Bio


Mark Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and the Director of the Stanford Program in Law, Science and Technology. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and is affiliated faculty in the Symbolic Systems program. He teaches intellectual property, patent law, trademark law, antitrust, the law of robotics and AI, video game law, and remedies. He is the author of 11 books and 218 articles, including the two-volume treatise IP and Antitrust. His works have been cited more than 300 times by courts, including 19 times by the United States Supreme Court, and more than 40,000 times in books and academic articles, making him the most-cited scholar in IP law and one of the ten most cited legal scholars of all time. He has published 9 of the 100 most-cited law review articles of the last twenty years, more than any other scholar, and is the third most cited legal scholar in the world from 2016-2020. His articles have appeared in 24 of the top 25 law reviews and in top journals in other fields, including Nature Biotechnology, the American Economic Review, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Harvard Business Review, and in multiple peer-reviewed and specialty journals. They have been reprinted throughout the world and translated into Chinese, Danish, Japanese, Korean, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish. He has taught IP law to judges at numerous Federal Judicial Center and ABA programs, has testified eight times before Congress, and has filed more than 70 amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts.

Mark is of counsel at the law firm Lex Lumina. He litigates and counsels clients in all areas of intellectual property, antitrust, and internet law. He has argued 30 federal appellate cases and numerous district court cases as well as before the California Supreme Court. He has participated in more than three dozen cases in the United States Supreme Court as counsel or amici. His client base is diverse and has included Genentech, Dykes on Bikes, video game companies, artists, computer scientists, and nearly every significant Internet company.

Mark cofounded Lex Machina, Inc., a startup company that provides litigation data and analytics to law firms, companies, courts, and policymakers. Lex Machina was acquired by Lexis in December 2015.

Mark has been named California Lawyer’s Attorney of the Year twice. He received the California State Bar’s inaugural IP Vanguard Award. He won the 2018 World Technology Award for Law. In 2017 he received the P.J. Federico Award from the Patent and Trademark Office Society. Back when he was young, he was named a Young Global Leader by the Davos World Economic Forum and Berkeley Law School’s Young Alumnus of the Year. He has been recognized as one of the top 50 litigators in the country under 45 and one of the 25 most influential people in IP by American Lawyer, one of the 100 most influential lawyers in the nation by the National Law Journal, and one of the 10 most admired attorneys in IP by IP360. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Law Institute, and the IP Hall of Fame.

Mark clerked for Judge Dorothy Nelson on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and has practiced law with Brown & Bain, Fish & Richardson, Keker & Van Nest, and Durie Tangri. He has previously taught at Berkeley Law School and the University of Texas School of Law. In his spare time, Mark enjoys cooking, travel, yoga, and video games (at this writing, Zelda: Tears of the Kingdom).

Program Affiliations


  • Public Policy
  • Symbolic Systems Program

Current Research and Scholarly Interests


intellectual property, Internet, and antitrust law; law and AI/robotics

2023-24 Courses


Stanford Advisees


  • Doctoral Dissertation Advisor (AC)
    Yutang Hsiao

All Publications


  • Illegal interlocks among life science company boards of directors. Journal of law and the biosciences Manjunath, A., Kahrobai, N., Lemley, M. A., Kumar, I. 2024; 11 (1): lsae005

    Abstract

    Competition between life science companies is critical to ensure innovative therapies are efficiently developed. Anticompetitive behavior may harm scientific progress and, ultimately, patients. One well-established category of anticompetitive behavior is the 'interlocking directorate'. It is illegal for companies' directors to 'interlock' by also serving on the boards of competitors. We evaluated overlaps in the board membership of 2,241 public life science companies since 2000. We show that a robust network of interlocking companies is present among these firms. At any given time, 10-20 percent of board members are interlocked; the number of interlocks has more than doubled in the last two decades. Over half of these interlocked firms report over $5 million in historical revenue, exceeding a legal threshold that makes an interlocking directorate a violation of antitrust law. Those interlocks are only illegal if the companies compete, even in part. Using the disease categories for which companies have sponsored clinical trials, we discover that a few markets are responsible for a large fraction of interlocks. We show that in dozens of cases, companies share directors with the very firms they identify as their biggest competitive threats. We provide a data-driven roadmap for policymakers, regulators, and companies to further investigate the contribution of anticompetitive behavior to increased healthcare costs and to enforce the law against illegal interlocks between firms.

