Academic Appointments


  • Professor, Philosophy

Administrative Appointments


  • Lectureship for Research, UCI (2001 - 2002)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1993 - 1994)
  • Guggenheim Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation (1987 - 1988)
  • Humanities Council Senior Fellow and Old Dominion Fellow, Princeton University (1987 - 1987)
  • President's Research Fellow in the Humanities, University of California (1993 - 1994)
  • Assistant Professor, California State University, Northridge (1964 - 1965)
  • Assistant Professor, University of Delaware (1965 - 1966)
  • Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan (1966 - 1967)
  • Assistant Professor, University of Ilinois, Chicago (1967 - 1968)
  • Associate Professor, University of Ilinois, Chicago (1968 - 1970)
  • Professor, University of Ilinois, Chicago (1970 - 1980)
  • Professor, University of California, Irvine (1980 - 1997)
  • Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine (1997 - Present)
  • UCI Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine (1997 - Present)
  • UCI Distinguished Professor of Social Science, University of California, Irvine (1999 - Present)
  • Logic and Philosophy of Science Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University (2007 - Present)

Honors & Awards


  • Carl Gustav Hempel Award, Philosophy of Science Association (Nov. 2016)
  • Elected Fellow, National Academy of Sciences of the USA (1999)
  • Lakatos Prize, London School of Economics and Political Science (1999)
  • Extraordinarius Award, University of California, Irvine (2011)
  • Synthese Distinguished Paper Award, Synthese (published by Springer) (2010)
  • Paul Silverman Award in Foundations of Ethics, University of California, Irvine (2006)
  • Distinguished Alumnus Award for Excellence, University of Pittsburgh (1986)
  • UCI Distinguished Lectureship for Research, University of California, Irvine (2001-2002)
  • Elected Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science (2004)
  • Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences (1993-94)
  • Guggenheim Fellow, Guggneheim Foundation (1987-88)

Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations


  • President, Philosophy of Science Association (2004 - 2006)
  • President, American Philosophical Association (Pacific) (2000 - 2001)
  • Member, National Academy of Sciences (1999 - Present)
  • Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994 - Present)
  • Member of Governing Board, Western Center of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2000 - 2006)
  • Director, Interdisciplinary Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
  • Member, Governing Board, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science, University of California, Irvine
  • Research Affiliate, Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics, University of California, Irvine
  • Research Affiliate, Symbolic Systems, Stanford University
  • Member of Governing Board, American Philosophical Association (1987 - 1990)
  • Member of Governing Board, American Philosophical Association (1999 - 2002)
  • Member of Governing Board, Philosophy of Science Association (1990 - 1991)
  • Member of Governing Board, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine (1998 - Present)
  • Member of Editorial Board, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • Member of Editorial Board, Erkenntnis
  • Member of Editorial Board, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
  • Member of Editorial Board, American Philosophical Quarterly
  • Member of Editorial Board, Nous
  • Member of Editorial Board, Journal of Logic Language and Information
  • Member of Editorial Board, Theory and Decision
  • Member of Editorial Board, Philosophical Studies
  • Member of Editorial Board, Risk, Decision and Policy
  • Member of Editorial Board, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Member of Editorial Board, Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (Book Series)
  • Member of Editorial Board, Theoria

Professional Education


  • Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy (1964)
  • M.A., University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy (1962)
  • B.A., Lehigh University, Philosophy (1961)
  • B.A., Lehigh University, Economics (1960)

2017-18 Courses


All Publications


  • Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Signaling for a Quorum PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY Pacheco, J. M., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., Skyrms, B. 2015; 11 (2)

    Abstract

    Collective signaling for a quorum is found in a wide range of organisms that face collective action problems whose successful solution requires the participation of some quorum of the individuals present. These range from humans, to social insects, to bacteria. The mechanisms involved, the quorum required, and the size of the group may vary. Here we address the general question of the evolution of collective signaling at a high level of abstraction. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of a population engaging in a signaling N-person game theoretic model. Parameter settings allow for loners and cheaters, and for costly or costless signals. We find a rich dynamics, showing how natural selection, operating on a population of individuals endowed with the simplest strategies, is able to evolve a costly signaling system that allows individuals to respond appropriately to different states of Nature. Signaling robustly promotes cooperative collective action, in particular when coordinated action is most needed and difficult to achieve. Two different signaling systems may emerge depending on Nature's most prevalent states.

