Jonathan Levin
President and Bing Presidential Professor, Holbrook Working Professor of Price Theory at the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Economics
Web page: http://president.stanford.edu
Bio
Jonathan Levin, a distinguished economist and academic leader, became Stanford University president on August 1, 2024. Previously, he was the Philip H. Knight Professor and Dean of the Stanford University Graduate School of Business. Levin is widely recognized for his scholarship in microeconomics and industrial organization. He received the John Bates Clark Medal as the outstanding American economist under the age of 40. He currently serves as a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.
Academic Appointments
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Professor, Economics
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Administrative Appointments
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Dean, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (2016 - 2024)
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Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (2013 - 2013)
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Holbrook Working Professor of Price Theory, Stanford University (2012 - Present)
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Chair of the Department of Economics, Stanford University (2011 - 2014)
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Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2009 - Present)
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Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (2008 - Present)
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Fellow, Econometric Society (2008 - 2008)
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Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2007 - 2008)
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Associate Professor, Stanford University (2005 - 2008)
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Faculty Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (2004 - 2009)
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Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research (2004 - 2008)
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Research Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (2004 - 2006)
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National Fellowship, Hoover Institution (2002 - 2003)
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Assistant Professor, Stanford University (2000 - 2005)
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Post-Doctoral Fellowship, Cowles Foundation (1999 - 2000)
Honors & Awards
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Young Global Leader, World Economic Forum (2012)
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John Bates Clark Medal, American Economic Association (2011)
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Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Stanford (2005)
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Department of Economics Teaching Prize, Stanford (2004)
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George Webb Medley Thesis Prize, Oxford (1996)
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George Webb Medley Exam Prize, Oxford (1996)
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Winston Churchill Scholarship, English Speaking Union (1994-1996)
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President's Award for Academic Performance, Stanford (1991)
Boards, Advisory Committees, Professional Organizations
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President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Stanford University (2021 - Present)
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Trustee, Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (2020 - Present)
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Member, Council of the Econometric Society (2013 - 2015)
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Member, Executive Committee, American Economic Association (2013 - 2015)
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Executive Committee Member, Public Policy Program, Stanford University (2011 - 2014)
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Member, Appointment and Promotions Committee, Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University (2011 - 2014)
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Associate Editor, Econometrica (2011 - 2013)
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Member, Provost's Diversity Cabinet, Stanford University (2010 - 2011)
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Member, Sloan Foundation Fellowship Committee (2009 - 2014)
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Member, Advisory Board of econjobmarket.org (2009 - 2013)
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Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics (2009 - 2011)
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Member, Working Group on Health Information Technology (2009 - 2010)
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Member, Toulouse Network on Information Technology (2008 - 2019)
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Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies (2008 - 2011)
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Graduate Placement Officer, Stanford University (2008 - 2009)
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Member, Committee on Undergraduate Admission and Financial Aid, Stanford University (2007 - 2013)
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Editorial Board, Journal of Economic Literature (2006 - 2009)
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Associate Editor, American Economic Review (2005 - 2014)
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Associate Editor, Rand Journal of Economics (2005 - 2011)
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Member, Phi Beta Kappa (1993 - 1993)
Program Affiliations
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Public Policy
Professional Education
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Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Economics (1999)
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M.Phil., Oxford University, Economics (1996)
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B.S., Stanford University, Mathematics (1994)
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B.A, Stanford University, English (1994)
2024-25 Courses
- Industrial Organization Seminar
ECON 355 (Aut, Win) -
Independent Studies (8)
- Directed Reading
ECON 139D (Spr) - Directed Reading
ECON 239D (Spr) - Doctoral Practicum in Research
MGTECON 699 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Doctoral Practicum in Teaching
MGTECON 698 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Honors Thesis Research
ECON 199D (Spr) - Individual Research
GSBGEN 390 (Aut, Win, Spr) - PhD Directed Reading
ACCT 691, FINANCE 691, MGTECON 691, MKTG 691, OB 691, OIT 691, POLECON 691 (Aut, Win, Spr, Sum) - Practical Training
ECON 299 (Spr)
- Directed Reading
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Prior Year Courses
2023-24 Courses
- Industrial Organization Seminar
ECON 355 (Win)
2022-23 Courses
- Industrial Organization Workshop
ECON 355 (Win)
2021-22 Courses
- Industrial Organization Workshop
ECON 355 (Aut, Win)
- Industrial Organization Seminar
All Publications
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The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2013; 44 (2): 249-274
View details for DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12019
View details for Web of Science ID 000320557300004
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Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
2013; 5 (1): 1-27
View details for DOI 10.1257/mic.5.1.1
View details for Web of Science ID 000314063400001
- The Economics of Internet Markets Advances in Economics and Econometrics edited by Acemoglu, D., Arellano, M., Dekel, E. Cambridge University Press. 2013
- Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships The Economics of Worker Cooperatives edited by Pencavel, J. Edward Elgar. 2013
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Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2012; 102 (7): 3214-3248
Abstract
Premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs, either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated. This creates inefficiencies when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers. We find a welfare loss of 2-11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating. Only about one-quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels. We also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums, finding only a modest welfare cost.