    View details for DOI 10.1093/jlb/lsae005

    View details for PubMedID 38623556

    View details for PubMedCentralID PMC11017978

  • THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO CUSTOMIZE? BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Mazzurco, S. 2023; 103 (2): 385-473
  • Trademark Spaces and Trademark Law's Secret Step Zero STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Mckenna, M. P. 2023; 75 (1): 1-70
  • THE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2023: 237-286
  • Trademark Spaces and Trademark Law's Secret Step Zero STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Mckenna, M. P. 2023; 75 (1): 1-70
  • Editorial: Scarcity, regulation, and the abundance society. Frontiers in research metrics and analytics Desai, D. R., Lemley, M. A. 2022; 7: 1104460

    View details for DOI 10.3389/frma.2022.1104460

    View details for PubMedID 36778157

  • Interfaces and Interoperability After Google v. Oracle TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Samuelson, P. 2021; 100 (1): 1-54
  • DISAPPEARING CONTENT BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2021; 101 (4): 1255-1288
  • Does Alice Target Patent Trolls? JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES Lemley, M. A., Zyontz, S. 2021

    View details for DOI 10.1111/jels.12275

    View details for Web of Science ID 000629285800001

  • THE SPLINTERNET DUKE LAW JOURNAL Lemley, M. A. 2021; 70 (6): 1297–1327
  • Abandoning Trade Secrets STANFORD LAW REVIEW Hrdy, C. A., Lemley, M. A. 2021; 73 (10): 1–66
  • Chief Justice Webster IOWA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2020; 106 (1): 299–323
  • THE MEDICARE INNOVATION SUBSIDY NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Ouellette, L., Sachs, R. E. 2020; 95 (1): 75–129
  • WITHOUT PREAMBLE BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2020; 100 (2): 357–88
  • Playing Both Sides? Branded Sales, Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL Carrier, M. A., Lemley, M. A., Miller, S. 2020; 71 (2): 307–58
  • YOU MIGHT BE A ROBOT CORNELL LAW REVIEW Casey, B., Lemley, M. A. 2020; 105 (2): 287–361
  • UNFAIR DISRUPTION BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., McKenna, M. P. 2020; 100 (1): 71–131
  • Pledging intellectual property for COVID-19. Nature biotechnology Contreras, J. L., Eisen, M. n., Ganz, A. n., Lemley, M. n., Molloy, J. n., Peters, D. M., Tietze, F. n. 2020; 38 (10): 1146–49