    View details for DOI 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101

    View details for Web of Science ID 000352081000042

    View details for PubMedID 25706984

  • Some dynamics of signaling games PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Huttegger, S., Skyrms, B., Tarres, P., Wagner, E. 2014; 111: 10873-10880

    Abstract

    Information transfer is a basic feature of life that includes signaling within and between organisms. Owing to its interactive nature, signaling can be investigated by using game theory. Game theoretic models of signaling have a long tradition in biology, economics, and philosophy. For a long time the analyses of these games has mostly relied on using static equilibrium concepts such as Pareto optimal Nash equilibria or evolutionarily stable strategies. More recently signaling games of various types have been investigated with the help of game dynamics, which includes dynamical models of evolution and individual learning. A dynamical analysis leads to more nuanced conclusions as to the outcomes of signaling interactions. Here we explore different kinds of signaling games that range from interactions without conflicts of interest between the players to interactions where their interests are seriously misaligned. We consider these games within the context of evolutionary dynamics (both infinite and finite population models) and learning dynamics (reinforcement learning). Some results are specific features of a particular dynamical model, whereas others turn out to be quite robust across different models. This suggests that there are certain qualitative aspects that are common to many real-world signaling interactions.

    View details for DOI 10.1073/pnas.1400838111

    View details for Web of Science ID 000339311100015

    View details for PubMedID 25024209

  • Grades of Inductive Skepticism PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 2014; 81 (3): 303-312

    View details for DOI 10.1086/676637

    View details for Web of Science ID 000337746400001

  • Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games ERKENNTNIS Huttegger, S. M., Skyrms, B., Zollman, K. J. 2014; 79: 835-853
  • The core theory of subjunctive conditionals SYNTHESE Skyrms, B. 2013; 190 (5): 923-928
  • Inventing New Signals DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS Alexander, J. M., Skyrms, B., Zabell, S. L. 2012; 2 (1): 129-145
  • Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., Skyrms, B. 2011; 274 (1): 30-35

    Abstract

    A finite-population dynamic evolutionary model is presented, which shows that increasing the individual capacity of sending pre-play signals (without any pre-defined meaning), opens a route for cooperation. The population dynamics leads individuals to discriminate between different signals and react accordingly to the signals received. The proportion of time that the population spends in different states can be calculated analytically. We show that increasing the number of different signals benefits cooperative strategies, illustrating how cooperators may take profit from a diverse signaling portfolio to forecast future behaviors and avoid being cheated by defectors.

    View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.004

    View details for Web of Science ID 000288312400003

    View details for PubMedID 21232542

  • Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms POLITICS PHILOSOPHY & ECONOMICS Skyrms, B., Zollman, K. J. 2010; 9 (3): 265-273
  • Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling SYNTHESE Huttegger, S. M., Skyrms, B., Smead, R., Zollman, K. J. 2010; 172 (1): 177-191
  • Evolution of signalling systems with multiple senders and receivers PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES Skyrms, B. 2009; 364 (1518): 771-779

    Abstract

    Sender-receiver games are simple, tractable models of information transmission. They provide a basic setting for the study the evolution of meaning. It is possible to investigate not only the equilibrium structure of these games but also the dynamics of evolution and learning-with sometimes surprising results. Generalizations of the usual binary game to interactions with multiple senders, multiple receivers or both provide the elements of signalling networks. These can be seen as the loci of information processing, group decisions, and teamwork.