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.102.7.3214
View details for Web of Science ID 000312093000004
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Amy Finkelstein: 2012 John Bates Clark Medalist
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2012; 26 (4): 171-184
View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.26.4.171
View details for Web of Science ID 000310776500009
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Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets
ECONOMETRICA
2012; 80 (4): 1387-1432
View details for DOI 10.3982/ECTA7677
View details for Web of Science ID 000306761800002
- Vertical Integration and Market Structure Handbook of Organizational Economics edited by Gibbons, R., Roberts, D. J. Princeton University Press. 2012
- Empirical Industrial Organization Voprosy Economiki 2012
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COMPARING OPEN AND SEALED BID AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM TIMBER AUCTIONS
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2011; 126 (1): 207-257
View details for DOI 10.1093/qje/qjq001
View details for Web of Science ID 000289627300005
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Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2010; 100 (5): 2125-2156
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.100.5.2125
View details for Web of Science ID 000285141700007
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CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM US CITIES
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
2010; 58 (3): 507-541
View details for Web of Science ID 000281658000002
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Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design
122nd Annual Meeting of the American-Economics-Association
AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. 2010: 603–7
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.100.2.603
View details for Web of Science ID 000278389300116
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Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
2010; 24 (2): 145-162
View details for DOI 10.1257/jep.24.2.145
View details for Web of Science ID 000278981600010
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Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 2
2010; 2: 311-336
View details for DOI 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254
View details for Web of Science ID 000290636900012
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Toward a 21st-Century Health Care System: Recommendations for Health Care Reform
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
2009; 150 (7): 493-?
Abstract
The coverage, cost, and quality problems of the U.S. health care system are evident. Sustainable health care reform must go beyond financing expanded access to care to substantially changing the organization and delivery of care. The FRESH-Thinking Project (www.fresh-thinking.org) held a series of workshops during which physicians, health policy experts, health insurance executives, business leaders, hospital administrators, economists, and others who represent diverse perspectives came together. This group agreed that the following 8 recommendations are fundamental to successful reform: 1. Replace the current fee-for-service payment system with a payment system that encourages and rewards innovation in the efficient delivery of quality care. The new payment system should invest in the development of outcome measures to guide payment. 2. Establish a securely funded, independent agency to sponsor and evaluate research on the comparative effectiveness of drugs, devices, and other medical interventions. 3. Simplify and rationalize federal and state laws and regulations to facilitate organizational innovation, support care coordination, and streamline financial and administrative functions. 4. Develop a health information technology infrastructure with national standards of interoperability to promote data exchange. 5. Create a national health database with the participation of all payers, delivery systems, and others who own health care data. Agree on methods to make de-identified information from this database on clinical interventions, patient outcomes, and costs available to researchers. 6. Identify revenue sources, including a cap on the tax exclusion of employer-based health insurance, to subsidize health care coverage with the goal of insuring all Americans. 7. Create state or regional insurance exchanges to pool risk, so that Americans without access to employer-based or other group insurance could obtain a standard benefits package through these exchanges. Employers should also be allowed to participate in these exchanges for their employees' coverage. 8. Create a health coverage board with broad stakeholder representation to determine and periodically update the affordable standard benefit package available through state or regional insurance exchanges.
View details for Web of Science ID 000265117600008
View details for PubMedID 19258550
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Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2009; 99 (1): 49-84
View details for DOI 10.1257/aer.99.1.49
View details for Web of Science ID 000264785500003
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The Dynamics of Collective Reputation
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
2009; 9 (1)
View details for Web of Science ID 000269470100001
- Relational Incentive Contracts The Economics of Contracts edited by Bolton, P. Edward Elgar. 2008
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Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition
ECONOMETRICA
2007; 75 (5): 1331-1370
View details for Web of Science ID 000248850600003
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Matching and price competition
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2006; 96 (3): 652-668
View details for Web of Science ID 000238567400009
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Profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2005; 120 (1): 131-171
View details for Web of Science ID 000227607200004
- Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions Empirical Industrial Organization edited by Joskow, P., Waterson, M. Edward Elgar. 2004
- An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes Readings in Public Choice Economics edited by Heckelman, J. University of Michigan Press. 2004
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Relational incentive contracts
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
2003; 93 (3): 835-857
View details for Web of Science ID 000183799900017
- Patent Oppositions Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz edited by Arnott, R., Greenwald, B., Kanbur, R., Nalebuff, B. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2003
- Patent Oppositions Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy edited by Cohen, W., Merill, S. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press. 2003: 120–141
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Multilateral contracting and the employment relationship
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2002; 117 (3): 1075-1103
View details for Web of Science ID 000177398100009
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Information and competition in US forest service timber auctions
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
2001; 109 (2): 375-417
View details for Web of Science ID 000167576100007
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Information and the market for lemons
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
2001; 32 (4): 657-666
View details for Web of Science ID 000173670900004
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An optimal auction for complements
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
1997; 18 (2): 176-192
View details for Web of Science ID A1997WK50200003
- An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes Essays in Microeconomic Theory edited by Manna, M. L. London: The Dryden Press. 1997: 467–489
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AN INTRODUCTION TO VOTE-COUNTING SCHEMES
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
1995; 9 (1): 3-26
View details for Web of Science ID A1995QM20500001