    View details for DOI 10.1038/s41587-020-0682-1

    View details for PubMedID 33020626

  • Remedies for Robots UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Casey, B. 2019; 86 (5): 1311–96
  • THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (Book Review) MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Book Review Authored by: Lemley, M. A. 2019; 117 (6): 1153–78
  • The Patent Enforcement Iceberg TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Richardson, K., Oliver, E. 2019; 97 (4): 801–33
  • HOW ESSENTIAL ARE STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS? CORNELL LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Simcoe, T. 2019; 104 (2): 607–42
  • The Sound and Fury of Patent Activity MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW Feldman, R. C., Lemley, M. A. 2019; 103 (4): 1793–1877
  • INTELLIGENT DESIGN DUKE LAW JOURNAL Buccafusco, C., Lemley, M. A., Masur, J. S. 2018; 68 (1): 75–139
  • LAW, VIRTUAL REALITY, AND AUGMENTED REALITY UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Volokh, E. 2018; 166 (5): 1051–1138
  • Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing? VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW Gugliuzza, P. R., Lemley, M. A. 2018; 71 (3): 765–820
  • IS PATENT ENFORCEMENT EFFICIENT? BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Feldman, R. 2018; 98 (2): 649–67
  • FUNCTIONALITY SCREENS VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW Buccafusco, C., Lemley, M. A. 2017; 103 (7): 1293–1378
  • Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND HIGH TECH Lemley, M. A., McKenna, M. P., Blair, R. D., Sokol, D. D. 2017: 183–203
  • Patent Licensing, Technology Transfer, and Innovation AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Feldman, R. 2016; 106 (5): 188-192
  • READY FOR PATENTING BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2016; 96 (3): 1171-1195
  • If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em? How Sitting by Designation Affects Judicial Behavior TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Miller, S. P. 2016; 94 (3): 451-484
  • Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation? IOWA LAW REVIEW Feldman, R., Lemley, M. A. 2015; 101 (1): 137-189
  • Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick IOWA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Leslie, C. R. 2015; 100 (5): 2115-2133
  • Our Divided Patent System UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A., Schwartz, D. L. 2015; 82 (3): 1073-1154
  • Faith-Based Intellectual Property UCLA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2015; 62 (5): 1328-1346
  • IP IN A WORLD WITHOUT SCARCITY NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2015; 90 (2): 460-515
  • Does "Public Use" Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year? TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2015; 93 (5): 1119-1136
  • ANTITRUST ARBITRATION AND MERGER APPROVAL NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Leslie, C. R. 2015; 110 (1): 1-62
  • Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation TEXAS LAW REVIEW Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A., Schwartz, D. L. 2014; 92 (7): 1769-1801
  • DOES FAMILIARITY BREED CONTEMPT AMONG JUDGES DECIDING PATENT CASES? STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Li, S., Urban, J. M. 2014; 66 (5): 1121-1157
  • THE AUDIENCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Fromer, J. C., Lemley, M. A. 2014; 112 (7): 1251-1304
  • WHY DO JURIES DECIDE IF PATENTS ARE VALID? VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2013; 99 (8): 1673-1736
  • MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TROLLS COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Melamed, A. D. 2013; 113 (8): 2117-2190
  • Do applicant patent citations matter? RESEARCH POLICY Cotropia, C. A., Lemley, M. A., Sampat, B. 2013; 42 (4): 844-854
  • SOFTWARE PATENTS AND THE RETURN OF FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2013: 905-964
  • The Fractioning of Patent Law Symposium on the Connection between Intellectual Property and the Common Law Lemley, M. A. CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. 2013: 504–513
  • THE REGULATORY TURN IN IP HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY Lemley, M. A. 2013; 36 (1): 109-115
  • PATENT HOLDUP, THE ITC, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST CORNELL LAW REVIEW Chien, C. V., Lemley, M. A. 2012; 98 (1): 1-45
  • EXAMINER CHARACTERISTICS AND PATENT OFFICE OUTCOMES REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Lemley, M. A., Sampat, B. 2012; 94 (3): 817-827
  • Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL Lemley, M. A., McKenna, M. P. 2012; 100 (6): 2055-2117
  • Contracting Around Liability Rules CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2012; 100 (2): 463-486
  • THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTOR MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2012; 110 (5): 709-760
  • POINT OF NOVELTY NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2011; 105 (3): 1253-1280
  • LIFE AFTER BILSKI STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Risch, M., Sichelman, T., Wagner, R. P. 2011; 63 (6): 1315-1347
  • Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A., Walker, J. 2011; 99 (3): 677-712
  • Who Chooses Open-Source Software? UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Shafir, Z. 2011; 78 (1): 139-164
  • EARNING EXCLUSIVITY: GENERIC DRUG INCENTIVES AND THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL Hemphill, C. S., Lemley, M. A. 2011; 77 (3): 947-989
  • The surprising virtues of treating trade secrets as IP rights Workshop on Trade Secrecy/Conference of the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy Lemley, M. A. EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING LTD. 2011: 109–139
  • OWNING MARK(ET)S MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., McKenna, M. P. 2010; 109 (2): 137-189
  • OUR BIZARRE SYSTEM FOR PROVING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT JOURNAL OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA Lemley, M. A. 2010; 57 (4): 719-742
  • IRRELEVANT CONFUSION STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., McKenna, M. 2010; 62 (2): 413-454
  • EXTREME VALUE OR TROLLS ON TOP? THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOST-LITIGATED PATENTS UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A., Walker, J. 2009; 158 (1): 1-37
  • FENCE POSTS OR SIGN POSTS? RETHINKING PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW Burk, D. L., Lemley, M. A. 2009; 157 (6): 1743-1799
  • Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming TEXAS LAW REVIEW Dogan, S. L., Lemley, M. A. 2009; 87 (4): 685-729
  • THE SURPRISING VIRTUES OF TREATING TRADE SECRETS AS IP RIGHTS STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2008; 61 (2): 311-353
  • Categorical analysis in antitrust jurisprudence IOWA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Leslie, C. R. 2008; 93 (4): 1207-1270
  • Rethinking patent law's presumption of validity STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lichtman, D., Lemley, M. A. 2007; 60 (1): 45-72
  • Grounding trademark law through trademark use IOWA LAW REVIEW Dogan, S. L., Lemley, M. A. 2007; 92 (5): 1669-1701
  • Patent holdup and royalty stacking TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Shapiro, C. 2007; 85 (7): 1991-2049
  • Should patent infringement require proof of copying? MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2007; 105 (7): 1525-1536
  • Should property or liability rules govern information? TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Weiser, P. J. 2007; 85 (4): 783-841
  • The (unnoticed) demise of the doctrine of equivalents STANFORD LAW REVIEW Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A. 2007; 59 (4): 955-984
  • Terms of use MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2006; 91 (2): 459-483
  • UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO LICENSE JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS Hovenkamp, H., Janis, M. D., Lemley, M. A. 2006; 2 (1): 1-42
  • What the right of publicity can learn from trademark law STANFORD LAW REVIEW Dogan, S. L., Lemley, M. A. 2006; 58 (4): 1161-1220
  • Patenting nanotechnology STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2005; 58 (2): 601-630