    View details for DOI 10.1098/rstb.2008.0258

    View details for Web of Science ID 000263434200005

    View details for PubMedID 19073482

  • Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model STOCHASTIC PROCESSES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS Argiento, R., Pemantle, R., Skyrms, B., Volkov, S. 2009; 119 (2): 373-390
  • Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., Souza, M. O., Skyrms, B. 2009; 276 (1655): 315-321

    Abstract

    In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N-person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simultaneously. On the other hand, whenever one takes into account that populations are finite and when their size is of the same order of magnitude as the group size, the evolutionary dynamics is profoundly affected: it may ultimately invert the direction of natural selection, compared with the infinite population limit.

    View details for DOI 10.1098/rspb.2008.1126

    View details for Web of Science ID 000262005200016

    View details for PubMedID 18812288

  • Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. Skyrms, B. 2009: 771-779
  • Presidential Address: Signals PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 2008; 75 (5): 489-500
  • Dynamics of conformist bias MONIST Skyrms, B. 2005; 88 (2): 260-269
  • Network formation by reinforcement learning: the long and medium run MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES Pemantle, R., Skyrms, B. 2004; 48 (3): 315-327
  • Time to absorption in discounted reinforcement models STOCHASTIC PROCESSES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS Pemantle, R., Skyrms, B. 2004; 109 (1): 1-12
  • Learning to take turns ERKENNTNIS Vanderschraaf, P., Skyrms, B. 2003; 59 (3): 311-348
  • Signals, evolution and the explanatory power of transient information PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 2002; 69 (3): 407-428
  • A dynamic model of social network formation PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Skyrms, B., Pemantle, R. 2000; 97 (16): 9340-9346

    Abstract

    We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and the network structure emerges as a consequence of the dynamics of the agents' learning behavior. We study this in a variety of game-theoretic conditions and show that the behavior is complex and sometimes dissimilar to behavior in the absence of structural dynamics. We argue that modeling network structure as dynamic increases realism without rendering the problem of analysis intractable.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000088608000103

