ECONOMETRICA
1979; 47 (3): 775-778
View details for Web of Science ID A1979GY04100019
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GAME-THEORETIC MODELS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
1979; 86 (6): 574-594
View details for Web of Science ID A1979HU08100003
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SHAPLEY VALUE AS APPLIED TO COST ALLOCATION - REINTERPRETATION
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
1979; 17 (1): 295-303
View details for Web of Science ID A1979HF32600017
- An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games International Journal of Game Theory 1979; 8: 129-132
- An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem Algebra Universalis 1979; 9: 131-132
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LARGE GROUP BARGAINING IN A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1978; 22 (2): 299-317
View details for Web of Science ID A1978FH01100006
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EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR AND REPEATED PLAY OF PRISONERS-DILEMMA
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY
1978; 17 (2): 189-198
View details for Web of Science ID A1978EX77600006
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NASH SOLUTION AND UTILITY OF BARGAINING
ECONOMETRICA
1978; 46 (3): 587-594
View details for Web of Science ID A1978FJ62200008
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CONCERNING ASYMMETRIC GAMES ON GRAPHS
NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
1978; 25 (2): 365-367
View details for Web of Science ID A1978FV59900014
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2-PERSON GAMES ON GRAPHS
JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL THEORY SERIES B
1978; 24 (2): 238-241
View details for Web of Science ID A1978EV77300014
- Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game Game Theory and Political Science edited by Ordeshook, P. C. New York University Press, New York. 1978: 463–475
- Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods Journal of Mathematical Economics 1977; 4: 131-137
- A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications edited by Karamardian, S. Academic Press. 1977: 165–180
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EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY OF A 3-PERSON GAME
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
1977; 23 (12): 1336-1348
View details for Web of Science ID A1977DV05200009
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BARGAINING ABILITY, UTILITY OF PLAYING A GAME, AND MODELS OF COALITION FORMATION
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY
1977; 16 (2): 153-160
View details for Web of Science ID A1977EC53000004
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem Mathematics of Operations Research 1977; 2: 64-65
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INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, AND SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1977; 16 (2): 247-251
View details for Web of Science ID A1977EM40500008
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UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR SIMPLE GAMES
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
1977; 16 (2): 481-489
View details for Web of Science ID A1977EM40500022
- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Econometrica 1977; 45: 657-664
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NOTE ON VALUES AND MULTILINEAR EXTENSIONS
NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
1977; 24 (3): 517-520
View details for Web of Science ID A1977ED89900015
- Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games Mathematics of Operations Research 1976; 1: 43-49
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LATTICE FIXED-POINT THEOREM WITH CONSTRAINTS
BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY
1975; 81 (1): 136-138
View details for Web of Science ID A1975V665800019