    Abstract

    Universities and companies are rushing to the patent office in record numbers to patent nanotechnology inventions. This rush to the patent office is so significant that many law firms have established nanotechnology practice groups and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has now created a new technology class designed to track nanotechnology products. Three big differences between the emerging science of nanotechnology and other inventions make the role of patents more significant in this arena than elsewhere. First, this is almost the first new field in a century in which the basic ideas are being patented at the outset. In many of the most important fields of invention over the past century--computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology--the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented or the patents were made available to all users by government regulation. In others, patents were delayed by interferences for so long that the industry developed free from their influence. In nanotechnology, by contrast, companies and universities alike are patenting early and often. A second factor distinguishing nanotechnology is its unique cross-industry structure. Unlike other new industries, in which the patentees are largely actual or at least potential participants in the market, a significant number of nanotechnology patentees will own rights not just in the industry in which they participate, but in other industries as well. This overlap may significantly affect their incentives to license the patents. Finally, a large number of the basic nanotechnology patents have been issued to universities, which have become far more active in patenting in the last twenty-five years. While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk. Whether it will prove a problem in practice depends in large part on how efficient the licensing market turns out to be.

    View details for Web of Science ID 000234233000005

    View details for PubMedID 16395838

  • Probabilistic patents JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Lemley, M. A., Shapiro, C. 2005; 19 (2): 75-98
  • Property, intellectual property, and free riding TEXAS LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A. 2005; 83 (4): 1031-1075
  • Reducing digital copyright infringement without restricting innovation STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Reese, R. A. 2004; 56 (6): 1345-1434
  • Valuable patents GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A., Moore, K. A., Trunkey, R. D. 2004; 92 (3): 435-479
  • Balancing ease and accuracy in assessing pharmaceutical exclusion payments MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HOVENKAMP, H., Janis, M. D., Lemley, M. A. 2004; 88 (3): 712-721
  • Ending abuse of patent continuations BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Moore, K. A. 2004; 84 (1): 63-?
  • Policy levers in patent law VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW Burk, D. L., Lemley, M. A. 2003; 89 (7): 1575-1696
  • Are the US patent priority rules really necessary? HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL Lemley, M. A., Chien, C. V. 2003; 54 (5): 1299-1333
  • Anticompetitive settlement of intellectual property disputes MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HOVENKAMP, H., Janis, M., Lemley, M. A. 2003; 87 (6): 1719-1766
  • Biotechnology's uncertainty principle PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT Burk, D. L., Lemley, M. A. 2003; 50: 305-353

    View details for Web of Science ID 000237631600016

    View details for PubMedID 14714698

  • The growing complexity of the United States patent system BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A. 2002; 82 (1): 77-144
  • The end of end-to-end: Preserving the architecture of the Internet in the broadband era UCLA LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., Lessig, L. 2001; 48 (4): 925-972
  • Who's patenting what? An empirical exploration of patent prosecution Conference on Taking Stock: the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property Rights Allison, J. R., Lemley, M. A. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW. 2000: 2099–2174
  • Private property Conference on Cyberspace and Privacy - A New Legal Paradigm Lemley, M. A. STANFORD UNIV, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL. 2000: 1545–57
  • Encouraging software reuse STANFORD LAW REVIEW Lemley, M. A., OBRIEN, D. W. 1997; 49 (2): 255-304