    View details for PubMedID 10922082

  • Stability and explanatory significance of some simple evolutionary models PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 2000; 67 (1): 94-113
  • Game theory, rationality and evolution of the social contract JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES Skyrms, B. 2000; 7 (1-2): 269-284
  • Adaptive dynamic models and the social contract - Response to commentary discussion JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES Skyrms, B. 2000; 7 (1-2): 335-339
  • Bargaining with neighbors: Is justice contagious? JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Alexander, J., Skyrms, B. 1999; 96 (11): 588-598
  • Precis of 'Evolution of the Social Contract' PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Skyrms, B. 1999; 59 (1): 217-220
  • General Facts Metascience Skyrms, B. 1999; 8: 77-79
  • Salience and symmetry-breaking in the evolution of convention LAW AND PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1998; 17 (4): 411-418
  • Evolution of an Anomaly Protosociology Skyrms, B. 1998; 12: 192-211
  • Introduction to the Nobel Symposium on Game Theory Games and Economic Behavior Skyrms, B. 1995; 8: 3-5
  • STRICT COHERENCE, SIGMA COHERENCE AND THE METAPHYSICS OF QUANTITY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Skyrms, B. 1995; 77 (1): 39-55
  • DARWIN MEETS THE LOGIC OF DECISION - CORRELATION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAME-THEORY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1994; 61 (4): 503-528
  • SEX AND JUSTICE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1994; 91 (6): 305-320
  • A MISTAKE IN DYNAMIC COHERENCE ARGUMENTS - DISCUSSION PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1993; 60 (2): 320-328
  • Logical Atomism and Combinatorial Possibility The Journal of Philosophy Skyrms, B. 1993; 90 (1993): 219-232
  • Deliberational Correlated Equilibria Philosophical Topics Skyrms, B., Vanderschraaf, P. 1993; 21: 191-227
  • Chaos in Game Dynamics Journal of Logic,Language and Information Skyrms, B. 1992; 1: 111-130
  • Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics PSA Skyrms, B. 1992; 2: 374-394
  • Carnapian Inductive Logic for Markov Chains Erkenntnis Skyrms, B. 1991; 35: 439-460
  • Introduction to `Three Theorems of Metaphysics' Synthese Skyrms, B. 1989; 81: 203-205
  • A Primer on Determinism Foundations of Physics Skyrms, B. 1989; 19: 111-113
  • PROBABILITY AND CAUSATION JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS Skyrms, B. 1988; 39 (1-2): 53-68
  • UPDATING, SUPPOSING, AND MAXENT THEORY AND DECISION Skyrms, B. 1987; 22 (3): 225-246
  • DYNAMIC COHERENCE AND PROBABILITY KINEMATICS PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1987; 54 (1): 1-20
  • MAXIMUM-ENTROPY INFERENCE AS A SPECIAL CASE OF CONDITIONALIZATION SYNTHESE Skyrms, B. 1985; 63 (1): 55-74
  • CAUSAL DECISION-THEORY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1982; 79 (11): 695-711
  • COUNTERFACTUAL DEFINITENESS AND LOCAL CAUSATION PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1982; 49 (1): 43-50
  • MATES QUANTIFICATION AND INTENSIONAL LOGIC AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1981; 59 (2): 177-188
  • TRACTARIAN NOMINALISM PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Skyrms, B. 1981; 40 (2): 199-206
  • IMMACULATE CONCEPTION OF MODALITY OR HOW TO CONFUSE USE AND MENTION JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1978; 75 (7): 368-387
  • Resiliency, Propensity and Causal Necessity The Journal of Philosophy Skyrms, B. 1977; LXXIV: 704-713
  • POSSIBLE WORLDS, PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Skyrms, B. 1976; 30 (5): 323-332
  • EXPLICATION OF X KNOWS THAT P JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1967; 64 (12): 373-389
  • Natural Social Contracts Biological Theory Skyrms, B. 2013; 8: 179-184
  • Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust Cooperation and its Evolution Skyrms, B. edited by Calcott, B., Joyce, R., Sterelny, K. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2013: 265–274
  • LEARNING TO SIGNAL WITH PROBE AND ADJUST EPISTEME-A JOURNAL OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY Skyrms, B. 2012; 9 (2): 139-150

    View details for DOI 10.1017/epi.2012.5

    View details for Web of Science ID 000310511600005

  • Rational Decisions (Book Review) BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 2012; 63 (2): 449-453
  • Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract Evolutionary Ethics III Skyrms, B. edited by Levy, N. London: Ashgate. 2010
  • Evolution of Moral Norms Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Biology Skyrms, B., Harns, W. edited by Ruse, M. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008: 434–450
  • The grammar of society (Book Review) MIND Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 2008; 117 (465): 167-170
  • Trust, risk, and the social contract SYNTHESE Skyrms, B. 2008; 160 (1): 21-25
  • Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning Studia Logica Huttegger, S., Skyrms, B. 2008; 89: 237-256
  • Commitment Evolution of the Social Contract in Reasoning: Studies in Human Inference and its Foundations Skyrms, B. edited by Adler, J., Rips, L. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008
  • Dynamic Networks and the Stag Hunt: Some Robustness Considerations Biological Theory Skyrms, B. 2007; 2: 1-3
  • Natural Justice Analyse & Kritik Skyrms, B. 2006; 28: 99-101
  • 'Natural justice' (Book Review) TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 2005: 26-26
  • Bayes or bust?: A critical examination of Bayesian confirmation theory (Book Review) PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Book Review Authored by: Hajek, A., Skyrms, B. 2000; 60 (3): 707-711
  • Convergence to a Signaling System Equilibrium Rationality, Rules and Structure Skyrms, B. edited by Nida-Rumeln, J., Spohn, W. Reidel: Dordrecht. 2000
  • Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume II: Just Playing Economics and Philosophy Skyrms, B. 2000; 16: 167-170
  • Theories of Counterfactual and Subjunctive Conditionals in Contexts of Strategic Interaction Research in Economics Skyrms, B. 1999; 53: 275-291
  • The Logic of Strategy edited by Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., Skyrms, B. Oxford University Press: New York. 1999
  • Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics Analytical Metaphysics Skyrms, B. edited by Tooley, M. New York:Garland. 1999
  • Precis of Evolution of the Social Contract Reply to Critics Skyrms, B. 1999; 59: 243-254
  • Subjunctive conditionals and revealed preference PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1998; 65 (4): 545-574
  • Making choices - A recasting of decision-theory (Book Review) TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1998: 30-30
  • Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions Game Theory, Experience and Rationality Skyrms, B. edited by Leinfellner, W., Kohler, E. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 1998: 161–172
  • Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Skyrms, B. edited by Dalla, M. L., Chiara, K., Mundici, D., van Bentham, J. 1997
  • Rationality and coordination - Bicchieri,C (Book Review) BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1996; 47 (4): 627-629
  • Taking chances - Sobel,JH (Book Review) PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1996; 105 (3): 410-413
  • GAME-THEORY AND THE SOCIAL-CONTRACT - VOLUME 1 - PLAYING FAIR - BINMORE,K (Book Review) ECONOMICA Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1995; 62 (248): 577-578
  • Probability and Conditionals edited by Eells, E., Skyrms, B. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1994
  • Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX Proceedings of the 9th International Congress of Logic Skyrms, B. 1994: 989
  • Adaptive and Inductive Deliberational Dynamics Economics and Cognitive Science Skyrms, B. edited by Bourgine, P., Walliser, B. Pergamon Press: Oxford. 1992: 93–107
  • Adaptive and Inductive Deliberational Dynamics Economics and Cognitive Science Skyrms, B. edited by Bourgie, P., Walliser, B. Pergamon Press: Oxford. 1992: 93–107
  • Adaptive and Inductive Deliberational Dynamics Economics and Cognitive Science Skyrms, B. edited by Bourgie, P., Walliser, B. 1992: 93–107
  • Hypothetico-deductivism is hopeless, Waters’ Relevance Logic brings hope for hypothetico-deductivism and Grimes’ Truth, Content and Hypothetico-deductive method The Journal of Symbolic Logic Skyrms, B. 1992; 57: 756-758
  • Equilibria and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction Skyrms, B. edited by Bicchieri, C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992: 93–106
  • Inductive Deliberation, Admissible Acts, and Perfect Equilibrium Foundations of Decision Theory Skyrms, B. edited by Bacharach, M., Hurley, S. Blackwell: Oxford. 1991: 220–241
  • Theories of Probability A Companion to Epistemology Skyrms, B. edited by Dancy , J., Sosa, E. Basil Blackwell: Oxford. 1991
  • Existence and Explanation edited by Spohn, W., Van Fraassen, B., Skyrms, B. Kluwer: Dordrecht. 1991
  • Deliberation and Games Economics and Artificial Intelligence Skyrms, B. Express-Tirages: Paris. 1990: 159–164
  • Models of Dynamic Deliberation and the Theory of Games Proceedings of the Third Conference (TARK 1990) Skyrms, B. edited by Parikh, R. 1990
  • Einfuhrung in die Inductive Logik Skyrms, B., Translated by Dorn, G. Peter Lang: Basel. 1989
  • Correlated Equilibria and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation Erkenntnis Skyrms, B. 1989; 31: 347-364
  • Deliberational Dynamics and the Foundations of Bayesian Game Theory Epistemology Skyrms, B. edited by Tomberlin, J. E. Ridgeview: Atascadero, California. 1988: 345–367
  • Causation in Decision, Belief Change and Explanation edited by Harper, W., Skyrms, B. Kluwer: Dordrecht. 1988
  • Causation, Chance and Credence edited by Harper, W., Skyrms, B. Kluwer: Dordrecht. 1988
  • Introduction to Probability and Causation Causation,Chance and Credence Skyrms, B. edited by Harper, W. L., Skyrms, B. 1988
  • PROBABILISTIC METAPHYSICS - SUPPES,P (Book Review) PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1987; 96 (3): 447-450
  • On the Principle of Total Evidence with and without Observation Sentences Proceedings of the 11th International Wittgenstein Symposium Skyrms, B. 1987: 187–95
  • Presuppositions of Induction The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism Skyrms, B. edited by Salmon, M. Kluwer: Dordrecht. 1987: 285–319
  • DELIBERATIONAL EQUILIBRIA TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1986; 5 (1): 59-67
  • ULTIMATE AND PROXIMATE CONSEQUENCES IN CAUSAL DECISION-THEORY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1985; 52 (4): 608-611
  • The Logic of Decision 2nd ed. and "Preferences Among Preferences" The Journal of Symbolic Logic Skyrms, B. 1985; 50: 247-48
  • The Foundations of Decision Logic The Journal of Symbolic Logic Skyrms, B. 1983; 48: 502-503
  • Conditional Probabilities, Taxicabs and Martingales The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Skyrms, B. 1981: 331-32
  • The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals IFs Skyrms, B. edited by Harper, W., Stalnaker, R., Pearce, G. A. Reidel:Dordrecht. 1980: 259–265
  • CAUSE, CHANCE AND REASON - BURKS,A (Book Review) THEORY AND DECISION Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1980; 12 (3): 299-309
  • RATIONAL BELIEF SYSTEMS - ELLIS,B (Book Review) AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Book Review Authored by: Skyrms, B. 1980; 58 (1): 65-71
  • Definitions of Semantical Reference and Self-Reference Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Skyrms, B. 1976; XVII: 147-148
  • Physical Laws and the Nature of Philosophical Reduction Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science VI Skyrms, B., Lehrer, K. edited by Feigl, H., Sellars, W. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, Minn. 1975: 496–529
  • Contraposition of the Conditional Philosophical Studies Skyrms, B. 1974; 26: 145-147
  • The Goodman Paradox Readings in Philosophical Analysis Skyrms, B. edited by Heigl, H., Sellar, W., Lehrer, K. Appleton,Century Crofts: N.Y.. 1972
  • Notes on Quantification and Self-Reference The Liar Skyrms, B. edited by Martin, R. Yale University Press: New Haven. 1971: 67–74
  • Return of the Liar: Three Valued Logic and the Nature of Truth American Philosophical Quarterly Skyrms, B. 1970; VII: 153-161
  • A Methodological Problem in the Evaluation of Explanations Nous Rescher, N., Skyrms, B. 1968: 121-129
  • A Neglected Logical Lapse in Reichenbach's Pragmatic Justification of Induction Methodology and Science Skyrms, B. 1968; 1: 155-159
  • A Methodological Problem in the Evaluation of Explanations Nous Richer, N., Skyrms, B. 1968
  • Science and Subjectivity The Journal of Philosophy Skyrms, B. 1968; LXV: 794-799
  • A Methodological Problem in the Evaluation of Explanations Nous Richer, N., Skyrms, B. 1968
  • Comments on Ackerman's `Problems Philosophical Logic Skyrms, B. edited by Davis, J. W., Hockney, D. J., Wilson, W. K. Reidel: Dordrecht. 1968: 155–157
  • SUPERVALUATIONS - IDENTITY, EXISTENCE, AND INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Skyrms, B. 1968; 65 (16): 477-482
  • Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic Skyrms, B. Dickenson: Belmont, California. 1966
  • Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation Philosophy of Science Skyrms, B. 1966; XXXIII: 230-249
  • NECESSITY, THE A PRIORI, AND UNEXPRESSIBLE STATEMENTS PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Skyrms, B., Sosa, E. 1965; 16 (5): 65-74
  • ON FAILING TO VINDICATE INDUCTION PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Skyrms, B. 1965; 32 (3): 253-268
  • Professor Grunbaum and Teleological Mechanisms Philosophy of Science Skyrms, B. 1964; XXXI
  • Falsifiability and the Logic of Experimental Tests Methodos Skyrms, B. 1962; XIV: 1-13